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A HISTORY OF FRANCE

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A HISTORY OF FRANCE

BY
J. R. MORETON MACDONALD, M.A.

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IN THREE VOLUMES

VOLUME I
WITH FIVE MAPS

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Vol. 1

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A history of France.



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INTRODUCTION

THIS book was in the press before anyone dreamt that we should be standing beside our traditional enemy on the very battlefields where we have so often confronted her. No alterations have been made to meet the new conditions: history can never be wholly free from bias, but a history of France written or revised during such a crisis as the present would be so biassed as to lose its value. I may, however, be allowed to say how conscious I am that I have overstated the temperamental characteristics, and in particular the temperamental weaknesses, of the French. The truly remarkable way in which, under the present trial, France has purified herself of her traditional vices and developed virtues which were supposed to be quite alien to her character drives one to the conclusion, not only that the temperamental qualities of nations change more rapidly than we have been accustomed to think, but also that they are often only qualities which have been foisted on nations by noisy minorities.

Two things seem to me to constitute the difficulty and the interest of French history—the lack of the historical sense in her people, and the adamant strength of her nationality. Frenchmen live by instinct rather than by tradition and the range of their political vision is short. The consequence is that they have always been ready to break with the past, and this peculiarity accounts for a certain lack of sequence in French history and for much

that, to the English mind, nurtured as it is on tradition, is difficult to comprehend.

It is no doubt partly due to this lack of the historical sense that France is of all the European nations the most truly national, for the sense of nationality is based on instinct rather than on tradition or reason. Whether this intensity of the national sense is due to the impress made by Rome on the most ductile material that ever came to her hand or whether it may be traced to causes more intricate and more profound, it is, happily, not the task of the historian to decide. The fact remains that a nation which has survived a revolution such as that of 1789 and catastrophes such as those of Napoleon I and Napoleon III is indestructible. That word has of late been much on the lips of her statesmen; it expresses a truth more profound than they are perhaps aware of.


And, if she is supreme in her indestructibility as a nation, France is also supreme in intellect, supreme in power of expression, in the art of living and the domestic qualities, supreme beyond all question in matters of taste: her grandeur in the present hour of trial is the best evidence of her vitality and the happiest omen for her future: a nation surely worthy to lead, though not to dominate, the new Europe which will arise from the present conflagration.

A work of this kind is bound to carry with it a pleasant load of acknowledgeable debt. I have to thank my old friend and tutor, Mr. C. R. L. Fletcher, for much fierce criticism and a searching revision of the proofs; without his encouragement and advice I doubt if the book would have been completed. In another direction I owe as much to my sister-in-law, Mrs. Hugh Willan, for her constant help in the spade-work which such a book as this entails: what I owe to her admirable sense of order and method it would be difficult to say: the

verification of the references and the compilation of the index were largely her work. Sir Foster Cunliffe placed his wide knowledge of military history and his keen literary judgment unreservedly at my disposal: any merit that attaches to my narrative of the Napoleonic and Franco-German Wars is due to him, while such errors of literary taste as remain do so in spite of his protests. I have to thank Professor Oman and Professor R. L. Poole for courteous help on specific points, and Miss Maude Harding for assistance in drafting the maps. I also desire to acknowledge the unfailing courtesy of the staff of the London Library and in particular that of Mr. Boddy, the Reading Room Assistant.

J. R. MORETON MACDONALD

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


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GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

THE great history of France recently completed by many eminent writers under the editorship of Lavissee practically supersedes all the earlier general histories. There are exhaustive bibliographies for each heading and sub-heading. Unfortunately the history is only carried as far as 1789. No history, however, can quite supersede the brilliant volumes of Michelet, "the Macaulay of French historians," while Henri Martin's history retains considerable value.

Of English works Dean Kitchin's lively history is still valuable in spite of its forty years. It, also, stops at 1789. Mention must be made of Mr. Hassall's edition of Jervis' "Student's France," also of his "French People" in the "Great Peoples" series. Mr. Cecil Headlam's recently published "History of France," in the "Story of the Nations" series, is packed with information in a very compressed form.

There are many works, the interest of which is not confined to any one period, a few of which must be mentioned here :—

FOR SOURCES.

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Fagniez, G. "Documents relatifs à l'histoire de l'industrie et du commerce de la France" (1898-1900). A work of great importance.

Delisle, L. "Étude sur la condition de la classe agricole en Normandie au moyen âge" (1851). A work of more than local importance by a great mediaevalist.

The first volume of Hanotaux's unfinished "Histoire de Richelieu" (1893-1903), which has been justly described by Mr. Gooch as "a masterpiece of descriptive sociology," has an interest which is not confined to the period of Richelieu.

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All the publications of the Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes, the Société de l'Histoire de France and the Société de l'Histoire de Paris are from the hands of eminent scholars. The *Revue historique* (founded in 1876) and the *Revue des questions historiques* are full of valuable articles.

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au moyen âge

A HISTORY OF FRANCE

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

IT has been maintained with much force that geographical and climatic have more influence than ethnological conditions upon the development of nations. It is at any rate reasonable to assume that their influence is considerable, and it is natural to study the reservoir before examining its contents.

The "France" of the first human inhabitants must be imagined as physically very different from the beautiful country which is familiar to us. The chief difference would be due to the extent of the dense forests which covered the greater part of the land.¹ In their untamed state, as explorers know, forests are the greatest obstacle to human progress and intercommunion, and we may safely assume that the forests were a chief factor in the disunion which prevailed amongst the earliest inhabitants of Western Europe. The network of rivers also with which France is covered, though in the end destined to become an invaluable aid to civilization, must in the earliest age of all have had a sundering influence. While navigation was practically unknown and bridges did not extend beyond the span of a single tree, a river, so far from being a means of communication, was simply a paralysing obstacle. The earliest inhabitants avoided as far as possible both rivers and forests, and clung to the ridges and the clearings, where there was a dry footing and a degree of security. Primitive man no doubt "hugged his chains," and deplored the clearing

¹ Maury, "*Les forêts de la Gaule*" (1867).

of the forests as injurious to his hunting, and the improvement in navigation as destructive to his fishing.

But however much we may sympathize with these conservative and sporting instincts, we must not approach our subject from the standpoint of the savage. Rather we must try and consider "France" as the potential home of a civilized population. Had she amidst the intricacies of her rivers and beneath her covering of forests a latent geographical unity? Undoubtedly she had. It needs little imagination to see the national destiny of the three contiguous river-systems of the Seine, the Loire, and the Garonne. The great plain or low country which slopes north-east, north-west, west and south-west to the Channel and the Atlantic Ocean, and is watered by these rivers and their tributaries, has an undeniable geographical "personality". But for the accident of the Channel indeed France and England would have been geologically and geographically continuous, and the close resemblance which Normandy and Brittany bear to the southern English counties strikes the most casual traveller. But the Channel asserted itself and forbade the union of the two countries, marked off for France those three great river basins which are the core and heart of her nationality, and left her to carve out for herself from the continent of Europe whatever more was politically necessary for her security. It is when we come to this eastward and south-eastward frontier that we lose the sense of unity, and exchange the geographically inevitable for the politically essential. The Rhône valley and the Mediterranean sea-board, and to a less extent the long-disputed lands between the Meuse and Rhine, give to France that violence of contrast which has been the theme of so many writers. The Saône-Rhône valley, that deep vertical thrust into the waist of Europe, at once provokes comparison with the more essentially French rivers. The Rhône is straight, rapid, and turbid, whereas the typical French river is slow, meandering, and clear; it is longitudinal, the typical French river is in the main latitudinal; the Rhône has feeding streams, but it has no great fan of tributaries like those of the Seine, the Loire, and the Garonne; the Rhône, in fine, is a political river while the typical French

river is domestic. Again the dweller in Provence might well feel himself far-sundered from the dweller in say la Beauce ; for the Mediterranean sea-board has more affinity with Italy than with the rest of France. As for the Rhinelands, they are as essentially continental as Western France is oceanic in character. Geologically too the whole Alpine region (everything east of the Rhône) belongs to a later formation than the rest of France.

The introduction of these alien elements, eastward and continental, and southward and Mediterranean, complicated and confused the mission of France and had marked consequences in her history. It gave her in the first place a continental as well as a national mission. The Rhône-Saône valley was early found to be the most convenient trade route to the North Sea from the Mediterranean, and the centre of gravity of France was drawn out of its true place. Glance down the third, fourth, and fifth parallels and it is apparent how all the places important in the early periods of civilization clung round this great artery :—Lyons, the Roman capital, Arles, Beaucaire, Châlons, Dijon, the great markets, Reims, the sacred city, and Aachen and Laon, the capitals of the Carolings. So long as this distribution lasted France might be said to have failed to attain her national centre of gravity, a fact which we shall have to bear in mind when we come to treat of the anti-national character of the Caroling Empire. The substitution of the Capetians for the Carolings restored the equilibrium. The idea of France as a European thoroughfare and mart gave way to that of France as a self-sufficing nation ; the Seine conquered the Rhône ; but it might still be argued that even in this settlement the influence of the Rhône drew France from her true centre of gravity, and that Orleans or Bourges rather than Paris might have been the true national capital. That these cities are the defensive centre of France was proved in the Hundred Years and Franco-Prussian Wars.¹

But the Rhône had other effects besides these on the destiny of France. It brought to Gaul the great intellectual

¹ Hanotaux, G., "l'Énergie Française" (1902), p. 23.

influences which were to impress themselves on every phase of the national life and character. It was mainly the Rhône that attracted first the Greeks and Phœnicians and afterwards the Romans to Gaul. If therefore the other rivers fed the body, the Rhône may be said to have fed the spirit and intellect of France. And long after Rome had fallen the importance of this southern aspect, of the contact with the Alps and the Mediterranean, continued; through it France became essentially the crusading country; through it she came at a later time to have a special share in the revival of learning in Italy; through it she has ever been the connecting link between the genius of the Mediterranean and the genius of the north; through it also she has ever been drawn towards trade as opposed to industry.

Yet it is easy to exaggerate the importance of these contrasts of climate and soil. The dominant characteristic of France is not the violence of contrast so much as the subtle modulations which draw all into an harmonious whole to make what may be called a climatic symphony. This delicate harmony is chiefly observable in the north and west, in the Seine, Loire, and Garonne basins, which have been described as the core of France. Eastward of the Seine there is a flavour of central Europe. The winter rigours are considerable, while at the same time the sunny autumns ripen the grape. In Brittany on the other hand, and the bulk of Normandy, the climate is of the true oceanic type—humid and precocious. The Île de France provides the link between the two. As we go west we quickly discover that France is not only oceanic, but that she belongs to two oceans and enjoys the climates peculiar to each. The damp fog peculiar to the North Atlantic and English Channel soon gives way to the clear air and sunshine of the Gulf of Gascony. These favourable conditions prevail far up the river valleys. Nowhere in Europe does the south penetrate so far north, with this additional advantage that it is a south modified by northern influences.

To make the harmony complete France is conspicuously a country of easy communications. Without these, diversity, however finely graduated, might have had centrifugal tenden-

cies, and pending the full utilization thereof it is probable that the disunity of feudalism was encouraged by the local diversities of climate and soil; but the integrating forces were silently at work. Some of them were political, but the more important were physical, and France gradually awoke to the fact that the diversities which had seemed so disintegrating were in truth the very reverse. They made her self-sufficing; they made her in later times, to use the phrase of a modern French writer, "the consumer of her own colonization"; they may in the near future provide her with the solution of the industrial problem of "over-production";¹ above all they gave her that satisfaction in herself, that love of the smiling sky and fertile soil which lies at the root of her national spirit. It is no influence of race, no community of speech, no deep belief in the virtues of any political constitution, that is or ever was, at the root of French patriotism, but the more potent love of the soil and the sky and the physical conditions of life, and this is mainly due to the happily harmonized diversity of her soil and climate. It was this that inspired the author of the "Chanson de Roland" when, as early as the eleventh century, he sang the praises of *douce France*, and it is this that still permeates the whole life of the Frenchman of to-day. In no country is local patriotism stronger than in modern France, and in none is it less injurious to national patriotism. Modern politicians with their fetish of rigid unity might learn from France the lesson of harmony from modulated discord.

With this brief survey of the geographical peculiarities of France it is time to return to the primitive inhabitant whom we left hunting in her forests and fishing in her rivers. Who was he and whence did he come? It has long been held, though it is now disputed, that the first identifiable inhabitants of France were a dark, non-Aryan race, speaking an agglutinative² language, and with very primitive anthropo-

¹ Jules Méline, "Le Retour à la terre et la sur-production industrielle" (1906).

²An agglutinative language is one which adds qualifying words as suffixes instead of inflecting the principal word or allowing the qualifying word to stand alone.

logical characteristics—retreating foreheads and small skulls. These men it was usual to regard as non-Aryans and to call “Iberians,” and it was held that the Basques of the Pyrenees, who speak a language of their own and preserve certain peculiar customs, were their direct descendants; the comfortable cut-and-dried theory that the romanized Iberians became Gascons while the unromanized became Basques has of late been called in question.¹ There is in fact no certainty either that the Iberians were non-Aryan or that the Basques are their direct descendants.

Whoever these early inhabitants were they remained for many dark centuries in undisputed possession. We may be sure that their life was of the most primitive description, that in the beginning at any rate they understood neither pasturage nor agriculture—who, for the matter of that, can raise stock or practise agriculture in the virgin forest?—that they hunted, fished, dwelt in caves and pits, and employed weapons made of stone and bone. Whether these primitive conditions persisted until the advent of the next race, whom we call the Ligurians, or whether, as is more likely, there was a grading upwards even in Iberian times, whether bronze came with the Ligurians or before them, and whether the new-comers filtered in by slow degrees or swept the Iberians before them in a great migratory flood—all these are questions to which there is no certain answer. Most probably the process was gradual, and some progress was made in Iberian times which was greatly stimulated by the advent of the new race, and that advent was a process rather than a cataclysm. The identity of the Ligurians is, if possible, even more doubtful than that of their predecessors.² It is probable, however, that they at least were an early wave of the great Aryan migration, and even that they were Celts;³ that the

¹ See Paper read before the Anthropological Section of the British Association by Professor Ridgeway (1908).

² d'Arbois de Jubainville, “Comptes rendues à l'Academie des inscriptions” (18 June, 1897).

³ The peculiarity of the Ligurian speech was the suffix—asco, usco, asca, e.g. in Tarascon.

Celts continued to roll up in wave after wave, breaking upon the racial beach formed by inversion by the Atlantic Ocean; and that the Gauls, whose name stuck to the district, were but the latest phase of an influx which had been going on for centuries.

Now although, broadly speaking, it may be said that the customs, language, religion, and social and political organization of all these early inhabitants was completely swept away, yet in one respect, and that not the least important, the Frenchman of to-day is the true descendant of these obscure and buffeted races, in respect of blood. Blood, as we shall see, was almost the only thing that Rome did not introduce; she civilized, organized, adapted, imposed her language, law, religion, and to some extent even her literature, but she never settled or attempted to settle the country which she had conquered. People profess to detect the Roman physiognomy in the beautiful women of Arles, but that hardly affects the broad truth that Rome left in Gaul no appreciable racial mark.

To demonstrate the persistency of what we may perhaps still venture to call Celtic blood in France, let us note the various infusions of blood which followed the Roman occupation. After Rome came the Teutons in those strange convulsions of the fifth century known as the "Barbarian Invasions," one of the strangest features of which is the slighness of their racial effect. Suevi and Sicambri are said to have left their mark about Bruges, but none in France proper; France received two dashes of Saxon blood, one of which is important, but less for its extent than because it gave to France her third line of kings. The Franks, although they gave their name to France and imposed their social impress, left remarkably little racial impress; the Visigoths left traces about Toulouse, but the Franks left almost none anywhere, and it is curious to reflect that neither in blood nor in speech do Frenchmen owe anything to the Teutonic people from whom they derived their name. Burgundian blood may

¹ The oldest of the lake dwellings so far explored reveal a state of civilization corresponding to that of the earliest Aryan migrations, and they are believed to be Ligurian work.

be traced to this day in the Jura and the Côte d'Or. The Vandals also are said to have left some traces of their passage; but the Huns, the most unpleasant of the Barbarians, fortunately left none. The Saracen invasion of the eighth century is more important for the introduction of equine than of human blood.¹ Finally the Norse settlement in the ninth century brought a strong teutonic tinge, gave to Normandy the "*cachet* of originality" which was to distinguish her, and to France that spirit of the rover which came to fruition in the Crusades. The conclusion is that the prehistoric races which succeeded the Iberians (the Celtic races *pace* M. d'Arbois de Jubainville) can claim the blood of the French people as their own almost unadulterated contribution to French nationality.

From this digression it is time to return to Gaul as she stood at the close of the Celtic domination. By slow degrees, mainly by gradual progression, but partly as we shall see by contact with the highly civilized nations of the Mediterranean, a certain measure of civilization had been established. At the moment when the shadow of Rome first began to fall across Gaul the inhabitants had ceased to be mere savages. They practised agriculture though they were above all stock-raisers. They even practised certain crafts, chief amongst which was the working of metal, and they knew the use of enamel. We may perhaps conclude that they had already lost some of the strength of barbarism without having gained that of civilization. The land was but sparsely populated, chiefly along the coast and in the river valleys, which suggests an advance from the days when civilization had clung to the hill-tops. The Gauls lived in wooden huts, but in time of trouble took refuge in fortified *oppida* built in sites chosen with considerable defensive sagacity, as Cæsar was to find to his cost. Communications had been developed by waterways as well as roads, but these were probably more used by alien traders than by the Gauls themselves, who, segregated in tribes which ranged in number from 50,000 to 100,000, seem

¹ But there are said to be isolated traces of Saracen customs: e.g. descent from brother to brother at Thouars.

to have had little intercommunication. Indeed the chief feature of pre-Roman times is the utter lack of corporate feeling or unity amongst the eighty or ninety tribes of Gaul. Between both tribes and their subdivisions (*Pagi*) there were frequent and bitter rivalries. The complete disunion of Gaul is illustrated by the fact that Roman arms were first called in to aid one tribe against another. But the division did not stop with the tribes and *Pagi*. Each tribe and each *Pagus* was further riddled by subdivision into groups of clients. The client-system dominated society. Not only were there innumerable groups of clients each clinging to its patron for protection's sake, but there were also client tribes and client families. It is noticeable that this system was common to the Gauls and their German neighbours, who called it *mundium*—a fact that was not without importance when Gaul and Germany collided.¹

The Gallic tribes or *Civitates*—to adopt the nomenclature of Cæsar, our principal authority—were either aristocratic Republics or elective Monarchies, but elective only amongst the aristocracy. Democratic parties existed in many of them, and it was in these democratic parties that, during the Roman wars, the germ of a national spirit arose, whereas the aristocracy generally speaking sided with Rome. In each aristocratic State there existed what Cæsar called a “Senate,” of whose functions we know nothing except that it delegated power to annually elected *Vergobrets*. There were also *Concilia*—assemblies of the whole State; and spasmodic assemblies of all Gaul afford an indication of the awakening of a national spirit. Rome in fact caught Gaul in a stage of transition, and just in time to nip in the bud the nascent spirit of unity which might soon have made the conquest difficult if not impossible.

In the growth of this spirit one of the main contributing factors had been the common religion of the country. There are evidences that Gaul had passed through several religious transformations, and few people now believe that the monuments usually called Druidical do not date from a period anterior to the Druids. At the time of which we are speaking,

¹ *Infra*, p. 39.

however, Druidism was the universal religion of Gaul. Our information about it is meagre, limited indeed to half a dozen references in later writers and a single passage in Cæsar.¹ There were many Druidical deities which the accommodating theology of Rome had no difficulty in identifying with Roman counterparts. Mars, Jupiter, Mercury, Apollo, and Minerva, were all found under other names in the temples of the Druids. Of the Druidical doctrines we only know that they included that of the immortality of the soul ; their rites included human sacrifice. That need not surprise us when we remember that even in Rome human sacrifice was only abolished by law in 97 B.C. The influence of the Druids was great ; "priest-ridden" is one of the epithets applied by Cæsar to the Gauls. When we remember that the Druids were not only priests, but judges and medicine-men, their power and the unifying influence they exercised is easily understood.

Such—disunited, aristocratic, semi-civilized, and priest-ridden—was the Gaul over which, in the second century B.C., the shadow of Rome began to creep. This shadow approached by way of the Mediterranean sea-board and the Rhône. Here Greek and Phœnician colonies had already long been established. The Phœnicians had begun to found trading stations on the Mediterranean littoral as early as the tenth century B.C.,² and about the year 600 B.C. the Phœceans, a Greek people, had established themselves at Marseilles, and had spread eastwards and westwards along the coast as well as up the Rhône to Avignon.³ They brought with them the olive and began the systematic cultivation of the vine ; they brought the first coins too and the Greek alphabet. The Phœcean colonists were on friendly terms with Rome, and, when in 218 B.C. Hannibal advanced through Spain, they warned their neighbours of the danger, though not in time to enable them to intercept his march. They also welcomed a Roman force under Scipio at

¹ Glasson, E. D., "Histoire du droit et des institutions de la France" (1887-1903), I. 127 *sqq.*

² Prosper Castanier, "Histoire de la Provence dans l'antiquité depuis les temps quaternaires jusqu'au Ve Siècle après J.C." (1893-6), I. 241.

³ *Ibid.* II. 21 *sqq.* See also Lentheric, "La Grèce et l'Orient en Provence" (1878).

Marseilles. Half a century later (154 B.C.) the Romans were able to repay the Massaliots by sending an army under Opimius to assist them against the Ligurians, and in 126-125 B.C. by sending Marcus Fulvius Flaccus, who helped them to defeat two Gallic tribes, the Arverni and Allobroges. This was the first occasion on which the Romans put into practice in Gaul the principle of *divide et impera* which was to serve them so well. They had the assistance of the Gallic Æduans against their fellow-countrymen. Flaccus' successor, Sextus Calvinus, was the founder (125 B.C.) of Aquæ Sextii (Aix en Provence). He was succeeded by Domitius Enobarbus. Both severely punished the Gallic tribes. Finally in 121 B.C. Quintus Fabius Maximus crushed the Allobroges near the Isère,¹ and his victory was followed by the foundation of a Roman Province known as Gallia Transalpina.

For the time being Rome looked on the Mediterranean littoral simply as a convenient route to Spain, and it was as such that she formed the Province, establishing the capital at Narbonne² (118 B.C.), from which place the whole Province eventually took its name. It was also to facilitate communications between Italy and Spain that Domitius made the great Domitian Way from the Col de Perthus to Arles. As yet there was no idea of a conquest of Gaul which should bring the whole country into the Roman net. In the last days of the second century B.C., however, the whole outlook was altered by the alarming movements of the Teutonic peoples beyond the Rhine. Gaul was by this time far advanced in decay; utterly disunited and half-civilized she was powerless to offer any resistance to the incursions of the German tribes, strong and terrible in their untamed barbarism. If the torrent was to be stemmed it must be by Rome and not by Gaul. In 109 B.C. the German Cimbri and Teutones defeated M. Junius Silanus in the country of the Allobroges (modern Dauphiné). They were joined by the Helvetii, a Gallic tribe, who advanced

¹ It was to celebrate this victory that the pyramid sometimes called the "tomb of Pilate" was erected at Vienne.

² Narbonne, now an inland town, then possessed a fine harbour and quickly became a rival to Marseilles.

south-west, and in 107 B.C. defeated Cassius Longinus on the Garonne. The Gallic Tolosates, encouraged by this event, seized Tolosa (Toulouse); but the Cimbri and Teutones were now in the heart of north-central France, and lacking their support the revolted tribes lost Tolosa to Q. Servilius Cæpio in 106. But in the following year the German invaders reappeared, and cut to pieces two Roman armies which were opposed to them. The great Marius was now sent to Gaul to deal with the invaders, who had by this time traversed Gaul and plunged into Spain. Marius waited three years for their return. He entrenched himself on the Alpilles near Glanum (St. Rémy). The Teutones and the Ambrones, who were associated with them, walked into the trap, and were crushingly defeated in the neighbourhood of Aix. The fine arch on the plateau above St. Rémy probably commemorates Marius' victory, the memory of which still lingers in Provence. The Cimbri were subsequently defeated at Vercellæ on the Adige (101 B.C.).

These events had opened the eyes of the Romans to the necessity of converting Gaul into a bulwark and outpost against the Barbarians. This, however, could only be done by the conquest of the country. The whole scope of the Roman enterprise in Gaul was thus altered; but it was not till nearly fifty years later, when Julius Cæsar became Governor of Illyria and the two Gauls, that the real conquest of Gaul began. Cæsar had scarcely assumed the reins of power when a pretext arose for interference in the affairs of the Gauls. For three years, however, the Roman campaigns were either directed against the Germans to prevent them from establishing a foothold, or in aid of some friendly Gallic State against a rival. Ariovistus, a German adventurer who had called in the Gallic Sequani to aid him against the Gallic Æduans, and aspired to the mastery of Gaul, was overthrown by Cæsar who usurped his aspirations; but until 54 B.C. the campaigns continued to be purely local, and Cæsar was never without the assistance of one or other of the Gallic tribes.

In that year, however, the war entered on a new phase; the successes, and perhaps also the harshness, of Cæsar had welded the Gallic States at last into something resembling

united resistance. A Roman legion was massacred, and there was an abortive attempt at a general insurrection. Next year the movement found a leader in Vercingetorix, under whom the Gauls united with surprising rapidity. This tardy concentration in reality made Gaul more rather than less vulnerable. A spasmodic war might have taxed even Cæsar's skill: now he had his enemy at his feet. The first campaign centred round Avaricum (Bourges); but that city fell into Cæsar's hands in spite of Vercingetorix' attempts to relieve it. Cæsar then marched into Vercingetorix' own country and laid siege to Gergovia. His attempt to storm this fortress was repulsed, and at the same moment the Æduans, long the faithful allies of Rome, completed the union of Gaul by joining in the general resistance. Cæsar was now within an ace of destruction, and it was only by dint of an extraordinary effort that he managed to effect a junction with his lieutenant Labienus. He then turned upon Vercingetorix who had invaded the Roman Province, and after repulsing him in a decisive battle near Dijon shut him up in the stronghold of Alesia. Vercingetorix' campaign had failed; but in response to his appeals a relieving army was assembled. Without him, however, the Gauls were still a prey to jealousy and dissension, and the attempt failed through want of leadership. Famine and this failure compelled Vercingetorix to surrender. The Romans kept him a prisoner for six years and then put him to death. With his surrender the resistance of Gaul collapsed, and in the year 50 Cæsar was able to return to Italy, leaving behind him a conquered and submissive country.

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CHAPTER II

GAUL UNDER ROMAN RULE

(50 B.C.—400 A.D.)

GAUL had thus come under Roman rule. The wars which had just been concluded can scarcely be described as wars of independence. Continued independence had been in fact outside the bounds of possibility. Gallic liberty was already doomed, and it had been merely a question whether Gaul should exchange it for Germanic barbarism or Roman civilization. The Barbarians came at last, but the Roman conquest postponed their coming for 430 years. This fact is momentous. Had Gaul fallen to the Barbarians in the first instead of the fifth century, France must have become a Teutonic nation speaking a German tongue, and the Gauls must have been pushed back to the Atlantic to become a kind of French Wales. But instead of this Gaul came for five hundred years under the greatest civilizing influence in the world. It is true that during the latter part of that period Rome was in decline, and that a sharp distinction must be drawn between the earlier and the later phases of Roman rule; but this did not prevent Rome from leaving on Gallic society and institutions a profound impression. Celtic in blood as we have seen her to be, France became in the main Roman in speech, laws, customs, and institutions. This superimposition of the Roman civilization was facilitated by the lack of genuine national culture and feeling amongst the Gauls themselves.

Cæsar himself had little opportunity to organize his conquest, though, by the diplomatic clemency which he displayed when the time for diplomatic harshness was past, he quickly

brought the Gauls to fight under the Roman standard. It was left to his successor to introduce the benefits of Roman civilization. Augustus is fairly entitled to rank among the builders of France. His plan was to leave the old Province, now (27 B.C.) called *Narbonensis*, untouched, and to establish in it settlements of Roman citizens, called "Colonies," as object-lessons in the advantages of Roman rule. Such settlements were Orange, Cavaillon, Carpentras, Valence, and many other places where the remains of Roman greatness may still be seen. The remainder of Gaul Augustus divided into three provinces, *Belgia*, *Lugdunensis*, and *Aquitania* (16-13 B.C.), so constructed as to make Lyons a convenient centre of government for the whole. Lyons, a town of wholly Roman construction,¹ he raised to be the capital of Gaul. Its strategic, geographic, and economic importance were great. Wedged tightly between the great rivers Rhône and Saône, which run for some distance in gently converging parallels before they unite their waters, it commanded the great artery of trade between the Mediterranean and the North Sea.² It was also the meeting place of this trade route with the important Alpine roads, and it stood at the junction of three great water-ways. Above all it was well within the bounds of Gaul, and at the same time in close proximity to the *Narbonensis* and in comparative proximity to Italy. There Augustus made long sojourns,³ there the Emperor Claudius was born, and there was established the chief seat of the Roman religion; there also was founded one of the earliest of those Christian communities which were to replace that religion. For a time Lyons was the second city in the Empire.

During the reign of Augustus the three new provinces

¹ Founded in 43 B.C. by Munatius Plancus.

² Strabo (ed. Didot) IV, I. 14, speaks of the navigation of the Rhône. Arles, founded in A.D. 17 by Tiberius, superseded Marseilles and Narbonne as the port of Lyons. Lyons is described as like an Acropolis: *τὸ Λούγδουνον ἐν μέσῳ τῆς χώρας ἐστὶν ὡσπερ ἀκρόπολις* (Strabo, op. cit. IV. 6).

³ In B.C. 40; a short time to raise troops; in the winter of 35-34, also in the end of 27; three years from the middle of 16 to the middle of 13; then in the year 10; and finally in the year 8.

were under the rule of a single military governor, and amongst other distinguished Romans Agrippa, Tiberius, Drusus, Varus, and Germanicus held the office. Ultimately, however (17 A.D.), a civil governor was appointed to each, who received the widest powers. Yet on the whole Roman rule in Gaul for some two hundred years after the conquest is less remarkable for the centralized government which it undoubtedly set up than for the toleration it extended to the ancient customs and liberties of the conquered people. There can be no doubt indeed that, so far from desiring to maintain their liberties and customs, the Gauls were only anxious to abandon them in exchange for the privileges of Roman citizenship. For two centuries we can see a constant and in the main successful striving after these privileges, and it was rather as a check on the absolutism of Roman officials than as a concession to the prejudices of the conquered race that the ancient Gallic institutions were artificially fostered by the Romans.¹ Finally between 212 and 217 an edict of Caracalla admitted all inhabitants of the Empire to the privileges of Roman citizenship.

The tribal divisions of ancient Gaul were maintained though reduced in number and in other respects readjusted; this was wise, because tribal patriotism was all the patriotism there was, and the destruction of the *civitates* would have roused Gaul as the loss of independence did not rouse her. Some of these *civitates*, mostly in Narbonensis, were as we have seen Roman colonies. Here the Roman, though probably not the Gallic, inhabitants were in full enjoyment of Roman citizenship and outside the jurisdiction of the Roman governor. Others, also at first mostly in Narbonensis, enjoyed the *Jus Latii*, a form of citizenship which was even more sought after. Other *civitates* again such as Marseilles, Langres, and Reims were *fæderatæ*. Their condition varied, but speaking generally they kept their Gallic customs with or without participation in Roman law. Thus they too escaped the jurisdiction of the Roman governor. With them may be

¹ Glasson, op. cit. I. 189 *sqq.*

grouped the "free" *civitates* (Trier, Soissons, etc.) which enjoyed identical immunities. But the majority were what was called "stipendiary".¹ These in point of law lost their ancient customs, magistrates, and even rights of property, their land being thrown into the Roman *ager publicus*. They were also in theory entirely at the mercy of the Roman officials. In practice, however, the old customs were to a large extent allowed to continue and, although legal ownership of land was disturbed, the old occupants were seldom actually dispossessed.

Within the *civitates* the towns enjoyed a large measure of freedom and prosperity. The first two centuries of the Christian era may in fact be regarded as the golden age of towns. Materially it was an age of building: theatres and amphitheatres, aqueducts, temples, and public buildings of all sorts—all the more impressive no doubt from the fact that they towered over the insignificant wooden structures of the Gauls—provoked the wonder of the inhabitants as their remains excite the admiration of the traveller of to-day. With them was established that municipal system which was the glory of the Roman administration. Each town had its senate, duumvirs, ædiles and quæstors, and enjoyed the protection of some powerful patron, and each town was governed by its own laws. It was a great misfortune that after the second century this splendid municipal system collapsed in the general decay of the Empire. Had it not done so it might have supplied a basis of resistance against the catastrophe of the fifth century. Two things contributed to this break-down of the municipalities—in the first place the antagonism of the Christian Church to which the municipalities, connected as they were with pagan rights, were of course anathema; and in the second place the financial debacle which threw intolerable burdens on to the municipal functionaries.

The Gallic *civitates* were maintained, the ancient Gallic customs respected, and the Roman municipal system introduced. What of the Gallic religion? The Roman principle was to interfere with nothing which was not an obstacle to govern-

¹ Glasson, *op. cit.* I. 407 *sqq.*

ment, and in regard to the Gallic religion this principle was strictly observed. The Roman religion in fact simply co-opted the Gallic gods, and only interfered with the Druids where their practices ran counter to Roman civil law. Magic, for instance, was forbidden, and with the advent of Roman justice the need for Druidical justice ceased. The Druids were neither persecuted nor martyred, but allowed to perish by the far more certain process of obsolescence.¹ In the interests of the Empire, however, though only to supplement not to replace the old religion, the cult of "Rome and Augustus" was introduced. In every municipality temples arose, and this imperial religion became, so to speak, the established and endowed religion of Gaul. Colleges of *Augustales* were founded all over the country, and every expedient was employed to give prestige to it. Once annually at the great temple at Lyons was celebrated a sort of "Empire Day," and it was in connexion with that festival that there assembled the *concilium* of all Gaul. Such general assemblies were common to every part of the Empire; they were not unknown in Gaul in pre-Roman times, but their erection into a regular institution was the work of the Romans. Similar assemblies were held regularly in each province, and though the main object in each case was religious yet they had definite rights of remonstrance and petition, and the fact that they were never used as centres of resistance to Rome is a proof that the rule of Rome was not unpopular.

It would be untrue to say that there was no opposition to that rule. There were outbreaks of the Aquitani and Belgæ about 38 B.C., which were repressed by the great Agrippa; then there was quiet for forty-eight years when a more general revolt occurred, provoked by the inquisitorial and corrupt financial administration of the Roman officials, and headed by two Gauls—Florus and Sacrovir. But Tiberius quelled the revolt with ease. Under the enlightened Gallophil Claudius there was a large extension of the privileges of Roman citizenship. Nero, however, found himself opposed by Caius Julius

¹ Augustus, Tiberius, and Claudius all proscribed Druidism, but never seem to have troubled to enforce the proscription.

Vindex, the Gallic Governor of the Lyonese. But Vindex was the personal enemy of Nero, not of Rome. He was defeated and killed at Besançon in 68 A.D. The death of Nero was followed by a confused period in which the part played by Gaul is difficult to unravel. Galba, the Legate in Spain, claimed the throne and was opposed by Vitellius the Legate in "Lower Germany".¹ Southern Gaul supported Galba, and, when in 69 he was dethroned by Otho, Vitellius with his legions and Belgic and German auxiliaries devastated the Rhône Valley.

It was at this juncture, when the whole Empire seemed in danger of falling to pieces, that a barbarian official of Rome named Civilis conceived the idea of carving out for himself a Rhenish kingdom. Civilis declared for Vespasian against Vitellius, and most of Vitellius' army mutinied and joined him. Only four of the Gallic *civitates* (the Treviri, the Lingones, the Nervii, and the Tongri) took part in this revolt (69-70 A.D.), and their leaders (Sabinus, Classicus, and Tutor) had the strange idea of setting up an imitation empire in Gaul. This was of no use to Civilis who was aiming at independence. Sabinus attacked the Sequani, who had refused allegiance to the mock emperor, and was defeated and killed. A congress of the Gallic tribes met at Durocortorum (Reims) and decided against the continuance of the revolt, for order had by this time been restored at Rome and a new Governor of Lower Germany had been appointed. This man, Cerealis, rallied the legions to their duty, and attacked and subdued the Treviri who were still in arms. After this the war was between the Romans and the Germans; Gaul took no more part in it. Civilis was quickly reduced to quiescence, and thus ended the last of the revolts against Rome. It had been more German than Gallic, and yet Gaul had played a conspicuous part in it.

Under the genial rule of the Flavians and Antonines (81-193) Gaul relapsed into a state which may be described as prosperous and contented. Hadrian travelled all over Gaul and built a great basilica at Nîmes. The Roman legions massed along the Rhine watched the Germans on the one side and the Gauls

¹One of the narrow barrier states which Rome had set up on the Rhine.

on the other, preventing revolt here and invasion there. So long as the might of Rome endured all would be well. Secure in her pride of strength, Rome did not contemplate the day when dangers nearer home should necessitate the withdrawal of her legions from the Rhine. Had she done so she would no doubt have trained the Gauls to defend their own frontiers, which were also the frontiers of the Empire. Instead of this, lulled by a false sense of security, she allowed the conquered country to become her sleeping partner, and to enjoy the blessings of the *pax Romana* on condition that she sacrificed her national aspirations and identified herself with the imperial fortunes. Under these circumstances the withdrawal of the Roman legions was bound to leave Gaul a defenceless prey to the barbarians, whose advent was becoming more and more inevitable. But spell-bound by the majesty of Rome men did not realize the approach of the impending calamity.

Meanwhile in the midst of the Gallo-Roman body-politic had been growing up, unnoticed at first, an organism by which the effects of that calamity were destined to be greatly modified. The arrival of Christianity in Gaul was obscure and humble, and the stories which afterwards gained credence of a conversion of Gaul in apostolic or sub-apostolic times have been riddled by recent criticism. Frequenters of Provence will be familiar with the pretty legend of the *Trois Maries* who, with Lazarus, are said to have ended their lives in these regions.¹ Needless to say the whole story is a pious invention. Equally slender are the foundations of the legend of the mission to Gaul of Dionysius the Areopagite. The fact that one of the seven missionary bishops of the third century bore the name of Dionysius was too tempting for eager and pious chroniclers. The mission of the Areopagite soon became almost an article of faith, and St. Denis became the patron saint of France.² One

¹ Their names are revered at the Saintes Maries de la mer, at Montmajour, and at Les Baux, and the confusion which has transferred the fame of Marius to these legendary travellers is not the least curious feature of the story. See Cook, "Old Provence" (1905), I. 70.

² Scott Holmes, "The origin and development of the Christian Church in Gaul during the first six centuries" (1907-8), pp. 15 *sqq.*; cp. Houtin, "La Controverse de l'apostolicité des églises de France au XIX^e Siècle" (1901).

thing only is certain—and it is sufficient—that by the beginning of the second half of the second century there existed Christian communities at Vienne and elsewhere in Southern Gaul, though Lyons itself was barred to the new religion owing no doubt to the fact that it was the seat of the cult of Rome and Augustus. But in the close of the second century there came to Lyons a missionary bishop, Pothinus. The new religion quickly provoked hostility there, and in 177 this developed into persecution, and many Christians suffered martyrdom, including Pothinus himself. He was succeeded by Irenæus who is also reputed to have suffered for the faith.¹

The hostility of Rome to Christianity was due to the excessive claims of that religion. The refusal of Christians to acknowledge more gods than one was a direct attack on the imperial religion. Christianity indeed adopted many of the graces of paganism, but it could not allow its God simply to sit beside the Roman gods as the Gallic gods had sat. Moreover the refusal of Christians to perform the functions of citizens naturally offended, while their attitude towards slaves and the poor was subversive of social order. The third century, however, saw the triumph of Christianity. The tolerance of the Emperors gave scope for proselytism, and during the reign of Decius (240-251) there was an organized effort to convert Gaul. The story of the mission of the "Seven Bishops" rests on altogether different and better evidence than the legends of the earlier missions; and there is no good reason to doubt that somewhere about the middle of the third century Saturninus, Gatianus, Trophimus, Austremonius, Martial, Paul, and Dionysius carried the Gospel to Toulouse, Tours, Arles, Auvergne, Limoges, Narbonne, and Paris respectively.²

The Edict of Milan (313) which followed the conversion of Constantine, and which has been described as the Edict of Nantes of the early Church, gave to Christianity the privileges which paganism already enjoyed. Many will lament the day

¹ Scott Holmes, *op. cit.* pp. 34 *sqq.*

² Gregory of Tours, "*Histoire Écclésiastique des Francs*," trans. Guadet et Taranne (ed. Société de l'histoire de France, 1836), I. 30.

when the Church put on her imperial guise and bade farewell to "the gracious spirit of her springtide," and will see in the conversion of the Emperor and the appointment to episcopal office of distinguished Gallo-Romans only the opening of a reign of worldly pomp and materialism.¹ Be this as it may, the triumph of Christianity meant, in France at any rate, something more. It meant that, when two hundred years later the Barbarians overran Gaul, they found a Christian and not a pagan people, with the momentous consequence that the wide cleft between the two stages of civilization was spanned by the bridge of a common religion.

Already the great crisis was imminent, and the barbarians were knocking at the gates. Until the year 250 their rude onslaughts had given little trouble to the trained legions. After that date it became more and more difficult for the distracted emperors to guard all their frontiers against simultaneous attacks. For a time, under Postumus a Roman governor, an independent Gaul was set up (258-373). Diocletian's reign brought some relief. Maximian and Constantius Chlorus defended the Rhine frontier with success, and although the barbarians could not be entirely excluded they were invariably defeated when they broke in. It is needless to record the many great slaughters of barbarians which are credited to Maximian, Chlorus, Julian, and Valentinian I. Gaul was thus kept Roman during the fourth century, and in spite of the invasions there remained a sense of security right into the fifth century. The pictures drawn by Ausonius and Sidonius Apollinaris of the Moselle Valley and Auvergne during that troubled period give an impression of ease, comfort, and leisured prosperity.

But before we notice the invasions we must pause to note some of the changes which had taken place in Gallo-Roman society during the decline of the Empire. The Gallic religion

¹ Harnack's estimate of the hold of Christianity in Gaul in the third century is a very low one. He puts the entire Christian population at 10,000. Nevertheless many distinguished Gallo-Romans held the office of bishop. Christianity seems to have been the aristocratic not the popular religion.

had, as we have seen, given place to the Roman and subsequently to the Christian religion, and it was into a country mainly Christian, though not without strong remnants of paganism, that the heathen Germans poured. Gallic law also had been swept into the net of Roman law. The struggle of the Gauls to secure the privileges of Roman citizenship had terminated in the decree of Caracalla already referred to, and this change involved the universal adoption of Roman law, probably the most unadulterated blessing that Rome brought to France. Nearly every trace of Gallic law has disappeared; but it was probably very like early German law. It was the same with language. The Gallic tongue was very gradually superseded by the simpler and more practical Latin tongue (*lingua romana rustica*, not classical Latin). Though it lingered on until the fourth century, the disappearance of Gallic was none the less complete, except in Brittany which was re-colonized in the sixth century. It is estimated that of the 6000 "root" words of modern French no less than 3800 are derived from Latin and no more than 20 from Celtic.¹ The Germans brought many new words chiefly connected with the institutions which they introduced, but these have gradually disappeared and only some 420 remain. Modern French is therefore essentially the speech of the Gallo-Roman, and France was French in speech before ever a Frank had crossed her borders.

And what—for after all that is the important matter—did men think of all this change, and were they happier and more prosperous in Roman times than in those which went before or followed after? In order to see life in Gaul as it was in the days of the declining Empire let us pay an imaginary visit to the estate of some Gallo-Roman gentleman. Antonius we will imagine owns a property in Touraine. It is called from the name of its original owner the *fundus Florianus*, and though Antonius would naturally like to call it Antonianus he finds himself unable to do so. In later times it will be known as Fleury. The estate is large and fertile, and

¹ See Glasson, *op. cit.* i. 72. Celtic writing disappeared almost at once. See also Brachet, A., "Historical Grammar of France" (trans. Kitchin and Toynbee, 1896), p. 6.

though times are bad it is not difficult to acquire land. Antonius, who has several other estates (*patrimonia sparsa per orbem*), may be regarded as well-to-do. On arrival at the *fundus* the most conspicuous object that meets our eye is Antonius' residence—a really considerable building. We admire the care with which the site has been chosen, to secure the advantages of sun, shelter, shade, and water; the magnificence and solid comfort of the exterior, the former perhaps a trifle overdone, and we note with interest the very un-Roman-looking tower and wall on which we see a gang of slaves engaged and which quite suggests a feudal castle. There has in fact been an alarm of brigands and rumours of unrest upon the Rhine; and in the decline of the Empire it behoves every prudent man to take the steps necessary for his own security. Antonius of course despises the barbarians with the self-satisfied contempt of one who has managed to forget his own extraction—his ancestors had been Gauls pure and simple—but he has no desire to expose his domestic treasures or his excellent cellar to desecration and pillage.

Having sufficiently admired the exterior we obtain leave to view the interior, for the great man has driven away yesterday—raging somewhat at the vile condition of the once famous Roman roads—on a visit to his neighbour Marcellus, the wild boars in whose *saltus*—a big waste estate much larger than Antonius' *fundus*—afford such excellent sport. And as he took with him his famous pedigree hounds and his favourite hawks he is sure to be absent for some days. So we are able to roam at will through his elegant porticoes, his great galleries and halls, to survey the elaborate bath and the careful arrangement of the summer and winter apartments, the tennis court—he gets the balls from Rome—and the *diversorium* or lounge; to observe the dice to which he is addicted, and the tablets on which he composes his verses—stilted stuff if this on the tablets is a specimen. As our ramble has already shown us many signs of pagan worship—not indeed of the old Roman gods with whom our classical education has made us familiar, but of those more mysterious and

warmer deities of the East, of Isis, Magna Mater, Attis, and above all Mithra, upon which the devotion of expiring paganism is focussed—it is with some astonishment that we find ourselves in what is evidently a Christian chapel. Livia, the wife of Antonius, we ascertain is a Christian; she had come under the direct influence of St. Martin,¹ and Antonius himself is curiously divided between the religion of his fathers and that of his wife.

On leaving the chapel we pause to admire a splendid mosaic of a hunting scene imported from Italy, the very one which a citizen of Fleury dug up in his garden in the days of the Third Republic and which is now in the Louvre—or ought to be. Emerging into the great avenue we are met by the bailiff (*villicus*) who offers to show us round. We are rather surprised to find that, though he has authority over many freemen, he is himself a slave. Experience has taught Antonius that slaves are better managers than freemen. Octavius, for that is his name, proves communicative and, so long as he does not lapse into a jargon which we take to be Celtic, intelligible. He informs us that he himself is under the orders of an *actor* and a *procurator*, but we are not able to extract from him a very clear idea of the functions of these officials; at any rate they are slaves too. Under Octavius there are *monitores* and *magistri operum* (clerks of the works)—slaves also. We proceed first to a group of buildings hard by, which Octavius calls the *villa rustica*, explaining that the

¹ Great reserve should be exercised in accepting the ordinary accounts of this celebrated saint. His reputation is to a great extent posthumous and artificial. During his lifetime his miracles attracted little attention, and it was only when they were “written up” and embellished by Sulpicius Severus, fifty years after his death, that Martin’s reputation began to grow until he became the most popular saint in France. Martin was the son of pagan parents and was born about 316. Converted to Christianity he was still obliged to enter the army. On leaving it he became associated with Hilary of Tours, and did good work as an evangelist of the humbler classes. There are few districts in France which do not claim to have had the Gospel from him. In particular he was the patron saint of Tours. See the articles of Babut in the “Revue d’histoire et de littérature religieuses”; also Delahaye, “The Legends of the Saints” (trans. Crawford, 1907).

residence itself is called the *villa urbana*. Here are the stables, the kennels, and the aviary, also the dove-cote—it stood till 1789—the wine-press, the mill, the oven, the forge, and the carpenter's shop, all most complete and self-contained as becomes the establishment of a Roman gentleman. The small cells which we observe are—Octavius tells us—the dwellings of the slaves; he himself occupies one of them; they have been greatly improved since Livia's conversion to Christianity. But the *ergastulum*, a large compound where idle slaves are put to work, has not been abolished. We also see the slaves' bath—only used on holidays. All these buildings are grouped round a large *cortis* or yard which strongly resembles a modern homestead.

But it is now time to take a walk through the fields. So we leave the *cortis* and are first introduced to that part of the estate which Antonius has on hand—the home-farm we may call it. This we are told is tilled for the most part by the slaves whose accommodation we have just been inspecting, and Octavius, slave though he is, does not hesitate to add that it is extraordinarily ill tilled. He even assures us that Antonius is no longer able to make it pay, and talks in quite twentieth century fashion about agricultural depression. “And what,” he adds, “can things be coming to when proprietors are obliged to send a quota of slaves to serve in the army?”

So far all the slaves we have seen have been in gangs, each gang controlled by a *monitor*, but now we observe a man working a plot of ground all by himself. Our inquiries elicit from our guide the fact that the class to which this man belongs is the result of an experiment made by Antonius' grandfather. To him it had occurred that, as slave labour entailed much waste and idleness and supervision, it might pay to hand over a specified plot to a single slave and allow him to work it on a profit-sharing system. “But,” says Octavius, “the State has now put this man on the *cadastre* using him as a unit for purposes of assessment, and has actually forbidden my master to part with him. In fact he is no longer a slave at all,” he adds with a touch of jealousy. “Then he is free?” we say; but Octavius shakes his head, and we remember the conditions

of mediaeval serfdom, and begin to wonder whether we may not by chance have traced it to one of its sources.

"There," our guide says as we pass another labourer, "is one of my master's *liberti*." We gather that he is one of a large class who hold small plots as tenants, but unfortunately on this subject Octavius is somewhat unintelligible, and we go away without a very clear idea of the position of the *libertus*. "And now," proceeds the bailiff, "here at last is one of your precious freemen. He rents a parcel of ground from my master on a lease—leases used to be for five years, but the tendency is to make them longer." We look with some emotion on this free farmer, and are surprised to find that Octavius has but a poor opinion of him. "As a matter of fact," he tells us, "these men have done so badly and got into such arrears that they are now very rare, and have dropped for the most part into another class whose tenure I will explain to you if you will step this way." So we follow Octavius, wondering if he is really able to appreciate a tenure which has no fixity. We now come upon some rather squalid dwellings, and ask our guide if it is possible that the magnificent Antonius whose splendid villa and offices we have just been admiring was really responsible for their erection. "Oh, no," he replies, "these particular *casulae* are occupied by that very class I was going to tell you about. We call them *coloni*." "Ah," we say, "the *coloni*, we have heard of them; now just drop your barbarous Gallic and tell us in your best Latin all about them."

"Well," he says, "I can remember when most of these fellows were free farmers like those stupid clods we have just left, but they mismanaged things so, and got into such arrears (agricultural depression of course had something to say to it too), that my master's grandfather had to distrain on their stock. But even that did not cover the arrears, and old Antonius, who was a hard man, just kept them on their holdings cultivating them and paying rent in kind until they should have liquidated the arrears or found security for them. Of course they have done neither the one nor the other, so you may say that they are really tied to the land by their

debts. But we have other *coloni* too ; men who without having any lease or contract came here to reclaim the waste *saltus* yonder, a heavy job it was too moving the timber. My master's father allowed them to remain. Then after the last big German scare my master, who was short of labour, got a grant of some fifty barbarians whom he settled here as squatters on similar conditions."

"Then these men are to all intents and purposes slaves?" we say. "Oh! dear no!" he replies, "they are perfectly free! Why, they can marry and have a family; they have civil rights which I have not; can even enjoy if they like the privilege of litigating with Antonius; can transmit and inherit property too, whereas when I die my *peculium* goes to my master; and although they don't own the land they cultivate they could own other land and movable goods as much as they could accumulate. Only they can't leave the land and they must till it. Slaves of the soil if you like, but not of Antonius. And you must remember that while they cannot leave the land neither can my master turn them away. We have had cases of *coloni* running away, but the law is very severe against them. Some of ours enlisted; my master was dreadfully annoyed; one became a Christian priest; Antonius could do nothing. On the other hand we have several *coloni* who became so voluntarily to escape the burden of curial dignities," and Antonius laughed. "They are not badly off," he added, "they are masters of their own time; I have no jurisdiction over them." "But bound to the soil," we repeat, "surely that is hard enough?" "I see no hardship in it," said Octavius. The sun was setting when we took leave of our guide, and as we trudged away in the gloom we reflected that many of the things which we are accustomed to lay at the door of the Middle Ages have their origin in a much earlier antiquity.¹

Peaceful though the scene is which we have just described it bore within it the seeds of dissolution. By the beginning of the fourth century the whole fabric of the Empire was

¹ See for all these questions of tenure, Fustel de Coulanges, "Histoire des institutions politiques de l'ancienne France" (1875, etc.).

undermined with political, administrative, and above all economic decay. The collapse of Rome in that century bears a significant resemblance to that of the *ancien régime* in the eighteenth. In both cases the aristocracy had to a great extent degenerated into a privileged class endowed with rights but divorced from responsibility. Above all in both cases the canker was more economic than political, and just as France by the commercial treaty of 1786 had voluntarily thrown a large portion of her industries to the lions, so the Roman Empire had long abandoned production, and had come to depend on the foreigner for supplies. Much of the luxury that we noticed in the villa came at great cost from outside the Empire; and it will be remembered that agricultural conditions were bad and the complaints of bad times bitter. At the same time the demands of the Government were increasing daily, and taxes were rising while the means of paying them were declining. The scarcity of the precious metals owing to the exhaustion of the mines added to the stringency which a false economic policy had created. Taxation was not only ill-distributed as it was under the later Bourbons but also excessive, which under the Bourbons it was not.¹ An unproductive Empire will soon tax itself out of existence, and this is what Rome was doing. Poverty was increasing with alarming rapidity; land, which no longer paid the expense of tillage, went rapidly out of cultivation, and the taxes went up as the assessments went down. The transference of the seat of government from Rome to Constantinople was an acknowledgment of failure, and added administrative to economic confusion. The splendid municipal system collapsed, and all the elaborate mechanism of the Empire was thrown out of gear. The next chapter will deal with the barbarian invasions, but it was not these invasions but the internal collapse of the Empire that ruined the Gallo-Roman body politic.

¹ Glasson, *op. cit.* p. 388.

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CHAPTER III
THE BARBARIAN INVASIONS AND THE
MEROVINGIAN DYNASTY

(400-715)

AMIDST all the signs of decay and degeneration enumerated at the close of the last chapter the end of the Roman Empire in the West was approaching. We are now upon the verge of that great movement, known as the Barbarian Invasions, which completely changed the destiny of Western Europe. It would be a simple task to picture the descent of a fierce wave of barbarism upon the effete civilization of Rome, sweeping society, institutions, civilization, all before it, and substituting in a single gigantic convulsion entirely new conditions. History, however, seldom rises to drama pitch, and such a picture would give a very false impression of what actually happened. Professor Freeman, Dr. Dill, and other learned historians have clearly demonstrated that even the name "Invasions" is a misnomer.¹ Long before the fifth century there had been an appreciable drift of the barbarians towards the Empire. At first it had been due to the desire of the drifters to secure for themselves the protection which Rome was still able to afford against the even more barbarous hordes who were in turn pressing on them from the East. It seems clear also that the barbarians who lived adjacent to the Empire, so far from despising the blessings of civilization, had the greatest respect for, and envy of the superior civilization of Rome, and desired above all things to profit by it. There were indeed armed inroads which must have wrought much havoc, though not so much as has

¹ Dill, "Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire" (1905), p. 286, and *passim*.

been sometimes suggested, but it was not on the whole the armed invaders, but those barbarians who insinuated themselves into the Empire as subjects, slaves, *coloni*, or soldiers who left the durable results. And if the barbarians did not look upon themselves, neither did the Romans regard them, as invaders. Throughout the havoc and unrest of the period we perceive upon the part of the latter a steady contempt for these unskilled hordes, an abiding confidence in the might of the Empire, and a total inability to treat the intruders as a common foe. During the most critical period of the invasions, indeed, the imperial dominions north of the Alps were the scene of a confused struggle between various Roman tyrants and pretenders, who saw in the distress of the Empire the opportunity of their own aggrandizement. We are driven to the conclusion that it was not the barbarian invasions that were the primary cause of the downfall of the Empire, but the moral, economic, fiscal, and political chaos in which the Empire was plunged.

Taking advantage of this chaos the barbarians flung themselves in the fifth century with new vigour on the frontiers. In 406-7 the Alans, Suevi, and Vandals swept across the Rhine. Alaric the Visigoth was already in Italy, and the Western Emperor—the incapable Honorius—was cowering amidst the marshes of Ravenna; so Gaul was left to her fate. The invaders passed on into Spain; the havoc they wrought was no doubt considerable, but the permanent impression was slight. In 412 Atawulf, the brother of Alaric, invaded Gaul and seized Narbonne, Toulouse, and Bordeaux, only like the previous invaders to pass on into Spain; but the Visigoths returned to France in 419 and settled in Western Aquitaine. Of all the barbarians they were the least antagonistic to the Empire. Alaric, Atawulf, and Wallia all desired to be regarded as confederates of Rome,¹ they none of them seem to have aimed at the purple, but rather to have desired to be considered “Emperor makers,” and the settlement in Aquitaine was by imperial sanction. It only endured as a kingdom for about one hundred years, but it left a considerable mark on South-Western

¹ Atawulf was married to Honorius' sister, Galla Placidia.

France. The Goth in fact was so much imbued with the Roman spirit that he actually left Aquitaine more Roman than he found it, and was in this way responsible to a great extent for the long-standing difference between the South-West and the remainder of France, which gave rise to the statement that "there are no Frenchmen south of the Loire".

Meanwhile other barbaric races had got a foothold either in Gaul or on the immediate frontier. The Burgundians, least barbaric of all the barbarians, established themselves on the Rhine in the neighbourhood of Worms in 413, and were afterwards brought into Savoy by the Gallo-Roman governor Aëtius, while the Alamans pushed into Alsace, the valley of the Doubs, and part of Switzerland. Two distinct groups of Franks also established themselves, the Ripuarians at Trier (in 413) whence they pushed onwards to the Meuse and Sambre, and the Salians in Belgium. But the most important event of the mid-fifth century was the irruption into Gaul of the Huns in 451. This ferocious Tartar people had established itself on the shores of the Black Sea in the third and fourth centuries, had swept across Europe, and now, led by the celebrated Attila, burst into Gaul. The Huns were as much disliked by the barbarian settlers as they were by the Gallo-Romans. Aëtius, who had already defeated the Franks in battle, and had inspired all the earlier invaders with respect, enlisted the services of Franks, Burgundians, and Visigoths against this new foe. His success is good evidence that there still was a solidarity in Gaul that its motley occupants thought it worth while to fight for. The invaders had penetrated as far as Orleans, and were worsted by Aëtius in the neighbourhood of that city in June, 451, and shortly after in a decisive three days' battle at Mauriac near Troyes, after which they withdrew over the Rhine. Aëtius only survived his triumph three years. He had fairly earned the title of "the last of the Romans," for with him disappeared the last prop of the Western Empire.

After the departure of the Huns the Burgundians and Goths, who had been instrumental in their defeat, enjoyed a period of ascendancy. The Empire was in a state of

collapse, and an attempt to set up a Gallic Emperor—A vitus, an Arvernian—in 455, met with no success ; a Roman General, Egidius, made an effort to restore authority but died in 464, after which Gaul became the scene of a struggle for ascendancy between its various barbarian occupants, which was destined to end—rather surprisingly—in the triumph of the Franks. At first, however, the struggle was between the Visigoths and the Burgundians. Under their great King Euric (466-485) the former made themselves masters of the Rhône valley and the whole country from the Loire to the Mediterranean, and but for the hostility of the Church there might have been a Visigothic kingdom of Gaul. The Burgundians then had their turn ; they had been invited by the Gallo-Romans into the Rhône Valley, and by degrees insinuated themselves into the whole country from the upper Loire to the Alps, and from the Jura mountains to the Durance. They were far from being mere savages. Sidonius Apollinaris, Bishop of Clermont, found them by no means bad neighbours, though their rough habits jarred on his fastidious taste. Their King, Gondebaud, was a wise and conciliatory ruler, and in his *Loi Gombette* made a great attempt at fusion between the barbarians and Gallo-Romans.¹

The failure of both the Visigoths and the Burgundians to establish a permanent ascendancy was due indeed not to the fact that they were barbarians, or to any attempt on their part to oppress the Gallo-Romans, but to the opposition of the Church. By force of necessity, with the collapse of the Empire, the bishops had come to wield secular even more than religious power in Gaul, and it is probable that without their support no barbarian ruler could have established a permanent supremacy in the country. It so happened that, in that age, of all sins heresy was the most grievous in the eyes of the Church, and both the Visigoths and Burgundians in adopting Christianity had adopted the Arian heresy. This fact quite outweighed any other claims they might seem to

¹ The *Loi Gombette*, unlike the Frankish law, provided similar treatment before the law for Burgundians and Gallo-Romans ; it was written in Latin.

have. The Catholic Church looked at them in turn and said to each—"neither hath the Lord chosen this".

It was mainly this accident of the heresy of the Visigoths and Burgundians that gave importance to the irruption of the Franks, whom we saw settling in Belgium and on the lower Rhine. The origin and history of the Franks is very obscure, and has been the cause of much interesting speculation. It has been held that they were the result of the emigration of the surplus population of a Gothic people who had passed from the tribal to the particularist stage of civilization; that they had moved across Europe, settled first in the Saxon Plain, then in Scandinavia, whence—the population becoming congested—they had (instead of swarming, as the other barbarian races did, in a great tribal convulsion) sent out bands of individual settlers to carve out new estates, each band led by a military chief; such bands thus led, it is suggested, had settled on the Rhine and Moselle and in the plain of Flanders. Though it would be rash to adopt this interesting theory in its entirety¹ we may at any rate assume that the Franks were not a race or a tribe, but federations of warriors under professional leadership; they were much more warlike and much more savage than the Visigoths and the Burgundians. They were undoubtedly splendid warriors, and were able to draw continually on the barbaric reservoir in Saxony. Clovis, King of the Salian Franks, like so many of the barbarian kings, had in some vague way become the Roman official of his district. In the district immediately to the west of him Syagrius, the son of Egidius, had a similar position. But if he was a Roman official Clovis was also a greedy barbarian. He coveted the rich lands of the Seine and Loire valleys, and in 486 defeated Syagrius in the Battle of Soissons. In a sense, though it is possible to exaggerate the point, this was merely a personal quarrel between two Roman officials for the privilege of governing in the Emperor's name. But it was also a step in Frankish conquest. The Franks had become the rivals of the Burgundians and the Visigoths in the struggle for the domination of Gaul.

¹ It is worked out in de Tourville's "Growth of Modern Nations" (trans. Lock, 1907).

During the ten years that followed that rivalry was inactive. Clovis indeed gradually pushed his influence westward even as far as Brittany, but he was chiefly occupied with wars against the Thuringian and Alaman tribes in the Rhine valley, wars which he carried on in the name of the Empire. The Alamans who inhabited the Rhine valley as far as the river Main attacked the Ripuarian Franks in 496; Clovis defeated them at Tolbiac, near Strassburg, and secured not only the submission of all Germany as far as the Elbe, but also that of the Ripuarians. This battle was important from another point of view, for in the stress of the contest Clovis called upon the God of his Christian wife Clotilda.¹ Gratitude for the conversion of defeat into victory, supplemented by the eloquence of Saint Remigius, Bishop of Reims, led to his baptism which took place on Christmas Day of the same year in the Cathedral of Reims. "Bow your head in meekness," said the Saint, "adore what you used to burn, and burn what you used to adore." This event was of far greater importance than any victory, however decisive, over the Alamans could have been. For Clovis in embracing Christianity had embraced Catholicism. The Church had at last found a barbaric champion against heresy, and the Frankish King sprang at one bound to the position of eldest son and protégé of the Church. All his savagery (which was unlimited) was as nothing in her eyes as compared to his orthodoxy. In the midst of a tottering civilization he stood out as the champion of the one organization which remained erect among the ruins. As the Arians were an insignificant minority in Gaul, the "new Constantine" secured by his opportune conversion an immense advantage over his rivals, upon whom he now turned. He first attacked the Burgundians, won a battle near Dijon, but failed to drive them out of the Rhône Valley. Against the Visigoths, perhaps because they were more violently Arian, he was more successful. Euric had been succeeded by Alaric II, who was in constant trouble with the bishops on account of his Arianism. Theodoric, King of

¹ Clotilda was a Burgundian princess who had been brought up in the orthodox faith.

the Ostrogoths, came to his assistance, but in 507 Clovis, who made this a regular religious war, defeated and slew Alaric at Vouillé, near Poitiers, and subdued Auvergne, Toulouse, and Bordeaux. This victory gave him a great ascendancy, and he received the rank of Consul from the Emperor Anastasius. Theodoric tried to preserve Provence from Clovis. The city of Arles held out against all the attacks of the Franks (now aided by the Burgundians), and Narbonne was retaken. The Goths could not be moved from Provence and Septimania.

In spite of this Clovis was now by far the most powerful man in Gaul. He was not only the ruler of the finest fighting race of barbarians, but he was the adopted son of the Catholic Church in Gaul and the chosen representative of the Empire. It is a little difficult to see why, girded with so much power, he did not at once cast off the dim overlordship of the decaying Empire and stand on his own feet. We must try to realize that the idea of the Catholic Church was at this time inextricably bound up with the idea of a universal temporal Empire. For Clovis to abandon this fiction would be to throw away all the advantage derived from his opportune conversion. He could only hope to stand as the accredited representative of the Empire. Paganism indeed had joined with Christianity in acknowledging the eternity of the Empire, and to one who had been a pagan and had become a Christian the conception was doubly sacred. Thus it was that Clovis had accepted with alacrity the empty consular rank with which the Emperor had endowed him. The upstart was in fact in an invidious position. The idea of territorial sovereignty did not yet exist. Tribal sovereignty there was, such as Clovis had himself exercised prior to 486; and universal sovereignty, such as the Eastern and Western Emperors by a pleasing fiction both professed to enjoy. And there was nothing between.¹ Clovis, great as he was, was not great enough to claim universal dominion; yet he was obviously something more than a mere tribal chief. The best, nay the only, way out of the dilemma was the way he adopted—to claim to be the delegate of the universal sovereign.

¹ See Maine, "Ancient Law" (1861), p. 104.

Whatever his title Clovis had made himself *de facto* master of most of Gaul, and it remains to inquire what were the precise results of the change. Socially and politically they seem to have been slight. The Franks were not in sufficient numbers, nor were they sufficiently civilized, to disturb to any great extent the social fabric. They merely took over the Roman administration without greatly interfering with it. The change, therefore, was political rather than social.¹ Nor was it accompanied by any considerable friction or perceptible dislocation of the social fabric; and this was not only because the new rulers had insinuated themselves into their commanding position in the guise of representatives of the old system, but because of certain curious analogies between the social systems of the new-comers and the old inhabitants. Both Roman and Gallic society had a form of patronage as its basis, and by a fortunate coincidence the Germans had in their *mundium* a similar tie;² only it was founded more on the family than on the territorial basis. Thus the three societies had the same foundations, and there was no violent clashing of systems when the Franks became masters of Gaul. In this respect the only result of the conquest was that men came more and more under the royal protection. Gradually patronage disconnected itself from the family and became contractual. It also tended to coincide more and more with territorial relations. Justice too tended to fall to the proprietor rather than to the head of the family, only *vassi* and slaves maintaining the personal relation with their patrons. So that the ordinary form of patronage was connected not with a person but with a certain piece of land. The great proprietor with his great clientele could not indeed be touched either by taxation—he kept the immunities he enjoyed in Roman times—or, for the present at any rate, by administrative functionaries—he carried his grievances and those of his clients direct to the King: but even so he was not immune from the attacks of some more than ordinarily determined royal official.

¹ See Fisher, "Mediaeval Empire" (1898), I. 18.

² Flach, "Les origines de l'ancienne France" (1886-94) I. 87. Flach says elsewhere that when a Frankish chief took possession of a Roman *villa* he found it ready prepared for him.

Antonius was of course the patron of all on the *fundus*, and after the invasion remained so. In old days it had been a personal tie, but now it came to be connected with the property itself. So that when he sold part of the *fundus* he found—perhaps somewhat to his surprise—that he had transferred not only the land but the clients on it to the purchaser. Only the slaves remained his clients. Gradually he came to exercise a considerable jurisdiction among his clients on the *fundus*. But one day he found himself confronted with an official who called himself a *comes* or *comte* and showed the authority of the King, demanding the payment of certain sums for the royal treasury. Antonius pleaded the immunity he had been granted in Roman times and his plea was allowed. But he was so much alarmed at the incident that he determined to become the direct client or *fidelis* of the King. Even after this he was occasionally visited by an officious *comes*. The obvious remedy was that he should himself become a *comes*. This was easily arranged, for his Roman civilization, his ability to write and read, and his knowledge of affairs, were valuable assets appreciated to the full by the new Government. So Antonius became an important functionary, enjoyed a triple “*wergild*,”¹ levied the taxes such as they were from his *pagus*,² dispensed royal justice, helped the needy, and recruited troops for the King. He was perhaps, after his own experience, not astonished to find that the one idea of the inhabitants of the *pagus* was to throw off his authority and come into direct relations with the King. Once when there was a war scare our friend was greatly disturbed by the appearance of another functionary who called himself a *dux*. He came with special military attributes and quite terrified Antonius; fortunately his appointment was not, at first at any rate, permanent. It was a much more serious thing for a later Antonius, when, in the reign of Charlemagne, an official who called himself a *missus a latere* came down with the avowed and authorized in-

¹ Fine payable by slayer, according to value of slain person. See note on Salic Law, *infra*, p. 41, note.

² The name *pagus* came to be applied to the old *civitas*, a change which is sometimes very confusing.

tention of checking the various abuses which a succession of Antonii had allowed to grow up in the *pagus*, and quartered himself in Antonius' house at Antonius' expense until justice was done.¹ In the long run, however, the *missus* found that he was not able to effect much in this direction.

The fortunes of the house of Antonius may be regarded as typical; for the majority of the great offices of Church and State seem to have remained in Gallo-Roman hands in spite of the change of government. On the *fundus* itself, were we to revisit it say in the fifth or sixth or even in the eighth century, we should see little change. It kept its old name and its old organization. But as time passes there will be fewer slave gangs and more plots tilled by liberated slaves and *coloni* who were tending to become mediaeval serfs, a condition probably much harder than the position of the *coloni*.² The result of this change on the *fundus* will be a great reduction in the acreage of the "Home-Farm," and a corresponding increase in the number of "Small-Holdings". Probably also much of that elaborate *cortis* (steading) will fall into disuse. But, taking one thing with another, it is clear that the Frankish conquest left the economy of the domain very much where it was. Neither was there any general imposition of German laws or customs on the Gallo-Romans. There was in fact no attempt at juridical unity. The Frankish kings left to each people its own law, and south of the Loire Roman Law continued to be generally used.³ Frankish custom (now begin-

¹ See the Capitulary of Charlemagne in Bouquet, "Recueil des Histoires des Gaules" (1738, etc.), v. 647.

"Si Comes in suo ministerio justitias non fecerit missos nostros in sua casa somare faciat usque dum justitiæ ibidem factæ fuerint; et si vassus noster justitias non fecerit tunc et comes et missus ad ipsius casam sedeant et de suo vivant quousque justitiam faciat."

² Doniol, H., "Histoire des Classes Rurales" (1857), p. 177.

³ The celebrated Salic Law is a mere collection of rules in force and a manual of procedure, together with a tariff of penalties. "Composition" is the keynote. Every one has his value (*wergild*) varying according to his utility and rarity. The lower *wergild* of the Gallo-Roman is probably only due to the fact that he was in a strong numerical superiority and so

ning to be written) ran concurrently with Roman Law; and that accounts for the curious mixture of crudely primitive and highly civilized customs which is a characteristic of the period. The Roman taxation also remained unaltered with all the immunities which had gradually grown up. Even the Roman valuation rolls were used. Under these conditions the Gallo-Romans regarded the barbarian invaders, whom they largely outnumbered, more as guests than as masters. They had come in the guise of imperial troops; they governed in the imperial name and with the imperial laws and customs. Moreover they were Christians, and most important of all, orthodox Christians. The Gallo-Romans were in fact subjected to the Frankish King in his capacity of Roman Governor, but in no sense to the Frankish people. And the chief result of the "conquest" was the establishment of a royal dynasty which soon acquired a certain sanctity and which, though at times it fell very low, yet occupied the throne for close on three hundred years. What description of royalty was it, and what sort of administration accompanied it?

It has already been observed that the "Merovings" (as the Frankish kings were called from their supposed descent from the legendary Merovius) were essentially tribal kings who had solved the problem of providing for themselves a title to the regions which they had conquered by becoming officials of the Empire. This arrangement was of course to a large extent fictitious, and the Merovingian period is remarkable for continual clumsy attempts to build up a new form of royalty out of materials both German and Roman.

could be more easily spared. The solidarity of the family is recognized. The "hundred" is the unit of justice; and the Royal Tribunal is superior to the Hundred Tribunal. Great stress is laid on land tenure. No woman might inherit land; it was this provision that in after times was held to exclude women from the throne of France. Amongst other customs and characteristics revealed by this important document is a complete system of guarantees, the practice of the Ordeal, addiction to the chase, absence of industry and commerce, and immunity from interference of the Gallo-Romans. The earliest known copy dates from a period after the Franks had reached the Loire; it is couched in barbarous Latin.

As to the nature of the Merovingian royalty it was simply untempered absolutism. The kings were sole law-givers, sole judges; they could tax and make war at will, levying the army when and leading it where they would. They administered the kingdom by officials directly responsible to themselves. To this absolutism there were no limitations; for there was no medium for popular resistance. The King governed through the "Palace," and it was the usurpation by that body of the royal power, and not popular or even aristocratic opposition, which ultimately overthrew the Merovingian dynasty. Aristocracy in fact did not yet exist, and nobility of birth was not recognized. A "noble family" was simply one that had served the King for some generations. The *grandes* of the Merovingian period were simply Court functionaries. The bishops too, whose importance at this time it would be difficult to overrate, gradually came to be appointed from the ranks of the Court officials, so that by the seventh century it is true to say that the Palace "possessed" both Church and State. Local Government was carried on by a ring of Court officials, who with the title of *dux* or *comes* administered specified districts. At first these men were the simple agents and personal servants of the Crown, but by the seventh century their offices were tending to become hereditary; they had converted their administrative districts into benefices, over which they had rights with which the King himself dared not tamper; had in fact joined the ranks of the great proprietors, and were rapidly becoming the pivot of a powerful aristocracy. We shall see how in the night of later Merovingian times these functionaries at last shook off the royal supremacy, freed themselves from all restrictions, and kept only the benefits of their offices. What concerns us here is the fact that the "Palace" of the earlier Merovingian kings was much more than an ordinary Court. It was the Ministry, and included both the Central *Bureaux* and the Local Administrations. The Mayor of the Palace, the leader of the State officials, was no mere Court functionary but a veritable Grand Vizier.

Although confiscation had not been general or systematic a certain portion of the land of Gaul—probably all the land which

had been allotted by the Romans to the maintenance of their officials—was seized by the Frankish kings and converted into “royal domain,” and as there was little actual money, all payments for services rendered were naturally made in confiscated land. So Duchies and Counties, or what in the course of time would become Duchies and Counties, were already taking root in Gallic soil, and feudalism had thus got a footing before the actual downfall of the Empire.

Not only was there a large royal domain, but the entire kingdom came to be regarded as royal patrimony. This idea of patrimony was engrained in the German mind long before the conquest of Gaul, and it was destined to have the most dire results on the future of the Merovingian dynasty, for on the death of each king, by the rules which governed the inheritance of patrimony, each of his sons was entitled to a share. In practice this told in favour of the youngest son, who, if he could manage to keep his head on his shoulders, stood a good chance of surviving his brothers and reuniting the kingdom. The system might in fact with justice be termed a system of “ultimogeniture”. Thus the only Merovings who ruled over the whole of the dominions of Clovis were either youngest sons or the sons or grandsons of youngest sons. The attempt to preserve the unity of the kingdom and at the same time to provide for every member of the royal family was foredoomed to failure. All the wisest of the Merovings—such as Brunhilda and Dagobert—perceived this; but the custom was too strong to be over-ridden, and it is useless to reproach the Merovings for not over-riding it. Indeed it survived the dynasty of which it was the undoing.

To sum up, the Merovings established an absolute hereditary monarchy in Gaul which by force of German custom was regarded as so much family patrimony. They adopted the Roman machinery of Government, and only partially changed the personnel of the administration. It must occur at once to the reader that this Government would be exposed to a double danger; that of dissolution from within by reason of the unfortunate necessity for repeated divisions of the kingdom, and that of destruction from without because of the scope given to

the *grandes* or Palace functionaries. The story of the Merovingian dynasty, which must now be shortly told, proves the reality of these dangers. Every attempt to consolidate the kingdom was wrecked by a fresh division ; and the government officials, profiting by this element of weakness, gradually absorbed all the power of the Crown, so that the kings became mere puppets in their hands.

His conversion to Christianity produced little change in the character of Clovis. His savagery is amazing ; he murdered not only his enemies, but all his own relations, in cold blood, to the applause of the Church. Even Gregory of Tours, who is not squeamish, though he does not disapprove, tires of the tale. "After killing many Kings," is his comprehensive conclusion, "and his own nearest relations, for fear they should wrest the Empire from him, he extended his power over the whole of Gaul."¹ And so in 511 Clovis died ; a grim and strange character, a political Christian, a barbarian who exploited civilization for his own ends. His kingdom, or more strictly his patrimony, was divided between his four sons, Theuderich (born out of wedlock), Clodomir, Childebert, and Clotair. That in the kingdom thus divided it was the intention to preserve at least a semblance of unity is clear from the proximity of the four capitals, Reims, Soissons, Paris, and Orleans ; but real unity under the prevalent conditions was only possible by the elimination of all save one of the royal stock and for such an elimination the various members of that house worked with a brutality and disregard of human life and family feeling which is fortunately rare in history. Clodomir died in 524, and his sons were promptly murdered by their uncles. Theuderich's line died out in 555, and Childebert dying in 558, Clotair, probably the greatest ruffian, and probably because he was the greatest ruffian, among the sons of Clovis,² reunited his father's realms.

But Clotair ruled over far more than his father's realms ; for the remarkable point about these sons of Clovis, even more than their savagery, was their faculty for uniting against

¹ Gregory of Tours, *op. cit.* i. 125.

² He burnt his rebellious son, Chramne, to death.

their common foes, and their tremendous warlike force. The period, so blood-stained and broken within, was one of steady external aggrandizement. Against Burgundy, where Gondebaud had been succeeded by his son Sigismund, repeated expeditions were made; the danger in this quarter came from the fact that the Arianism of the Burgundians was weakening, and that consequently the Merovings ran a risk of losing their most effective weapon—the support of the Catholic Church. It was not till 534 that Burgundy was finally conquered (after an independent existence of one hundred years) and divided between Childebert, Clotair, and Theudebert, the successor of Theuderich. The disappearance of Burgundy deserves more than a passing notice. Less violent than the Franks, the Burgundians were also by far less savage, and seem to have assimilated more easily with the Gallo-Romans than any of the other barbarian races. They were men of great stature and simple and genial habits. But all chance of a Burgundified Gaul was ruined by their Arianism, which, though much weaker than that of the Visigoths, was enough to rouse the antagonism of the Church. Once more it was in the strange guise of handmaid of the Church that the brutal Frankish monarchy had triumphed.

The Burgundians crushed, the next business of the Merovings was to deal with the Ostrogoths in Provence; and in this they were greatly helped by the support of the Emperor Justinian, who, recognizing the military power of the Franks, hoped to use them as auxiliaries to the armies which, under Belisarius, he was sending to Italy (534) for the reconquest of the Western Empire. The Ostrogoths outbid the Emperor by surrendering Provence to the Franks, and the three kings proceeded to divide that region as they had previously divided Burgundy; Justinian afterwards confirmed this cession and the Frankish kings became special protégés of the Emperor, their coinage having currency throughout the imperial dominions. About the same time they subdued the Alamans in Rhoëtia. Gaul was by this time wholly under Frankish sway with the solitary exception of Septimania, where the Visigoths obstinately resisted all attempts at conquest. The activity of

the Frankish kings extended indeed far beyond the bounds of Gaul. Theuderich's vigorous son, Theudebert, scoured Northern Italy in 539, and at one time seemed likely to anticipate the Empire of Charlemagne; he meditated an expedition to Thrace. The Franks maintained themselves in Italy until 554.

In 542 Childebert and Clotair had penetrated into Visigothic Spain, but without managing to establish a real foothold. In Germany the Franks pushed out as far as the Saale and Elbe. Francia (the modern Franconia) had been conquered by Clovis; Thuringia was subdued in 531; encroachments were also made upon the Saxon and Bavarian areas, and Theudebert won a naval victory over the Danes in 515. For three years after the death of Childebert these vast realms acknowledged the rule of a single man—Clotair. With his death in 561 the period of expansion ends, and a fresh period of internal division begins. Clotair left four sons, Caribert, Gontran, Sigebert, and Chilperic, and once more, to meet their claims, the fabric tumbled to pieces.¹ Caribert died in 567, Gontran was a pacific nonentity, and the interest of the period centres on Sigebert and Chilperic. The former seems to have been somewhat less, the latter somewhat more, savage than the average Meroving. Both married daughters of the Visigothic King of Spain. Sigebert's wife, Brunhilda, who accepted Catholicism on her marriage, was a woman of parts, who developed considerable faculties for government in later life. Chilperic who is denounced—and not without reason—by Gregory of Tours as “the Nero and Herod” of his time,

¹ Caribert ruled at Paris over the West of Gaul. Gontran over the Rhône Valley and Berry with capital at Orleans; Sigebert at Reims over the Meuse and Rhine valleys (coming to be called Austrasia). He also ruled the German tribes, and had Auvergne and part of Provence. Chilperic had the smallest portion—the North-East, with capital at Soissons. On Caribert's death Chilperic got two detached portions of his patrimony—Brittany, Angers, Évreux and Rouen in the north, and Bordeaux, Cahors, Limoges, Bigorre, and Béarn in the south. Sigebert got Tours and Poitiers, and Gontran Saintes, Angoulême, and Périgueux. The government of Paris was put in commission, good evidence of the special importance that was coming to be attached to the city.

soon tired of his civilized bride. She was strangled, and the King married an earlier concubine, Fredegonde; this was the signal for a fierce outbreak of civil war which lasted for forty years (573-613). Sigebert was at first successful in his attempt to avenge his murdered sister-in-law, but in 575 he in turn was assassinated. His son Childebert escaped, but Brunhilda was thrown into prison—one wonders why she was not murdered—and the period of Chilperic's ascendancy begins. Chilperic is a strange and terrible character, a sixth century "Wolf of Badenoch". His cruelties and atrocities were unbounded; but with all the worst instincts of barbarism he combined the tastes of a civilized man; he had literary aspirations, wrote verses, encouraged Latin as opposed to German, and even started a heresy of his own.¹

In 584 this remarkable man met the death which was appropriate for him—assassination. His widow, Fredegonde, escaped with her child son Clotair II, and for a time Gontran, who was an inveterate trimmer, gave her his protection. But the appearance of an illegitimate son of Clotair I (Gondovald) drove him to a reconciliation with Brunhilda and Childebert. Gondovald thrice invaded Gaul and in 583 had considerable success in the South, but in 587 he was assassinated. During this period, while Austrasia was ruled by a woman for a minor, there had been an ominous increase of turbulence among the *grandes* of that region, and by this time they were a real menace to the royal power. It was this alarming state of affairs that drove Gontran to make the *Pacte d'Andelot* (587) with Brunhilda and Childebert, by which the latter was acknowledged heir of Gontran's (Burgundian) kingdom. This rally of the royal power checkmated the *grandes*, and endured until Gontran's death in 593, when Childebert succeeded him, only, however, to follow him to the grave in 596 at the early age of twenty-six.

The Visigothic Queen, who had really always dominated her son, now ruled for two grandsons, Theuderich and Theu-

¹ Gregory of Tours, op. cit. II. 327. "About the same time King Chilperic wrote a letter to ordain that the Holy Trinity alone should be called God, without distinction of persons."

debert, and with great sagacity tried to avoid the redivision of the kingdom which her careful diplomacy had united. Childebert's sons were but children and the children of a child, and it was deplorable to have to sacrifice the hard-won unity for the sake of two infants. Custom, however, was too strong, and Theudebert became King of the north-eastern region, whilst Theuderich took Burgundy and Alsace. Fredegonde seized the opportunity to attack Austrasia, but death overtook her before she had had time to push her early success very far (597), and her son was not able to do anything without her. A series of internecine wars between Theuderich and Theudebert ended in the defeat and death of the latter (612). But Theuderich only survived one year to enjoy the reunited kingdom. On his death Brunhilda made another attempt to maintain the unity of the realms by raising the eldest of Theuderich's sons (Sigebert) to the throne at the expense of his brothers. Thereupon the *grandes* revolted and called in Clotair II. Amongst the revolted *grandes* were Arnulf, Bishop of Metz, and Pepin of Heristal, from the union of whose houses was to spring the Caroling stock. The old Queen resisted; but she had alienated the *grandes* of Austrasia by her firmness, her insistence on primogeniture, and her vindication of the royal power; she was deserted by her followers, captured, cruelly tortured, tied to the tail of a horse, and dragged to death (613). Brunhilda's forty years' rule of Austrasia is the one ray of light in the dark Merovingian night. One is sorry for a princess so enlightened and so civilized condemned to play her part in times so stormy and amongst men so savage. Her alien origin had no doubt enabled her to view such things as the custom of division of patrimony from a detached standpoint, but it must also have prejudiced her people against her wise counsels. Her championship of the principle of primogeniture had condemned her to the fate of those who assault time-honoured customs and wound "national" susceptibilities. But we may guess that it was not this alone that brought about Brunhilda's downfall. The Queen had steadily vindicated the power of the Crown as against the disintegrating claims of the *grandes*; she had really

tried to govern, and had exacted duties from her subjects instead of conceding privileges; she had taxed them, and enforced the obligations of military service. Such a rule in such times was bound to provoke hostility; she was a brave woman to attempt it. Brunhilda cared for the prosperity of Austrasia, and did what she could to promote trade and industry; she was a builder of roads as well as of castles—a pillar of order and progress in a world of bandits.

It is a most remarkable thing that during this period of civil war and internal disturbance the boundaries of the Frankish realms remained inviolate. The period of conquest indeed is over; and one wonders how far the Frankish kings might have gone had they been able to adjust their family quarrels; even as it is the kings can still show a resolute front against rebellion (e.g. against the Bretons and Basques); can throw back an invasion such as that of the Lombards (571-572) in Provence; can rouse themselves to a Visigothic war (as Gontran did in 585 and 589); can resist an incursion of Avars on the Elbe (as Sigebert did in 562); can even make expeditions against the Lombards in Northern Italy (as Childebert repeatedly did in response to the prayers of the Emperor, in 584, 585, 588, 590). But if the Franks are still active, the signs of approaching paralysis are not wanting. The Avars have to be bought off—they will be dealt with in firmer fashion by Charlemagne. The Visigothic war is unsuccessful; Septimania also is reserved for Charlemagne; and Childebert's enterprises in Italy are expeditions rather than invasions; there too the laurels will be culled by the Carolings.

This slackening of the tide of conquest is the first indication of the failure of the Merovings. And now, with the death of Brunhilda, the aristocracy rises to a position from which it can threaten the absolutism of the Crown, and at the same time the essential unity of the Frankish realms, which, in spite of dynastic divisions had always sub-existed, began to show signs of disintegration. Over against Austrasia which had long had its separate entity in the North and East, Neustria begins to develop in the West, and the growth of a Teutonic language in the former and a Romance language in the latter

accentuates the difference. The basins of the Scheldt, Seine, and partially that of the Loire, thus become the germ of modern France, and the basins of the Rhine, Moselle, and Meuse that of modern Germany. At the same time Burgundy and Aquitaine keep their separate existences. Clotair II, after the death of Brunhilda, nominally ruled over the whole Frankish realm, but, in Austrasia at least, he only did so by consent of the aristocracy, and that consent could only be secured in return for copious concessions. These concessions were embodied in an edict of 18 October, 614, which surrendered to the Church (with certain reservations) the right to elect bishops, extended the power of ecclesiastical tribunals, restricted the royal power of taxation, confirmed all the royal grants to the *grandes*, and declared that *comtes* must be persons belonging to the districts they are appointed to administer. This was an abdication of absolutism and a real charter, and marks a sensible decline in the power of the Merovings.

As if to emphasize the disunion of the kingdom, separate Mayors of the Palace were next given to Austrasia, Neustria, and Burgundy. Austrasia, however, wanted a king of its own as well as a mayor, and in 626 the kingdom of Austrasia was revived for Clotair's son, Dagobert. His youth gave scope to the ambitions of Arnulf, Bishop of Metz, and Pepin, the Mayor of the Palace.

In 629 Clotair died, and Dagobert at once reasserted the principle of unity which had been in abeyance since the death of Brunhilda, his brother Caribert being relegated to a kind of lordship of the marches in Aquitaine. Pepin fled from Austrasia and a single Mayor of the Palace was appointed for the whole realm. Dagobert was a wise and vigorous ruler, and during the ten years of his reign made a great effort to stave off the impending ruin of his house. In this task he encountered two main obstacles—firstly, the power of the aristocracy, acting through the Palace functionaries, who had profited by the weakness of the Merovings and the repeated divisions of the kingdom to usurp many of the functions of royalty; and secondly, the division of the kingdom, especially the distinction between Austrasia and Neustria, which was by this

time beginning to have some "national" justification. So grave were these obstacles that they ruined Dagobert's chances. In 634 he was obliged to recognize the separate entity of Austrasia by handing it to his son Sigibert, and as Sigibert was only a child this was equivalent to handing it to the Austrasian aristocracy. In other respects the brief reign of Dagobert was the last flicker of Merovingian success. He made successful expeditions against the Bretons and Basques, prevented an irruption of the Slav races on his eastern frontier, and allied himself with the Emperor Heraclius. But his death in 639 was the signal for a complete collapse of the Merovingian royalty. His successors were so entirely in the power of the aristocracy, in particular of the Mayors of the Palace, that even their names need not concern us. One mayor indeed, Grimoald, son of Pepin and representative of what was afterwards the Caroling house, actually attempted to secure for his own son the throne of Austrasia. The failure of this attempted *coup d'état* was the chief reason why the Carolings (if we may already so call them) were content to remain so long kings in fact without assuming the title.

By this time, however, it was clear that the Merovings could not keep even the semblance of kingship without the permission of the aristocracy. It is probable that the pictures drawn of the *Rois fainéants*, which are the work of Caroling writers, are considerably exaggerated. It would have required a strong king indeed to succeed where Brunhilda and Dagobert had failed, and of such a king there was no sign. So much so that it seemed hardly worth while to depose the Merovings who, moreover, possessed a royal and half mythological lineage which it would have been dangerous to ignore. Thus for another century they continued nominally to rule over the Franks. But from the death of Dagobert it is the mayors and not the kings who struggle and torture and assassinate one another, and enjoy the other privileges of kingship. "The kings strive no longer," says Professor Freeman, "other men strive in their name for the exercise of their authority."

The period from 639-687 is one of transition. In it many contending principles were at work. The one thing certain

was the ultimate downfall of the dynasty. Political geography meanwhile becomes clearer, and we see the limits of Austrasia, Neustria, and Burgundy defining themselves. The two latter with a common tongue are drifting together, while Austrasia tends to become distinct. Austrasia through its great Mayors of the Palace voiced the opposition to the claim of Neustria to be the heart of the Frankish dominions; voiced in fact the unconscious idea of German national independence. To Austrasia also, we may trace the aristocratic tendencies which overthrew the Merovings; of which tendencies the "Caroling" mayors were the great exponents. Aquitaine meanwhile is wrapt in obscurity, and at times at least partially independent. From her neighbour Neustria, she was racially distinct. It was not natural that Gothic-Iberians should mix readily with Franco-Celts.

After the failure of Grimoald in 656, the lead was transferred from Austrasia to Neustria, and for a time the Frankish dominions were united under Clovis II and Clotair III and the Neustrian Mayor of the Palace, Ebroin. But Austrasia recovered her separate existence under Childeric II, brother of Clotair III, with Wulfoald as Mayor. Burgundy at the same time made a bid for independence under the leadership of Leodegarius (St. Leger), Bishop of Autun, who brought her into an unnatural alliance with Austrasia against Neustria (673). Ebroin could not resist this combination, and was deposed, the three kingdoms obtaining each a separate existence. But the alliance between Burgundy and Austrasia was too unnatural to be enduring; Ebroin escaped and besieged Leger in his episcopal city, and when he surrendered put him to death with cruel tortures. Ebroin, and with him Neustria, thus recovered the ascendancy. Austrasia, now led by Pepin II, the grandson of Arnulf and Pepin I, revolted unsuccessfully in 680; but in the following year (681) Ebroin was assassinated. For a time his successors in the mayoralty continued to hold the Austrasians at bay, but in 686 the Neustrian Mayor, Bertharic, was defeated at Tertry near St. Quentin by the Austrasians under Pepin, aided by many disaffected Neustrians, and the ascendancy was trans-

ferred from Neustria to Austrasia, but in particular to the house of Pepin, who now assumed almost royal powers and held them until his own death in 714, allotting the mayoralties and the succession to the mayoralties amongst his sons and grandsons. The thirty-one years of Pepin's rule were not signalized by any great feat of arms or policy. The Mayor made several successful expeditions against the German peoples, subdued the Frisians and defeated the Alamans; and his ascendancy at home was never really challenged. In some degree at least he had asserted himself over the Aristocracy as well as over the Monarchy.

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CHAPTER IV

CHARLES MARTEL AND PEPIN THE SHORT

(715-768)

PEPIN'S two sons had predeceased him, and his widow, Plectrude, proceeded to assume the government of the kingdom in the name of his young grandchildren—a curious illustration of the confusion into which things had fallen. It was only to be expected that under these conditions the Frankish realms should begin to fall to pieces once more. In 715 Neustria revolted and joined hands with the Frisians against Austrasia. Then Pepin's illegitimate son Charles, a man of twenty-seven, stepped into the breach, defeated the rebels and seized the mayoralty. This event marks the end of a period of transition. Austrasia had triumphed over Neustria; Teutonic over Romance tendencies; we might almost say German over French at once. The Merovingians it is true were, with one brief interval, to occupy the throne for thirty-two more years; but in reality the Carolingian period dates from the accession to the mayoralty of Charles Martel. It has been argued that the accession of the Carolings was no more than the triumph of one palace faction over another; that the Carolings were at least in part Gallo-Romans, and that to call their accession a triumph for Teutonic tendencies is an invention of historians in search for generalizations. It is quite possible that much Gallo-Roman blood flowed in the veins of the Carolings, possible also that they never regarded themselves as in any special sense representing Teutonic ideas, that their Teutonism was in fact unconscious. But it is not possible to deny that their accession, by re-emphasizing the Teutonic element, materially delayed the development of France.

Charles at once installed a Meroving of his own, Clotair

IV, made himself master of Neustria, and restored the unity of the kingdom. He then proceeded to deal with the restless German peoples, and between 725 and 734 made two expeditions in Bavaria and also invaded Alamannia, Frisia, and Saxony. But in 732 he found himself confronted with a crisis far graver than he had encountered in any of these quarters. The Saracens, whose astonishing career through Africa had eventually brought them to Spain, began to threaten France from the South. They penetrated, in spite of the stout resistance of Odo of Aquitaine, as far as Poitiers, where Charles met them with an enormous host and, after a fearful struggle which lasted for three days, completely routed them (732). They fell back towards the Pyrenees, but retained their foothold in Septimania and Provence. The Battle of Poitiers is one of the most important in history; it set the seal on the military supremacy of the Franks; the "wall of ice"—so the chronicler describes their formation—withstood every onslaught of the fiery horsemen of the desert. Moreover, the victory gave Charles Martel a unique position in Europe. Already lord of the greater part of France, he had by his successful campaigns in the East made himself supreme in the greater part of Germany also; and now by his triumph over the Saracens he became the saviour of Christendom.¹

Nor was it against the Saracens alone that Charles fought the battles of the Faith. His operations on his eastern frontier were almost as much missionary enterprises as wars of conquest; so much was this the case that the enlargement of the Frankish kingdom came to be equivalent to the enlargement of Christendom. The actual conversion of the heathen Germans was the work of Saint Boniface and his helpers, but in all his missionary enterprises Boniface had Charles Martel at his side. In this way Hesse, Thuringia, Bavaria, and Alamannia received the Gospel at the sword's point, and Charles soon came to be regarded, and with justice, as the secular arm of the Church.

¹ But see Mercier's article in "*Revue Historique*" (1878), "*La bataille de Poitiers et les vraies causes du recul de l'invasion Arabe*". Mercier's view is that the battle was not decisive, but that the Arab invasion had reached its natural limit and would in any case have receded.

It was a curious position for a mere palace functionary and it was rendered more curious still by the death in 737 of the Merovingian King, Theuderich IV. Charles either did not desire or did not dare to take the crown; but he saw no sense in maintaining another Merovingian puppet; so the heir to the throne was set aside, and for four years we have the strange spectacle of a kingdom without a king, and a royal official without a royal master. The Mayor carried war into Aquitaine in 735 and made himself master of Bordeaux. In 737 and 738 he was engaged in fresh Saracenic wars, with the object of ejecting the Saracens from Septimania and Provence. It was while he was thus engaged that he first came into contact with the Lombards, a Teutonic race who had made their way into Italy in the sixth century, and set up a kingdom with capital at Pavia. The Lombards were interested in the ejection of the Saracens, and entered into an alliance with the Franks. The Saracens were driven out of Septimania and Provence, retaining only a foothold at the seaport of Narbonne.

But, if the Lombards were useful allies to the Franks in their conflict with the Saracens, they were by no means acceptable allies to the Papacy. In the first place they were Arians, and we know what that meant in the eyes of the Church; and then they were dangerous and encroaching neighbours of the Popes in Italy. Gregory III, in fact, probably viewed the Lombards with more alarm than he viewed the Saracens, and no doubt disapproved of the unholy alliance. He was in fact very hard pressed by Charles' allies, and the Eastern Emperor, the traditional protector of the Church, had neither the means nor the desire to fulfil his rôle. In these straits Gregory turned to the conqueror of the Saracens, the ally of Boniface, and implored his protection, judging no doubt that the man who was willing to be mayor where there was no king, might agree to be consul¹ where there was no

¹ The title of *consul* was borne by the dukes and other local magnates of Ravenna, Rome, and Naples; it conferred a certain municipal nobility. (See "Revue des questions historiques," LXIX. Article by H. Hubert on the "Iconoclastic Movement and the formation of the States of the Church".)

emperor, and so play in Italy a part akin to that which he was already playing in Gaul (739). The moment was critical, the offer tempting; it was no mean thing to be called on to perform functions which properly belonged to the Emperor. It might eventually mean imperial dignity, and that would at any rate solve the difficulty about a Carolingian title. But Charles refused to respond to the Papal invitation. Did he see that the Franks had no interests in Italy, that their mission was elsewhere, or did he merely cherish honourable scruples about deserting an ally? We cannot tell. We only know that he refused; and that he was supremely right in refusing the history of his descendants abundantly proves. Charles' memory suffered at the hands of clerical historians for this refusal to succour the Pope; but in truth he was the greatest of his house, for with all the force which was common to his son and grandson, he combined a sober self-restraint with which they were not endowed.

Charles Martel died on 22 October, 741. His two sons, Carloman and Pepin, found themselves in a strange position. A kingdom was divided between them, yet they were not kings. The great Charles himself had not been able to depart from the custom of division. But the two brothers managed to govern in harmony for six years, when Carloman abdicated and retired to a monastery. Even before this event, however, the brothers had decided to bring the interregnum to a close, and had raised to the throne a Meroving whose pedigree is uncertain but whose name was Childeric III. This step was probably taken with the object of giving a semblance of unity to the divided kingdom; but it is another proof that, in the view of the Carolings, the time was not yet ripe for a change of dynasty. The difficulty of providing an effective claim for a parvenu house whose sovereignty could be neither tribal nor universal seemed insuperable. The gradual *rapprochement* with the Papacy, which now began, gives an indication of the way in which the difficulty was destined to be overcome.

Pepin the Short, in fact, as soon as he became sole ruler, decided that the time had come to strike. His position as

mayor was highly ambiguous, based as it was solely on the personal qualifications of his talented house. Moreover there was always the chance that a Meroving might arise who would not be content with the position of royal marionette. Thus even on grounds of public interest a change of dynasty was desirable. But on what pretext could it be made? By a happy inspiration the new dynasty founded its strength on that particular sanction which had been most lacking to the Merovings. Clovis had no doubt profited by his opportune conversion; but there was nothing essentially Christian in the kingships of the Merovings, on the contrary it was a pure amplification of the heathen Teutonic kingship. The Carolings, on the other hand, would seek their sanction from the first in religion. Pepin, therefore, consulted the Pope on the grave question of conscience, whether one who actually wields the power should assume the crown. The Pope replied favourably, whereupon Pepin summoned an assembly of the Frankish people to Soissons (751) and procured his own election. Childeric was deposed and Pepin mounted the throne. Even so, however, his position was by no means secure, and he was ready to clutch at any additional sanction for his usurpation. For this he could only look to the Pope; and if Pepin needed the Pope, the Pope needed Pepin. The encroachments of the Lombards were becoming more and more a menace to the Holy See, and if assistance could not be procured from the Franks the Popes would look in vain for it elsewhere. Each therefore saw his opportunity in the other's dilemma. Overtures were made, and in 754 Stephen II crossed the Alps and met Pepin at Ponthion, where they drove a bargain that each should come to the other's assistance. The Pope carried out his part of the bargain at once. On 28 July, 754, he performed on Pepin the solemn, and (in Gaul) novel, ceremony of anointing at St. Denis, at the same time conferring on him and his two sons the dignity of "Patrician of the Romans," and warning the Frankish people that never under pain of the direst anathemas must they choose a king outside the direct Carolingian line.

It was now Pepin's turn. He undertook to do what his father had refused to do, to "restore to the *Respublica Romana*" (by which he meant the Papacy) "the Exarchate and Ravenna, and whatever else the Lombard King had taken from it";¹ and he proceeded at once to execute his side of the bargain, though he met with violent opposition from the Frankish *grandes* as well as from St. Boniface. Pepin invaded Italy and soon brought Aistulf, the Lombard King, to his knees (754). But as soon as the Franks had gone Aistulf renewed hostilities, and in 756 actually besieged Rome. Pepin returned and again saved the Pope, and on this occasion handed over to the Holy See the cities which Aistulf surrendered,² in spite of a demand from Constantinople that they should be made over to the Emperor.³ Thus was accomplished the famous and fatal "donation of Pepin," the nucleus of the temporal power of the Papacy. The agreement between Pepin and the Pope had far-reaching results in many directions; not only did it lay the foundations of the temporal power, but it heralded the transference of the Western Empire to the Franks and the birth of the Holy Roman Empire; this revival of imperial ideals in the West was a grave blow to the development of nationalities, while the creation of the temporal power postponed for more than a thousand years the national unity of Italy.

Pepin of course never dreamt of all this. He had merely taken the obvious and necessary steps for the establishment of his dynasty; and having carried out his side of the bargain returned to the traditional task of his house, that of hammering his neighbours. Two years of peace (756-8) were followed

¹ The *Pacte de Quierzy* (754), by which the Pope was promised a donation of lands (the old Exarchate, the Duchies of Spoleto and Benevento, part of Corsica, Istria, and Venice, and not as a property but definitely as a realm), was signed not only by Pepin but also by his sons Charles and Carloman. (Hubert, H., in "Revue des questions historiques," LXIX.)

² Ravenna, Rimini, Pesaro, Faro, Cesena, Sinigaglia, Jesi, Forlì, Urbino, Cagli, Gubbio, Narni and Connachio.

³ The Papal application for Frankish aid had been without the consent or approval of the Emperor.

by a Saxon war, and a further expedition against the Saracens, who were now driven out of Narbonne. Then in 760 began a war with Aquitaine which lasted for six years. Pepin conquered Berry and Auvergne, and after a brief interlude, while he was attending to a revolt in Bavaria, completely mastered Aquitaine and killed its Duke, Waifre, who had organized the trouble (766). Two years later (24 September, 768) Pepin died. His reign was of the utmost importance; he had set the course which his son was to follow. He had maintained the Frankish power at the standard of strength set by his father, and made it felt in regions which his father had hesitated to enter. With him the Carolingian Monarchy became the greatest power in Europe. And in striking the path of empire he had not neglected the traditional task of the Carolings and Merovings. He had eradicated the last vestiges of the Saracens, subdued Aquitaine and organized it as an integral part of the kingdom, and continued the hammer blows of his father on his Eastern frontier. The great name of his son must not be allowed to obscure the great deeds of Pepin the Short.

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
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SIMPLIFIED TABLE OF CAROLINGIAN HOUSE



CHAPTER V
CHARLEMAGNE

(768-814)

ALTHOUGH we are now deep in the story of the "second race," France in its modern sense has not yet even begun to take shape. For some time yet we shall have to extract from much material that is beside the point those elements which either contributed to the formation of the French nation, or influenced its subsequent history.

We have concentrated our attention on the geographical area which we know as France while that area was in the occupation of warring tribes, which overran the larger part of Europe without any semblance of political unity. We have watched the same area become an almost indistinguishable item in the great organism of the Roman Empire, until, in the decay of that organism, it fell under the domination of Teutonic invaders, the most important of whom were the Franks. On the Frankish monarchs we next fixed our attention, marking the extension of their dominions until they reached the geographical limits of modern France. We have briefly followed the vicissitudes of these dominions through the countless divisions and reunions which were the unfortunate consequence of the curious limitations of Frankish kingship. For a moment at different junctures the eye has been arrested by some division which seems to present the appearance of modern France, an appearance quickly dissipated by a fresh turn of the ever-changing kaleidoscope. More recently, during the reigns of the first Carolings, we have come to realize that our search for national boundaries is premature, that the idea of universal empire is still the only alternative to that of tribal chieftainship. And as we watched the uneasy and tentative action of Charles Martel and Pepin the Short in Italy, we have been

forced to the conclusion that we must give up for a little longer the hope of starting on a real France. With the accession of Charlemagne all doubt on this score is at an end. Once more we are on the path of empire, and the day of nationalities is once more postponed. Charlemagne indeed owes his position in history to the fact that he seized upon this ideal of empire, and bent all his vast energy and splendid persistency to its realization. From our point of view, who are eagerly awaiting the dawn of French nationality, his reign must thus of necessity appear in a reactionary light.

Yet, reactionary as in a sense it undoubtedly was, it profoundly influenced the future of France. The goal of imperialism for one thing could only be reached along the path of orthodoxy. Thus it is that we trace to the days of Charlemagne the essential character of the France of later times. For while the imperial dignities drifted into German hands, the tradition of Catholic orthodoxy and the title of "Most Christian King" was France's special share of the imperial heritage. Moreover some period of preparation was necessary before any division of Western Europe into separate nationalities could be satisfactorily made. The loaf must be kneaded before it is sliced, and Charlemagne's policy gave to Western Europe a certain solidarity and consistency of politics, administration, and above all religion, which was not without its effect when the time for division came. Of Charlemagne in his essentially French aspect, and of the direct results of his reign on the formation of French institutions, we shall have to speak before the close of this chapter. Meanwhile it is necessary to get an idea of the story of his reign and of the broader aspects of his work.

From the outset Charlemagne seems to have been imbued with the ideal of empire. Before, however, he could reasonably hope to realize this ideal much would have to be done. In the first place he must appear before Christendom as the most conspicuous champion of Catholicism; secondly, he must enlarge his boundaries to imperial dimensions; thirdly, he must find some means of meeting the natural hostility of the Eastern Emperor; and fourthly, he must contrive to

overcome the reluctance of the Pope. We shall see how, with a rare consistency, every step in his policy was directed towards the attainment of some one of these ends.

Even before he became sole ruler of his father's dominions he had given indications of the line he intended to adopt in Italy. While his brother Carloman allied himself with the Lombards, Charlemagne threw himself on to the side of the Pope; and it was against his will, and in deference to the bidding of his mother, that in 770 he was persuaded to marry the daughter of the Lombard King, Desiderius.¹ On the death of his brother, he was free to return to his first policy. He repudiated his Lombard wife, and once more established friendly relations with the Pope. Then, in spite of the opposition of the Frankish *grandes*, he declared war upon the ancient enemy of his people (773). This time there was no hesitation. Pavia and Verona were taken and Desiderius himself captured. Then for the first time in history a Frankish king entered the Papal City as the guest and protector of the Pope (Hadrian I). Charlemagne confirmed, in what form is uncertain, the donation of Pepin. It was clear that he was not going to be guilty of the "great refusal": if greatness came his way he would go to meet it. His next step was to assume the title of King of the Lombards, and after two further campaigns that of Suzerain of Beneventum. Desiderius was relegated to a monastery. The Byzantines still clung to Southern Apulia, Calabria, and Sicily; while the Pope maintained himself in the remnant of the Exarchate and Pentapolis, and the greater part of the Duchy of Rome. Venice remained intact. But from this time forward the dominating influence in the peninsula was not that of Venice, nor the Papacy, nor the Empire, but that of the conquering Frank.

To a man of Charlemagne's world-wide ambition, however, the conquest of Italy could be no more than an item in his scheme. Upon the eastern frontiers of his realms he was confronted with a task as important and many times more difficult. Here the heathen and hostile Saxons practised their barbarous rites on the very threshold of Christendom.

¹ Carloman married another Lombard princess.

Here, then, was the task which would bring Charlemagne before the world as the champion of Christianity.

It is proof of his courage and energy that the Frank did not hesitate to embark on the Italian venture before the German venture had been brought to an end; nor even nearly to an end. For from a military point of view the Saxon War, in which campaign succeeded campaign with wearisome regularity for no less than thirty years, was by far the sternest enterprise which the would-be Emperor had to face.

Italy and Germany might seem an arena wide enough for the most ambitious, but Charlemagne recognized that his imperial aspirations demanded a universal activity. So in 778 he did not hesitate to cross the Pyrenees, and to attack those old enemies of the Christian faith, the Saracens; Pampeluna capitulated, but Saragossa held out, and the Franks were obliged to withdraw. It was during their retreat towards the Pyrenees that they suffered (probably at the hands of the Basques, who had maintained in their mountain fastnesses an undying hatred of the Franks) a reverse which is more important from a literary than from a military point of view. The destruction of the Frankish rear-guard at Roncevaux, 15 August, 778, and the deaths of the "Paladin" Roland, his companions Oliver, and Turpin the warlike Archbishop of Reims, military events of no more than second-rate importance, were made in a later century the theme of that great literary monument the "Chanson de Roland".¹ Quickly immersed in fresh Saxon campaigns, the King was unable, or perhaps did not trouble, to avenge his slaughtered companions. Affairs in the South-West were relegated to subordinates, and it was another hand than Charlemagne's that vindicated Frankish supremacy in Northern Spain, and brought Aragon and Catalonia under Frankish rule. In the East it was not the Saxons alone who claimed Charlemagne's attention. In 788 he extended his dominion over Bavaria, a step which brought him into geographical contiguity with the kingdom of the Avars.²

¹ *Infra*, p. 107.

² A very barbarous people who appeared on the Danube about the sixth century—probably of the same stock as the Huns.

With unfaltering energy he proceeded to the reduction of this new neighbour (791). The Avaric War lasted for eight years, and was second only in importance to the Saxon. Its successful issue, which, as Professor Oman has pointed out,¹ was mainly due to the efficiency of the Lombard horsemen who had been pressed into the Frankish service, extended the conqueror's boundaries to the Drave and the Danube.

It is not necessary to attribute this feverish military energy to mere thirst of conquest or the simple desire for new possessions, rather it was but an essential part of that great imperial ideal with which Charlemagne had identified himself. In order to realize that ideal he must provide both a territorial and a religious justification for the claims which he intended eventually to bring forward. The ruler of dominions which extended from the Ebro to the Drave, and from the English Channel to the Straits of Messina, the converter of the most obstinate and warlike of heathen peoples, might without hyperbole more truly claim to fulfil the imperial functions than the feeble and unorthodox representative of the Cæsars. Charlemagne was in fact solving the problem of the house of Pepin in the most effective way. Great as his actions seem even in isolation, they were in fact each subordinate to, and part and parcel of, his imperial scheme; important to him only so far as each contributed to the realization of that scheme. To such a realization there remained but two obstacles, the existence of a legitimate Emperor at Constantinople and the antagonism of the Pope. Hadrian I indeed was dreaming of a Papacy which should be independent of all secular interference, in which the Pope should be in fact Emperor as well as pontiff.

Events now played into the hands of Charlemagne. In 797 the Emperor Constantine was deposed and brutally mutilated by his own mother Irene, who then proceeded to usurp the imperial throne. From the moment when the imperial dignities fell into her hands it became possible to urge that the Empire was in abeyance. The second obstacle to the realization of Charlemagne's dream was removed by the death

¹ "The Art of War in the Middle Ages, 378-1515" (1885), p. 78.

of Hadrian (795) and the accession of Leo III. Luckily for Charlemagne, the new Pope was unpopular in Rome, and was soon driven, in the interests of his own personal safety, to renew those appeals for Frankish aid which had been so common in the times of Charles Martel and Pepin the Short. In 799 matters in Rome came to a head. The Pope was assaulted and nearly killed in his own city. Driven out of Rome, it was to Charlemagne's Court at Paderborn that he fled for protection.

Everything now seemed ready for the stroke which the Frankish King had no doubt long been preparing. The four conditions of success were all present. Charlemagne was already ruler of the greater part of Europe; he had long been the foremost champion of Christendom against the heathen; the rival throne was to all intents and purposes vacant; and now the panic-stricken Pope was at his Court craving the assistance of the Roman "Patrician". It is quite possible that the question of the imperial crown was broached at Paderborn, but if so the secret was well kept. Charles at any rate willingly acceded to the Pope's request, and in the autumn of the year 800 entered Rome for the second time. Leo III was exonerated from the charges which had been levelled at him,¹ and punishment was meted out to his traducers. The Patrician had done his work; it was now the Pope's turn. The Christmas feast was at hand, than which no day could be more fitting for a great ceremony. The protector of St. Peter's successor knelt before the high altar in St. Peter's Church. As he rose from his knees the Pope, advancing, laid upon his head a precious crown, and knelt in homage while the assembled faithful shouted allegiance. Charlemagne had entered the church a mere Patrician; he left it Emperor of the world. His great dream was fulfilled. Had his coronation been long designed and arranged between himself and the Pope, or was it a surprise to him? This, though a comparatively unimportant point, has always been one of the puzzles of history. Charlemagne himself asserted

¹ It is not very clear what these charges were, but *both* sides appealed with confidence to Charlemagne.

that the Pope's action had taken him by surprise, and that, had he guessed Leo's intention, he would never have entered St. Peter's that Christmas Day. It seems rather much to ask us to believe that no idea of the imperial crown had entered his head. So far as we can judge this very crown had been the central object of his whole reign. It is just possible, though unlikely, that the precise time and method of his coronation had been concealed from him. Perhaps like the great Napoleon, his imitator, he perceived already the difficulties that must beset a temporal sovereign who wears his crown by the sanction of a spiritual superior. With this perception, it may have been his intention to crown himself as Napoleon actually did. If so the Pope, by crowning him unexpectedly, cleverly rushed him into the very position he wished to avoid.

His ideal thus realized, Charlemagne was at liberty to cultivate and enjoy its fruits. Freed from the necessity for constant warfare, he now for fourteen years devoted his apparently undiminishing energy to the organization and administration of the fabric he had reared. He was now in name at any rate, and in practice far more than the majority of Roman Emperors had been, lord of the whole world, the temporal head of Christendom. When one remembers that, less than one hundred years before, the Carolings had been no more than the chief ministers of an apparently ill-established Monarchy, the extraordinary ease and rapidity of their rise takes the breath away ; and it becomes necessary to seek some explanation for an ascendancy so unparalleled.

It seems clear in the first place that one of the great opportunities of which history is so parsimonious had presented itself, and that—which is still rarer—men had been found who had been able and quick to seize it. These men had been of the stock of Pepin, and perhaps the most important factor in the great upheaval had been the personal qualities of the kings of that line. But this in itself would never have sufficed. No men, not even men of the stamp of Charles Martel and Charlemagne, could have succeeded both at home and beyond the Rhine and beyond the Alps, had they not been backed by

a race of extraordinary virility and extraordinary power of growth. The superimposition of the Frankish upon the Gallo-Roman character had produced, as when one chemical acts upon another, a new compound whose properties it is indeed difficult for us to recognize, but one which evidently possessed qualities superior to those of either of the elements which had gone to its formation. It should be remembered also in this connexion that to the people who had to conquer and to rule both Germany and Italy confusion of race must have been no mean advantage.

But apart from these advantages of race and character the Franks also possessed advantages of administration and organization which helped them greatly in their task. Whatever menaces for the future may be found in the Frankish body politic, it possessed for contemporaries all the advantages of an absolute, centralized Monarchy. Round the king and his courtiers was centred the whole administration of the rapidly increasing realms. The king was in theory at any rate, and in practice to a large extent, sole law-giver, sole fountain of justice, sole arbiter of peace and war, commander of the host, and, to a very considerable and ever-increasing extent, head of the Church, while local government was in the hands of his *comites*, *duces*, and *missi*, appointed by him and removable at will. The "Mallum," *Conventus*, or assembly of the Frankish *grandes*, though in it may have lain the germ of popular representation, presented no real obstacle to the absolutism of the Carolings. Beginning in Merovingian times as a purely occasional and military gathering, the "Marchfield," later the "Mayfield," developed during the reigns of the earlier Carolings into an annual custom. But the time and place of the Marchfield was always at the King's discretion, and attendance thereat was an obligation rather than a privilege. The crowd indeed had no share in the royal councils. From time to time it received instructions to acclaim, and came in point of fact to provide that "confused noise without" which the stage directions of the Caroling councils occasionally required. Clearly, however, neither the *Conventus* nor any other body placed any limit on the unfettered absolutism of the Caroling

monarchs. That unfettered absolutism was a considerable factor in their extraordinary success.

Finally it must be admitted that the Franks had some military superiority for which it is difficult to account, but without which they could scarcely have gone on from conquest to conquest as they did. Neither the practised military skill of the Romans, the clouds of horsemen with which the Saracens fought, the highly armed cavalry of the Lombards, the fierce infantry of the Saxons, nor the skilled marksmanship of the Avar bowmen had availed against the all-conquering Frank. Yet (in the earlier Caroling times) we look in vain for a reason sufficient to account for a success so unbroken. The Franks, in spite of their long contact with Rome, imbibed hardly any of the Roman military tradition. Right through the Merovingian period they continued to fight on foot, without defensive armour, and in large unwieldy masses which rendered manœuvring impossible. Such a mass was the "wall of ice" with which Charles Martel opposed the conquering Saracens at Poitiers, and by its very unwieldiness it won. And, if the line of battle was cumbersome, so too was the organization, the commissariat, and the discipline. With such troops it was possible to oppose a stubborn resistance; but offensive warfare was a more difficult matter. For that reason the victories of Pepin over the Lombards are all the more remarkable. How it was possible with such materials to cross the Alps and carry on successful campaigns in the heart of Italy remains a mystery. By all rules too the Lombards, a later wave of barbarians, ought to have swept the Franks before them. But though in point of time fresher from the fountain-head the Lombards had been contaminated by the proximity of decaying Rome, a contamination from which the Franks had escaped. In spite of this the triumph of the unorganized, ill-armed, dismounted Franks over an enemy who was their superior in all these respects comes as a surprise for which even superior barbarism would not wholly account.

The military "walk over" of the early Carolings must therefore remain a puzzle. With Charlemagne, however, a new era opens. He at once realized that the military organi-

zation at his disposal was insufficient for the great task which he had set himself; and his "Capitularia"¹ are full of schemes for the better mounting, better arming, and better organization of his troops.² Long before his imperial coronation he had converted the unwieldy *levées en masse* of his father and grandfather into the disciplined, highly armed, and to a great extent mounted armies with which he fought and conquered the Lombards, the Saxons, and the Avars. The fact, however, remains that during the critical period of the Caroling dynasty there was nothing in the military organization of the Carolings to suggest or account for their overwhelming superiority in the field, and their complete and unbroken and military success remains to a large extent an unsolved riddle.

The world-shaking enterprises of Charlemagne have rather obscured his special importance in the history of France. The difficulty to the historian of France in treating of the great Emperor must always be to show in what degree he was a builder of France as well as a builder of Germany and an architect of Empire. The importance of Charlemagne was certainly German as well as French, and it is not easy to decide whether his reign had more influence on the growth of Germany or on the growth of France. The story has often been told how, as the tenth century was drawing to its troubled close, the young enthusiast, Otto III, who had dreams of making the Romano-German Empire a real power, descended by night into

¹ Administrative regulations which Charlemagne issued nearly every year.

² E.g. "*Brunia*" (cuirasses) not to go out of the kingdom ("Capitulary of 779," Bouquet, op. cit. v. 647). People who miss the Heriban, or armed assembly of freemen, to pay a penalty (*ibid.* 673). Every man with two *mansi* (the *mansus* was the unit of territorial property; it varied greatly in extent, and may be translated as "holding") to have a cuirass and to bring it with him under penalty (*ibid.* 672). The Heriban was very strict, and the fine for non-attendance prohibitive (*ibid.* 673). Every man with four garnished *mansi* had to attend the host; a man with only three *mansi* had to associate himself with a man who had only one and to send the latter to the host (*ibid.* 683). Every man of the host was to come to the periodical reviews or weapon shows, with spear, shield, bow, two strings, and twelve arrows. Helmets at the summer meeting only. A club (*baculus*) was not a proper substitute for a bow.

the vault at Aachen and saw the great Emperor seated as in life upon a throne of rock, with a golden crown, orb, and sceptre ; and the story is certainly worth this much that it proves how deeply Charlemagne impressed both his own and succeeding generations. In just such guise too we may still see his portrait first in order upon the walls of the Kaiser Saal at Frankfort. Germany then has certainly claimed him for her own ; none the less may France too claim for her own the ruler who extended her borders to the Ebro, who laid, unwittingly perhaps, but none the less securely, the foundations of her feudal system, and who became in her literature the embodiment of a French national unity of which he assuredly never dreamt. It is not without justification that in the line of the kings of the "three races" she reckons him as Charles the First.

With his German policy we must concern ourselves as little as possible ; even his imperial policy, though we have been obliged to try and understand it, is somewhat beside the mark. It is rather as a would-be French sovereign that we want to consider him, and it is unfortunately just in this capacity that he and the other sovereigns of the "second race" somewhat escape us. To the student of French history Laon is familiar and Paris is familiar, but Aachen and Ingelheim belong, or will shortly belong, to the natural enemies of France. The French nation was already too far developed to be ruled for any long time by the same hand that stretched out to the Danube and the Main.

Although in the history of the development of the French nationality the reign of Charlemagne is in many respects a reaction, in one respect it was of supreme importance in the making of mediaeval France. Consciously or unconsciously Charlemagne in his organization of the imperial system laid his foundations upon that official hierarchy of princes, *duces*, *comites*, and *missi* which was to be also the foundation of the feudal system of France. We shall find when we come to feudal times that the feudal hierarchy was nothing more or less than a development of the administrative hierarchy of Charlemagne. It is true to say that the great houses of

Blois, Anjou, Vermandois, Aquitaine, Brittany and the like, with which at a later date we shall become so familiar, were already in the reign of Charlemagne present in *posse* if not in *esse*. Their founders were in fact serving the Caroling monarchs as provincial governors.

It is not at first easy to see how a provincial governor should have grown into a feudal noble. We must remember that in the decline of Rome and the dark times that followed, all other wealth had disappeared save land only, and that, as the Merovingians, so the Carolingians, had nothing wherewith to pay their servants but landed estates; and when the land-owning official died who so fit to carry on his office and to succeed to his landed property as his eldest son? After a few generations it will become difficult to refuse admittance to both office and lands to the eldest son of a deceased official. Then in the incoming night of the ninth century all the official machinery perished, and nothing remained but the personal power of the land-holders.

We have no clear knowledge of the time at which these changes took place; and the "Capitularia" of Charlemagne throw little light on the subject. Did he or did he not make an effort to concentrate, and to repress this nascent feudalism? did he even recognize that it was nascent feudalism? or did he, recognizing it or not recognizing it, make terms with it and shut his eyes to its disruptive tendencies? The fact that he constantly sent commissions to hold Pleas all over his Empire—the famous *Missi Dominici*,¹ seems to indicate that he realized, not only that justice could not be safely left in the hands of the *grandes*, *comites*, and *vassi*, but also to the fact that in normal times it *was* in their hands. We may suspect that these *Missi* were not unlike the "justices" in *itinere* of our own Henry I, and that their primary object was to screw a few more *solidi* out of the *Tributarii*.² Justice and finance

¹ The *Missi Dominici* were chosen from the greatest in the realm—Archbishops, Bishops, and Abbots ("Capitularies," op. cit. v. 660).

² That the Carolingians gave attention to the organization of their revenues is clear. The Roman registers or Assessment Rolls began to be replaced by new records, compiled by order of the kings and called "poly-

went hand in hand, and were easily administered by the same machinery. Yet it is also clear that the *Missi* were entrusted with the task of seeing justice done, and if a *Comes* refused to do justice the *Missus* simply quartered himself on the defaulting official until he saw the error of his ways.¹ If a simple *Vassus* refused to do justice he enjoyed the privilege of entertaining both *Missus* and *Comes* until he changed his mind.

The whole strength and also weakness of this system which Charlemagne extended over so great a part of Europe, lay in its intimate connexion with landownership. We see this in the immense care that he bestowed on his personal properties, which were innumerable and scattered all over his realms, in the regulations which he made against encroachments on the landed property of the Crown,² in the fact that a large part of the duty of the royal officials was to look after the scattered properties. The chief, almost the only source of revenue was land; hence the need for all these elaborate provisions; it was less from any contribution or taxation that the Crown raised the money necessary for government than from the careful administration of its own land. The reign of Charlemagne may therefore be regarded as the apotheosis of landownership, and the Emperor himself spread his power across Western Europe more as a great landowner than as anything else.

It is the gradual rise in the importance of land which followed on the decline of Rome and the disappearance of all other sources of wealth that accounts both for the disappearance of slavery and for the rise of serfdom; slave labour

ptyques". In these were recorded all the lands owned, for example, by a certain religious body, together with the status, property, and obligations of every man who held land from that foundation. The famous polyptyque of Irmino is such a record for the Abbey of Saint-Germain-des-Prés.

¹ "Capitularies," op. cit. v. 647.

² "Auditum habemus qualiter et Comites et alii homines qui nostra beneficia habere videntur, comparant sibi proprietates de ipso nostro beneficio et faciunt servire ad ipsas proprietates servientes nostros de eorum beneficio et cortes (i.e., villæ) nostræ remanent desertæ et in aliquibus locis ipsi vicinantes multa mala patiuntur" ("Capitularies," op. cit. v. 677).

disappeared not we may be sure from any humanitarian reason but simply because it did not pay. But as land grew up into the chief, almost the only, source of wealth, it became more and more important that there should be hands to cultivate it. Hence the *colonus* whom we found in his early stages on the *fundus Florianus* in the fifth century.¹ From the *colonus* to the mediaeval serf was no great distance. In Caroling times we may take it that the peasant was personally free but that, by sheer force of necessity, he had become bound to the soil.² The Caroling "Capitularies" undoubtedly show us estates garnished with peasant cultivators—probably many of them of free birth. Let an estate of this kind be given to a *fidelis* of the King (i.e. to a man within the King's personal patronage) and the free peasants upon it will be dangerously near the condition of serfdom. This embryo serfdom was no heavier in France as regards its burdens and obligations than it was in England. The Carolingian and Capetian laws alike all tend in the direction of ameliorating the condition of the serf, and, though labour rents must at one time have been, in the North at least, an almost universal mode of service, due from the once free peasant to his feudal lord, they were never excessively heavy and in many cases were easily commuted.

How long and to what extent allodial holdings (*alleu*), that is to say holdings free from all service and held as simple property, survived either in Northern or Southern France it is very difficult to say. The practice of converting *alleu* into some kind of feudal tenure dates from Carolingian times. It is probable that very little real *alleu* survived in the tenth century.

The "Capitularies" of Charlemagne are a mine of information on these and kindred subjects, and bear testimony to his all-embracing activity. There is hardly any department of life with which they do not deal, from high matters of State down to the maintenance of the flower gardens on the royal *villæ*.

¹ *Supra*, pp. 28, 29.

² There are constant references in the "Capitularies" to *coloni* and *servi* who have migrated on to lands where they had no *status*; it was obviously a breach of custom if not of law. If men of the *fisc* (*fiscalini*), whether *coloni* or slaves, stop in other people's dominions inquiry must be made into their *status*.

A large proportion of the provisions deal with Church matters, for if Charlemagne was the creator of bishops and the protector of clerics, he was also their keen critic and task-master. The bishops are enjoined to make regular visitations of their dioceses (*parrochia*). Clerics are ordered not to have dogs, hawks, or jesters, nor are they to bear arms, shed blood, or have many wives. Unlearned priests are to be dismissed. Even small details about the baptismal chrism and the oil for the sanctuary lamps did not escape the keen eye of the Emperor. He was not a Sabbatarian (*quod antea fieri die Dominica licuit liceat* is the conservative injunction of one of the "Capitularies"), but agricultural operations were to be suspended on Sundays.¹ The regulations for military services have already been referred to. Bishops were ordered to sing masses for the army.² Charles was also interested in the building up of a navy as a protection against the Danes who were just beginning to be troublesome, and he was concerned for the supply of shipbuilding materials.

To the details of management of his own countless *villæ* and *beneficia* the Emperor gave meticulous attention. The undated Capitulary *de Villis*³ is by no means the least interesting of these documents. Charles specified the kind of stock that he wished to have on his farms, the kind of flowers, herbs, and fruits, that he desired to have in his gardens—he had a particular liking for roses. Here are the names of all the old-fashioned flowers and herbs that were as dear to him as they were to our great-grandmothers. The whole Capitulary might be the letter of a great landowner of any age to his bailiffs; it is just such a letter as Cockburn from London wrote to his gardener in East Lothian in the early eighteenth century.⁴

¹ Cp. "Capitularies," op. cit. v. 645; "ut diem Dominicum cum omni diligentia custoidatis," p. 668.

² Charlemagne had a correspondence with Offa, King of Mercia, about a priest who *would* eat flesh in Lent ("Capitularies," op. cit. v. p. 626).

³ *Ibid.* op. cit. v. 652.

⁴ Letters of John Cockburn of Ormiston to his gardener (Scottish History Society, 1904).

But it is not only from his Capitularies that we can draw a living picture of the great Emperor. His private secretary and chaplain, Eginhard, compiled a brief but priceless biography of his master which provides us with a realistic sketch of Charlemagne's personal appearance and habits. He shows us in his sober pages a very different person from the *roi à barbe fleurie* of the *chansons de geste*, for the Emperor was clean shaven, and had a prominent belly, and a bull neck. Nevertheless his presence was dignified whether he stood or sat. His hair was white, and he had large animated eyes. But his voice was weak and shrill, and he spoke with immense volubility—a curious trait in so great a man. His activity was tremendous; he slept lightly, and eat and, above all, drank moderately; he was indeed something of an enthusiast on the question of temperance, and constantly protested in the Capitularies against the abuse of liquor and the habit of treating.¹ He was passionately fond of hunting and bathing. Hence his residence at Aachen, where he might sometimes be seen with a hundred companions enjoying the warm baths. He loved music, despised medical advice, hated fasting, and preferred roast to boiled meat. He was a man of domestic habits and devoted to his family, to his wife, his mother, his sister, and the many children born to him by his wife and concubines. He particularly disliked foreign costume and wore the Frankish dress—a tunic with a silver border, shoes, stockings, and garters, in winter a vest of otter skins and sable, a blue cloak and a sword with hilt and belt of gold and silver.

But if he disliked foreign raiment he delighted in the company of foreigners. He spoke several languages fluently, could express himself in Latin, and understood Greek. He respected learning, collected books and tried, unsuccessfully, to learn to write; he welcomed the presence of learned men at his court; the literary renaissance which he fostered drew scholars from all over the world; Paul the Deacon was at-

¹“ut nemini liceat alium cogere ad bibendum” (“Capitularies,” op. cit. v. 803, and “Omnino prohibendum est omnibus ebrietatis malum” (*ibid.* v. 649).

tracted from Italy to Aachen and spent several years there. But the most distinguished literary guest was Alcuin, the British scholar from York. Charlemagne waylaid him on a mission to Rome and kept him at Aachen, where he became the tutor and theological director of the imperial family. He set up a regular school to which the nobles flocked for instruction, and when he retired to Tours he set up a school there. Such was Charlemagne's patronage of learning.

Charlemagne reigned for fourteen years as Emperor, chiefly occupied in the administration of his vast realms. It was not till 809 that the Saxons finally submitted to him, and in the following year he reduced the Avars to terms. In 811 his health began to give way, and he limped in one leg. He had the wisdom to procure the assent of the *grandes* to the coronation of his eldest son Louis (813). In the autumn of that year he went on his usual hunting expedition and contracted a fever. This brought on pleurisy; and on 28 January, 814, fortified by the last rites of the Church, he died, and was buried in the great basilica of Aachen which he built. He was seventy-two years of age.

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CHAPTER VI
THE LATER CAROLINGS

(814-987)

THE reign of Charlemagne had been one long struggle to revivify the imperial ideal—to restore the Roman Empire in the Caroling line. This struggle had been wonderfully successful. The Frankish Empire had been extended over almost the whole of Western Europe, and not only in name but with thorough effectiveness. And the ideal lingered long after nationalities had established themselves, and lured king after king away from his national mission after the will-o'-the-wisp of Empire. Under the Emperor Charles V, and even in quite modern times under Napoleon I, the ideals and example of Charlemagne went near to triumph, while it was only in 1806 that the title of "Holy Roman Emperor," which was born on Christmas Day, 800, was finally abandoned. Charlemagne's ideal therefore endured, in name at any rate, for more than a thousand years.

Nevertheless the life-work of Charlemagne, though no doubt a necessary stage in the development of Western Europe, was, at least from the French standpoint, a mere *tour de force*; and on the death of its creator the unwieldy fabric of Empire came tumbling down with a rapidity which is startling. The deterioration of character in the royal house is not sufficient to account for this collapse, nor can it be wholly attributed to the custom of subdivision; dangerous though that was, a strong king might have ignored it. Over and above these causes there was an inherent weakness in the Caroling ideal, and in any hands, under any conditions, the Empire was doomed. The era of "universal" sovereignty was already antiquated, and the future was for the national not the imperial ideal. The

period which we know as the "Dark Ages" is the period of transition between the two, when men and peoples were groping after they knew not what, but with a sense that the old ideals were no longer possible.

The main outline of this long and dreary period may be very briefly sketched. Charlemagne was outlived by only one of his legitimate sons, Louis (called the *débonnaire*, or the Pious). This was fortunate, because the necessity for a division of the patrimony was thereby postponed; nevertheless the principle of division was recognized in the allotment of the Italian patrimony to Charlemagne's grandson Bernard. The entire reign of Louis *le débonnaire* was taken up by attempts to settle the succession amongst his four sons, in other words (if we shut our eyes for a moment to matters dynastic), to arrange the future of nationalities. Clearly, as the Empire was destined to division, the nearer the division adhered to distinctions of race and geography the better it would be for the peace of Western Europe. Not that this was by any means apparent to the men who now began to quarrel over the carcase of the Empire. Personal interests placed scales on their eyes. Louis' three elder sons accused him of favouring Charles, his youngest son (by his second marriage with Judith of Bavaria).¹ They revolted, and for a moment actually deposed him (833). Repeated divisions were made in the hope of satisfying the claims of all concerned. These culminated in 839 in the Treaty of Worms, by which the entire patrimony was divided between Lothair, Louis' eldest son, and Charles, his youngest.² Pepin, the second son, was dead (838); but he had left a son of the same name who laid claim to Aquitaine. He joined hands with the Emperor's third son, Louis, against a distribution that was patently unjust. In the middle of the rebellion which ensued the Emperor died. He had been from the beginning in a hopeless position; but he seems to have been the worst type of ruler, one

¹ Louis gave to Charles Alamannia, Alsatia, Rhoetia, and a part of Burgundy (Donation of Worms, 829).

² The first appearance of modern France. See Freeman, "Norman Conquest" (1870), I. 154.

who oscillated between misplaced clemency and ill-judged cruelty.¹

Lothair immediately repudiated the Treaty of Worms and laid claim to the entire patrimony. But Charlemagne's army had been worn to pieces in the civil wars, and Lothair was without the material force to vindicate his imperial aspirations. The three brothers met in a sanguinary battle at Fontenoy-en-Puisaye, and Charles and Louis inflicted a severe defeat on Lothair (25 June, 841). The Battle of Fontenoy did not end the struggle, and in order to end it Louis and Charles found it necessary to cement their alliance. On 14 February, 842, in the presence of their followers, each took an oath of loyalty to the other, and swore not to make a separate peace with Lothair. The oaths of Strassburg were made in presence of men of different speech, and were taken in two languages, Romance and Teutonic. The Romance version is the first specimen that has come down to us of this speech which was to become the French language.²

In face of this cemented union Lothair was powerless, and in August of the following year (843) hostilities were closed by the Treaty of Verdun, which has been called the birthday of modern nationalities. In it we find the germ of France and that of Germany, as well as the germ of the long-disputed barrier states which lie between the two. Louis was restored to the East-Frankish dominions which had been his allotted share. He is always known as Louis "the German". The

¹ E.g. the putting out of the eyes of Bernard of Italy, his nephew, who had revolted against him (818).

² "*Pro Deo amur et pro christian poblo et nostro commun salvament, d'ist di en avant, in quant Deus savir et podir me dunat, si salvarai eo cist meon fradre Karlo, et in aiudha et in cadhuna cosa, si cum om per dreit son fradra salva dift, in o quid il mi altresi fazet; et ab Ludher nul plaid nunquam prindrai qui, meon vol, cist meon fradre Karle in damno sit.*"

"For the love of God, and for the Christian people's and our own common safety, from this day forward, so far as God gives me knowledge and power, I will support my brother Charles with my assistance and in all things, as one ought properly to support one's brother, on condition that he does the same by me, and I will never make an arrangement with Lothair, of my own free will, to the detriment of my said brother Charles."

Rhine became his Western frontier though he crossed it at Speyer and Worms. Charles "the Bald" retained the West-Frankish dominions; his frontier fell short, generally speaking, of the Saône-Rhône, though it overstepped the Saône in the neighbourhood of Châlons. It also fell short of the Meuse and was greatly contracted about Cambrai. Farther North it followed the line of the Scheldt. In the kingdoms of Louis and Charles thus defined we have the first France and the first Germany; both had a geographical and a race personality; they spoke distinct languages and conformed broadly to the exigencies of geographical accidents, and therefore persisted as nations. Between them, under the rule of Lothair, was established a third kingdom, the richest of the three, and in certain respects the most important. Lotharingia included the basins of the Po, Rhône, Meuse, and Moselle, and half those of the Rhine and the Scheldt, and the imperial cities Rome, Arles, Milan, and Aachen. Lothair ruled in Frisia, Belgium, the greater part of Francia proper, Alsace, Eastern Burgundy, Provence, and Lombardy.

Louis' heritage stood and Charles' heritage stood, but Lothair's was doomed from the first, if not to extinction, to infinite division. The idea of a middle kingdom, it is true, persisted, to be galvanized into new life by the great Dukes of Burgundy in the fourteenth century, and it still persists and is exemplified in the existence of Belgium and Switzerland, the modern representatives of Lotharingia. The rest has been absorbed by Germany, France, and Italy. Lotharingia, as conceived in 839, perished in this way because she was without national personality. She had no common tongue and no geographical or economic unity. Also she lay athwart the great trade routes of Western Europe and was thus drawn away from the true ideal of a nation, the ideal of self-sufficing production, by the siren of international trade. Important, therefore, as was the part she played, she was trebly doomed to extinction.

The Empire of Charlemagne thus dispersed, the historian of France may confine himself to that portion of the Empire over which reigned the youngest of the grandsons of Charle-

magne—Charles “the Bald”. Charles was a man of considerable energy and character, but he was in a well-nigh impossible position. The new force which his grandfather had given to the Imperial ideal had added to the difficulties of one who, abandoning it, set out upon the national path. Lothair monopolized the title of emperor, that of king had little significance. Charles had to start from the foundations, and was driven back upon his position as head of the great ladder of patronage, in order to find a claim to the allegiance of his subjects. Unfortunately in the civil wars that had followed the death of Charlemagne there had arisen many independent groups of *fideles* under patrons other than the King, with the result that Charles found himself surrounded by a number of independent sovereigns who denied that they owed him any allegiance. Three such sovereigns stood out as especially dangerous, Nomenoë, Duke of Brittany, Bernard of Septimania, and Pepin II of Aquitaine. In the revolts of two of these it is possible to see the abortive births of embryo nationalities; in Brittany, colonized from Cornwall in the sixth century, and preserving the Celtic speech unadulterated, an unromanized hyper-Celtic nationality grew up, in Aquitaine a Visigothic-Iberian nationality. After prolonged struggles Charles managed to assert some kind of supremacy over Septimania and Aquitaine, but he was obliged (Treaty of Angers, 851) to recognize the independence of Brittany, and to grant the title of king to Nomenoë’s son, together with the lands of Nantes, Rennes, and Retz, in return for homage. Brittany remained independent until the fifteenth century.

Meanwhile, a new danger confronted the harassed monarch. In 841 the Scandinavian “Northmen” had begun to force their way up the rivers of northern France and pillaged the great city of Rouen. In 845 they penetrated to Paris, then confined to the small island now known as the *cité*, and subjected it to similar treatment. Charles bought them off, and this naturally provoked them to repeat the lucrative experiment. Orleans, Angers, and Tours, at different times suffered a similar fate. Charles was in a very difficult position. Attacked in this way by a new and terrible foreign foe, his

kingdom was at the same time honeycombed with internal revolt, while his step-brother (Louis the German) was laying claim to his dominions. Louis invaded Charles' realms in August, 858, and the latter was obliged to retire into Burgundy. It was only the opposition of the Church which prevented him from seizing the crown. In 860 peace was established between the brothers (Peace of Coblentz), and Charles was able to turn his undivided attention to the Northmen. The Norse invasions are important, not only because they introduce us for the first time to the men who, as Normans, afterwards played so remarkable a part in the history of Europe, but because they introduce us to Paris and to the family which, fixing its roots in Paris, was destined to become the embodiment of French nationality when the Carolings relapsed into their native Teutonism.¹

Paris now became the outpost against the Norse ravages. Around the little island in the Seine with its memories of resistance to Rome, of the mission of Dionysius, and of the residence of the Emperor Julian, there had gradually grown up, in the period of the weakness of the Caroling house, a compact little territory, in the hands of a family well-fitted to command in a post of danger. The origin of this family has been the subject of much dispute. Robert "the Strong" has been described as an *étranger Germain*, as a Saxon, as an Austrasian. He probably came from Eastern France—that is to say, the Rhine or Main basin. The French are naturally loath to concede the ancestry of yet another of their royal houses to the hated Teutons; yet it is most probable that the Robertians or Capetians sprang from a Saxon "plantation" of Charlemagne, and were therefore in blood more purely Teutonic than the Carolings themselves. But in spirit, which is more important than blood, they represented the dawning nationality of France. When Charles withdrew eastward and fixed his capital at Laon, leaving Robert the Strong to defend the marchland about Paris, he little dreamt that he was

¹ There was an attempt at an *entente* between the three Caroling kings against the Norse in 844. Several conferences took place, but the attempt came to nothing.

bringing his house on to the inclined plane of ruin. Nor did Robert, we may guess, as he faithfully performed the stiff task which had been entrusted to him, dream that on his side he was laying the foundations of one of the most enduring dynasties that Western Europe has known. Falling in battle against the Northmen at Brissarthe in 866, Robert was succeeded by his son, Odo, Count of Paris.

Meanwhile Lothair's two younger sons died without children, while his elder son the Emperor Louis II, whose power lay in Italy, had only a daughter.¹ Lotharingia therefore made its first disappearance in the Treaty of Mersen (870), being divided between Charles and Louis the German. In the Treaty the modern boundaries of France and Germany were very nearly approached.² Then on the death of Louis II (12 August, 875), the question arose which of the brothers should enjoy the imperial title. With great promptness Charles made straight for Rome and, emulating his grandfather, caused himself to be crowned in St. Peter's on Christmas Day, 875. When in the following year his step-brother, Louis the German, died, he made a resolute but unsuccessful attempt to reunite the entire patrimony of Charlemagne. He invaded Lorraine and was marching on Aachen when on 8 October, 876, he was met by Louis' son, Louis le Jeune, at Andernach and completely defeated. In the following year he died, having reigned as King thirty-seven years and as Emperor two. He had played a by no means despicable part under most difficult conditions. In the later years of his reign he had successfully held the Northmen at bay by the ring of fortifications which he constructed on the

¹ See genealogical table, p. 62.

² Treaty of Mersen (or Meerssen), 870. The western boundary of France began at Fli (where the Zuiderzee joins the sea), crossed the Rhine west of Utrecht, followed the Meuse to Liège, then the Ourthe, then crossed the Moselle half-way between Trier and Thionville, the Meuse south of Jusey, turned the sources of the Oignon and Saône, followed the Rhône from Valence to the sea. Charles got nine towns (three of them metropolitan: Besançon, Lyon, Vienne), thirty-three abbeys, thirty counties, and four half counties; a good part of modern Holland and Belgium, half modern Lorraine, a large part of Burgundy, Lyonnais, Viennois, the Dioceses of Uzès and Viviers.

Seine and its tributaries, and even won a notable success at Angers, while by his "Capitularies"—the most celebrated of which was that of Quierzy-sur-Oise (857)—he did what he could to maintain order in his distracted kingdom. But he had not been able to take his eyes off the idea of World Empire, and to concentrate himself on the greater task of nation-building, greater because upon it the future depended.

While he had been dissipating his slender resources on these grandiose but antiquated schemes, the power and independence of the *ducs* and *comtes* (as, for instance, that of the Counts of Paris, whose rise is an excellent illustration of the way in which a military command could become a great fief) within the West Frankish dominions, had been rapidly increasing, and more and more men were deserting the King to become *fideles* of these great local magnates, who could and would protect them, whereas the King-Emperor could not or would not. If the Carolings could have looked forward instead of back, they would have abandoned for ever the idea of Empire, withdrawn within the ample boundaries of the Treaty of Mersen, and built up out of their patrimony a powerful duchy; would in fact have claimed for themselves the chief place in the feudal order that was coming into being. Instead, however, of consolidating they were rather disintegrating their patrimony. Officials had to be paid, and there was nothing but patrimony to pay them with.¹ This had not mattered so much in the strong days of Charlemagne when *ducs* and *comtes* were removable at will; it mattered a great deal in the weak days of his successors, when *ducs* and *comtes* had contrived to make their offices hereditary. The ninth century must be recognized as the period when the feudal system asserted itself in France. Things had indeed already gone so far in this direction that when Charles the

¹ See Edouard Beaudouin, "Études sur le régime féodal" (1889), p. 97. "Un jour est venu où le descendant de Charlemagne . . . n'a plus trouvé d'autre moyen de garder ces hommes dans son service que de leur distribuer de plus en plus largement les terres du fisc avec des concessions d'immunité. C'est à dire . . . pour pouvoir regner encore d'abdiquer toujours de plus en plus." Cp. Viollet, "Histoire des Institutions politiques et administratives de la France" (1890-8), I. 443.

Bald died, the succession was only secured to his son Louis *le bègue* (the stammerer) by broadcast concessions. Louis *le bègue* died eighteen months later and his patrimony was divided between his two sons, Louis III and Carloman. In the same year Burgundy and Provence were usurped by Boso, the husband of the Emperor Louis II's daughter Hermingarde; Lotharingia, that is, reappears in a new and much curtailed shape. Louis III inflicted a severe defeat on Rollo the Northman at Saulcourt (3 August, 881); but he died in the following year (5 August, 882), and two years later Carloman was accidentally killed (12 October, 884). This was the signal for a revival of the imperial ideal. The claims of Louis *le bègue's* infant and posthumous son, Charles, were ignored, and Charles the Fat, son of Louis the German, who was already Emperor (2 February, 881) and ruler of "Germany" and "Italy," was made King of "France" (or, strictly speaking, "King of the West Franks," for the name France is not found yet) also (June, 885). Rome, Aachen, and Laon were once more united.

Imperialism and nationalism, the force of the past and the force of the future, were now definitely confronted; and the utter failure of Charles the Fat demonstrated the triumph of the latter over the former. The Emperor himself, sickly and corpulent, was ill-qualified for his gigantic task; but there were the seeds of failure in the task itself. The Northmen were renewing their attacks, and in 885 appeared in force before the walls of Paris. Odo, Count of Paris, stoutly backed by Archbishop Gozelin, held the city against the attack, in which the Northmen displayed great knowledge of siegecraft and little of strategy. The tale of the defence has been handed down to us by a chronicler called Abbo who took part in it. His cramped and pedantic hexameters are illuminated by touches of real force. We see with him the enemy peering into the breach they had made, but unwilling to enter when they counted the great men drawn up within, we hear the arrows whistling by night, we see the vision of St. Germanus, the guardian of the city, and the unknown man in armour who appeared on the walls by night. Above all we see Odo in the forefront of the defence emitting barbaric jokes and performing prodigies of valour.

Finally the Lord of all the World lumbered up and bought the enemy off. He handed Burgundy over to Siegfried to pillage, and afterwards paid a large sum of money to the Northmen. One is tempted to ask whether it did not already occur to men to contrast the faint-hearted Emperor, at the head of a fresh and powerful army, completing this shameful bargain, with the stout-hearted Count, surrounded by half-ruined defences, and a storm-beaten and dwindled garrison, still breathing unfaltering defiance.¹ The old ideal was in fact here contrasted with the new—imperialism with nationality—how favourably to the latter. The Siege of Paris set the seal on the Caroling anachronism. The incapable Emperor, “shameful parody of Charlemagne” he has been called, was deposed in his German dominions, and died three months after his deposition (888) without leaving sons. With him finally disappeared the Empire of Charlemagne in the concrete. The ideal lingered on to bewitch the minds of Charles V and Napoleon.

The period which opens with the deposition of Charles the Fat and closes with the accession of Hugh Capet is one of transition. The spirit of Empire having been exorcised, there was scope for the growing but still unconscious sense of nationality to assert itself. Already in the Oaths of Strassburg we have seen the antagonism in language between Teuton and Romance, and it cannot be doubted that by this time the East Frank was being made to realize that he had more in common with Bavarians and Saxons than he had with his Western neighbours. Of this antagonism Paris and Laon came to be the geographical, and the houses of Robert the Strong and Charlemagne the dynastic, centres. The West Frank desired two things, protection from the Northmen, and a strong monarchy which should put bounds to the ever-growing disorders attendant on an unbridled feudalism.² He

¹ The contrast is only figuratively accurate, for Odo actually left the city to fetch help.

² See Luchaire, “*Histoire des institutions monarchiques de la France sous les premiers Capétiens (987-1180)*” (1883-5), II. 272-283; Beaudouin, “*Études sur les origines du régime féodal*,” *op cit.*, and Viollet, “*Histoire des institutions politiques*,” *op. cit.*

looked to Laon and the house of Carl, and he got such help as Charles the Fat had brought to Paris; his eyes then turned to the house of Robert, and there found not only protection against invasion but the promise of a powerful royal house. Thus the Robertians—Teutons though they were—were becoming the true embodiment of the growing Romance nationality. So real was this development of the national instinct that it was probably only the prestige and sanctity of the Caroling dynasty, and the oaths by which men were bound to it, that secured four more kings of that house on the West Frank throne. The later Carolings in fact reaped the benefits of Pepin's wisdom.

Charles the Fat died childless, and there was consequently no legitimate claimant to his dominions. Germany had already accepted Arnulf, the bastard son of Carloman, son of Louis the German; the Lotharingian realm split into three: Lorraine which went first to Arnulf's illegitimate son Zwentibold, and then to his legitimate son Louis "the Child"; the kingdom of Burgundy which fell to Rudolf, son of Conrad, nephew of Charles the Bald's second wife Judith; and Provence, where the house of Boso was still established.¹

In the West Frank region the Crown had by this time become at least partially elective,² with the result that Odo, the hero of the Siege of Paris, was raised to the throne (29 February, 888) to the exclusion of the legitimate claimant, Charles "the Simple," son of Louis *le Bègue*. Odo, however, successful though he had been as defender of Paris, was a failure as king; he was killed in the civil war which ensued (898), and on his death Charles the Simple, who had already been crowned at Reims in 893, was raised to the throne by unanimous consent. The prestige of the house of Charlemagne had once more triumphed over the nascent force of nationality.

Charles the Simple's reign of twenty-five years was marked

¹ Boso died 887, and was succeeded by his son Louis (890) after an interregnum. Provence passed ultimately to Rudolph II of Burgundy in 933, and the two States thus united became the kingdom of Arles,

² Louis *le Bègue* had been elected,

by two important events: the settlement of the Northmen in the north of France and the conquest of Lorraine. By the Treaty of St. Clair-sur-Epte which Charles signed with Rollo in 911, the King hoped to pacify the Northmen and to have them in future as loyal subjects instead of dangerous foes; but he desired also to damage the Robertian ascendancy by making the concessions to the Northmen at the expense of the Robertian house. The territory conceded (all between the River Epte and the frontier of Brittany) was Robertian territory and not royal domain. The treaty was in fact a very subtle effort of Charles to restore the fortunes of his house, and had the Normans remained loyal to that house it might have succeeded. As it was it no doubt did much to preserve the throne in the Carolingian line for seventy-six more years. In the very year of the Treaty of St. Clair the Carolingian line in Germany came to an end, and Lorraine, always the most loyal of the Carolingian possessions, passed to Charles the Simple. The West Franks, who by this time really desired the maintenance of a separate and homogeneous and uni-lingual kingdom, resented this eastward tendency, and set up Odo's son Robert as a nationalist pretender. Robert was killed at Soissons (923) and Hugh, his son, now Duke of Francia, declining the crown, Robert's son-in-law, Raoul of Burgundy, was elected (923). Duke Hugh's position under this arrangement recalls the position of the early Carolings who were content to remain Mayors of the Palace, and to retain the feeble Merovings upon the throne. So Hugh remained mere Duke of the French, and on the death of Raoul in 936 even made himself responsible for a Carolingian restoration, Charles the Simple's son, Louis d'*Outremer*, being fetched from the English¹ Court where he had taken refuge and placed on the throne. This restoration of the Carolings was an antinational Teutonic reaction.

Louis, however, failed to sustain the part of *Roi fainéant* for which Hugh had cast him. Two courses were open to him, to throw himself on the support of the Saxon house which had just despoiled the Carolings of their imperial dig-

¹ Charles the Simple had died in 929.

nities, or to carve out for himself in the west a domain or dukedom which should rival that of the Robertians. For the development of the latter policy Lorraine was the only available arena, and to lay hands on Lorraine was to affront the Empire. For a while Louis braved this risk, but in the end he thought it wiser to reconcile himself to the Emperor (Diet of Attigny, 940), and to renounce his Lotharingian projects. It was the wiser but the less heroic course. In the year 943, however, Louis suffered a misfortune against which even the alliance with the Emperor could not avail him. William Longsword of Normandy transferred his allegiance to Duke Hugh. The tearing up of the Treaty of St. Clair sealed the fate of the Caroling house. "Had Rouen (Normandy) been hostile or even doubtful, Paris (the Robertians) might not after all have triumphed over Laon (the Carolings)."¹ The vigour and wisdom of the young king, however, bade fair to triumph even over a conjunction of circumstances so unfavourable, and for a time he made good headway against the two dukes. But the new hopes of the Carolings were dashed suddenly to the ground in 954 by Louis' premature death. Hugh the Great became arbiter of the situation. He might have crowned himself, but reluctant, in his old age to depart from his established policy, he secured the election of Louis' son, Lothair, and for the two remaining years of his life exploited this youth to his own advantage, absorbing into the Robertian heritage the important districts of Aquitaine and Burgundy.

On the death of Hugh the Great (956), Lothair fell under the influence of his mother, who was a sister of the Emperor, and of her brother Bruno, Archbishop of Cologne. Until her death in 967 a rupture with the Emperor was impossible, and that involved the impossibility of adopting a forward policy in Lorraine. When after his mother's death he attempted to prosecute this policy, he was thwarted by Otto II, who set up as his vassal in Lorraine Charles, the second son of Louis *d'Outremer*. Charles, having been ignored in the succession, was

¹ Freeman, "Western Europe in the Eighth Century and onward" (1904).

only too ready to make things uncomfortable for his brother. Lothair was a man of restless energy, but with little fixity of purpose. At one moment he would ally himself with Hugh Capet (who had succeeded his father Hugh the Great), to throw himself upon Lorraine; at another he would abandon all hope of Lorraine to make war upon Hugh.

Another factor now enters the equation. In the heat of dynastic changes and national tendencies it is easy to forget the steady and ever-increasing influence of the Church. Merovings and Carolings in turn had owed their triumphs to the support of the Church. The foundations of the Empire of Charlemagne were laid on the rock of the Church, and now it was to be demonstrated that the new national monarchy for which all were looking could only come into being by the good offices of the Church. The maintenance of the Empire was by this time part and parcel of the creed of all good Churchmen. The Empire had passed from the house of Karl to the Saxon house of Otto in 962; the designs of the later Carolings on Lorraine were a direct menace to the Empire, and as such distasteful to Churchmen; and it was to protect the Empire from this attack rather than to establish a national dynasty in France that Churchmen now intervened, and intervened decisively, in the struggle between Carolings and Capetians. Adalberon, Archbishop of Reims, the most prominent Churchman of the day, was committed to the Churchman's policy of maintaining the Empire. He it was who was chiefly responsible for the failure of the Carolings to establish in Lorraine a counterpoise to the Robertian Dukedom of Francia; in fact it was he who decided the fate of the Caroling house. Ill-fortune dogged the footsteps of that house. In 986 Lothair died, and a few months later his son and successor, Louis V, was thrown from his horse and killed. Louis IV, Lothair, and Louis V had all died prematurely, and it might now be said that the Caroling stock had run out. Charles of Lorraine, Lothair's brother, was no doubt of the royal line; but national feeling was by this time so thoroughly alive that his identification with Lorraine rendered him distasteful to the West Frankish *grandes*, whose sanction was necessary

before he could be crowned.¹ Moreover Adalberon, whose object was to prevent Lorraine falling in to the West Frankish Crown, would refuse to crown him. The Archbishop assembled the *grandes* at Noyon (June, 987) and procured the election of Hugh Capet. Inspired by his secretary Gerbert, afterwards Pope Sylvester II, he was acting in the interests of the Church and the Empire, and the national dynasty was established on the throne by influences which by no means favoured the national trend. So on 3 July, 987, at Noyon, the crown of France was placed on the head of the first² of that famous line of kings which was to wear it uninterruptedly for eight centuries.

¹ This right of the *grandes* to choose the King had grown up gradually. Clovis and his successors had reigned by divine right; but from the time of Pepin there had always been a formal sanction of the *grandes*. This sanction grew more and more important as the monarchy weakened. Louis le Bègue was raised to the throne by election pure and simple.

² Hugh was not really the first of his line to wear the crown. Odo had been King of France.

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CHAPTER VII
THE EARLY CAPETIANS

(987-1108)

BY reason of the greatness subsequently attained by the Capetian dynasty,¹ and the important part they played in the consolidation of France, it is easy to overrate the importance of the Revolution of 987. In one sense of course it would be impossible to do so, for with the sundering of the eastward connexion and the fall of the Caroling house France withdrew into borders which distinctions of geography and language marked out as national; and after 987 her unification as a nation was inevitable. But from the contemporary point of view the substitution of Capetian for Caroling, Paris for Laon, was an event of but slight importance. Those of the feudal barons who were not too busy storming each other's castles may have lifted their heads to wonder if more could be wrung as the price of allegiance from the new kings than from the old; but the majority probably took little heed of the change. Kingship was in fact of little worth in the hey-day of feudalism. Little prestige and no revenue attached to the title, and the feudal position of the Capetians was a matter of far more importance to contemporaries than a dignity which was almost entirely honorary. The Capetians had secured the Crown because they were the strongest and best placed of the

¹ On the significance of the change of dynasty see Edmé Champion, "Philosophie de l'histoire de France" (1882), pp. 107, 113. Luchaire, "Hist. des institutions monarchiques sous les premiers Capétiens," op. cit. Articles in "Revue des questions historiques," Vols. VII and VIII (1869 and 1870); Ferdinand Lot (in "Bibliothèque de l'École des hautes Études"), "Études sur le règne de Hugues Capet".

feudatories.¹ But in the effort they had completely spent themselves by alienating land and feudal overlordship in order to secure allegiance ; and to contemporaries it must have seemed that they had dropped the substance in order to secure the shadow. And indeed the new royal dynasty relapses, after its triumph of 987, into a prolonged period of torpor. Four long and dreary reigns elapse before the shadow proves itself substantial. During this period the strength displayed by the Capetians is almost purely passive. They hold on doggedly to what they have got, not strong enough to go forward but strong enough not to be thrust back. They are in fact little more than very big barons surrounded, for a time indeed almost hemmed in, by other very big barons, but they had the card of kingship in reserve which when the time came gave them the victory.

In a history of France it would be as foolish to ignore the story of a house which was destined to be the means of the unification of France, as it would be ridiculous to pretend that during this waiting period the story of that house is identical with that of France. It would be as sensible to write the history of the Counts of Blois or the Counts of Toulouse, and to parade that as the history of France as to write that of the early Capetians and make the same claim. The truth is that France in the eleventh century was nothing more than a feudal patchwork of immense complexity, in which the House of Capet enjoyed an almost honorary hegemony. It would be futile to attempt a complete analysis of this patchwork ; but it is necessary to give some attention at least to the greater fiefs.

The Capetians had one great advantage, that of position. They were firmly seated in the Île de France, the region round which by geographical necessity the French nation was destined to be built. Paris and Orleans were theirs, and theirs in direct suzerainty were the royal Bishoprics of Beauvais, Noyon, Châlons, Laon, Langres and—most important of all—

¹ See Avenel, " Richelieu et la Monarchie Absolue " (1895), I, 5, 6. When Pepin was crowned the title of king was united to the greatest *office*, when Capet was crowned it was united to the greatest *fief*.

the Archbishopric of Reims. But their domain was sadly curtailed by alienations, and in point of size and riches many of the great feudatories could soon meet them on terms of equality. The great house of Blois-Champagne, for instance, pressed upon them from the East and West, from Beauvais and Troyes on one side, Blois and Tours on the other. But there was no unity in this piece-meal inheritance, and the Capetians profited by the central position. To the North-East, Flanders, a remnant of ancient Lotharingia, occupied a position of great strategical and commercial importance. It was a marchland between France, Germany, and England. Lotharingia was destined to be the battle-ground of Western Europe, and in all the great wars in which France engaged Flanders was to play an important part. Commercial affinity drew her gradually towards England, and this was the most deep-seated cause of the Hundred Years War. Then, as always, Flanders held both of France and of Germany, and as the ambition of the Counts was mainly directed towards the imperial lands of Hainault, their tendency was to be loyal to their French overlords. But the steady growth of Flanders in size and riches was always a menace to both overlords.

Of Normandy something has already been said. Adaptability is a common feature in colonizing and conquering peoples. The English in Ireland became more Irish than the Irish, and the heathen Northmen who had made havoc of Rouen and Paris were rapidly becoming more French than the French. It was with the aid of the Normans that the Capetians had driven out the Carolings, and on the continued loyalty of the Normans the stability of the house of Capet seemed largely to depend. But the Franco-Norman alliance had not the elements of permanence. Sooner or later the King who ruled in Paris was bound to resent the presence of the Duke who ruled at Rouen and controlled the mouth of the Seine. How the rivalry began, and by the Norman Conquest was converted into a rivalry between France and England, and what importance that converted rivalry assumed, will concern us at a later period, but it had its beginnings in the period of which we are now treating.

In the far North-West the Duchy of Brittany preserved an even greater measure of independence. Here the dawning unity of France was rudely challenged by the existence of peculiarities of race. The Bretons spoke a Celtic language and preserved Celtic customs. Even in religion they were distinct, and the Papal supremacy was hardly recognized. Brittany was the last of the feudal powers to fall in to the Crown.¹ Only because of its remoteness and its economic nullity was it prevented from becoming a real danger to the advance of French nationality; as it was it remained a jarring note long after harmony was established.

On the eastern frontier the kingdom of Burgundy was being merged in the Empire² and in the tenth century the County of Burgundy, with its capital of Besançon, had also passed out of French control. The Duchy remained, with its capital at Dijon. It was destined in later days by its union with Flanders to become the basis of an attempt to restore the kingdom of Lotharingia. For the time being it was closely gripped by the Capetians, who twice established cadets of their line upon the ducal throne. Hugh the Great gave it to his younger son; on the extinction of that line Henry I had to reconquer the Duchy, and he gave it to his brother Robert, and the dynasty which he founded held it till 1383.³ Of all the great fiefs Burgundy was the one that was most dominated by ecclesiastical houses. These abounded in that region and afforded a great lever to the Kings in their dealings with the Dukes.

In the South the national unity was threatened by the homogeneity of Aquitaine, and the distinctions of race and language which sundered it from Northern France. The menace of Aquitaine to the cause of nationality was really considerable; but it may be doubted if Hugh the Great was

¹ *Infra*, p. 340.

² *Supra*, p. 90, note. By the Conradian dynasty. The Kingdom of Arles was an imperial fief.

³ It was by a marriage with a descendant of his, Mary, with the Emperor Maximilian I, that Burgundy became identified with Spain and the Empire; Robert was a direct ancestor of the Emperor Charles V.

seeking to avert it when he persuaded Lothair to make him Duke of Aquitaine. Fortunately for France there arose a fierce rivalry amongst the great feudatories in that region for this title, which brought with it a supremacy over the whole of the South. The result was that in the early eleventh century Aquitaine was divided into four supreme fiefs: Aquitaine, Gascony, Toulouse, and Barcelona. Thus the danger was averted. But the idea of a separate and independent Aquitaine persisted, and was exploited by the English in the fourteenth century. The Hundred Years War was an expression not only of the rivalry of France and England, but of the old race antagonism between France and Aquitaine.¹

Remembering how comparatively small a part it really played in the history of France in the eleventh century, we may now return to the house of Capet. The reigns of the first four Capetians cover a period of 121 years, but need not detain us long. Hugh Capet is provokingly illusive. He displayed wisdom in reasserting and extending the rule of heredity which he had not scrupled to violate in order to secure the throne. His own coronation was quickly followed by that of his son, and this practice of crowning the eldest son during his father's lifetime was steadily enforced, until in the end the elective character of the monarchy was destroyed, and the Capetian kingship came to be based on a much more absolute heredity than that of the Carolings. This wise policy, combined with longevity and good fortune in begetting heirs, established the dynasty very firmly on the throne.

Churchmen had hoped that the new dynasty would accept the supremacy of the Emperor. But Hugh soon showed that this was not his intention. After failing to destroy the Caroling pretender, Charles of Lorraine, by force of arms, he seized his person and that of Arnulf, Archbishop of Reims, by treachery. He then threw over all allegiance to the Empire; nominated his own candidate to the See of Reims in the teeth of Pope and Emperor; attempted to contract a matrimonial alliance with Constantinople which would have been highly embarrassing to the Emperors, and introduced his influence

¹ *Infra*, p. 221.

into a part of the "Middle Kingdom," even more important than Lorraine, by the marriage of his son Robert to Roxale, widow of Arnulf Count of Flanders.¹ For the rest the reign of Hugh gave little promise of a great future for the house of Capet. A heavy price in gifts of domain had been paid to the supporters of the new dynasty, and the most probable consequence seemed to be the division of the West Frank realm into a number of petty feudal states. Not for two centuries did it become apparent that the Capetians would vindicate their supremacy over the entire region.

Hugh was quietly succeeded by his eldest son Robert called "the Pious". In him we find the personal piety, scholarship, and love of letters and music, which were a recurring feature among his descendants. Almost his first action was to put away his elderly wife—*la vieille Italienne*, he called her—and to espouse Bertha, widow of the Count of Blois. Bertha was within the prohibited degrees, and Robert quickly found himself excommunicated (998). For all his piety he was not without a spark of that self-will which we shall learn to expect even in the feebler Capetians, and neither excommunication nor anathema could prevail upon him to put away the wife of his bosom. It was something which to a Capetian was more dangerous than all the fulminations of the Church—to wit the lack of an heir—that at length moved him to exchange Bertha for Constance, daughter of the Count of Arles. Constance was a bad wife; her name affords perpetual material for the wit of the chroniclers; *inconstans Constantia* they call her; but she had one supreme merit, that she bore four sons in rapid succession—Hugh, who died in 1025; Henry, afterwards Henry I; Robert; and Odo. Hugh had already been crowned, and on his death Henry was crowned, not, however, without opposition from the nobles, jealous of their elective rights. The later years of Robert's reign were clouded not only by the jealousy of his wife and sons, but also by his ceaseless quarrels with his neighbours.

¹ Her dowry was the important district of Montreuil-sur-mer, which gave the Capetians access to the Channel; Robert kept it after he put his wife away.

In these struggles he was steadily aided by the Normans, and in Burgundy by the great religious houses, which were ever ready to look to the King as their natural protector against the encroachments of the Dukes and Counts. With their aid Robert was able to bring Burgundy for a time under the direct control of the Crown. He had discovered in the Church one of the great props of his dynasty. When he died in 1031 he left that dynasty, not strong indeed, but strengthened rather than weakened since his accession.

His son Henry was at once confronted with a rebellion in favour of his brother Robert. Vigorously backed by loyal Normandy he was able to stave off the danger, and in 1032 peace was restored, Robert receiving the Duchy of Burgundy as a peace-offering. With considerable dexterity Henry played off the Counts of Blois-Champagne, the most threatening of his neighbours, against the rising house of Anjou. The loyalty of the Normans was rewarded by the gift of the French Vexin to Count Robert "the Devil," which brought the Norman frontier within dangerous proximity of Paris, and boded ill for the Capetians should Norman loyalty fail. Meanwhile, however, that loyalty was as firm as ever, and on the death of Robert the Devil Henry undertook the tutelage of his bastard son William, for whom, in 1047, French troops, led by the King in person, won the Battle of Val-es-Dunes over a coalition led by Guy of Burgundy which had hoped to take advantage of his youth. But the Franco-Norman alliance was doomed to crumble, and two years later, from being William the bastard's protector, Henry became his opponent, and a general coalition was formed against Normandy, in which the Capetians had the support of Anjou, Auvergne, Burgundy, Champagne, and even that of distant Aquitaine. After the Battle of Mortemer (1054), in which William gave the Count of Chartres a taste of his mettle, there was an interval of peace, and when the war was rekindled Henry was defeated in person at the Battle of Varaville (1058).

The position of the house of Capet at the close of the reign of Henry I was discouraging in the extreme. The defection of Normandy was only one among many signs of the

increasing arrogance and independence of the great feudatories. The Royal House seemed to be sinking into comparative insignificance. The only real advance was the acquisition of Sens in 1055, and this was no set-off to the loss of the Vexin.¹ In his relations with foreign powers Henry was happier than in his relations with the feudatories. The kingdom of Burgundy, it is true, was finally drawn into the Imperial net (1031-9), but Henry maintained his influence in the Archbishopric of Lyons. He also maintained, though he never enforced or seriously attempted to enforce, his claims on Lorraine. More important still, he set himself against all encroachment by the Pope, and when the latter held a council at Reims he instituted a successful boycott of it; for he was backed by the whole Episcopate in his resistance to the See of Rome.

Henry I died in 1060 and was succeeded by his son, Philip I, who occupied the throne for forty-eight years. A big, sensual, greedy man, he was probably less incapable than he has been painted. It should be remembered that he was for long under the ban of the Church for his adulterous marriage with Bertrade de Montfort (1092), for which he was excommunicated, and that history was entirely in the hands of clerks who had little scruple about blackening an opponent. Albeit on a humble scale, Philip actually began the policy of annexation which was destined to be so successfully employed by his successors. He never lost a chance of grabbing an addition to the royal domain. Thus when he attempted to intervene in Flemish affairs he failed, but he carried off the valuable spoil of Corbie as the price of his labours. He established a cadet branch of the Capetian line in Vermandois where it grew to be an important prop of the dynasty. He reintroduced Capetian influence into the Vexin and thrust out into the Valois. He acquired Château-Landon and the Gâtinais, and in 1101 purchased Bourges and a considerable surrounding district. Meanwhile the conquest of Eng-

¹ The alienation of Burgundy to Henry's younger brother Robert was not for the moment a source of weakness, but the policy of apanages was to become dangerous in the future.

land by the Duke of Normandy had given a fresh turn to the Norman question. The centre of gravity of the Norman house was shifted from France to England, an event which told ultimately in favour of the union of France under the Capetians, but which was at the moment the cause of grave alarm to the royal house. In order to throw discord between England and Normandy, Philip supported the Conqueror's son, Robert Curthose, in his claim on the Duchy. Hostilities in the Vexin ensued; the conqueror was actually defeated at Gerberoi (1079), and only retained Gisors by the payment of a large sum of money to Philip. On William's death (1087) the war over the Vexin was resumed with William Rufus. That much-abused king was at any rate a considerable warrior; his troops threatened Paris, and the danger was only warded off by the energy of Philip's eldest son Louis, who from 1100 to 1108 was associated with his father, and to whose influence may be traced the revival in the fortunes of the royal house that marks these years. It cannot, therefore, be said that the reign was utterly ignoble and fruitless. Rather it was the moment when the Capetian first rubbed his eyes and thought of rousing himself from the long torpor which had followed the revolution of 987. And yet to read the story of the Capetian kings one would hardly believe that the close of the eleventh century was a time of frenzied excitement in Western Europe. That house is indeed showing signs of awakening, but it is elsewhere than in the palace of the island of the Seine that we must look for evidences of the growing spirit of national unity.

The power of the Eastern Empire had for many years been advancing and receding with almost tidal regularity. Under the Macedonian Emperors it had risen very high indeed, had checked the advance of the Saracens and carried the imperial frontier to the Euphrates. Not only so, but it had established order in the East so effectually that close economic relations were set up between Asia and Western Europe, and Constantinople became the mart of the world. Throughout the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries the Byzantine Empire was to a great extent a vast trading concern.

Towards the close of the eleventh century, however, a terrible catastrophe befell it. The Seljouk Turks invaded the imperial dominions, and in 1071 cut the imperial army to pieces in the Battle of Manzikert. This catastrophe affected not only the Empire but all Europe, which was dependent on the East for supplies, and on the Holy Land for the gratification of its religious emotions (for in the eleventh century pilgrimages were at the height of their popularity). The Turks not only maltreated the pilgrims to the Holy Sepulchre, but by their fanatical intolerance completely dislocated the machinery of commerce. Without undue cynicism it is possible to believe that the latter was the more widely felt effect of the Turkish conquests. Thus while the Capetian kings were still glaring at the nearest castle in sulky defiance, the whole of Western Europe, touched at its tenderest points, was girding itself for the first of those wonderful expeditions to the East which were the most characteristic product of the Middle Ages. Now, it is a very striking fact that the First Crusade was almost entirely French in conception and execution. The idea was that of a French Pope; it was first preached in France, and its most inspiring preacher was a French hermit; its leaders and its language were both French; so was the bulk of the rank and file—so much so that, to an Eastern, Europeans were for centuries known simply as “Franks”. But above all the spirit of the Crusade was French. Beginning in France it ended in the establishment of a veritable miniature France in the East.

The credit of conceiving and organizing the Crusade lies in the first instance with Pope Urban II. He was at issue with the greater monarchs of Western Europe on the question of investitures, and was therefore obliged to look elsewhere for support. He turned from the royal to the great feudal houses, and they responded with enthusiasm to his appeal. A council was held at Clermont-Ferrand on 28 November, 1095, and the Crusade was determined on. Indulgences, pardons, and privileges were offered broadcast, and the pious and penitent flocked with the adventurous to the standard. Raymond IV, Count of Toulouse, led the contingent from the South of France;

Godfrey de Bouillon, Duke of Lower Lorraine, that from Northern France. Philip himself, being under the ban of the Church, could have no share in the Crusade, but his brother Hugh of Vermandois led the royal vassals, supported by Stephen of Blois and Robert of Flanders. Bohemond of Tarentum and his nephew Tancred (half-Norman, half-Sicilian in extraction) commanded the Italian contingent. Thus all the leaders were men with French blood in their veins and French speech on their tongues.

The movement was taken up and popularized by the preaching of the hermit, Peter of Amiens. But it was an army of peasants, mendicants, and paupers that he drew to the standard. Bad harvests, and the dislocation of trade already referred to, had plunged France into famine, misery, and unrest. Economic conditions were as much at the root of the "popular" Crusade as religious enthusiasm. Many of those who joined did so in despair, with no alternative but starvation. The "popular" Crusade set off at once, in utter ignorance even of the whereabouts of Jerusalem, and dashed itself to pieces in Hungary and Asia Minor. The feudal Crusade followed more deliberately, and reached Constantinople at the close of the year 1096. Hampered rather than aided by the Eastern Emperor, who had no wish to see trade rivals established in the East, they pushed on into Asia Minor. The difficulties of that march it would be impossible to exaggerate. The Crusaders were utterly unfitted for desert campaigning. They were unaccustomed to, and ill-equipped for, the climate. The hostility of the Seljouks was the least of the obstacles they had to encounter. Thirst and the burning sun laid thousands low. They won the Battle of Dorylæum (1 July, 1097) and thrust on into the desert; the wonder is that even a fraction of the army reached the plains of Cilicia. On 3 June, 1098, they took Antioch, only, however, to be themselves besieged in the captured city. Famine and pestilence swept them down; and all but the stoutest hearted returned to Europe. But the diminution of their numbers was pure gain to the Crusaders. Their task would have been more easily accomplished if they had operated from the first with a compact and mobile force,

and so avoided the terrible difficulties of transport, discipline, and commissariat. Under these trying conditions the "miraculous" phase of the Crusade began. The discovery of the Holy Lance which had pierced the side of Christ provoked an outburst of religious enthusiasm before which all obstacles gave way. It was this enthusiasm and the generalship of Bohemond which on 28 June, 1098, won the Battle of Antioch, a military exploit of the first order. However mixed the motives of those who left Europe in 1096, nothing but religious exaltation could have sufficed to carry the 40,000 worn-out men who now remained from Antioch to Jerusalem, and finally to deliver the Holy City into their hands (15 July, 1099). It is harder but perhaps not less true to say that only religious fanaticism could have provoked them to the horrible excesses that marked the fall of the city. The victorious Crusaders at once set to work to entrench themselves as the garrison of the East. Godfrey founded a kingdom of Jerusalem, while Bohemond ruled at Antioch and Godfrey's brother Baldwin at Edessa. The rule of the Franks in the East had a triple character; it was necessarily military in the first place, but it had also both a religious and a commercial side. Trade relations between Western Europe and the affluent East were restored, and on this occasion under the auspices of the French, not that of the Eastern Empire.

Coming just at the moment when the Capetian monarchy was at its lowest ebb, the story of the Crusade is a remarkable witness to the extraordinary vitality and tone of a nation which had not yet "found itself," had not achieved the goal of national unity. The French had stepped out to meet an ideal, which, mixed as were the motives which inspired it, was in the main generous, romantic, spiritual. They had displayed in the execution marvellous fortitude and tenacity and great military qualities, and in the use they made of their conquest versatility and common sense. The heart of a people which could do all this was evidently in the right place. From this time forward, wherever she fought, whatever cause she adopted, France stands out as a real nation endowed with glorious and peculiar national qualities. If

there is any lesson to be drawn from the First Crusade it is that, disunited as she was by unrestrained feudalism, with large districts owning only the most shadowy allegiance to her kings, France was already in the truest sense a nation. The growth and consciousness of national unity among the *bas-fonds* of the people was far in advance of the growth and consciousness thereof that existed in the palace on the Seine, and was all the more deep and sure for that. The influences that had caused the West Franks to reject the Teutonic Carolings, and had prompted them to make the First Crusade their own, were at work during these two centuries, making Frenchmen realize that they had an essential unity and inspiring them all unconsciously with the ideal of a national life. It was the mission of the Capetians, not to create that ideal, but to be the active means of satisfying it when it had been created.

Amongst the recentralizing influences which begot this ideal one of the most important was that of a common language. This had for long existed, although there was a flaw in Brittany and although there was a real distinction between *Langue d'oïl* and *Langue d'oc*. In the eleventh century the common language led on to a common literature. The Germans of Tacitus' day had been in the habit of chanting *antiqua carmina*, and no doubt in Meroving times the same songs were chanted in Teutonic and Romance. From the former sprang the "Nibelungen," from the latter the "Chanson de Roland".¹ This great epic was composed in the eleventh century (probably between 1066 and 1099) and by a Norman. German in descent it is Romance in language; its subject is a Teutonic Emperor.² But in spirit it is pure French. It is permeated by a real patriotism, a real love of "fair France". The imagination of its author, and the ringing verse full of the clash of arms, are typically French. So France had her national music before she was fully conscious of her national mission. But the country in which the "Chanson de Roland" could be sung could not long repudiate its mission.

Such, deep down in the heart of the people, independent

¹ *Supra*, p. 66.

² The only existing manuscript is preserved in the Bodleian.

of the Capetian or any other house, was the spontaneous birth of French national feeling. With the advent of the twelfth century the moment approaches when that feeling demanded the repression of the feudal spirit, in so far as that spirit militated against consolidation, and when the Capetian house stepped forward with its royal claims to be the chief agent in that repression. Feudalism was already in its decline. Many causes had been at work sapping its foundations. Chief amongst these was the fact that it was in conflict with the spirit of the times, which demanded union not division, and eleventh century feudalism was division run mad. But already the process of consolidation was beginning; the smaller fiefs were disappearing, and France was shaping herself into a few great feudal States. Feudalism had in fact concentrated its forces, and it seemed probable that France might be doomed to permanent division into some dozen great States. The assertion of a royal supremacy over the whole of France was the only possible escape from this menace of division; and the great question of the twelfth and succeeding centuries was, would the house of Capet be equal to its task? The Crusade had contributed to the weakening of the Feudal System. It had removed the fiercer spirits, and provided a permanent outlet through which those spirits continued to be drawn to the East. Had it not been for this, and for the fact that circumstances excluded the Capetians from all share in the Crusades, the task of crushing feudalism and consolidating France might well have been too much for them.

Most profitable of all, however, had been the politic attitude of the house of Capet in its relations with the Church. During the greater part of the eleventh century Christendom had been convulsed by the repeated efforts to reform the Church. This movement had at first been identified with, and proceeded from, the Monastery of Cluni, and resolved itself to a great extent into a battle between the secular and regular clergy. The Cluniacs fought for the celibacy of the clergy, and for the wholesale internal reform of the Church. The first Capetians, Hugh and Robert, had sided with the reformers, but Henry I and Philip I had thrown themselves

on to the opposite side. They were in constant conflict with the reforming Popes, and it was this fact that debarred them—to their great good fortune—from active participation in the Crusade. Opposed as they were to the extreme demands of the reformers, these kings profited by the activity of the Church, and in particular by its opposition to feudalism, the common enemy of Church and Crown. The “Peace of God”—an attempt to impose an oath on the feudatories to spare Churchmen and the humbler classes, and in fact to keep their quarrels to themselves—was only partially successful, and the “Truce of God” which declared Sunday a *dies non* in feudal warfare, and was afterwards extended to cover a generous week-end from Thursday to Monday was not wholly successful. But so far as Peace and Truce were observed they told in favour of the forces of order—the anti-feudal forces, of which the Capetian royalty was the chief.

Under Gregory VII and Urban II the reform movement developed into a battle royal between Church and State all over Western Europe. The Popes claimed spiritual independence, and attempted to throw off the yoke of the Empire. They claimed the full right of investiture, and even challenged the claim of the feudal overlords to exact homage from their ecclesiastical vassals. So stern was the struggle that in the early years of the twelfth century the Popes conceived the idea of compromising with the Capetians in order to concentrate their forces against the Emperor. The kings abandoned their claim to investiture and homage, but retained, in so far as their direct ecclesiastical vassals were concerned, the right to exact the oath of fealty, collation (i.e. appointment) to benefices, the *régale*,¹ and the control of elections. Thus while retaining enough of their rights to form a lever in future struggles with the Papacy, the Capetians secured the immediate advantage of alliance with the Papacy, and sup-

¹ *Régale*. This was the right of the King to enjoy the revenues of an ecclesiastical fief during its vacancy. The date and origin are equally obscure. Some authors trace it as far back as Merovingian times, but it is only from the beginning of the twelfth century that it is in any way properly regulated,

port from the reforming party in the Church. From this compromise dates their real claim to be regarded as "eldest sons of the Church," a position which was of immense service to them in the struggle with feudalism. Finally the Capetians had on their side the silent but potent support of all to whom not feudalism but unrestrained feudalism made life unbearable;—the peasantry, the labouring and commercial classes, and the religious orders. Insignificant materially, this support was morally of supreme importance.

To sum up: feudalism was running counter to the spirit of the times; it had spent itself in the Crusade, and was still spending itself in the task of garrisoning the East. It was violently opposed to the claims of the growing Papal theocracy with which the Capetians were presently to effect a compromise. It had itself consolidated France into a few great fiefs which could be dealt with one by one. Finally, by its brawlings and oppressions it had driven public opinion into the Capetian camp. Philip I was drifting unregretted to the tomb. His son Louis became virtual king in 1098. The time was ripe for great events. Would the Capetian dynasty be ready with the personal leadership necessary to guide these events in the direction of national unity under their supremacy?

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CHAPTER VIII

LOUIS VI AND LOUIS VII

(1108-1180)

ACCORDING as we are inclined to lay emphasis on the inevitability of the march of events, or on the influence of personal leadership in guiding them, we shall minimize or emphasize the personal qualities of the King to whom the Capetian sceptre fell in the years which opened the new century. The personality of Louis *le Gros* is not one which lends itself readily to neglect. He is the first of the Capetians who comes down to us with much colour or life. This huge man, pale with a pallor attributed to his step-mother Bertrade's attempt to poison him,¹ strikes the eye. This mighty warrior, hand-to-hand fighter, revelling in the joy of battle, the first into the water, the first into the flames, "incomparable athlete and mighty swordsman," yet unable at the age of forty-six, by reason of his great corpulence, to mount his horse, appeals to human sympathy: "Ah! quelle misérable condition que le notre! ne pouvoir jamais jouir en même temps de l'expérience et de la force. Si j'avais su étant jeune, si je pouvais maintenant que je suis vieux, j'aurais dompté bien des Empires."² Could the vanity of human wishes be more pathetically expressed?

An excellent son to a difficult father and a monstrous step-mother, his humanity, bonhomie, and affability endeared

¹ Philip I put away his first wife Bertha, daughter of the Count of Holland, and scandalously espoused Bertrade de Montfort, Countess of Anjou, who had run away from her husband. Louis was Bertha's son.

² Suger, "Vie de Louis le Gros" (ed. Molinier, 1887), p. 123.

him to his subjects.¹ First of the Capetians he enjoyed a genuine popularity. Sensual he was and avaricious ; a hoarder of money (as all the greatest kings of France have been—Louis VI, Philip Augustus, Louis XI, and Henry IV) ; but his humanity, justness, and sincerity were far in advance of the age in which he lived. In him we are able to trace some at least of the humane virtues which helped to make his great-great-grandson the paragon of the Middle Ages.

Louis VI was endowed with great political perspicacity, and embarked on the task of consolidation with deliberate thoroughness. He was determined to assure himself of the soundness of the take-off before he committed himself to the leap. In other words his first object was to consolidate the royal domain, reduce the lesser feudatories to subordination, and allow feudalism to be disintegrated by natural causes. In his relations with his greater vassals he was in the main wisely content to mark time until these preliminaries were complete ; and his ceaseless wars were waged chiefly to vindicate his supremacy over *Vicomtes* and *Châtelains*. This policy had the additional merit of being popular. For it was the lesser feudatories, such as Hugues du Puiset and Thomas de Marle,² who were the real scourges of the country, the rule of the greater feudatories being on the whole protective and beneficial.

At the same time he seized with unerring instinct the opportunities which fell to him of posing as the protector of the Church. In this way he was able to secure important outposts in the hearts of the dominions of the rival feudatories, which were of the utmost value to his successors when they carried the war of consolidation into those regions. In fact he made use of the Church as an indirect means of undermining the feudatories, even the great feudatories. He steadily supported the ecclesiastical dignitaries in their struggle with

¹ Simplicity is the word that comes to the mouth of the chroniclers.

² For Louis' expeditions against Hugues du Puiset and Thomas de Marle, see Suger, "*Vie de Louis le Gros*," op. cit. 71 *sqq.* and 80 *sqq.* Suger calls the latter "*homo perditissimus*," who, "the devil favouring him," devoured the country with the fury of a wolf (*ibid.* 81).

the latter (e.g. the Bishop of Nantes against the Duke of Brittany). But it was no part of the policy of Louis VI to throw down the gauntlet to these feudatories. Indeed it was hardly in his power to do so. His feudal levies were becoming daily smaller and more uncertain, and the royal army had not yet come into being. In his wars Louis had to rely in the main on his personal prowess and that of his immediate entourage. At the same time it was impossible for him to observe a complete neutrality in the continual upheavals provoked by the Feudal System. For one thing, men were beginning to appeal to the Capetian as an arbiter in their disputes, a practice which was of good omen for that house, but which involved them in many struggles which they would gladly have avoided. It was such an appeal that drew Louis into the successful Bourbonnais expedition of 1108-1109, where he settled a disputed succession in terms agreeable to himself, and into a less successful intervention in Flanders (1127).¹ In that case he was called in to punish the murderers of Charles "the Good". He established his unworthy protégé William Cliton, son of Robert Curthose, as Count, but was unable to maintain him in face of the popular opposition which his insolence aroused. Under these circumstances Louis did the best he could for the royal dignity by himself investing William Cliton's opponent, Thierry, as Count, and accepting defeat with a good grace. Into the remoter fiefs he never penetrated, and, though the marriage of his son to the heiress of Aquitaine² was a deliberate attempt to throw the Capetian net round the sundered Southern region, his arm was never really felt beyond Auvergne, where he successfully defended the Bishop of Clermont against Count William VI (1122 and 1126). It was with his immediate neighbours in the North that he was most concerned. With Anjou he managed to preserve peace. That rapidly growing feudal house was for the time being united with the Capetians

¹ Suger, "Vie de Louis le Grô's," *op. cit.* 110 *sqq.*

² In 1137 Louis "le jeune" married Eleanor at Bordeaux and was crowned at Poitiers. (Suger, "Vie de Louis le Gros," *op. cit.* 127-129.) Aquitaine, after Gascony passed to it, 1052, comprised about one-third of France.

in opposition to the Anglo-Norman power. It was by the last named power that the growth of the Capetian house was for the moment most gravely threatened. Henry I of England and Normandy was a much greater figure in the world than Louis VI, and his material strength was infinitely superior. But the Anglo-Norman power had not found its true centre. Thus it was that, though from time to time hard pressed, the Capetian monarchy was able to cope with the Anglo-Norman danger, even when that danger was enhanced by the accession of Anjou and the transference of Aquitaine from the Capetians to the Plantagenets.

Louis' dealings with his neighbour, however, gave little promise of this favourable conclusion. The prolonged hostilities which he was obliged to wage with Henry I were almost uniformly unsuccessful. His policy, like that of his father, was to favour the maintenance of Normandy as a Dukedom separate from England, in the line of Robert Curthose (i.e. in William Cliton). But never for a moment was there any promise of a successful issue to this policy. The first hostilities (1109-1112) ended in the Treaty of Gisors, which not only left the Anglo-Norman union intact, but gave Henry suzerain rights over Maine and Brittany. The hostilities of 1116-1120 were even more disastrous. Louis' headstrong courage only landed him in defeat, and at the Council of Reims (1119) he was driven to appeal fruitlessly for Papal assistance.¹ Then occurred the dramatic catastrophe of The White Ship (25 November, 1120), which gave a new impetus to the policy of severing Normandy from England. Henry parried the blow by allying himself with the Emperor, and a German army marched on Reims: his counter-thrust—a deadly one—was the Angevin marriage. Matilda, his daughter and heiress, espoused Geoffrey *le Bel*, Count of Anjou, and the continental position of the Norman kings was immensely strengthened (1127). Only the death of Henry I in 1135, and the anarchy which ensued in England, checked the tide of war which was running so unfavourably to the

¹ The Pope was Callixtus VI; in Louis VI's policy alliance with the Papacy is a constant item.

Capetians. Clearly there was to be a stern fight with the Anglo-Norman-Angevin house before the Capetians could claim the supremacy in France. As to the other great feudatories, Louis kept peace with Burgundy, being content to insinuate himself into that region in the guise of protector of the many great ecclesiastical houses with which it was studded; while with the neighbouring house of Blois-Champagne he maintained, reluctantly enough, indecisive hostilities during the greater part of his reign.

It was not only in his direct dealings with the feudatories that Louis VI showed his determination to elevate the monarchy at the expense of feudalism. The same principle governed his actions in other spheres; defeudalization and its complement—the aggrandizement of the royal power—were the guiding motives of his life. He defeudalized the Court. For twenty years (1108-1127) he was dominated by a greedy favourite, Étienne de Garlande, not a feudal noble but a humble clerk in origin. On his fall the King found a more worthy adviser in another man of humble origin, Suger, Abbot of Saint-Denis. Suger's main work lay in the reign of Louis' successor, and will be dealt with in the narrative of that reign. The point to remember here is that the Court had become a "career open to the talents," no longer the monopoly of nobles with hereditary offices. Not that the nobles were excluded from the royal councils; one of Louis' most trusted advisers was Raoul de Vermandois, a cadet of the royal house. Society also was beginning to be defeudalized. Individuals and whole groups of individuals were pushing heads and shoulders out of the feudal bog. Louis was no emancipator on general principles; he probably neither understood nor cared to understand the idea of liberty in the abstract; but he was a shrewd man of business, and not slow to realize firstly, that freedom from harassing feudal restrictions was a thing that men would pay for, and secondly, that it was to his interest to rule over an economically prosperous kingdom, and that such a kingdom could only be built up by loosing the shackles with which feudalism had hampered the limbs of industry.

The closing years of the eleventh century had witnessed a great economic awakening. The reopening of the East by the Crusade had provided a wide outlet for commercial activity, and now the decline of feudalism gave men the chance of using these opportunities. Feudalism in its origin had been beneficial and protective; men had grouped themselves round the great *seigneurs*, in the night of the monarchy, as the only guarantors of order and security. But in its exaggeration feudalism had lost its original character. In the ceaseless wars and upheavals, raids and reprisals, of the ninth and tenth centuries, the idea of protecting the industrial and agricultural classes, in order that they might attain the height of production and so be able to pay more to their lord, had been lost sight of. In the turmoil of feudalism run mad, the sole object of every *seigneur*, more especially of the smaller barons, was to exploit every individual and group of individuals to the utmost, before a stronger, *seigneur* than he ousted him and began in turn the process of exploitation. The suppression of the smaller feudatories made an end of this uncomfortable and uneconomic state of affairs. Once more, as order was re-established and the castle walls crumbled, it became possible and profitable to protect the wealth-producing classes. Not only to the King but to the great feudatories it became clear that a protected, privileged community was more profitable than one whose productive powers were diminished by unbridled exploitation; while to peasants and bourgeois it was equally clear that regular and, if possible, limited exploitation by one great man was infinitely preferable to indefinite exploitation by a host of small men. Thus a modified freedom was desired on both sides, and we enter upon an epoch of charters and liberation.

The affranchisement of the remaining serfs was facilitated, and the services and exactions (*péages*, *corvées*, etc.) to which the peasantry were subject began to be written. Louis' famous "Charter of Lorris"¹ was the model on which most of these

¹(1) The *Prévost* and his serjeants on entering office are compelled to respect the rights of the men of Lorris. (2) Inhabitants wishing to quit the town may sell their goods. Strangers who have resided a year and a day

charters were based; and, as it was found to pay, the idea was taken up by other *seigneurs* and such charters (protecting the community against royal and seigneurial agents, abolishing *corvées*, limiting exactions direct and indirect, and regulating justice) became common.¹ New towns were founded, often round monasteries, abbeys, or castles, with charters of rights and privileges and inviolability, which encouraged merchants and artisans to seek their shelter; old towns also secured freedoms. Prosperity was necessary to exploitation, and prosperity, it was found, could only be obtained in an atmosphere of comparative freedom. That was the discovery of the early twelfth century. In the beginning it was the intention to develop the privileged towns for the benefit each of its own *seigneur* and to protect it against all others. But soon the towns became so powerful in their prosperity that in many districts they began to demand communal rights— independence, self-government—in fact, to be their own *seigneurs*. The communal movement of the twelfth century had no coherence; each aspirant fought in its own way for the privileges it especially wanted. The demands were at first resisted, but in the end many towns, especially in Flanders and Picardy and the Pyrenean regions, obtained communal liberties. The communal movement and the widespread emancipation of the industrial and agricultural classes was a heavy additional blow to the Feudal System. That system by no means perished in the reign of Louis *le Gros*; the greater fiefs endured as rivals, and dangerous rivals, to the royal power for many

in Lorrain can claim citizen rights and may not afterwards be reclaimed by the Lord whose land they have left. (3) All *corvées* (i.e. forced labour) are abolished except the annual cartage of the King's wine from Lorrain to Orleans, also the King could no longer exact *taille or tolte*, or any *impôt extraordinaire*. (4) The inhabitants are dispensed from the *guet* and no longer required to perform the service *d'ost* and *de chevauchée*, except when the distance admits of their return to their homes the same night. (5) Indirect taxation is limited and merchants attending Lorrain Fair have royal protection. The customs of Lorrain were continually accorded to towns by later kings. See Delisle, "Catalogue des Actes de Philippe Auguste" (1856), *passim*.

¹ The emancipation of the towns did not, however, begin with Louis VI. The process had already more than begun in the reign of his father. Le Mans 1073, Cambrai 1076, Noyon 1098.

long years; but the greater abuses of feudalism did perish during his reign, with the result that before his death, monarchy had its head above water.

Louis *le Gros* died in 1137. He had laid the foundations of the national monarchy strong and deep; all the more so because he had not pushed them out too wide. He had confined himself to beginnings, had given the Capetians elbow room in Paris, had set his own house in order before interfering in his neighbours'. Above all he had laid the axe at the root of the tree of feudalism, and encouraged the development of a national life looking to the Royal House for protection. He is the first of the builders of modern France.

It was fortunate for the Capetian monarchy that at the moment of the King's death both England and the Empire were harassed by domestic troubles. The death of Henry I had plunged the former into civil war; that of the Emperor Lothair, the last of the Saxon house, led to a disputed succession in Germany, the deceased Emperor's son-in-law, the Duke of Saxony, disputing the crown with Conrad of Hohenstaufen. Under these circumstances Louis VI's son, Louis *le Jeune*, then a lad of sixteen, ascended the throne without serious opposition.¹

Louis, who was married to Eleanor of Aquitaine, and whose policy was to a great extent that of his masterful wife, was quickly embroiled not only with the ecclesiastical power but also with the most dangerous of the feudatories, Thibaut of Champagne. The house of Champagne was closely identified with the cause of ecclesiastical reform, and St. Bernard and the Cistercian order were under its special protection. Louis' kinsman and seneschal, Raoul of Vermandois, was married to a niece of Thibaut, and when he repudiated her, in order to wed the King's sister-in-law, Petronilla, Thibaut's anger knew no bounds. The Pope was appealed to and, as he was much incensed at Louis' revival of the investiture quarrel² and his

¹ Louis' elder son, Philip, had been accidentally killed, his horse taking fright at a pig which was scavenging the streets of Paris, *obvio porco diabolico offensus* (Suger, "Vie de Louis le Gros," op. cit. 121).

² Cf. *Supra*, p. 109.

refusal to invest legally appointed clergy, he imposed an interdict.

St. Bernard, then at the height of his fame, flung himself between the combatants. He was no champion of nationality, being Burgundian rather than French;¹ but he was wholly wrapped up in the ideal of the supremacy of the universal Church and it was with that ideal in view that he had made himself the friend of the Capetians, taken up the reformer's mantle that had fallen from the shoulders of Cluni, founded the Cistercian order, and attempted the reform not only of the Episcopate but of the Papacy itself, preserved the Papacy from schism (1130-1138), and promoted a Second Crusade.

St. Bernard was in fact a versatile genius, battling against the irresistible drift of events. He now flung himself on to the side of Champagne and opposed Louis' pretensions in the matter of investitures, and it was by his intervention that the peace of Vitri, between Louis and Thibaut, was signed (1143). Louis was persuaded to withdraw his troops from Champagne on the understanding that the Pope would take off the excommunication of Raoul of Vermandois. This condition not being fulfilled, hostilities recommenced. Innocent II refused to listen to St. Bernard, and it was only after the death of the former (September, 1143) that the Saint got his way, the interdict on the King being removed though the excommunication of Raoul was maintained. Louis VII had found himself no match for the ecclesiastical power; he was paying for the concessions his father had made to secure the goodwill of the Church. In other respects he fared better. He had demonstrated his military superiority over Champagne, and, although he failed to prevent the union of Anjou and Normandy in 1144, he recovered as the price of acquiescence the all-important frontier fortress of Gisors. This feudal success outweighed the ecclesiastical failure.

Suddenly all other events were thrown into the shade by the announcement of the King that he was about to take the Cross. He had been impelled to this step by ill news from the East. The fall of Edessa (1143) seemed likely to lay

¹ He was born in the neighbourhood of Dijon,

Antioch and Jerusalem itself open to the infidels. The whole work of the First Crusade, political, commercial, and religious, was in jeopardy. The idea of the Second Crusade was Louis' own ; it appealed to his restless and adventurous temperament, and also to the genuine religious zeal which, in spite of his quarrel with the Pope, was a determining element in his character. The Pope (Eugenius III) was lukewarm, and the Emperor (Conrad III) half-hearted ; even St. Bernard hesitated at first. But when at last he allowed himself to be drawn into the project he flung himself into it with all his matchless zeal and power as an agitator. The magnetism of his eloquence carried all before it and even obliterated the terrible memories of the First Crusade. If the idea and the execution of the Second Crusade belong to the King of France the inspiration came from St. Bernard. The Emperor took up arms and in June, 1147, the French and Germans joined forces at Ratisbon. The Crusade had hardly started when its misfortunes began. The idea of a united Christendom marching against the infidel was splendid, but with the dawn of the sense of nationality its realization had become impossible.

Dissensions arose between the French and the Germans ; and, as the march proceeded, matters were further complicated by the jealous attitude of the Eastern Emperor. The struggles with climatic and physical difficulties in Asia Minor were a repetition of those of the First Crusade. For a time Louis behaved with gallantry, but he was not of the stuff which endures the test of extreme adversity. The trials of the long march, in the face of an enemy whose tactics dumbfounded him, overcame his spirit ; and when he reached Antioch with a mere remnant of his army, he abandoned the greater part of that remnant to shift for itself, and himself proceeded—no conqueror but a simple pilgrim—to the Holy Sepulchre. It was not Louis' military enterprise alone that had suffered shipwreck, a canker had eaten its way into his domestic life. Queen Eleanor—a woman of fiery spirit—was perhaps disgusted at her husband's failure in the field, but there were whispers too of scandalous relations with her own uncle. Whatever the cause an estrangement had risen between

the King and Queen, and their domestic happiness was irretrievably damaged. The double blow was too much for Louis. One last attempt he made to redeem his enterprise from complete disaster; but the attack on Damascus was as great a failure as the rest. It is hardly surprising that the King lingered in Jerusalem rather than face the ignominy of his homecoming. At last in 1149 Louis and Eleanor—estranged and embittered—returned to France, practically the sole remnant of the mighty host which had set forth two years before with such enthusiasm and fair promise. The failure of the Second Crusade (an enterprise undertaken by kings marching at the head of national armies rather than feudal barons leading feudal levies as in the First Crusade) demonstrated the bankruptcy of the idea of a homogeneous Christendom, and afforded a signal proof of the growing importance of national distinctions. It had failed, not so much from lack of valour or ardour in its leaders, as from their jealousies and inability to co-operate. The old conception of Christendom as a brotherhood was dead and buried in the sands of Syria.

Dark as the cloud is that broods over the Crusade, it is not without its silver lining. The administration of the kingdom had been conducted in Louis' absence with great ability by Suger. The frail figure of the little Abbot, quiet and unpretentious, is one of the most remarkable of the twelfth century. Quite whole-hearted and unambitious in an age when these qualities were practically unknown, he was the very model of the upright steward. Unsolicitous, he was the companion and counsellor of kings; the correspondent of Roger of Sicily; the admired friend of the great English Henry; whilst two kings of France successively hung upon his lips. The only blessing indeed, his biographer complains, which Heaven denied him, was *embonpoint*!¹ "Cæsar in spirit, in speech he was Cicero,"² and his spirit and his eloquence are

¹ "Au milieu de tous les genres divers de grâces qu'il reçût du ciel, une seule lui manqua, celle de devenir plus gras" (Guillaume de Saint-Denys, "Vie de Suger" (ed. Guizot, 1825), 178).

² "César par le cœur, Cicéron par l'éloquence" (*ibid.* II. 77).

unquestionable. Pious, simple, and unostentatious, he was able in an ascetic age to live in the world but not of it ; to fulfil his ecclesiastical duties and yet to study profane letters ; to control interests both worldly and ecclesiastical without sacrificing the one to the other. He solved for himself in practice the question which above all puzzled the statesmen of the Middle Ages—that of the relations between Church and State, and solved it because he looked at it from the practical not from the theoretical standpoint. He had a moderation, a detachment, and a faculty for unbiassed judgment which stamp him as a statesman, and make him positively modern ; and it was a curiously modern trait to be able, in an age when writing was a laborious art, to write “almost as fast as he could talk”. Suger disarmed all rivals by his simplicity and candour, and not only met the financial exigencies of the Crusade but was able by careful management to lay by money against his master’s return. “After providing for the Crusade expenses,” he could write to Louis, “your judicial revenues, *tailles*, feudal reliefs, and the products of your domain are reserved for your return”. Suger’s administration, in fact, proved that the wise policy of Louis VI in emancipating and fostering the industrial and agricultural life of the kingdom had borne fruit. France in the twelfth century was self-sufficing, and it was possible for a disinterested and sagacious ruler to govern without either bloodshed or oppression. On the King’s return Suger handed over with alacrity the administration of the kingdom which he had only with reluctance undertaken, and retired to the seclusion of Saint-Denis. There in January, 1151, at the age of seventy, amidst universal sorrow, he died. It is with no more than truth that his biographer says, “from the moment when he was first admitted to the counsels of the Prince to the moment of his death, the kingdom enjoyed continuous prosperity and reached a high pitch of splendour. But scarcely was he removed when the sceptre of the Franks felt grievously the inconvenience of his loss.”

Louis was now confronted with a grave and difficult question. He was by this time completely estranged from his wife ; but neither estrangement nor the remote degree of con-

sanguinity (which had of course always existed) between them,¹ would have driven him to sacrifice her immense dower, had it not been for the fact that after fifteen years of wedlock he was still without a male heir. This was a situation which no Capetian could face with equanimity, and it was this rather than consanguinity or alienation that constrained the King to take a step which had most serious results.

In 1152 Louis and Eleanor were divorced; Suger had opposed this step, yet it is difficult to say that the King was wrong. Aquitaine was desirable but an heir was essential.² Louis, however, can hardly have foreseen the full consequences of his action. In two months Eleanor had wedded Henry Plantagenet and one-half of the Capetian realm was transferred to the most dangerous rival of that house. Louis protested, forbade the banns in his capacity as suzerain, and continued (rather fatuously) to call himself Duke of Aquitaine;³ but his energy seems to have left him, and he did not push hostilities with vigour. The crowning blow came when in 1154, on the death of Stephen, Henry Plantagenet assumed the crown of England. With this event the Plantagenet house takes its final shape as the continental rival of the Capetians. Materially the balance seemed to be all in favour of the former. Henry, already thrice a Count, and twice a Duke, was now also a King. He was master of Bordeaux, Angers, Rouen, and London. The situation recalls the Lotharingian kingdom in the tenth century, and the somewhat similar possession by one hand of Rome, Milan, Aachen, and Arles. And like the Lotharingian kingdom the Plantagenet heritage was doomed by its want of cohesion to dissolution.

The immediate advantages seemed to be on the side of the Plantagenets. Henry was Louis' superior in character, energy, and military and political talent. Eleanor, moreover,

¹ They had a common great-great-great-great-grandfather—Thibaut of Aquitaine (father-in-law of Hugh Capet). Eleanor had borne Louis two daughters.

² Louis had never enjoyed direct royal rights over Aquitaine. There he was Duke, while elsewhere he was King.

³ Louis VII's daughters by Eleanor were the rightful heiresses of Aquitaine.

who had borne Louis nothing but daughters, presented Henry with three sons,¹ with a rapidity that was positively spiteful. But the forces of nature which tell in the long run were on the side of the Capetians.² The whole claim of the English kings to rule in France was an anachronism, an attempt to revive purely feudal claims and to ignore the ever-growing forces of nationality. The process of consolidation was advancing steadily in Eastern and Central France, aided greatly by the assumption on the part of the Capetians of the rôle of protectors of the Church. The Bishops of Lorraine and Burgundy, even of Imperial Burgundy, looked to the King of France for protection against the oppression of the nobles. In Dauphiné the marriage of Louis' nephew to the heiress gave the Capetians a foothold ; and in many places where the nobles held of Henry of England, the clergy attached themselves to France. Henry was an immeasurably greater man than Louis, but he was to learn that even a giant battling against the tide is no match for a weak man swimming on it.

Meanwhile, having established himself in Anjou and secured a foothold in Brittany, Henry allied himself with Raymond Berenger to press his wife's claims on Toulouse. Louis was next threatened in his own capital, and obliged to buy peace by agreeing to the marriage of one of his daughters—Margaret—to Henry's eldest son, Henry, and to the alienation as her dower of the Norman Vexin and the all-important Gisors.

Thus harassed in his Western marches, Louis was also threatened with grave dangers in the East, and above all in the district known as the kingdom of Arles. Here the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa (1152-1190) was pursuing a deliberate policy which had for its object the assertion of his authority in the old Lotharingian regions. For many years he pursued it with great tenacity of purpose. He married Beatrice, daughter of Renaud, Count of Burgundy, and

¹ And a fourth after a short interval.

² The possession of suzerain rights, moreover, gave a great moral advantage. Even so violent a man as Henry feared to draw the sword directly on his suzerain.

gradually persuaded all the Burgundian houses to recognize his authority. He had a strong backing at the French Court headed by the Count of Champagne. By 1162 it may be said that he had accomplished his object, and it seemed probable that Louis would have to acquiesce in a surrender of his claims in the South-East in order to save himself from a coalition between Henry II and Barbarossa. It was then that he conceived the ecclesiastical policy by which alone France was saved from the jaws of the nutcrackers which seemed to be closing upon her.

Barbarossa was not only intent on swallowing Burgundy, he was set on the vindication of the superiority of the Empire over the Papacy. When Hadrian IV died (1159) two Popes, Victor IX and Alexander III, had been elected, of whom the former was the imperial nominee and the latter the orthodox Pope. The schism which followed was the salvation of Louis. It had been his steady policy to cultivate the support of the Papacy. He now decided to support the orthodox candidate. Nevertheless he was anxious that the question should be peacefully settled, and arranged an interview with the Emperor at St. Jean de Losne (August, 1162). The interview never took place, but the negotiations between France and the Empire drove Alexander III into the arms of Henry II, and he took refuge first in Berry then at Tours (both in the Angevin realm). But friendly relations could not long exist between the Supreme Pontiff and the persecutor of Becket, the author of the "Constitutions of Clarendon," and in 1163 Alexander III took up his abode in the Capetian city of Sens. Louis had placed himself on the winning side in this great ecclesiastical struggle. Both his rivals were at issue with the orthodox Church, and all the moral and material weight of that Church went into the Capetian scale. Louis was alive to the advantage to be secured from this fortunate alliance. In Burgundy he gathered round him all orthodox opinion and undermined the recently acquired influence of the Emperor; in the Becket quarrel he threw himself on to the side of the exiled Archbishop. Thrice he had arranged interviews between Becket and his king when the extraordinary acci-

dent of Becket's murder (29 December, 1170) wrought Henry an ill service, such as neither Pope nor Louis nor Becket, nor all three combined, could have contrived. Louis VII was in fact gradually emerging from the terrible crisis with which he had been confronted when he took the step of divorcing Eleanor. Barbarossa's designs in Burgundy had been thwarted, Henry II was being checked if not driven back; finally the arrival of the long-awaited heir (21 August, 1165) was a staggering blow to the Plantagenet.¹ Henry II had played a bold matrimonial game. He had snapped up the divorced Queen eagerly, and had married his eldest son to the daughter of the heirless King. Clearly he was playing for the Crown of France; and the birth of Philip Augustus was the appearance of the one card which he had calculated that his opponent did not hold.

History has been accustomed to write down Louis VII in the years that followed the Crusade as a pious and feeble nonentity who threw away Aquitaine by an impolitic act based on domestic feelings; in reality the divorce was a prime necessity for the continuance of his stock. He kept on marrying and begetting children;² for this he should be praised rather than blamed; and in 1165 he got his reward. He has been accused, too, of having placed the Capetian neck under the heel of the Papacy, a position from which it was only extricated with difficulty by the efforts of Philip IV. The accusation is not wholly just, for Louis VII was almost as clever as he was pious and succeeded in a wonderful way in conciliating Alexander without sacrificing the prerogatives of the Crown. Even if the sacrifices had been greater than they actually were Louis would have been justified. He had to make sacrifices to save his dynasty from the imperial danger and the Plantagenet danger; and he did save both his dynasty and France. It is idle to maintain that the risk was too great. When the house is on fire the leap must be

¹ Louis had married Constance of Castille in 1154. She died in 1160 having borne him only a daughter. He immediately married Adela of Champagne.

² He had three wives and several daughters.

taken, and broken limbs are to be preferred to charred remains. Thus, although he was still making headway, the tide had begun to set against Henry Plantagenet. But he was still more than a match for his rival in the field. Louis made an abortive alliance with the Emperor with whom he had an interview at Vaucouleurs in 1171, and then found a more serviceable ally in the eldest of Henry's sons, his own son-in-law, Henry. For two years (1173-1174) Louis headed a coalition against Henry. But he failed egregiously to take Rouen, and was once again saved from complete disaster by the intervention of his old ally the Pope (Treaty of Ivry, 1177).

Louis had still three years to live ; worn out, buffeted and partially paralysed, his only object was to set his son upon the throne. In 1179 he summoned an assembly, and it was decided that Philip should be crowned at the approaching Feast of the Assumption. But before that day an untoward incident occurred which went near to dash the hopes of France to the ground. Philip, an active lad in his fifteenth year, went off one day to hunt. The hounds struck the line of a boar, and being well mounted as became a prince, he soon distanced his attendants and got lost in the forest. The sun was setting and the boy was overcome with fear—forests were no doubt highly lawless places in those days. The adventure ended tamely enough ; a countryman found him and took him home.¹ But the boy had had a great fright and fell sick, and the coronation had to be postponed. The whole future of the Capetian house hung once more by a thread. The poor old King, all paralysed as he was, actually set off for Canterbury to plead for his son's life at the tomb of the martyred Becket.

His prayer was heard ; the boy recovered, and on All Saints' Day, 1179, the postponed ceremony was carried through. With the coronation the reign of Louis VII virtually ends. He lingered, it is true, into the following year, but all eyes were fixed on the precocious lad who was to succeed him.

The story of the reign has been an inglorious one. Louis

¹ See Rigordus, "*de gestis Philippi Augusti*," in Bouquet, "*Rerum gallicarum scriptores*," *op. cit.* xvii. 4, 5.

had been steadily unsuccessful in the field, and the crown had been shorn of much of its material heritage. But the alliance with the Church had been cemented fast and strong, and internally Louis had steadily pursued and amplified his father's policy. Emancipation had proceeded apace. More and more charters had been granted. Tolerance had been extended even to the Jews. Heredity of office was rapidly becoming a thing of the past. But Louis' greatest work was perhaps in the field of judicial reform. Into the *Cour du Roi*, the body of courtiers by whose advice the kings of France performed all their functions, judicial, legislative, and administrative, he introduced a nucleus of non-feudal persons, bourgeois and ecclesiastics of his own personal entourage. These "palatines" absorbed the more laborious duties of the Court, and gradually it came to be the custom that the reports of these experts should be adopted by the acclamation of the *Cour du Roi* as a whole. Thus they became a sort of judicial committee—judges sitting in the midst of councillors. Louis himself was an ardent and upright judge, and in this not unworthy rôle claims our approbation.

Thus, amidst external disasters, was being built up a real justice and a real government, to which men could look above and beyond the institutions of feudalism. Louis VII and his father did this indispensable "spade-work," and in doing so were real contributors to the making of France. And the external failures of the latter must not blind us to the real share he had in the building up of the monarchy and the nation.

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CHAPTER IX

PHILIP AUGUSTUS AND LOUIS VIII

(1180-1226)

FRANCE had passed through a critical period. She was now ripe for development. The hour had come, and with the hour the man. Philip Augustus, the lad whose single life stood between his dynasty and extinction, inherited a kingdom neither very large nor very rich nor very well defined, though better endowed in these respects than might at first sight appear. For it should not be forgotten that the resources of France had proved adequate for the financing of the crusade and the maintenance of the government at home. Louis VII, contrasting his kingdom with those of his neighbours, had said with quaint humility : *Nos in Francia nihil habemus nisi panem et vinum et gaudium*. Bread and wine and a glad countenance are no bad assets ; and indeed what was chiefly lacking to the crown of France was territory. If the royal house was to assert a real supremacy over the whole of France its territorial resources would have to be largely increased. The time for annexation on the grand scale had arrived. It is because Philip II was able successfully to prosecute this policy that he may claim to be one of the founders of France. The kingdom which he inherited was sound at heart, but inadequate, especially in the matter of the royal domain (still the main source of revenue), for the prosecution of its ever-growing national mission. It was a very different kingdom that Philip handed to his son after a reign of thirty years. During those years he made his family the richest in France, perhaps in Europe. He added vast districts to the domain : Artois, Amienois, Valois, Clermont, Beaumont, Alençon, Normandy, Maine,

Anjou, Touraine. He encroached on Aquitaine itself. Moreover, by extending his boundaries to the sea, he transformed the kingdom of bread and wine and joy into one of commerce and trade; in fact he made France an economic power. But this was not all. Profiting by this material advance, he was able to assert his supremacy over the greater vassals; to handle a problem, that is, which his predecessors had feared to touch. Auvergne, Ponthieu, above all wealthy Flanders, came under his control; the Count of Champagne who had so troubled his father became his ward; the Duke of Burgundy his vassal; the Count of Brittany his creature. Even in the independent South the royal authority began to be felt. To find a parallel to Philip's power we must go back to the days of Charlemagne.

A work such as this was evidently that of a great man, and in an age of great men—Henry II, Richard I, Frederick Barbarossa, and Innocent III—Philip II stands out as perhaps the most remarkable of all. He was in fact endowed with just those qualities which were essential to the prosecution of the Capetian mission. He was hard, calculating, and unscrupulous. As cunning and as overbearing as Henry II, he was less outrageously violent and, though possibly not less wicked, he was certainly not so godless. He disliked and punished oaths, for instance, which Henry did not.¹ Though without the supreme military talent and wonderful valour of Richard I he was second only to that great commander in generalship, and it is possible that had Richard lived even he might have been worn down by his deliberate and sagacious opponent. Richard dead, Philip became the first soldier in Europe, while for Pope and Emperor he was always an intellectual match.

His personal appearance somewhat belied his character—a well-made, shock-headed, rubicund, jovial man of the world; passionate, quick-tempered, and sensual, he had few of the virtues that sometimes accompany these vices; though by no means a coward he was held to be careful of his life. Certainly he had none of his grandfather's joy in battle; his

¹ Rigordus, *op. cit.* xvii. 5, also Guillaume le Breton in Bouquet, *op. cit.* xvii. 66.

merits as a soldier were rather those of a consummate strategist who knew how to balance to a nicety the chances of battle, and to employ with all the confidence of genius small and efficient forces against numerical odds. As a ruler he had many excellent qualities. Generous to his friends, he was firm with those whom he distrusted; opinionated and quick in judgment, he was nevertheless gifted with admirable foresight; and he understood how to win the affection of his subjects by restraining the great vassals, by an appearance of bonhomie and by a careful avoidance of the more serious forms of oppression. It was as a politician, however, that his supremacy was most undoubted, and in the field of politics neither his heart—one suspects him of having little heart—nor his religion—which according to its kind was considerable—was allowed to interfere. A character unlovable and unattractive perhaps, but to which it is impossible to deny the epithet of great.

Philip had been virtually king since 1179, and had been busy wresting power from his father and undermining the influence of his mother Queen Adela: it was with the latter object in view that he espoused Elizabeth, daughter of Baldwin of Hainault and niece and heiress of Philip of Alsace, Count of Flanders.¹ Flanders² was one of the richest districts of Europe. It occupied an intermediate position between England, Germany and France. Through it ran the trade routes which connected England with the Mediterranean, and the scarcely less important routes which connected Paris and the Seine and Loire, with Cologne and the Rhine and Meuse. Thickly populated from the earliest times, Flanders was becoming one of the great commercial centres of Europe, and an urban civilization, comparable only with that of Italy and of certain districts in Germany, was being established within her borders. Into this all-important region Philip, while hardly more than a boy, insinuated the arm of the Capetians, carrying off as his wife's dower the reversion of the rich district afterwards known as

¹ Philip of Alsace was the vassal of both France and the Empire, but mainly held of France.

² *Infra*, pp. 183 and 222.

Artois, which included the towns of Arras, St. Omer, Aire and Hesdin (28 April, 1180).¹

The Flemish marriage was a serious rebuff to the Champagne faction at Court, and Queen Adela appealed to Henry Plantagenet. For a moment Philip was threatened with an alliance between Champagne and England. Fortunately Henry declined to be drawn into the quarrel, and Philip scored an immense success in the Treaty of Gisors (28 June, 1180), which bound Henry II to neutrality for six years, and removed from the arena of active hostilities the most dangerous enemy of the Capetians. On 28 September, 1180, Louis VII died, and Philip II was at once confronted with his first serious feudal rebellion. Philip of Alsace, who recognized that he had been tricked into the sacrifice of an important district, put himself at the head of a league which included the disaffected Champennois (the Queen Mother, the Count of Champagne, and the Archbishop of Reims), the Counts of Hainault, Sancerre, Blois, Chartres, and Nevers, and the Duke of Burgundy (May, 1181).

Philip II at once invaded Flanders with an army "like a flock of locusts" and invested Amiens. Desultory hostilities continued for five years and then the King, by a diplomacy not uncontaminated by treachery, divided his enemies, and concluded a treaty which confirmed the cession of his wife's dowry and gave him as well sixty-five castles in Vermandois² together with the important town of Amiens; the boundaries of the domain being thus extended to the River Authie with the prospect of yet further extension (Treaty of Boves, July, 1185). It was a veritable triumph for the twenty-year-old monarch; he had given his neighbours the first taste of his

¹ In 1185 Philip of Alsace reserved the right to rule Artois during his own life. It was to revert to France if Philip left a direct heir who himself in turn had direct heirs. Artois only legally became part of France in 1226, though it was occupied by Philip Augustus during his lifetime. See Powicke, "The Loss of Normandy" (1913), p. 135.

² Vermandois was brought into the royal net by the death without children of Isabella, wife of Philip of Alsace, who was Countess of Vermandois in her own right. Philip at once (1182) put in his claim, and was successful in establishing it in the Treaty of Blois.

quality. Of the rebellious vassals Burgundy alone held out. Philip took the important fortress of Châtillon-sur-Seine, and the Duke, after vainly appealing to the Emperor, was compelled to sue for peace. "*Philippus rex, semper Augustus, cum suis, Dominum laudans et magnificans, in palatium suum Parisius reversus est cum gloria*" (1186).¹

Once rid of his troublesome vassals in the East, Philip proceeded to close with the Plantagenet colossus in the West. He desired to prove that the "King of France had a long arm"; he may even have been dreaming of a revival of the Caroling Empire; at any rate he believed that "a single man was sufficient to rule the world". It seems at first sight astonishing that he should have dared to challenge the vast Plantagenet power, but the inherent weakness of that power must not be forgotten; to Philip it was probably very obvious; no ruler was ever more alive than he to the value of small and compact forces in comparison with large and unwieldy ones, and what he was able to do in a military sense at Bouvines twenty-eight years later, he now did in a political sense in his struggle with the Plantagenets. There was no lack of pretexts for a rupture. Broken matrimonial alliances, disregarded treaties, abounded, and there was the continued occupation by the Plantagenets of Gisors and the Norman Vexin. Moreover Philip was demanding homage for Poitou from Henry's son Richard. Two years were spent in fruitless conferences on these and kindred subjects. Meanwhile the disaffection of Henry's sons—the domestic hornet's nest that Eleanor had presented to her husband—gave Philip ample scope for diplomatic operations. Geoffrey of Brittany, the third of these sons, was the first object of his sinister attentions, and when he died (at Paris, 1186) Philip began to make advances to Richard.

Having secured the alliance of the Emperor, Philip suddenly crossed the Cher, took Issoudun, and invested Châteauroux. Henry, paralysed by his domestic troubles, declined battle and offered terms. Issoudun was handed to France (June, 1187, Peace of Châteauroux). Philip was now aiming at the com-

¹ Rigordus, *op. cit.* p. 16.

plete alienation of Richard from his father. With superb cunning he agreed, unknown to Richard, to the betrothal of that Prince's fiancée, Alix of France, to Henry's youngest son John. The scheme was entirely successful. Beside himself with passion, Richard flung himself into Philip's arms; the two became inseparable, shared one plate at meals and one bed at night. The house of Plantagenet was split in two, and simultaneously the alliance of Philip with the Emperor Barbarossa was confirmed (December, 1187).

At this moment national movements received a check by the revival of the old idea of a united Christendom. Jerusalem had fallen into the hands of Saladin on 3 October, 1187, and public opinion demanded an effort for its recovery. Neither Philip nor Henry desired to abandon their affairs in Europe in order to fight the battles of the faith in Asia. A rebellion against Richard in Languedoc—fomented some said, and Richard thought, by Henry himself—brought the preparations to a stand-still. Philip saw his opportunity; he summoned Richard to submit the quarrel to his suzerain. Henry met his son's demands with a flat refusal; Richard then publicly and in the presence of his father approached Philip and offered him homage for all his fiefs. The two had been in relations all the time and the scene had been carefully planned. Philip accepted the homage, and Richard and he rode off together (interview of Bonmoulins, November, 1188). Thus the alienation of Richard and his father was completed and Philip was in a position to crush his antagonist. After a further interview at La Ferté-Bernard, Philip overran Maine and besieged Le Mans, undeterred by the call of the Crusade and the protests of the Pope. Aged and deserted, Henry could only shut himself up in Chinon, and on the fall of Tours he surrendered unconditionally. The pathetic story of this surrender (Capitulation of Azai, 4 July, 1189) and of Henry's death is too well-known to call for repetition.¹ He

¹ Terms of Capitulation of Azai: Henry placed himself *au conseil et à la volonté* of Philip Augustus; agreed to do homage for his continental possessions; paid an indemnity; surrendered Graçai and Issoudun and gave up his suzerain rights in Auvergne. Henry II gave up

died on 6 July, 1189, deserted by all save his bastard son Geoffrey.

Philip did not profit by the substitution of Richard for Henry; for Richard was a more dangerous antagonist than his father; he was the first soldier of his day and no mean politician. During their long intimacy, however, Philip had gauged his character to a nicety: he took every advantage of his impetuosity and generosity, but even so Richard held him at bay, and but for his untimely death might have checked the advance of the Capetians. Philip grasped at once at the Crusade as a heaven-sent means of getting rid of his dangerous opponent. He himself was not of crusading stuff, but he was ready to go in order to allay Richard's suspicions. Peace was renewed between the two kings. Philip left the Regency to his mother and his uncle, the Archbishop of Reims, under careful restrictions. He then received the blessing of the Church; and amidst general enthusiasm the two kings set out upon their sanctified errand. Disagreements, probably deliberate on Philip's part, broke out at once, and it became necessary to sign a further treaty at Messina (March, 1191)¹ by which Richard paid Philip 10,000 marks and promised to restore the Princess Alix to her brother on his return. No sooner had Acre fallen (13 July, 1191) than Philip decided to return to France; *dont il en fut moult blasmez*. The immediate pretexts were the breakdown of his health² and the need for dealing with the affairs of

the custody of Princess Alix. The barons did homage to Richard as heir of the Crown of England. The start for the Crusade was fixed for 1191.

¹ Rigordus, op. cit. p. 32. The actual treaty has not come down to us, and there are two versions of it: that Philip abandoned his claims on the Norman Vexin and Gisors in return for 10,000 silver marks, while Richard surrendered his claims in Auvergne, Issoudun and Graçai, and accepted Philip as his liege lord for all his continental dominions. Philip tried to make out that Richard had surrendered Gisors and the Norman Vexin together with the Princess Alix. As the possession of the Norman Vexin would have given the King of France a passage along the right bank of the Seine as far as Rouen, as in fact the district was essential to the security of the lower Seine valley, it is not likely that Richard surrendered it.

² *gravabatur enim rex tunc morbo gravissimo* (Rigordus, op. cit. p. 116).

Flanders, whose Count had died during the siege of Acre. The Count had married twice and settled on his second wife some of the lands which had been settled on Philip's Queen, Elizabeth, who had died in 1190. Philip successfully asserted his claim on these lands, and afterwards (1196) extorted further concessions from the new Count, Baldwin IX. But the French rule in Flanders was unpopular, and in 1200 Philip was obliged to surrender St. Omer and Aire, and it was only Baldwin's promotion to the throne of Constantinople (1204) that finally secured France in the district.¹

His health and Flanders were not, however, the uppermost things in Philip's mind when he said good-bye to Richard. He had conceived a treacherous plot against the Plantagenets. On his way home he had interviews with the Pope at Rome and the new Emperor, Henry VI, at Milan. The parting oaths which he had sworn to Richard would not deter him from stabbing his rival in the back. A lucky chance threw Richard into the hands of the Duke of Austria, who handed him to the Emperor, who threw him into prison (February, 1193). This opportunity was more than Philip could resist, and as he had previously backed Richard against his father, so now he began to back Prince John against his brother. He even tried to secure the custody of the unfortunate captive. Already he had taken Gisors, made himself master of the Norman Vexin, and threatened Rouen. Rouen, however, offered a determined resistance, and Philip began to negotiate with John who, prodigal and unscrupulous, was willing enough to purchase a crown by wholesale concessions.² But while Philip was negotiating with John, Richard was negotiating with the Emperor. He agreed to pay an immense ransom, and on 2 February, 1194, found himself once more at large. "*Diabolus*," said Philip, "*jam solutus est*," and so indeed it proved.

The war which ensued was fought in Normandy and Berry and was embittered by all the treachery that had preceded it. Richard's rage was terrible. We see him ordering the mutila-

¹ *Infra*, I. 143 note.

² Philip's pact with John is printed in Rigordus, *op. cit.* p. 39.

tion of prisoners, even hurling them with his own hands into the Seine.¹ The balance of advantage was steadily on his side, and Philip suffered a humiliating reverse at Frétevale (3 July, 1194). Then the Pope interfered, remonstrating against the internecine strife of Christians at the moment when an infidel invasion of Spain seemed imminent. The Treaty of Gaillon (January, 1196) was signed; Philip gave up Berry, Issoudun, and Graçai, but retained Gisors with the Norman Vexin and the suzerainty of Auvergne.

Richard's unerring military eye saw that Rouen was left open to French attack by this treaty, and it was now that he commenced for the protection of that city the building of Château-Gaillard,² the most celebrated fortress of the Middle Ages; nature and art and the brain of one of the greatest military geniuses of the Middle Ages combining to make it the touchstone of military reputations. "I would take it," said Philip, "though its walls were of iron"; "and I," said its builder, "would hold it were they of butter". The completion of this mighty fortress enabled Richard to reopen hostilities. He had also secured the support of Baldwin IX of Flanders, of the Emperor Otto his nephew, and of the Counts of Blois, Boulogne, and Toulouse. Philip was roughly handled in Flanders, where he only saved himself from annihilation by agreeing to terms which he afterwards repudiated. Aire and St. Omer were lost (1197). In the following year he was severely defeated by Richard at Courcelles (September 28), after which battle he narrowly escaped being drowned by tumbling fully armed into a ford. It was only the Pope's intervention and the fact that Richard's heart was still in the East that saved him from destruction. A five years' truce was arranged; the Norman Vexin changed hands once more, but Philip retained Gisors. Louis, Philip's son and heir, was betrothed to Richard's niece, Blanche of Castille. By the Treaty of Péronne, in which Philip came to terms with Baldwin

¹ Guillaume le Breton, in Bouquet, op. cit. pp. 177, 178.

² For Château-Gaillard, refer to Deville, "Histoire du Château-Gaillard" (1829).

IX, the better part of Artois was also abandoned, and so at one stroke was sacrificed "the fruit of ten years of energetic treachery" (Treaty of Vernon, 1199). Philip was at the nadir of his fortunes when his extraordinary good luck came to his aid and death removed his rival: *visitavit Deus regnum Franciæ, nam Ricardus rex occiditur*, as William the Breton puts it.¹ Engaged in the siege of a fortress in the Limousin, Richard was mortally wounded by a chance arrow (6 April, 1199). His death removed the chief obstacle in the path of French aggrandizement. For the future Philip would have to contend with John, who was in character and capacity immeasurably his inferior. Philip's first idea was to support the claim—undeniably a good one—of Arthur, the posthumous son of John's elder brother Geoffrey. Posing as Arthur's protector² he overran Normandy and Maine. But after the defection of William des Roches, and owing to matrimonial complications which will shortly claim our attention, Philip suddenly abandoned Arthur and came to terms with John (Treaty of Le Goulet, 22 May, 1200). By this treaty Philip received Évreux, Graçai, Issoudun and certain fiefs in Berry, with the promise of more if John died without heirs, also the suzerainty of Auvergne, while John paid an indemnity of 20,000 marks and became Philip's vassal for his continental dominions. Then, with characteristic treachery, Philip sacrificed Arthur, gave John possession of Angers, and received him at Paris.

In his struggle with Richard Philip had received invaluable support from the Pope. More recently he had been deprived of that support owing to a difference between himself and the Papal See. On the death of his wife Elizabeth (1190) he had married the Princess Ingeborge of Denmark. This unfortunate lady quickly inspired him with an intense dislike. Consanguinity—the unfailing resource of the faithless husbands of the Middle Ages—was easily discovered; and on that ground Philip persuaded the French clergy to sanction a divorce.

¹ Guillaume le Breton, *op. cit.* p. 74.

² Philip Augustus went so far as to betroth his daughter to Arthur. See Delisle, "Catalogue des Actes de Philippe Auguste," *op. cit.* p. 726.

Ingeborge appealed to the Pope who annulled the divorce. In spite of this the King espoused Agnes, daughter of the Duke of Merania (in Upper Saxony) (June, 1195). The Pope laid the kingdom under an interdict ; but it was only in 1201 that the King submitted to Papal jurisdiction.¹

His reconciliation with the Pope enabled Philip to concentrate his energies on John. The clumsy brutality of that foolish monarch had provoked the feudatories of Aquitaine, who now appealed to Philip as John's suzerain. Philip summoned John to appear and answer for his conduct ; and in April, 1202, sentence of deprivation of all the lands held of the Crown of France was passed upon the Plantagenet king. Philip then ordered John to restore to his nephew the lands of Poitou and Anjou, and on his refusal invaded Normandy (1202). At first things went in John's favour. He secured Arthur's person after defeating him at Mirebeau, and forced Philip to retire on Paris.² But John once more proved his own worst enemy ; he quickly alienated all his supporters, the most important of whom was William des Roches, and Philip began hostilities in 1203 with everything in his favour. The disappearance of Arthur while in his uncle's custody at Rouen finally destroyed John's chances.³ Rouen was now Philip's objective ; but the frowning towers of Château-Gaillard intervened. Frowning towers, however, even when defended

¹ Innocent III had twice attempted to intervene in the quarrel between France and England.

² One result of Arthur's imprisonment was that pending his release many of Arthur's vassals did homage to Philip Augustus. See Delisle, "Catalogue des Actes de Philippe Auguste," op. cit. p. 752.

³ The story that John was condemned to death for Arthur's murder by the Peers of France is a legend invented by Louis VIII (see "Revue historique," LIV). The expression "Peers of France" was first used in 1171, but there was no court of Peers. In 1216 there was a body of peers sitting among the barons. They included six ecclesiastical peers—Reims, Laon, Langres, Châlons, Beauvais and Noyon ; and the Dukes of Burgundy, Normandy, and Aquitaine, with the Counts of Toulouse, Champagne, and Flanders. [Professor Powicke in his "Loss of Normandy," published as I go to press, carefully sifts the evidence as to John's condemnation for Arthur's murder, and concludes that there was such a trial and condemnation.]

by stout arms, are of little use if there are not also determined men to relieve them: and John made little effort to relieve his most important stronghold. The French were practically allowed to besiege the castle unmolested from without. Roger de Lacy held out for twelve months and was then forced to surrender (6 March, 1204). The fall of Château-Gaillard meant the loss of Normandy. Rouen, it is true, resisted for a time and in the end was only won by treachery.¹ After that Normandy fell finally into Philip's hands. Aquitaine seemed likely to follow suit. Then in 1204-5 Philip conquered Poitou and pushed on into Brittany. When John crossed the channel to face him he was completely powerless; and in 1208 the continental dominions of the house of Anjou, except Aquitaine, passed for ever into the hands of France. This date, therefore, marks a great forward step in the evolution of the distinct nationalities of France and England. Each now occupied in the main the sphere in which alone it could work out its national destiny. Not that men recognized the truth of this; for centuries they continued to fight against it. In a few years the French kings will be found aiming at the English throne, while a few generations later the English monarchy will be embroiled in a fierce and senseless struggle for the recovery of its continental dominions. But the truth remains that the historical necessity had asserted itself, and that from that time forward those who sought to overset the settlement of 1208 were fighting against the inevitable.

The political situation was now complicated by the great struggle between the Guelfs and the Ghibellines for the supremacy in Germany. On the death of Henry VI (1197) his brother Philip of Suabia was elected by the Ghibellines and Otto of Brunswick by the Guelfs, to the detriment of Henry VI's son Frederick, afterwards Frederick II. Otto had the support of the Pope and of his uncle the King of England. France naturally sided with his rival. The downfall of John had, therefore, been a triumph for the Ghibel-

¹ See Delisle, "Catalogue des Actes," *op. cit.* p. 340.

lines as well as for the Capetians. The assassination of Philip of Suabia in 1208, with the prospect of a hostile alliance between Otto, John, and the Pope, created an alarming situation. Philip fortified Reims and Châlons and awaited developments. But Otto's Sicilian policy quickly alienated the Pope, who turned once more to the King of France and in conjunction with him secured the election of Henry's son, Frederick II, in 1212. Philip indeed paid for his election in hard cash.

Philip had long had his ambitious gaze fixed on England. With the rupture between that country and the Papacy his opportunity seemed to have come. In 1213 a powerful force was collected to invade England, and the King's eldest son, Louis, was put in command. But Innocent was only using France as a lever to force John to accept his terms, and, to Philip's great chagrin, just when the expedition was starting, news came that the King of England had submitted to the Pope. The tables were now completely turned, and the would-be invader became the invaded. John secured the support of Flanders,¹ Holland and Boulogne; Lorraine, and the Emperor Otto IV, the rival of young Frederick, completed a sufficiently formidable coalition. While his allies threatened the Eastern frontier John himself landed at La Rochelle in order to create a diversion. Philip, however, was not to be drawn off on a false scent. He left his son Louis to watch the English while he himself hurried off to Picardy, where, as he rightly judged, the seat of danger really was. John advanced to the Loire with the intention of hanging on Philip's rear. The fortress of La-Roche-au-Moine lay in his path and to this he laid siege. Louis proceeded to its relief; on his approach John fled basely (*vilainement*) although in superior numbers. His Poitevin vassals were merely out on a foray and had no stomach for pitched battles.

¹ In 1202 Baldwin went on crusade leaving his daughters, Jeanne and Marguerite, in charge of their uncle, Philip of Namur. The latter quickly became the creature of Philip Augustus and sent his little wards to Paris. Jeanne was married (in Paris) to Ferrand of Portugal and Philip seized the opportunity of appropriating Aire and St. Omer (Treaty of Lens, February, 1212). Ferrand at once, and not unnaturally, inclined towards the League which was gathering against Philip.

The rout of La-Roche-au-Moine relieved Philip from all danger to his rear, and he could now give his undivided attention to the formidable enemy with whom he was confronted in Picardy. That enemy outnumbered him by two to one and was especially powerful in infantry, for the Flemings excelled in that arm. With great audacity Philip thrust himself between the allies and the sea. Otto took up a strong position in the fork of the rivers Scarpe and Scheldt. Philip then began to withdraw upon Lille, hoping to reach the plain of Cambr sis where his cavalry could be used to the best advantage. Otto mistook this movement for a rout and commenced a disorderly pursuit. When Philip reached the open plateau of Bouvines he received the intelligence that his rear-guard was engaged (27 July, 1214). It was at this moment that he displayed real military talent. He took in the situation at a glance, calculated the chances to a nicety—the disorder of the enemy, the favourable character of the ground—and decided to alter his dispositions and accept battle then and there. The Flemish infantry in the centre carried all before it until the French cavalry, having won the “colossal tilting match” on the wings, came and turned the tables. As evening closed the army of the allies was in full flight; the Emperor had fled, leaving his imperial standard in the hands of the French; the plateau was strewn with the dead and the French camp encumbered with the prisoners. The battle had been a great triumph for cavalry over infantry—almost the last until the great battles of the seventeenth century. But it was also a marked triumph for professional troops as opposed to the feudal levies. Bouvines was the first evidence that the Capetian kings had overcome the military difficulty which attended the decay of feudalism—had tapped a new military source. It also gave the first European expression to the fighting prestige of the French nation, which had already been established in the Crusades. How great an element in the welding together of the nation that prestige was we may guess from the essentially military character which that nation has always borne.

In direct results also Bouvines was fruitful. The feudal

revolt in the North was finally crushed, and Flanders swept into the Capetian net. Boulogne was handed over to Prince Louis. John once more surrendered his continental possessions and paid a large indemnity. He was only saved from even greater humiliations by the intervention of the Pope. Bouvines also decided the Guelf-Ghibelline duel in favour of the latter. Frederick II secured undisputed possession of the imperial crown, and Otto remained a fugitive for the remainder of his life.

Philip now resigned the sword to his son. The nine remaining years of his life were devoted to internal administration and organization. Seldom has ruler at the close of his life been able to look back on a life's work more fruitful in tangible results. Geographically the restricted domain of his ancestors had been doubled and doubled again. The number of *prévôtés* (taking them as the units of the royal domain)¹ had risen from thirty-eight to ninety-four. The confiscation of John's possessions had doubled the Capetian domain at one stroke, bringing as it did the whole of Normandy, Anjou, Poitou, Saintonge and the county of Meulant. Then, between 1211 and 1215, Auvergne had passed into the possession of the Crown and in 1212 St. Omer and Aire. Philip also purchased lands freely, amongst others Clermont (1218), Nogent d'Érembert (1219), Alençon (1221), and Beaumont-sur-Oise (1223). Valois and St. Quentin were acquired by treaties of 1185 and 1191 respectively.²

The royal revenue had expanded in proportion, not merely by the development of commerce which followed the acquisition of seaports, but by the conversion of feudal services into money payments and the encouragement of extraordinary sources of revenue. Casualties such as reliefs (fines on change of proprietorship), which had been exacted only from direct vassals in the past, were now extended to the great fiefs, to Flanders, for instance (1195), to Nevers (1199), and to Blois (1212), and Philip not only exploited the greater vassals but also the Church; the *droit de régale*³ was capable of indefinite

¹ *Infra*, I. 148.

² Longnon, "Atlas" (1912), pp. 232 *sqq.*

³ *Supra*, p. 109. The *régale* was a very valuable right. See Delisle, "Catalogue des Actes de Philippe Auguste," op. cit. p. 855.

extension and many dioceses and abbeys were gradually driven into buying themselves out of it, and extraordinary taxes known as *décimes*, at first imposed for purposes such as the Crusades, were substituted.¹ By the free extension of the royal protection—now obviously a thing worth having—the power of the Crown had also been introduced into many isolated abbeys and towns. Sometimes the King agreed to divide the suzerainty with a count or bishop or abbot; this arrangement was known as *parage*. But such an associate as Philip was bound in the long run to become sole suzerain, and *parage* was little more than a step towards annexation. A strong king had opportunities for asserting his power over the greater feudatories also. Any crisis in a fief—a disputed succession, the birth of a posthumous heir, a division amongst co-heirs, an event such as the Albigensian Crusade,—was exploited for the benefit of the Crown. By such means Champagne and Burgundy were drawn under the direct influence of the Crown and in every corner of France monarchical was ousting merely feudal power. In this way Brittany in 1204 became a direct vassal of the Crown. With the acquisition of Normandy, Eu, Aumale, Mortain, La Perche, Vendôme and Beaumont (fiefs of Normandy) followed suit. Similarly with the fiefs of Anjou—Mayenne, Laval, Craon, Amboise, and the fiefs of Guyenne—Marche, Angoulême, Thouars, Périgord, Châtelherault, Aulnay, Limoges, Turenne, Ventadour, Parthenay, Talmont, and Lusignan; and the Albigensian Crusades, to which reference will shortly be made, resulted in the accession of a whole host of direct vassals.²

In his relations with the Church Philip was purely practical. When he required the Church's aid he became her benefactor, but he never alienated an iota of the royal power. He strenuously opposed the extension of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and steadily—even at the price of great concessions—refused homage where such was due by him to ecclesiastical

¹ Paris, for instance, paid 4000 *livres* in lieu of military service. See for *décimes*, Rigordus, op. cit. i. 85.

² Longnon, op. cit. p. 234.

dignatories, such as the Bishop of Amiens,¹ and insisted on the performance of their feudal services by the ecclesiastical vassals; thus establishing the principle that "the Kings of France hold by God and their sword".

In the same way Philip was a liberator of serfs only where he saw that the step was calculated to bring profit in prestige or cash. He was always ready to confirm other people's enfranchisements, but most chary about enfranchising the serfs of the royal domain. In his relations with the towns and bourgeois again he readily confirmed the liberties granted by his father and grandfather, because he recognized that they were profitable to the Crown, and he granted charters to *communes* because he realized that free cities would pay him politically and financially as well as from a military point of view;² politically they could be used as a set-off against the royal officials who were quite out of hand; financially they could be made to pay more for their privileges (in some cases twice as much); while for military purposes a loyal free city was a fortified place garrisoned by trained militia, and at need could, as at Bouvines, provide skilled troops to swell the royal army.

While he was thus extending the power of the Crown, Philip was careful to reorganize the instrument by which that power was exercised. The *Curia Regis* (Cour du Roi) had already been reformed, and in his relations with that body Philip continued the policy of his predecessors. He suppressed the offices of chancellor and seneschal. The words *dapifero nullo* recur in his charters. That office in fact remained vacant until the fourteenth century. Those offices which were preserved were kept out of the hands of the greater barons and entrusted to men of non-noble origin. The jurisdiction of the *Cour du Roi* was sedulously extended at the expense of the great feudatories and of the Church. In the

¹ E.g. when the Bishop of Th  rouanne gave up his claim to homage for Hesdin Philip abandoned his *droit de g  te* (the royal right to exact hospitality when passing through a district) in exchange (Delisle, "Catalogue des Actes," op. cit. 446-447).

² For such charters see *ibid.*, *passim*.

administration of the kingdom, therefore, as distinct from the domain, Philip did little more than complete the policy of his predecessors. In the domain he introduced some important innovations. The development of the Feudal System under the Carolings had involved the collapse of the domain organization. The old officials of the domain had converted their trusts into fiefs and themselves into feudal *seigneurs*. The royal domain was thus without a staff and so remained throughout the reigns of the two first Capetians, until—at some period prior to 1046—there had come into existence a new official called *prévôt*. This functionary became the sole representative of the monarchy in the “provinces”. He was at once receiver of taxes, judge, and civil and political administrator, and it was by the agency of these *prévôts* that the power of their predecessors, the feudal *comtes* and *ducs*, was combated. In the new officials, however, were reproduced many of the vices of the old, and they in their turn tended to become feudal and their offices hereditary. In fact the Capetians were soon threatened with a repetition among their *prévôts* of what had taken place among the Carolingian *comtes*. Thus by the second half of the twelfth century the kings were getting very nervous about the power of the *prévôts*, and began to shower exemptions, and by increasing the judicial activity of the *Cour du Roi* to withdraw many localities from their jurisdiction. Now the chief of the *prévôts* was the seneschal, and when that office was abolished in 1191 the *prévôts* disappeared with it and were replaced by simple stipendiary and removable agents called *baillis*. These *baillis* were at first rather the travelling agents than the resident functionaries of the Crown. But in the thirteenth century they became fixed in districts much larger than those which had been administered by the *prévôts*.

Such was the administrative work of Philip Augustus; simple, comprehensive, progressive, and based on that common sense which was the most valuable element in his character. The nine years which followed Bouvines were chiefly devoted to this task, but they were not without importance in other spheres. They brought for one thing another opportunity for

interference in England. The English barons, seeing that John had no intention of putting the great Charter into operation, offered the Crown of England to Philip's eldest son, Louis. An elaborate claim was manufactured by the French lawyers, and Louis prepared for the enterprise. Innocent III was greatly alarmed at the peril of his latest vassal, and sent urgent messages to Philip to forbid the expedition. The King adopted a very characteristic line. He blandly professed indifference to the whole business, but declined to interfere with his son. The comedy was much to his taste and he played it with relish, made pretence of confiscating his son's lands at the very moment when he was supplying him with men and money. Louis landed in Thanet on 21 May, 1216, entered London, received homage, and confirmed the great Charter, which must have sounded oddly in his ears. By the end of summer he had reduced the whole of the East of England with the exception of Lincoln, Windsor, and Dover. The situation, however, was completely reversed in October by the death of John, with whose nine-year-old son the barons had no quarrel. The Papal influence was still also cast on the side of the Plantagenets. Defeated by William the Marshall and Faulkes de Breauté in April, 1217, and having suffered a naval reverse in August, Louis signed on 11 September the Treaty of Lambeth. To put it quite bluntly he was bought off for a sum of 10,000 marks.

If the interference of the Capetians in England was fruitless, the reverse was the case with their much more restricted, but highly politic interference in the affairs of Languedoc. It was in the South-West that monarchical and national influences had hitherto been least felt, and it was fortunate for the Capetians that the spread of heresy in this quarter provoked the intervention of the Church; for in the end, as we shall see, the kings of France were able to reap most of the profit of that intervention.

To understand the cause and scope of the "Albigensian" heresy, as it came to be called, it is necessary to realize that the practice of the Catholic Church had, in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, so terribly fallen short of its teaching that

strong anti-sacerdotal feeling had been aroused among the humbler classes, and this feeling had already found vent in outbreaks of heresy in many quarters. The first voice of protest had been that of Abelard (1079-1142), whose unorthodox views on the doctrine of the Trinity, as expounded by him in the schools of Paris, provoked the anger and the intervention of the ecclesiastical authorities. Abelard's heretical teaching had been carried on by his pupil, Arnald of Brescia. Other heresies were that of Pierre de Bruys (of Embrun) and the Petrobusians as his followers were called, that of Henry of Lausanne and the Henricians, and that of Pons in Périgord. More important than any of these was the heresy of Waldo in the close of the twelfth century. His followers, the Waldensians or "Poor men of Lyons," spread his anti-sacerdotal doctrines from Aragon to Bohemia.

All these heresies of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, though not springing the one from the other, were in some degree related. Provoked as they were by the scandalous laxity of the Catholic priesthood, they were all naturally tinged with Donatism, i.e. with the idea that the Sacraments were polluted in polluted hands, and they were thus not only anti-sacerdotal but to some extent anti-sacramental also. The Waldensians, for instance, maintained that merit rather than ordination conferred the priestly powers. Such doctrines threatened the very bases of Christianity and could not be allowed to go unchallenged. It was in the south-west of France that they attained their most alarming development. There the heresy that prevailed was Catharism, known locally as Albigensianism. Catharism was akin to Manichæism, which had been the most alarming of all the early heresies. Its two principal doctrines—Dualism (i.e. the contest between good and evil, God and Satan, spirit and matter) and the transmigration of souls, were purely Manichæan. The Cathari rejected the Old Testament, and, while accepting the New, held Christ to have been a phantasm. They discarded the Catholic sacraments, their only sacrament being the *Consolamentum* or baptism of the spirit. The Scriptures were translated, but the custom of praying in Latin was retained. An

extremely ascetic rule of life was imposed, meat being forbidden and marriage discouraged. The Cathari divided themselves into two classes, the perfected, whose rule of life was very rigid, and the ordinary faithful, to whom more latitude was allowed. Such was the austere and extraordinary faith, which by its popularity threatened the very existence of Catholicism in large districts. Its strength was among the humbler classes and at its height, and especially after it had come to be associated with local patriotism, it claimed a majority of the inhabitants of south-western France as its adherents.

To a great extent the Albigensian heresy became a rallying ground for the national feeling of the South-West, and it is a remarkable illustration of the reality of that feeling at a time when the ideas of feudalism and a united Christendom still predominated. Adherence to a distinct religion made people remember that they were also distinct from the rest of France in descent, language, and custom; and when Raymond Count of Toulouse, the greatest of the south-western feudatories, was called upon by the Pope to put down the heresy in his dominions, he realized that it was impossible for him to run counter to local patriotism and at the same time to attempt to extinguish the religion of the majority of his subjects. He therefore declined to move, and tried without success to throw the duty on to the shoulders of Louis VII of France. Innocent III appealed three times (1204, 1205, 1207) to Philip Augustus to provide the necessary force to stamp out the heresy.¹ Finally in 1207 the Pope declared a crusade, and offered indulgences equivalent to those given for an expedition to Palestine. Raymond VI, who had succeeded his father in 1195, continued obstinately to refuse to persecute his own subjects. He was excommunicated by the papal legate, Peter of Castelnau (1207). In the following year the legate was assassinated under circumstances which threw suspicion on the Count. This incident was as disastrous to

¹ Delisle, "Catalogue des Actes," op. cit. (December, 1207). Philip tells the Bishop of Paris that he cannot go because he has only one army and that is engaged with John.

Raymond as the murder of Becket had been to Henry II of England. The popularity of the crusade was assured. Philip Augustus indeed maintained his attitude of neutrality, and even protested against interference with his vassal and nephew, but he raised no objections to his immediate vassals joining the crusade. Immense numbers flocked to the standard, and the crusading army reached the astounding size of 20,000 horse and 200,000 foot. In 1209 the process of punishment and extermination began.

Raymond's fatal weakness of character now betrayed itself. Though unwilling to persecute his own subjects, he was too timid to head the resistance to persecution. He opened negotiations with the legate, handed over some of his castles, and finally agreed to make full satisfaction to the Church and even to join the crusade in person. The leadership of the resistance thus fell to Raymond's nephew, Raymond Roger, Viscount of Béziers. The city of Béziers offered a determined resistance, and its capture was followed by an appalling massacre in which, according to the legate's own figures, 20,000 persons perished. Raymond Roger held out in the almost impregnable stronghold of Carcassonne; his death, however, was the signal for the fall of the place. The weakness of the crusading force lay in the fact that the period of service was limited to forty days, and, after these triumphs, this weakness began to show itself and many of the crusaders went home. The difficult task of organizing the conquered districts was handed over to a younger son of the Count of Évreux, Simon de Montfort, who was a direct vassal of the King of France. Raymond VI now discovered that his vacillation was to bring him little profit. In spite of his protestations of loyalty to the Church, he was besieged in Toulouse (June, 1211); Pedro II of Aragon, who was suzerain of Béziers, and had interests scattered all over south-western France, in 1213 intervened in his favour; but his very moderate proposals were rejected, with the result that in September he laid siege to the town of Muret, only, however, to be overwhelmingly defeated and killed in a battle fought under the walls (13 September, 1213). Raymond pled for a fair

trial, but was deposed by a council of prelates which met at Montpellier in January, 1215, de Montfort being set up in his place. The final settlement was reserved for the fourth Lateran Council which was then about to assemble. This Council confirmed Raymond's deposition and handed over all the territories won in the crusade (including Toulouse and Montauban) to de Montfort, reserving the remainder for Raymond's son.

In 1217 rebellion against de Montfort broke out in Toulouse and the city was besieged a second time. In the course of the siege de Montfort was killed by a stone hurled from the city walls. He was succeeded by his son Amauri, a man of much weaker character. Louis, Philip's eldest son, who had already led one expedition to the South, now reappeared at the head of a large army to support Amauri. The savage massacre of Marmande, in which 5000 persons perished, was the chief incident in this crusade, and Louis returned home (August, 1219) without having reduced Toulouse. Amauri now implored Philip Augustus to intervene, offering him all his possessions in the South; but the King was not to be moved, and the fruits of the earlier crusades seemed likely to be thrown away. It was on his way to attend a council at Paris in which a settlement of these anxious questions was to be attempted that Philip died on 14 July, 1223.

"Cui successit Ludovicus filius ejus, sed multum dissimilis hic vir et ille." Matthew Paris' criticism is hardly just, for Louis VIII, who now ascended the throne, was indeed little more than a lifeless echo of his father, and his reign may be regarded as a simple supplement to that of Philip. As a man he lacked his father's originality, as a politician he was his imitator. The offspring of immature wedlock, Louis VIII was cursed with a delicate constitution and lacked his father's animation and full-bloodedness. Cold and correct in private life, tall and emaciated in appearance, he is the type that one associates with the Inquisition, and it is without surprise that one reads of his cruelties in Languedoc.

His rebuff in England rankled, and when at Easter, 1224, the truce with England expired he laid claim to Poitou, which

country, and indeed the whole stretch from the Loire to the Garonne, was in a state of unrest, unwilling to accept the rule of the Capetians and apparently aiming at complete independence. England replied by claiming Normandy and Anjou, and on 5 May war was declared. Everything favoured French arms. Hugh of Lusignan, the most powerful feudatory of the district, was won over to the French interest in spite of the fact that he was Henry of England's stepfather. Niort (5 July) and La Rochelle (3 August) quickly fell, and, although an expedition against Bordeaux failed, Louis was able to return to Paris in September, 1224, the richer by all the lands between the Loire and the Garonne, and even by some small parcels south of the latter. He marked the occasion by the grant of special privileges to certain towns such as Niort, La Rochelle, and Poitiers, as well as to some of the great abbeys. He also propitiated the house of Lusignan by the gift of the island of Oléron. England, however, was not content to submit to these losses without striking a further blow, and in May, 1225, the Duke of Gloucester recovered La Réole and the lost lands south of the Garonne. Poitou, the Limousin, and Périgord remained uneasily French, while Gascony reverted to England.

Meanwhile Louis had been burning to renew the Albigensian Crusade, but for a time the Pope held back, while Raymond VII made piteous appeals to be allowed to submit to the Church. It was not till 1225 that Honorius III sent Romano Frangipani, Cardinal of Sant' Angelo, as Papal Legate to arrange a further crusade. Louis made excellent terms for himself. Amauri renounced his claims in favour of the Crown and Henry III undertook not to intervene. In May, 1226, the King himself led a large army down the Rhône. Avignon shut its gates against the crusaders, and the siege which followed cost them dear. In a single assault they lost 3000 men and in the end it was famine that secured the capitulation of the city. After this Louis advanced on Toulouse, but turned back just before he reached the city. On the journey home he was seized with dysentery at Montpensier, before which his delicate constitution collapsed (8 November, 1226).

Louis had reaped where his father had sown. He had

considerably added both to the domain and to the feudal supremacy of the Crown. In 1226 Perche had fallen in; in 1229 the Count of Toulouse had been deprived of Narbonne; and Nîmes, Béziers, Carcassonne and Crèze were also added to the domain as fruits of the last Albigensian Crusade. In 1224 the Crown had acquired the immensely strong town of Domfront¹ and Macon had been purchased. Castres, Albi, Lodève, Lautrec, Agde, and the Vicomté (as distinct from the Duchy) of Narbonne had at different times during the reign become direct royal fiefs. The Cotentin had been exchanged with the King's bastard brother "Hurepel" for Clermont-en-Beauvaisais. Blois, Chartres, Châteaudun, and Sancerre had been secured for a sum of 40,000 *livres tournois*.² On the other hand Louis had commenced the alienation of large fiefs to the Princes of the Blood, a policy which was to have results perilous to the Crown. He left Artois by will to his second son, Anjou and Maine to his third, Poitiers and Auvergne to his fourth.

In methods of internal administration Louis VIII had been able to proceed boldly where his father had felt his way. The re-establishment of the old offices of butler and seneschal shows that the danger from overweening officials had disappeared. The successes of Louis VIII were considerable, but they go to prove his father's greatness rather than his own.

¹ Domfront was part of the County of Mortain and did not belong to the domain of the Dukes of Normandy, which alone had been surrendered in 1208.

² The *livre* was not a coin but a sum. The Paris *livre* (two *marcs* of 8 oz. each) was considerably larger than the *livre tournois* which eventually (1667) became the standard. The actual and relative value of a *livre tournois*, as compared with modern money, is not easy to estimate. Roughly, it was about equal in the sixteenth century to four francs of modern money. Payments were made either in gold crowns or silver *testons*, which were reckoned either by weight in *marcs* or by their relation to the *livre tournois*. The gold crown was roughly two *livres tournois*, the *teston* about half a *livre*. See Wailly, "Mémoire sur les variations de la livre tournois" in *Mémoires de l'Académie des inscriptions*, xxi. (1857); also Avenel, "Histoire économique des salaires des décuries, etc., depuis l'an 1200 jusqu'en l'an 1800" (1899), and Lavissee, "Histoire de France," v. i. 266-267 and notes.

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CHAPTER X

SAINT LOUIS

(1226-1270)

THE period of 102 years, during which the direct descendants of Hugh Capet continue to occupy the throne of France, roughly coincides with the thirteenth century. That century has always rightly been regarded as the culminating point of the Middle Ages. In France it was especially so; and from the horrible welter of the Hundred Years War men looked back to it as a golden age. And so in a great degree it was. The salient point so far as France is concerned is that the Capetian monarchy has "arrived"; that the King is no longer a great noble amidst other great nobles, but a true king with a real administration and a real capital.¹ This "arrival" of the French monarchy is apparent in many ways; in the great influence which Louis IX was able to bring to bear on European politics, the persistent neutrality which he was able to observe in the great struggle between the Empire and the Church, the respect with which he was treated by Pope and Emperor. In European affairs he—first of his line—was able to speak as a king with a nation at his back, a nation which had proved itself in battle at Bouvines and which was at last a real force in Europe.

And the triumph of the monarchy was apparent internally as well as externally. The process of defeudalization, the early stages of which have already been recorded, had necessarily been gradual. It had not been completed by Philip Augustus, it would even be rash to say that it was altogether completed in the reign of Louis IX.² But the leaven of royal

¹ Matthew Paris describes the King of France as "the King of earthly Kings".

² Joinville, for instance, refused to take an oath of loyalty to the King's children before Louis started on crusade, on the ground that he

authority was at work in the lump of feudalism, and the crusades of Philip Augustus and Louis IX assisted the process. The lesser barons had been rolled over by Louis *le Gros*, the greater fiefs had either been absorbed into the domain or bound in direct fealty to the Crown. Great fiefs and agglomerations of fiefs were being handed over to the Princes of the Blood and a certain cohesion and centralization was thus being secured. Royal castles and fortified towns were taking the place of, or at least dominating, the feudal strongholds. This important process culminated in the reign of Philippe-le-Hardi (1270-85), the greatest military builder of the Capetian monarchs, but it was already in full swing in the reigns of Louis IX and Philip Augustus. The king who could build a Carcassonne or an Aigues Mortes¹ was, even to his greater vassals, as a State which can build "Dreadnoughts" to one which has to depend on armoured cruisers. Thus castles and fortifications, which had in many cases degenerated into centres of misgovernment and lairs of robbers, were resuming their proper position as instruments of order and government. Order and government are conditions under which feudalism, as the early Capetians had known it, could not exist. Under these happy conditions there was a marked advance in order and internal prosperity. The reigns of Philip Augustus and Louis VIII, during which the great transition of the monarchy took place, had been, like all times of transition, marked by great unrest and social misery. With the "arrival" of the monarchy all this was gradually changed and, by degrees and not of course without some sets back, France settled down into a comfortable and orderly prosperity which was only disturbed by the terrible catastrophe of the Hundred Years War. This is not to say that the period was one of unbroken calm. As a matter of fact there was a good deal of popular unrest—the most remarkable outbreak being that of the *Pastoureaux*

was a vassal of Champagne (Joinville, "Histoire de St. Louis," ed. Wailly (1890), p. 50).

"je ne voz faire point de sairement car je
n'estoie pas ses hom."

¹ The walls of both these cities are the work of Philippe-le-Hardi.

in 1251; but this was a kind of anti-clerical *Jacquerie* and in no sense directed against the royal power.

It was not only castles and walled towns that were altering the physical appearance of France. The period of monarchical self-assertion was contemporaneous with a glorious outburst of ecclesiastical architecture. One by one, from the erection of St. Denis in the reign of Louis VII to that of the Sainte Chapelle by Louis IX, the stately shrines of France began to rear themselves. Cathedral building, it is true, was not a national work, but such an outbreak of ecclesiastical architecture could hardly have occurred in a country where disunion and disorder prevailed; and it was by no accident that the golden age of Gothic architecture was contemporaneous with the growth of the Capetian monarchy and the birth of the French nation.

As the Capetian had grown from a mere feudal noble into a king, the town which he made in a peculiar sense his own had grown from a mere town into a capital; and it is not surprising that Philip Augustus, the maker of the kingdom, should also have been the maker of Paris. The city had long since spread from the island on to both banks of the Seine. Its population had doubled during the reign of Louis *le Gros*. Philip Augustus paved the narrow streets,¹ surrounded the city with walls,² and outside the walls on the west side had built the great square castle—the Louvre—to which eventually the kings migrated from the old palace on the island. The choir of the great royal Cathedral had been completed in 1177, and under Philip Augustus Notre Dame assumed the appearance familiar to us to-day.³ A whole colony of minor churches began to crowd the restricted area enclosed by the

¹ *Duris et fortibus lapidibus*, as Rigord (op. cit. p. 16) puts it, blocks of sandstone, the biggest 1 metre 50 square. Cp. Guillaume le Breton, op. cit. p. 67.

² Traces of the walls of Philip Augustus can still be seen in the courtyard of No. 55 Rue des francs bourgeois (a *mont de piété*). See Rigord, op. cit. p. 16.

³ Notre Dame was begun in 1163, consecrated in 1182. The west front was built between 1200 and 1220, and the transepts in the middle of the thirteenth century.

walls.¹ In Paris, at any rate, it had been an era of feverish change. A man leaving the city at the opening of the reign of Philip Augustus and returning at the close would hardly have recognized it. It is an instructive commentary on the history of the period that Saint Louis only needed to add the tiny gem in the centre, the *Sainte Chapelle*: as the kingdom, so he found the capital complete—a thing to be feared as well as loved (the fact that the Louvre was built outside the walls proves how the kings feared Paris). Already the capital dominated France, while her wall still shone white and new in the sun, and the rattle of the pavement sounded strange in the ears of her citizens. This domination by the capital is as we shall see a cardinal feature of the history of France, and it was already an accomplished fact although the nation had but just found itself.

Louis, the son of Louis VIII, who inherited this completed kingdom, was but twelve years old in 1226, and by his father's will the government devolved on his mother, to the exclusion of the Princes of the Blood. Queen Blanche of Castille was the daughter of Alfonso IX of Castille and Eleanor, daughter of Henry II of England. She had already done good work for her husband, and now she proved herself not only a good mother but a firm and capable ruler. Feudal rebellion was a foregone conclusion. Every discontented interest was sure to take advantage of a minority and the government of a foreigner and a woman. And the discontented interests were numerous and important. In the first place England was anxious to redeem her position on the Continent. Next, Philip "Hurepel," the natural but legitimized son of Philip Augustus and his third wife Agnes of Merania, to whom had been allotted the County of Boulogne, part of the spoil of Bouvines, was sure to claim a share in the government as first Prince of the Blood. In the North-East again, Pierre Mauclerc, a cadet of the house of Dreux and a great-grandson of Louis *le Gros*, had married the heiress of Brittany and now ruled that country in the name of a child son. His ambitious

¹ St. Julian *le pauvre* dates from Louis VII.

character made it certain that he would have a share in any rebellion that might occur. Then there was the unstable Count de la Marche—Hugh of Lusignan, married to John of England's widow—who, though bound by alliance to the throne, was only waiting for a chance to reassert his independence. Finally there was Thibaut, Count of Champagne, who had deserted Louis VIII at Avignon, and who was even accused of having poisoned him, and—with more justice—of paying court to his widow. Against Thibaut public opinion within the Capetian domain ran very strong, and Blanche had been obliged to refuse him admission to the coronation. Stung by this insult, he had joined the ranks of the malcontents.

With this formidable coalition Blanche was now confronted. Fortunately she was surrounded by faithful advisers. The Cardinal of Sant' Angelo was by this time thoroughly identified with the fortunes of the Capetians and may be reckoned as one of the pillars of the regency. Beside him stood Guérin, the veteran Archbishop of Senlis, one of the heroes of Bouvines,¹ and in the background was a complete staff of tried officials—the legacy of Philip Augustus. The most prominent of these was Barthélemy de Roie, who had controlled the Exchequer for twenty years; and the great recruiting ground for Government officials were the loyal houses of the Île de France and the Gâtinais; Montfort, Montmorency, and Beaumont were becoming familiar names at Court. But, above all, the Government was aided by the want of union amongst the malcontents; this, too, was a legacy of Philip Augustus, and it was as much his dead hand as the living hand of Blanche that triumphed over the feudal opposition. For six years that opposition intrigued in various combinations without ever managing to concert a united attack; one or other was always beguiled into quiescence by the astute Queen. The King had hardly been crowned (9 November, 1226) when the first of the rebellions broke out. It quickly dissolved before Blanche's determined attitude. Thibaut was more sulky than seriously disaffected and came in at once; and

¹ Guérin died in April, 1227.

Pierre Mauclerc and Hugues de la Marche accepted the tempting offers made to them in the Treaties of Vendôme (1227). The next rebellion was headed by Philip Hurepel, against whom the Queen marched in the winter of 1228-9. This outbreak was quickly suppressed. Meanwhile desultory hostilities had continued in Languedoc; but in April, 1229, by the instrumentality of the Cardinal of Sant' Angelo, Raymond VII was at last brought to terms. Beaucaire and Carcassonne were handed over to the Crown. Louis IX's brother Alfonse was betrothed to the Count's only daughter, Jeanne. Failing other heirs to Raymond she would bring the entire heritage of Toulouse to the Capetians. Raymond at the same time surrendered one-half of Albi to the Crown, and most of his possessions beyond the Rhône to the Church; levelled the walls of Toulouse and thirty other towns; delivered to the Crown the citadel of Toulouse and eight other fortresses; made reparation to the Church; provided for the propagation of the Catholic faith in his dominions; agreed to make war on his late ally the Comte de Foix; to take the Cross, and remain six years on crusade (Treaty of Paris, 1229). Thus ended the Albigenian episode in the complete surrender of the Count of Toulouse, and the Crown of France reaped the profit of an enterprise in which it had played but a modest part.

The Regent's troubles, however, were not yet at an end. The truce with England had expired in 1229 and in the following year Henry III had to be reckoned with. In May, 1230, the King of England landed in France and advanced through Poitou to Bordeaux. Arrived there, he turned round and marched back to Nantes, whence he returned to England. Mauclerc, who had allied himself with the invaders, thus deserted, was soon obliged to sue for terms (July, 1231), while in the East a coalition which had been formed against Thibaut of Champagne, now the protégé of the Crown, collapsed before the vigorous attitude of the Regent.

Queen Blanche had been successful all along the line. One has only to compare the position of England at the same time to realize her success. Hurepel was dead (January, 1234) and France controlled the succession in Flanders. Thibaut

had succeeded to the throne of Navarre : Louis advanced him money for this purpose and in return acquired direct suzerainty over Chartres, Blois, Sancerre, and Châteaudun (price, 40,000 *livres*) ; Mauclerc had submitted in 1234 and Raymond in 1229 ; in 1235 England agreed to a five years' truce. In addition to the above fiefs in direct vassalage, the Regent had added Beaucaire and Carcassonne to the royal domain, while the marriage of Louis with Margaret of Provence was an intrusion of the French into the Rhône valley and a challenge to the power of the Emperor in that quarter. The rebellions had never received the slightest popular support. The sympathies of the common people had indeed been with the Crown, as the only guarantor of law and order. This was especially the case in the central district round Paris. In 1227 there had been a plot to seize the person of the King at Monthléry. He was extricated by the loyalty of the local militia and was escorted to Paris amidst the enthusiasm of the populace.¹

Busied as she had been in the administration of a turbulent kingdom, Blanche had yet managed to give attention to the education of the young King. In an atmosphere which combined severe piety with attention to the manly and royal graces, Louis' character had been developing, so that on the attainment of his majority he stands out as the example of all that is most chivalrous in an age to which we are accustomed to look for the culminating standard of chivalry. King Louis was handsome ; *subtilis et gracilis convenienter et longus* says one who saw him in 1248. As a young man he had abundant fair hair ; in frame he was more elegant than powerful. His eyes were soft, "like those of a dove," and his manners frank and engaging. He was brave with a courage which impelled him at one moment to leap fully armed into the sea, to strike the first blow at the infidel,² at another to remain calmly on an apparently sinking ship rather than desert his companions. He had a delightful irony, and the keen sense of humour which sometimes accompanies great piety. Of his ardent and un-

¹ Joinville, "Histoire de St. Louis," op. cit. p. 31. *Ibid.* 86, 87, 88.

² *Ibid.* p. 3.

flagging piety and the stainlessness of his life, his biographer, Joinville, has left us a great array of examples. "I had rather see you dead before my eyes," his stern Castilian mother had once said, "than that you should commit a mortal sin." And the words had burned themselves into the boy's heart. It was perhaps with a direct recollection of them that he pressed upon the unconvinced but admiring Joinville, how greatly preferable it would be to be a leper than to have a mortal sin upon the conscience: "for when a man dies he is cured of bodily ailments, but when a man dies who has committed mortal sin he knows not for certain if he has in his life made repentance sufficient to win God's pardon".¹ Of sayings such as these innumerable examples might be culled from the pages of Joinville, who tells us also of the long hours spent in prayer, of the absorbed meditations and continual mortifications. Fifty genuflexions and fifty *Ave Marias* he made every evening before going to bed. Even on horseback during his campaigns he observed the canonical hours. Charity, penitence, devotion, were the regular theme of his daily life. To prolong the tale would be to let history drift into hagiology. We must turn, therefore, to the worldly side of the story—to Louis IX's government and policy.

And it may be said at once that it is not the King's excessive sanctity alone which marks him out as unique. Others have been as holy, but few have combined so much worldly wisdom with so much piety. The religious excitement of the Crusade, it is true, threw his judgment out of balance, but in matters of policy where the Crusade was not involved, he showed much of that common sense and even of that eye for the main chance which we are accustomed to expect in the descendants of Hugh Capet. Indeed, when we look at the reign as a whole we are constrained to write down the Crusade, which Louis undoubtedly regarded as the work of his life, as a mere interruption of its true historical significance. That signifi-

¹ "Et bien est voirs que quant l'hom meurt, il est gueris de la meselerie dou cors; mais quant l'hom qui a fait le pechie mortel meurt, il ne n'est certains que il ait eu en sa vie tel repentance que Diex li ait pardon-nei" (Joinville, op. cit. p. 11).

cance will be found elsewhere; in the steady increase of security and material prosperity; in the firm neutrality of France and her abstention from the devastating quarrels which racked Europe during the period; in the quiet resistance to the increasing pretensions of the Church; in the steady but unceasing development of government institutions; finally, in the advance in the prestige of the monarchy due to the recognized sanctity and disinterestedness of the King himself. It is easy to overrate this prestige, but the truth is undeniable; Saint Louis cast a fresh cloak of sanctity over the anointed line.

The reign was not allowed to open without one more spurt of rebellion. Thibaut of Champagne, now King of Navarre, had married his daughter and heiress to a son of Pierre Mauclerc, and was conspiring with the latter to recover the lands which he had sold to the Crown (Blois, Chartres, Châteaudun, Sancerre). The strength of the monarchy was illustrated by the collapse of the coalition in face of a mere demonstration in force.

More dangerous was the opposition provoked by the assumption by the King's brother Alfonse of his titles in Poitou and Auvergne.¹ Alfonse demanded homage from his new vassals. Of these the most important was the Count de la Marche, whose possessions comprised about one-third of Alfonse's apanage and were completely smothered by the new creation. Incited by his strong-headed wife, Hugh put himself at the head of a rebellion into which the whole south of France flung itself with delight. Henry of England agreed to lead an army into France. Minor feudatories tumbled over one another to join the revolt. The Emperor looked on with approval. Even Raymond of Toulouse girded himself for a final effort. Henry III landed at Royau on 12 May, 1242. But he was about the most incapable commander that ever raised standard, and he failed entirely to co-operate with his stepfather. After an insignificant skirmish at Taillebourg (1242) on the Charente, Louis rather weakly agreed to a truce.

¹ The apanages were his by the will of his father.

A second reverse under the walls of Saintes heralded the collapse of the Anglo-Poitevin coalition. Louis could now round up the unfortunate Count of Toulouse at leisure. Before the end of the year Raymond was pleading for terms, and the Peace of Lorris (January, 1243, a ratification of the Peace of 1229) ended the last rebellion with which Louis had to deal. The final submission of Aquitaine and Toulouse marks a most important step in the unification of France. The armed antagonism between Franks and Visigoths was at an end. A district of foreign blood and alien customs and language had been annexed, and though it occasionally betrayed centrifugal tendencies, it proved on the whole loyal and patriotic. It was thanks largely to the wisdom of Louis IX and his brother Alfonse, who respected the idiosyncrasies of the South-West and pursued a wise conciliatory policy, that this desirable consummation was attained.¹

Feudal resistance—never very serious but always preoccupying—being exhausted, there came an opportunity for the development of external policy. It was in 1244 that the King, falling very sick, “took the Cross,”² that is vowed an expedition against the infidels. This vow once made, his singleness of heart made its execution the absorbing passion of his life. Far other were the passions which swayed his neighbours in Europe. The idea of a universal Empire guiding the destinies of the world hand in hand with a universal Church was not yet dead, and it was destined for long to distract Europe by its death-throes. Under its last real vindicator—Frederick II—the Empire was now crumbling to its decay, and the Popes were endeavouring to usurp the imperial functions. Empire and Papacy, Guelfs and Ghibellines, were locked in this great struggle; and into it it was the policy of the combatants on either side to draw the young King of France. It might have been expected that a man so devout and orthodox as Louis would easily have been captured for the Papacy; but no one knew better than this crowned saint how to distinguish be-

¹ Boutaric, “Saint Louis et Alfonse de Poitiers” (1870).

² His three brothers, Robert of Artois, Alfonse of Poitou, and Charles of Anjou (afterwards King of Sicily) followed his example.

tween the Pope as Holy Father and the Pope as temporal Prince. Louis was firmly determined to remain neutral ; he desired to respect the Pope and to be friendly with the Emperor, but at the same time to abstain from interference in their quarrels. It was an ideal not easy of execution. In 1240 Gregory IX made the first advance ; he offered the crown of Germany to the King's brother, Robert of Artois. The offer was declined. In 1241 some French prelates on their way to a general Council at Rome in Genoese ships were attacked by a Pisan fleet in the imperial service and fell into the hands of Frederick II. Louis vigorously demanded their liberation and by his firmness compelled the Emperor to give way. Clearly he was not going to be a pawn upon either side in the European struggle. But if he did not want to become the tool of the Papacy, he did desire the countenance of the Pope for his Crusade ; and in the hope of securing it he had a meeting with Innocent IV at Cluni (November, 1245).¹ The King attempted to draw the Pope into his Eastern schemes, and the Pope to entice the King to take part in the European struggle. Of the two the Pope was the more successful ; for he got Louis to agree to the marriage of his younger brother, Charles of Anjou, to Beatrice, heiress of Provence ; an arrangement which placed the imperial district eastward of the Rhône, the old Lotharingian region which had become the kingdom of Arles, under the control of France. The Provençal marriage was a departure from the rule of neutrality which Louis had set himself. It also brought France into dangerous proximity to Italy and heralded the time when Angevin princes should become the protectors of the Papacy. It is possible that at Cluni Louis may have agreed to the scheme of making his brother the pillar of the Papacy and the rival of the Hohenstaufens in Italy. If so he is responsible for the first opening of that Italian door which was to be so fatal to France in later years. At the same time it is impossible to accuse Louis of sacrificing the interests of France at Cluni : for it must not be forgotten that even if by

¹ Innocent IV had taken refuge (1244) at Lyons, then an imperial, not a French, city.

acquiescing in the Provençal marriage, the King accepted a rôle in Italy for which France was not truly destined, he added to the Crown a region which was essential to the completion of the kingdom. But if he hoped in return for the acceptance of the Italian mission to effect an armistice in Europe and secure the active co-operation of the Pope in the crusade, Louis miscalculated the strength of the passions which had been unchained in Europe. For three years he stood by, watching the struggle in the hope that peace might be restored. Alive to the vices of the clerical system, he associated himself with the expression of grievances with which Frederick confronted Innocent in 1247 and which found an echo in the anticlerical protests of the Baronage of France, but he declined to allow Frederick to seize the person of the Pope at Lyons; and France had only to cry "hands off" for the Emperor to abandon the idea. Seeing that the chances of peace were only dwindling, Louis at last in July, 1248, determined to undertake his crusade alone. He took the oriflamme at St. Denis and set sail from Aigues-Mortes¹ (28 August) on his gallant but ill-starred and ill-conducted enterprise.

The stories of the first three Crusades in 1096, 1147, and 1189 have already been recounted in these pages.² Since then there had been three further expeditions to the East. The Fourth Crusade, which started in 1202, was a purely feudal enterprise and France took no official part in it. It was diverted to Constantinople, and resulted in the foundation of

¹ The difficulties in the way of securing a suitable maritime base on the Mediterranean for the Crusade illustrate the feudal obstructions which still—though they were gradually disappearing—hampered the Capetian monarchy. Montpellier belonged to Aragon; Agde and St. Gilles to the Counts of Toulouse; Provence, with its splendid harbour of Marseilles, was independent and remained so till 1486. Narbonne, which, moreover, was rapidly silting up, belonged to its Viscounts; Maguelonne to its Bishop. There remained the swampy and unhealthy city of Aigues-Mortes, with its roadstead five kilometres distant. It belonged to the Abbey of Psalmodi, and Louis IX acquired it in exchange for some royal lands near Sommière. See Lenthalic, "Les Villes Mortes du Golfe de Lyon" (1889), pp. 364 and 506, where the deed of acquisition is printed.

² *Supra*, pp. 103 *sqq.*, 120 *sqq.*, 137.

the Latin Empire under Baldwin IX, Count of Flanders, who in the year 1204 became Emperor as Baldwin I. Neither was the Crusade of 1218-19 a French enterprise. It was led by John of Brienne, King of Jerusalem, and the King of Hungary. The Sixth Crusade (1238) was, so far as France was concerned, one of those purely feudal expeditions which had become so common. The chief participants were Louis IX's unruly vassals Thibaut IV of Champagne and Pierre Mauclerc. The Seventh and Eighth Crusades, of which the story has now to be told, were national matters in which the King of France played the principal part.

Louis must be credited with good judgment in his choice of the direction in which his blow was to be delivered. He had determined to effect a landing in the rich and vulnerable land of Egypt. But, this once granted, little more can be said in praise of the management of the expedition. From the military point of view, indeed, the Crusade was a monument of ineptitude. It is possible that Louis really thought that the holy nature of his task eliminated the need for the ordinary precautions of those who make war on a brave and numerous enemy in an unknown country. The Crusade wintered in Cyprus, its sojourn there being chiefly notable for the King's attempt to convert the Tartars by the simple expedient of sending them from Cyprus a tent furnished as a chapel *qui mout cousta*, a proceeding which sufficiently demonstrates the simplicity of his mind. On the Eve of Pentecost next spring the expedition re-embarked, and on the following Thursday arrived off Damietta, to find the Saracens drawn up in force to resist their landing. Watermanship was never a strong point with Crusaders, and the disembarkation was a scene of wild confusion. The King leapt into the water up to his armpits, and on being informed that the forces in front of him were veritable Saracens—a fact which he does not seem to have realized at once—so completely lost his head that he would have charged them single-handed had not his *preudome* prevented him. The Saracens, however, were paralysed by the mortal illness of their leader and offered but a faint-hearted resistance. Damietta capitulated without

a blow. But the choice of Damietta for a base had been a great blunder. There are two main difficulties in an invasion of Egypt: the desert, and the tangle of water-ways of the Nile Delta. To avoid the latter, either by keeping west of the westernmost of the branches, as Napoleon did in 1798, or east of the easternmost, as every other successful invader of Egypt has done from Cambyzes to Wolesley, is the first rule for the invasion of Egypt. By landing at Damietta Louis IX ignored it.

The Crusade was thus committed to a blind plunge amongst a maze of water-ways. The only hope was in the demoralization of the enemy; but instead of taking immediate advantage of this Louis wasted six months before making a start, and then simply ran his head against the canal of Ashmoun, the very obstacle which had ruined John of Brienne in 1219. Getting his cavalry across with great difficulty, Louis tried to sweep the enemy away and so to secure a passage for his infantry also. But it was only after a desperate struggle, and after the whole of the division commanded by Robert of Artois had been cut to pieces in a mad and insubordinate charge into the town of Mansoureh, that the King was able to effect his object and bring his infantry across the canal (February, 1250). The Battle of Mansoureh was fatal to the Crusade. The army had been so roughly handled that further advance was out of the question. Famine and pestilence completed its discomfiture. The enemy got between Louis and his base, and the retreat to Damietta resolved itself into a running fight which ended in the capture of the King himself and the surrender of the remnant of his army. The majority of the prisoners were put to the sword.

Louis' qualities were better suited to the rôle of prisoner than to that of commander. Courageous and unperturbed, he confronted the possibilities of death and torture, bargained collectedly with his captors over his ransom, and eventually arranged terms on the basis of a payment of 500,000 *livres* and the surrender of Damietta. On his release Louis withdrew to St. John d'Acre and remained in Palestine for four years, strengthening the remaining fortresses there and doing what

he could for the prisoners of the Egyptian campaign. It was no longer possible, however, to retrieve the blunders of that campaign, and when in 1253 the King received the news of his mother's death he felt it time to return home and resume the reins of government. In September, 1254, he once more set foot in his capital.

It was a much altered Europe that he found on his return after six years' absence. Not only was Blanche dead, but Innocent IV (1254) and his great rival the Emperor Frederick II (1250) were dead also. Two important questions confronted Louis; the succession in Flanders and the succession in Champagne. Already in 1246 Louis IX had arbitrated in the matters of Flanders. Countess Margaret of Flanders had been twice married, first to a nobleman of Hainault, Bouchard d'Avesnes, secondly to William of Dampierre. The dispute was between the children of these two marriages. In 1246 Louis IX had awarded Flanders to the Dampierres and Hainault to the d'Avesnes. During his absence on crusade the quarrel had broken out afresh, and now by the *Dit de Péronne* (24 September, 1256) he confirmed his previous award, but cut down the d'Avesnes share and ordered Jean d'Avesnes to do homage to his rival. This was probably just; but it was certainly not unprofitable to the Crown to prevent the reunion of Flanders. The death of Thibaut of Navarre and Champagne in 1253 had left a somewhat analogous situation in Champagne. Louis turned the disputes between the offspring of Thibaut's three marriages to good account by marrying his daughter Isabella to Thibaut V.

A like good fortune attended his relations with England. After his failure in 1242 Henry III had agreed to a truce, which Louis, who sincerely respected his pious neighbour,¹

¹ This peace was made, says Joinville, in the teeth of the advice of the Council (op. cit. 65). Louis argued that, his Queen and Henry III's being sisters, there were good reasons why he should make some sacrifice. But he added: "That which I give him is well employed because he becomes my vassal which he was not before". All of which shows that St. Louis was not without an eye to worldly profit (Joinville, op. cit. p. 287).

desired to develop into a definite peace. In 1259 this desire was gratified, and the Treaty of Paris was ratified between the Kings of France and England. By the terms of this treaty Louis gave up all his domains and fiefs in the dioceses of Limoges, Cahors, and Périgueux.¹ In the event of the death without children of Alfonse of Poitiers, Saintonge south of the Charente and the Agenais were to lapse to England. In return for these concessions Henry renounced all claims on Normandy, Maine, and Poitou, and agreed to become the vassal of France for all his continental possessions. This vindication of the supremacy of France within her own borders was worth many times the price paid by Louis. The King, indeed, protested that he had signed in order to "put peace between his children and the children of Henry".² We have only to look forward a little to recognize that this was the one thing which the treaty did not do. But at least it secured to France in large measure the recognition of her internal unity and pushed the English frontier many miles farther south. Public opinion in both countries regarded the Treaty of Paris as shameful. This may be taken as good proof that it was in reality a fair solution of the outstanding differences between France and England. Yet one is sometimes inclined to speculate whether, if St. Louis had directed against the natural enemy of France some of the energy which he devoted to the crusades, the catastrophe of the Hundred Years War might not have been averted. For England was plunged in domestic troubles, and in 1264 Louis was actually called in to arbitrate between Henry and his barons. The *Dit d'Amiens* (24 January, 1264), in which Louis gave his decision in this matter, was from the constitutional standpoint a reactionary pronouncement, annulling as it did the Provisions of Oxford and destroying the constitutional safeguards which the barons had extorted from the Crown. It is curious

¹ This concession was somewhat deceptive; for the royal domain in that quarter was not extensive, and the treaty specially excepted the numerous *seigneurs* who had the option of becoming direct vassals of the Crown.

² Joinville, *op. cit.* p. 287.

that the English barons should have expected satisfaction from a monarch so absolute as the King of France.

In the South-West also Louis was able to take a further step towards the final establishment of the supremacy of the Crown. Since the decline of the house of Toulouse the only obstacle to this supremacy had been the house of Aragon. In 1258, by the Treaty of Corbeil, the King of Aragon abandoned all his pretensions in Languedoc and Provence in return for the abandonment by Louis of claims over Roussillon and Barcelona, which he inherited from Charlemagne. At the same time Louis' eldest son Philip was betrothed to Isabella of Aragon. Of all the South-West Montpellier alone continued to owe allegiance to the trans-Pyrenean monarch. From all these instances it is clear that Louis IX was not unwilling to follow, when conscience permitted, the policy of aggrandizement of which his grandfather had been so conspicuous an exponent.

Italian affairs now once more claimed the King's attention. His brother Charles of Anjou, it will be remembered, had in 1246 married the heiress of the county of Provence. In 1262 he accepted the Pope's renewed offer of the Crown of the Two Sicilies.¹ The acquiescence of the King in this step committed France more deeply than ever to the policy of interference in the Peninsula. Charles invaded Italy in order to take possession of his kingdom, and colonized Naples from France. It was on the death of his rival Manfred in the Battle of Benevento, 1266, that the Hohenstaufen claim on the Two Sicilies passed to the Spanish house of Aragon, by the marriage of Manfred's daughter Constance to Peter III of Aragon. But neither in this nor in any other matter was Louis slavishly led by any of the powerful contemporary Popes; and the same is true of his dealings with the clergy. In fact the saint oppressed the Church with a hand every bit as heavy as that of his unsaintly grandfather. And indeed it must be admitted that, if the State was to survive, "oppression" of the clergy was inevitable. The complete immunity claimed by the clergy

¹ Urban IV (a native of Champagne) was now Pope.

was inconsistent with the supremacy of the Crown. In the fifteenth century there was forged for political purposes what purported to be the "Pragmatic Sanction of Louis IX"—a kind of French "Constitutions of Clarendon". Though an undoubted forgery it represents quite fairly the attitude adopted by Louis in Church matters.¹

To make a long story short the clergy found themselves in the unhappy position of having to pay *extorsions tyranniques* to both Pope and King. It is not recorded that they preferred the latter because levied for the purposes of the Crusade, whereas the Papal extortions were for the furtherance of the Pope's own private ends. In point of fact they protested indiscriminately against both; to the Pope against the King and to the King against the Pope. Even in the matter of the Inquisition, although he was a staunch patron of that body, Louis was no servant of the Papacy.

His reign saw the gradual establishment of the Inquisition in France. It had been rendered necessary by the great increase in heresies. The introduction of special Papal commissioners to deal with heretics was an encroachment on the powers of the bishops and met with strenuous opposition from that quarter. Thus the success of the Inquisition depended largely on the support it could get from the State—the "secular arm". Elsewhere it failed for want of this; but in France that support was freely granted, with the result that the Inquisition was able to prosecute its task of persecution without hindrance. To Louis, a devout Catholic, extirpation of heresy, even by means so arbitrary and savage as those employed by the Inquisition, was welcome. But he cannot have been blind to the other advantages which accrued to the Crown from its connexion with the Inquisition. The confiscations, which invariably formed part of inquisitorial sentences, went almost wholly to the Crown as the reward of its assistance, and large tracts of confiscated land, especially in the South-West, thus came into the King's hands as personal

¹ It prohibited simony, irregular collation to benefices, and oppressive Papal exactions.

property. Louis' co-operation may have been disinterested ; it certainly was not gratuitous. The connexion between the Inquisition and the State left disastrous effects on French Law (then in a state of transition). To this day the effects of the secrecy and arbitrary procedure of the inquisitorial tribunals may be traced in French Courts of Law.¹ The more terrible abuses of justice, torture, and the manufacture of evidence, have disappeared, but for many centuries they formed part of the ordinary procedure in French Criminal Law.

But the King's heart was still in the East. Time and experience had not brought wisdom so far as crusading went. With a melancholy lack of judgment Louis decided to strike at Tunis, in the firm belief that the "King" of that country was ardently longing to be converted and in the still wilder belief that Tunis would prove the key to the Holy Places. Heaping blunder upon blunder Louis selected the heat of summer for his embarkation. He landed at Carthage on 18 July, 1270 ; in a little more than a month he was dead, stricken by plague generated by the heat of the tropical sun. Thus perished in a hopeless and quixotic errand the most noble of the Kings of France.

By reason of his great sanctity and by reason also of the good peace which he kept and the prosperity which the kingdom enjoyed under his rule, St. Louis has been regarded as a great reformer, whereas he was rather an able administrator who innovated little, but by firm and upright government gave scope for the development and enjoyment of reforms which had been introduced by his predecessors. Various reforms were attributed to him in later years, for which he was not responsible. Such was the collection of "Customs" known as the "*Établissements de Saint Louis*" (1273).² This was not a royal code but a collection by a private individual of certain "customs" current at that epoch. The King had nothing to do with it. In a certain sense, indeed, so far from being an age of reform the reign of Louis IX was actually

¹ It must however be remembered that much of the character of French justice and many of its abuses are traceable to Roman Law.

² Viollet, "*Établissements de St. Louis*" (1881-1886).

an age of reaction. We have seen how it had been the policy of Louis VII and Philip Augustus to grant privileges and charters to towns. These privileges had been seized by the upper classes in the towns—the bourgeois aristocracy—who had turned them to their own profit. To them liberty meant liberty to oppress and exploit the artisans; and “sweating” and famine wages became the order of the day. Liberty had in fact been granted too soon. In the reign of Louis IX the towns were therefore in a state of spasmodic revolt, and their discontent could be easily turned to the advantage of the *seigneurs* and the Crown, who, on the pretext of seeing justice done, recovered many of their abandoned rights and themselves began to supervise—and exploit—municipal affairs. The famous law-book of Philippe de Beaumanoir—“*Coutumes de Beauvoisis*”¹—is in the main a justification of this royal and seignorial supervision. The reform was no doubt a needful one, but it was one which told in the main in favour of absolutism rather than freedom. It was exploitation by the Crown or the responsible vassals of the Crown—something very different and very much less oppressive than the capricious exploitation of greedy and brutal barons. But it does not justify us in writing St. Louis down as a liberator and democratic reformer. He was nothing of the kind. He was something much better than this—a King who really governed; accessible to his subjects, dealing an even-handed royal justice; one who rightly regarded order and justice as superior to liberty, who brought everything to the touchstone of his own great simplicity and whose reign came rightly to be regarded as a golden epoch in a golden age.

¹ Published by the Société de l'Histoire de France (1842).

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CHAPTER XI
THE AGE OF PHILIP THE FAIR
(1285-1328)

PHILIPPE *le Hardi*, the eldest son of St. Louis, was a reproduction of his father without his energy and vitality. His character recalls that of Henry III of England, for like him he was hasty and ill-balanced, and like him the tool of favourites. Of these for a time the most important was Pierre de la Broce, whom he promoted from the position of valet de chambre to the highest place at Court. But when in 1274 he married the Princess of Brabant¹ the King came quickly under the ascendancy of his wife, who degraded de la Broce and had him executed. From that time the true rulers of France were the Queen, the Queen Mother, Margaret of Provence, and a certain Matthew of St. Denis, of whom we really know nothing, but to whom the chroniclers continually refer.

The reign saw the reversion to the Crown of the Poitevin inheritance which had been detached by Louis VIII as an apanage for his younger son Alfonse. That prince had died without heirs and, in defiance of the terms of the Treaty of Paris (1229),² Alfonse's dominions fell in to the Crown, and with them the whole of the valuable district of Languedoc which had been gradually wrested from the Counts of Toulouse and transferred to the Counts of Poitou. England and Languedoc resisted, but the Government acted with vigour; Philip himself

¹ She was his second wife; he had married previously Isabella of Aragon. She had been one of the victims of the Crusade; had died on the way home and is buried at Cosenza.

² *Supra*, p. 172.

invaded Languedoc and captured the strong mountain fortress of Foix (5 June, 1272).¹ The year 1272 may be regarded as the date of the final establishment of the royal power in the South-West. Philip was a great builder, and it was he who converted the city of Carcassonne into the wonderful fortress which we still admire.²

In other directions Philip behaved in weaker fashion. In 1271 the rich district known as the "Comtât Venaissin," on the banks of the lower Rhône, was handed over to the Popes, who had established a claim to it during the Albigensian Crusades. This addition to the Papal possessions was destined to have a considerable influence on the relations between France and the Holy See, when in the fourteenth century the Popes actually took refuge in the valley of the Rhône.³ It was not till 1797 that they finally abandoned their claim to the Venaissin.

It was at this juncture that a plan was evolved in the ill-balanced brain of Charles of Anjou, for placing his nephew, the King of France, on the Imperial Throne, which had been vacant since 1256. This idea of a French Emperor recurred at intervals—as for instance in the candidature of Francis I⁴—but it never had much chance of realization, and on this occasion was quickly dropped in face of the disapproval of Gregory X. Another surrender was made to propitiate England, the Agenais being abandoned;⁵ while the dispute as to parts of Querci which had belonged to England was submitted to an arbiter; at the same time Edward I's Queen (Eleanor of Castille) was permitted to take possession of her maternal heritage of Abbeville and Ponthieu, whereby England gained important outposts, on the north-eastern frontier of the Capetian dominions (Treaty of Amiens, 23 May, 1279).

¹ The picturesque ruins of which may still be seen beside the tumbling Ariège on the lower slopes of the Pyrenees.

² Those who prefer to see such work unrestored should visit Aigues-Mortes, whose walls were also Philip's work.

³ *Infra*, p. 262.

⁴ *Infra*, II. II.

⁵ It is worth noting that the new Agenais frontier was systematically fortified.

But the chief centre of interest of Philip III's reign was in lands beyond and about the Pyrenees. In that quarter France had interests in Navarre, Aragon, and Castille and, in view of the strength of the English claims in Guyenne and Gascony, it was highly important to France that these interests should not be neglected. Philip's son, Philip, afterwards Philip IV, was betrothed to the heiress of Henry I of Navarre (who died 1274). Philip III's sister Blanche married the eldest son of Alfonso X of Castille. But on Alfonso's death (1275) his children were passed over in favour of those of his younger brother, and France was not able to protect the interests of the French Princess. It was in Aragon, however, that the most serious entanglement occurred. Aragon was the habitual ally of France in trans-Pyrenean matters. But her Italian interests had thrown her into opposition to the Pope, with the result that it was impossible for France at once to enjoy the friendship of Aragon and to maintain good relations with Rome. When (1282) the Angevins were driven from Sicily, where, as we have seen, they had been established in 1261,¹ and Peter of Aragon ascended the throne in their place, the indignant Pope (Martin IV) ordered a crusade. He conceived the idea of establishing Charles of Valois (Philip III's younger son) in Spain, to further the interests of the Holy See in that quarter, just as the Angevins had been established in Italy. So Philip was forced to fight against the resuscitation of Ghibellinism in Italy by making war on the house of Aragon in Spain. In 1285 death removed the two main instigators of this crusade—Martin IV and Charles of Anjou. But this did not stop the invasion of Spain. In that same year Philip led an immense army on the first European war of conquest undertaken by the Capetians beyond their own borders. It proved a disastrous failure. The French were held in check by the defences of Gerona and, while their troops were being decimated by fever, their fleet fell a prey to the famous Roger de Loria. These disasters were consummated by the death of the King himself at Perpignan (5 October, 1285).

¹ *Supra*, p. 175.

Philip *le Hardi's* son, Philip "the Fair," was twenty-five years of age. He is one of the enigmas of history. His reign covers a critical period in the development of France. It saw the determination of the final character of the French monarchy, and it saw also the triumph of that monarchy over the mediaeval Papacy. We look for some great man to guide these great events. But how are we to call Philip great? Either the chroniclers have conspired to blur his features, or he was in reality a nonentity who sat still while great things were transacted in his name. Even the descriptions of his personal appearance are strangely contradictory. "He was the handsomest man in the world," says Villani, "and one of the largest in person and well proportioned in every limb—a wise and good man for a layman." "C'est le plus bel homme du monde," says another, "mais il ne sait que regarder les gens fixement sans parler. Ce n'est ni un homme ni un bête c'est un statue." That at least does not sound like invention. And perhaps we are near the truth in suggesting that Philip was politically, as well as socially, something of a lay figure. He is one of the darkest villains of Dante's great poem: "France's Pest"; "That malignant plant which overshadows all the Christian World".¹ But Dante was in this matter a partisan as well as a poet, and to the bulk of contemporary opinion Philip appeared not as a sinister plotter but rather as a weak man swayed by unscrupulous adventurers.

But at best the picture is blurred. And this is true not only of the King himself but of his entourage. Philip's ministers and agents move in a kind of squalid mist. Jeanne of Navarre the Queen, Louis, Philip, and Charles, the King's sons, who all in turn occupied the throne, are obscure and intangible figures. Charles of Valois, alone of the Royal Family, emerges a little from the fog; a needy swashbuckling

¹ "Purgatory," canto VII. line III (trans. Cary):—

Gallia's bane: his vicious life they know

And foul; thence comes the grief that rends them thus.

"Paradise," canto XIX. line 117 (trans. Cary):—

There shall he read the woe that he doth work

With his adulterate money on the Seine,

Who by the tusk will perish.

adventurer, cumbered with an immense family of daughters and continually in search of new fields for his feverish energy. Philip's ministers too are for the most part obscure. They all rose from humble ranks. Pierre Flôte was a jurist from Montpellier, Enguerrand de Marigni was a Norman Squire, and a protégé of the Queen, and Nogaret, the most famous of all, was a native of Toulouse and a protégé of Flôte. Of the three Nogaret is the most tangible; after Flôte's death (in the battle of Courtrai) it was his wonderful ability in intrigue that carried the anti-papal crusade to a triumphant issue.

In two respects this reign is one of the most important in French history. It had lasting effects on the constitutional problem and on the question of the relations of France with the Papacy. Foreign politics proper occupy a subordinate position, and may be disposed of in a few sentences to leave the ground clear for the consideration of more important matters. Philip inherited the Aragonese "Crusade". But, being himself of Aragonese extraction on his mother's side, he quickly withdrew from the Spanish entanglement, although friendly relations with Aragon were not actually restored until 1295. With the other trans-Pyrenean powers also Philip lived at peace, and his wife Jeanne left her Crown of Navarre to her sons, thereby founding the long connexion of the Royal House of France with the kingdom of Navarre. She also brought Champagne to the French Crown.

In Italy it was more difficult to follow a conciliatory policy. The Aragonese domination of Sicily continued and the Pope looked to France for help. The King's brother, Charles of Valois, was allowed to lead French troops into Italy. His expedition, however, met with no success, and friction between Philip and the Pope, combined with the reverse which the French suffered at Courtrai, led to the recall of Charles. His failure justifies the scathing epigram of Villani: "He came to make peace in Tuscany and left that country at war, to carry war into Sicily and left that country at peace". But Philip's subsequent relations with Italy are inextricably mixed up with his struggle with the Holy See, and can best be dealt with when we come to speak of that matter.

With the King of England there was, of course, a standing quarrel, and when in 1294, 1295, and 1296 Philip's troops occupied Guyenne it seemed likely to come to a head. A quarrel with England involved a quarrel with Flanders. The feudal position of the Counts of Flanders with regard to the French Crown closely resembled that of England, and not only was this the case but there existed an intimate commercial interdependence between Flanders and England. Flanders lived by her cloth-making and was dependent on England for the supply of wool which fed her looms. Severance from England and the cessation of this supply meant starvation to the Flemings; and a close union between Flanders and England had come into existence, based on that most potent of motives—self-interest. Thus Flanders, a country depending on her manufactures, was dragged at the chariot wheels of England. She had fought and lost with the allies at Bouvines, and since Bouvines she had been struggling to escape from the grasp of the Capetians. Guy of Dampierre, Count of Flanders, had established close relations with Edward I of England, and in 1294 a matrimonial alliance was arranged between the heir to the English throne and Philippine of Flanders. The King at once threw the Count into the Louvre and kept him there till he foreswore the English alliance (1296). Such pressure, however, was of no avail. Stark necessity drove Flanders into the arms of England, and in 1297 Guy signed an offensive and defensive alliance with Edward I. But Philip acted with praiseworthy decision and managed to bring Guy to his knees before Edward could transport an army to Flanders. Robert of Artois won the Battle of Furnes on 20 August. England, hard pressed by domestic difficulties, agreed to a truce (1297),¹ which was developed after endless conferences into a definite peace in 1303. Edward I married Philip's sister Margaret and his son was betrothed to Philip's daughter Isabelle, whom he afterwards married. France threw Scotland, and England threw Flanders to the lions.

The lions to which Flanders was thrown were unemploy-

¹ Truce of Yve-Saint-Baron (October).

ment and starvation, wild beasts which quickly make their presence known to working people; and it was the working people of Flanders who in 1302 rose from their idle looms to throw off the yoke of the French King and incidentally that of their unworthy Count and to reopen the English market.¹ Philip IV despatched Robert of Artois to deal with the insolent Flemings. Confident that the Chivalry of France would make short work of such vermin, Artois, who had omitted to reconnoitre the ground, led his army full tilt into the canal at Courtrai behind which the Flemings had posted themselves. The defeat that ensued was of course overwhelming and the carnage frightful. It was a foretaste of the humiliations of Crécy, Poitiers, and Agincourt, and might have afforded a lesson to the French if they had not been too arrogant to learn (11 July, 1302).

Philip recalled Charles of Valois from Italy and girded his loins to repair the disaster, and in 1304 he did retrieve the reputation of the French Chivalry by the decisive victory of Mons en Pevèle. But he found the Flemings so stubborn—they were fighting for their existence—that he resolved to abandon the task. On 5 June, 1305, he signed a treaty (Treaty of Athis) restoring their liberties, setting on the throne the son of the late Count, and accepting a large indemnity, for which the towns of Lille, Douai, Athies, and Béthune were pledged, together with the whole of French Flanders. This treaty, however, was unconfirmed, and was never really carried out; and the two countries remained in a state of partially suppressed hostility for nine years. The quarrel between France and Flanders lay too deep to be settled by any such agreement; it lived on till the Hundred Years War provided its solution.

But it was neither in Guyenne nor in Flanders that Philip's real interests lay; nor was it by force of arms that these interests were promoted. It was Italian politics that occupied the King and his advisers, and it was by the more congenial instrument of intrigue that they intervened in these politics.

¹ Cf. *Supra*, p. 133.

For many years the Popes had, with few and unimportant exceptions, been steadily bent on the assertion of the absolute independence and temporal sovereignty of the See of Rome. To carry out this policy they had called in the assistance of the Royal House of France, and it had been by the aid of Charles of Anjou that they had administered the *coup-de-grâce* to the Hohenstaufens. It remained to be seen whether the Popes would be strong enough to vindicate their independence of the protectors they had themselves called in. For a time they hesitated to put this crucial question to the test; but when in December, 1294, Celestine V, the pious and gentle hermit who had been called to the Papal Chair in August, made the "great refusal," by which he earned in the opinion of Dante¹ the punishment of Hell, and was succeeded by Benedict Gaetani (Boniface VIII), who was the incarnation of the idea of Secular Supremacy, then it was inevitable that the question would have to be decided.

The echoes of the great conflict which was now to open have endured so long that judgment of the characters and conduct of the protagonists has been seriously distorted. To regard either Philip or Boniface VIII as so wholly black as each has been painted would be an error of judgment. Just as Philip was probably not the sinister sphinx he is sometimes said to have been,² so neither was Boniface the immoral and blasphemous monster "delighting in scandal as a salamander in the fire" that Ghibelline writers have described to us. Dante was perhaps justified as a partisan and a poet in consigning him to Hell before the Earth had closed over him,³ and in causing St. Peter to direct against his latest successor the terrible invective which turned the whole Heaven red;⁴ but he was not justified as a historian. Boniface was

¹"Hell," canto III. line 55 (trans. Cary):—

When some of these I recognized, I saw
And knew the shade of him who to base fear
Yielding, abjured his high estate.

²"Le démon d'un race dont Louis IX avait été le saint" (Hanotaux, "Richelieu," I. 253).

³Dante, "Hell," canto XIX. line 55 (trans. Cary).

⁴Dante, "Paradise," canto XXVII. line 19 *sqq.* (trans. Cary).

in fact no more than a very violent, intractable, and overbearing politician, and a quite uncompromising advocate of the supremacy of the Holy See. Of saintliness there is no vestige in his character; but as he was the last, so he was perhaps the greatest, of the exponents of the mediæval conception of the Papacy.

Boniface had not long occupied the Papal Chair when the quarrel, now inevitable, broke out. The first round was short and sharp. The kings of France had been allowed, for purposes of crusade, to levy a tax upon ecclesiastical property. They desired to convert this special privilege into a general and permanent right. So when in 1294 war with England was declared Philip demanded a subsidy from the clergy. The majority acquiesced, but a minority appealed to the Pope, who took up their cause with fiery energy, and finally on 24 February, 1296, flung a challenge to the whole of Europe in the shape of the famous bull *Clericis laicos*. With uncompromising clearness he forbade in this bull the exaction by secular princes of subsidies from the clergy and the payment by the clergy of such subsidies. Edward I invented the ingenious plan by which clerical subsidies were called voluntary gifts, and in this way checkmated the Pope. Philip adopted other methods. He dealt a severe blow at the Papal exchequer by forbidding the exportation of gold and silver. The exasperated pontiff rapped out bull upon bull. *Ineffabilis amor* (save the mark) remonstrated with the King in terms of patronizing condescension. It provoked what, considering the period, can only be regarded as a most extraordinary outburst of feeling in France. Anonymous anti-Papal pamphlets began to fly about, and such phrases were heard as "Christ did not rise for clerks alone". In face of this outcry even Boniface quailed. *Romana Mater* (7 February, 1297) made the following concession: "When an Ecclesiastic of your Kingdom voluntarily makes a contribution, We authorize you to accept it in case of pressing need without recourse to the Holy See". The first round had been won by the King of France. *Romana Mater* was followed by *Etsi de statu*, in which the extreme theories put forward in *Clericis laicos* were taken back. The

explanation of Boniface's surrender must be sought in Italy, where the quarrel between the Papacy and the great house of Colonna was at its height. The Pope knew that before he could hope to carry out his designs abroad he must settle his domestic affairs. By the year 1298 he had done so, and in 1300 he celebrated with unparalleled magnificence the jubilee of Christianity. The success of this function and the pomp and splendour of which he was the centre gave the old man new spirit for the fray. He had attained the highest pinnacle of earthly power yet reached by the successors of St. Peter, and his fall was all the more sudden and complete.

A pretext for a further collision with France was soon forthcoming. Bernard Saisset, Bishop of Pamiers, a Languedocian nationalist with an uncontrollable tongue, had been denounced at Paris as a slanderer of the King. He was arrested and a mission was sent to Boniface to demand his punishment. Boniface told the envoys that Philip must hand Saisset over to be tried at Rome; and the rain of bulls began once more. *Salvator Mundi* revoked *Etsi de statu* and the *Clericis laicos* attitude was resumed. *Ausculda fili*, which followed, charged the King with grave offences and demanded redress. In it also the Pope announced his intention of convoking a Council to Rome to get these matters settled. *Ante promotionem* summoned the French clergy to this Council.

The King's advisers now set to work with a will on the congenial task of arousing popular feeling against the Pope. A curious and clever parody of the bull beginning with the words *Scire te volumus*, together with a supposititious reply purporting to come from Philip, was circulated, and these forgeries were at the time generally accepted as genuine. As a matter of fact they were almost certainly the work of Nogaret, who had a special genius in this line and a brutal style which it is easy to identify. Philip prepared a counter-blast to the proposed Council by summoning on 10 April, 1302, a National Assembly of the Three Estates of the Realm.¹ The Nobles and

¹ This assembly has been called the first of the Estates General; but such assemblies had undoubtedly met in previous reigns, and that of 1302 has received undue attention because of the importance of the question with which it was called to deal.

the Commons agreed to support the Crown ; the Clergy were in a difficult position, but they went as far as they could short of adopting an attitude openly hostile to the Holy See. By this time both Philip and Boniface knew that France was practically solid on the question. The choleric old man was driven into paroxysms of fury and abused Flôte in language of which Nogaret himself might have been proud, fierce threats alternating with biting irony. The Battle of Courtrai and the death of Flôte seemed to come as a direct answer to these invectives. Much heartened by this fortunate event, Boniface met the Council in his most uncompromising mood. Some thirty-nine French bishops and abbots appeared, and Boniface seized the opportunity to deliver the famous bull *Unam Sanctam*, the most absolute statement of the theocratic doctrine formulated in the Middle Ages : a pronouncement which earns for Boniface from Modern Ultramontanes the title of Boniface the Great. “ Porro subesse,” it runs, “ Romano Pontifici omni humanæ creaturæ declaramus, dicimus, diffinimus et pronunciamus omnino esse de necessitate salutis.” The Pope followed up this sweeping pronouncement by the despatch of a special mission to the French Court, which seems to indicate that he was hopeful that Philip would submit.

The mission presented a list of twelve grievances in the form of an *Ultimatum* and Philip after some hesitation made a temperate reply, expressing his willingness to submit the matter to arbitration (January, 1303). Boniface now made a mistake to which men of his overbearing character are prone. Believing that he had brought Philip to his knees, he could not resist the temptation to humiliate him yet further. He spurned Philip’s *Responsiones* and demanded complete submission. He had reckoned without Nogaret, on whom the mantle of his patron Flôte now fell. With his advent the affair assumed a new complexion, and it was decided to carry the war literally into the enemy’s country. By March the Court, which had made such humble submission in January, was plotting to seize the person of the Pope, to drag him before a council, and secure his deposition. Nogaret publicly accused the Pope of heresy, tyranny, unchastity, and intercourse with the

devil. He then set out for Italy with a number of kindred spirits to carry out the active part of his scheme.

Philip now entered the arena in person. He would have preferred, he said, to "cover his father's nakedness," but under the circumstances he felt bound to proceed against Boniface. The prelates of France signified their adherence and commissioners were appointed to enlist the goodwill of the local corporations. Philip approached foreign courts to secure support. It was not until July that Boniface got news of all this. Once more he began to pour forth letter upon letter and bull upon bull. In a letter of remonstrance addressed to Philip (*Nuper ad audientiam*) he accused the King of blasphemy against the "Holy One of Israel". In *Super Petri solio*, a more moderate pronouncement, he compared the King to "Nebuchodonosor".

Meanwhile Nogaret had not been idle, and on 7 September, just at the moment of the publication of *Super Petri solio*, a small body of troops riding under the *fleur-de-lis* clattered into the little hill town of Anagni where the Pope was residing. It was Nogaret, who had gathered a force of some 1600 malcontents and was intent on a *coup d'état*. After some street fighting he forced his way into Boniface's presence. The Pope was discovered seated on a throne in full pontificals. Just in such guise his statue still looks from Anagni Cathedral. How far the story of blows and insults is true it is difficult to say. But Boniface was a prisoner. "The fleur de luce" entered Anagni, and "in his vicar Christ himself again became a captive".¹ But it was one thing to capture the Pope and another to drag him all the way to Lyons for trial. Nogaret's triumph was ephemeral. On the 9th the Pope's supporters rallied and drove the raiders out of the town. The Pope, his proud spirit quite broken, was carried to Rome. His reason was probably affected, but he lingered thirty-five days, a prey to agonies of fear and spasms of wild anger. On 11 October he died.

The election, to succeed Boniface VIII, of Benedict XI, a man of mild disposition who willingly accepted the domina-

¹ Dante (trans. Cary), "Purgatorio," xx. 86.

tion of the Capetians, was the first-fruits of the "*attentât of Anagni*". Benedict realized that the Guelf tradition had failed, that the support of Italy on which it should have founded its strength had been alienated; he therefore abandoned the struggle, and revoked the long series of bulls by which his predecessor had attempted to beat down the Capetians. To save his face, however, he had to demand the punishment of those who had perpetrated the outrage. But before any active steps could be taken death intervened, and for nearly a year the Papal Chair remained vacant. During that year the last round of the struggle between the partisans of France and the Bonifacians was fought out in the Sacred College. The election of Bertrand de Got, Archbishop of Bordeaux (5 June, 1305), marks the triumph of the Capetians. The new Pope consented to absolve the conspirators of Anagni, and thus the treacherous deed which had brought the Papacy to the dust received the hall-mark of the papal approval. Clement V can hardly have failed to perceive the irony of his words when he described the action of Nogaret and his accomplices as *zelum bonum atque iustum*.

The talent for calumny and intrigue which had been so conspicuously displayed in the struggle with Boniface VIII was too valuable to be allowed to rust for want of use. A new sphere was quickly found in which it could be profitably employed. It had for some time been inevitable—now that the crusades were over—that the great military Orders which owed their existence to the crusades would have to be adapted to new conditions. The fusion of the two Orders of Knights Templars and Knights Hospitallers had been in contemplation; but nothing had been done. Of these two Orders that of the Temple, by reason of the vast wealth which had made them bankers both to the Popes and the Kings of France, was the more important. The Temple had used the power which it had thus gained to secure for itself great privileges and immunities, so that by the close of the thirteenth century it had come to be a wealthy and powerful republic within the kingdom. Against a body so opulent and so privileged it was natural that there should be jealousy and

ill-feeling. Nor can it be maintained that the Templars had escaped the failings to which such a society is naturally prone. But there is nothing to show that the Order as a whole had been false to its vows or become generally corrupt. That public opinion credited it with unspeakable and mysterious vices was due partly to its riches and its immunities, and also to the fact that its operations were shrouded in a veil of mystery.

Philip and his advisers recognized that the continued existence of the Templars in an unreformed condition was incompatible with monarchical rule as they conceived it; but, greedy of the immense riches which filled the coffers of the Temple, they resolved to end and not to mend. "The new Pilate," says Dante, "pushes on into the Temple his yet eager sails." If Philip was in truth the inspirer of the accusations against the Temple he was a Pilate indeed. But Nogaret was probably the prime mover in a matter so congenial to his sinister genius. In September, 1307, he began to apply to these new victims the methods which had been so successful against Boniface. The Templars were suddenly arrested and dragged before the Inquisition. And, just as in the case of Boniface his offences against God and man had been rehearsed to the people, so now the sins of the Templars were made the text of a turgid manifesto which Nogaret put into the mouth of the King. At the same time the royal agents were instructed to seize and administer the property of the Order. Under terror of torture many of the prisoners avowed their guilt; but there is no doubt that in reality the accusations were unfounded. True or false, however, the Court was determined to make an end of the Order. Clement V, in the early months of 1308, attempted to intervene, but when threatened by Nogaret with treatment similar to that which had been applied to his predecessor he gave way, and by giving way sealed the fate of the Templars. The judgment of the Order as an Order was reserved to the Pope, while the judgment of individual members was remitted to the Diocesan Bishops and the Inquisitors. It should be remembered that in France the Inquisition was the tool of the Crown. From

the autumn of 1308 to the spring of 1310 the entire Episcopate of Europe was occupied with this ghastly task.

On 9 August, 1309, the Pontifical Commission to which the Pope had entrusted the Trial of the Order as a whole commenced its sittings at Paris. Before this Commission one Templar after another denied the accusations. This unexpected turn roused the Court to take a most arbitrary and abominable step. In order to terrorize the men who were defending the Order before the Papal Court they persuaded the Diocesan Tribunal, which was also sitting in Paris, to condemn unheard fifty-four Templars who had made avowals under torture, but who were now—encouraged by the comparative impartiality of the Papal Commission—offering to give evidence before it in favour of the Order. On the very next day the fifty-four were publicly burnt outside the Porte Saint Antoine. The significance of this atrocious proceeding was clear. If witnesses for the defence before one tribunal rendered themselves liable to immediate condemnation and summary execution at the hands of the other, witnesses for the defence were not likely to be numerous.

It would be fruitless to follow the fortunes of the Order when in 1312 an Œcumenical Council met to decide its fate. It suffices to say that no fair proof of the guilt of the Templars was ever forthcoming. The condemnation was pronounced and the Order dissolved simply, and almost avowedly, because the Crown of France demanded it. It is good evidence of the ascendancy of the Crown over the Church.¹ Within a year both the Pope and the King who had been the prime movers in the matter had gone to their account. Philip the Fair died on 29 November, 1314.

In these two struggles which have just been described the questions at stake had been whether France could submit to

¹ The immense buildings of the Temple, covering over 120 *hectares*, remained long as a witness to past greatness, used sometimes as prisons, during the siege of 1594 as quarters for foreign troops, then for residential purposes; the *grosse tour* became the prison of the royal family in the Revolution. As a resort of royalists the Temple was unpopular with Napoleon I who had the buildings demolished, and Napoleon III finally buried them in modern constructions.

the existence of an *imperium in imperio*, and whether the power of the kings was to be continually called in question by the Popes. It was a problem which had to be faced at one time or another by every Government in Western Europe. The earlier Capetians as we have seen had only succeeded in unifying France by leaning on the support of the Church. To secure this support they had made many surrenders to the Popes. Once securely established on the throne of a united kingdom, they were confronted with the necessity of casting off the yoke under which for utilitarian purposes they had bowed. This difficult and unpleasant task had fallen to the lot of Philip the Fair and his ministers. They accomplished it with admirable success and in a manner entirely favourable to the Crown. Whatever their methods, they had performed their historical mission, had freed France from the domination of the Pope, and must be regarded as the true founders of the Gallican Church. This alone would have made the reign memorable. But it is memorable for other reasons also. It marks the final stage in the transformation of France from a feudal to a monarchical kingdom, of which transformation the reign of Philip Augustus had seen the initial stages. Under Philip the Fair the monarchy begins to organize itself. Monarchy triumphs in the sphere of institutions.

By this time the feudatories had learnt to regard the King as a person with very real powers of government, justice, and taxation, and in all these directions the monarchy registered a step forward in the reign of Philip the Fair. Perhaps the most important step was the establishment of a royal judicial body to absorb and override the worn-out feudal justice. As the power of the Crown increased, the single royal Council was no longer sufficient to cope with all the work—legislative, administrative, and judicial—which fell to it. Even before this reign the finances had fallen into the hands of the *Chambre des comptes*, the advisory work into those of the *Conseil*, and the judicial work into those of the *Parlement*. Each of these bodies was a Committee of the *Conseil du Roi*, and each was tending to become permanent; for it was obviously

convenient that such matters as justice and finance, at any rate, should remain in the same hands; the business of the *Parlement* tended to become not only permanent but stationary also, for it was intolerable that justice should follow the ever moving royal court. Thus came into being the famous *Parlement de Paris*, for so it was eventually called because it sat in the capital.¹

Not only did Philip the Fair subdivide the *Conseil du Roi* but he also subdivided the *Parlement* itself, into a *grand' chambre*, a *chambre des enquêtes* and two *chambres des réquêtes*. Of these chambers the former was by far the most important, indeed it was often called the *Parlement*; it sat eventually in a sumptuous chamber known as the *Chambre Dorée*, decorated by the celebrated Giovanni Giocondo who was brought from Italy by Louis XII for the express purpose. In the *Grand' Chambre* sat the Peers² of France on special occasions; and here was the Royal Throne or *Lit* on which occasionally the King sat in order to resume the powers which had been delegated to the *Parlement*. This Chamber dealt with all the important appeals from local courts, with cases of high treason and with the more important "cases of first instance," especially those in which the rights of the Crown, the great functionaries and great institutions of the kingdom were involved. In the *Chambres des Enquêtes* were conducted preliminary inquiries into appeals which came up for the *Grand' Chambre*. In the *Chambres des Réquêtes* were decided the minor "cases of first instance" which were not of sufficient importance to go before the *Grand' Chambre*.

While upon the subject of the *Parlement* we may anticipate a little to inquire how it was that that important judicial body came to claim, and in part to enjoy, powers quite other than judicial. It is probably correct to say that at the time of the subdivision of the *Conseil du Roi* in the early fourteenth century the principle of separation of powers, except as a pure matter of convenience, was unfamiliar and indeed incomprehensible.

¹ In later times it occupied the royal palace in the *Cité* when the Kings had moved to the Louvre.

² *Supra*, p. 141 note.

Thus it was that the *Parlement*, which was necessarily permanent and which had not by any means realized that the assumption of a monopoly of the judicial function of the *Conseil du Roi* involved an abdication of political and administrative functions, and whose name of *Parlement* gave it both in its own eyes and in the eyes of others a deceptive semblance of political power, came to reassert claims to all the functions which had belonged to the undivided *Cour du Roi*. We shall see as we go on how, whenever there was a temporary eclipse of the monarchy, the *Parlement* struck in with such claims, and was often a serious obstacle in the path of the Crown. More often, however, the King rode roughshod over it. From motives of convenience, and in order to secure publicity and the weight of the sanction of a body so distinguished, the Crown had made it a rule to register its edicts in the *Parlement* and had tolerated and afterwards recognized the right of that body to remonstrate. But whenever matters went too far all that the King had to do was to cause his edicts to be registered in a *lit de justice*. It is clear, therefore, that in face of a strong king the political power claimed by the *Parlement* was delusive. Doubtless it was tolerated by the kings because they knew that an appearance of free criticism was valuable to them, and the fact that the *Parlement* professed to enjoy powers of criticism and a power of veto, which in reality were entirely dependent on the good pleasure of the King, probably went far to prevent the setting up of a power which might have acted as a real check on the absolutism of the Crown.

Such was the nature of the famous *Parlement de Paris*, which came into actual being in the reign of Philip the Fair, although it had its roots in the reigns of Louis VIII and Louis IX, and even to a certain extent in that of Philip Augustus. This organization of a royal justice superior to the feudal justice is evidence of the triumph of the monarchy over feudalism. A still better proof may be found in the fact that never once in his reign of twenty-nine years was Philip confronted with anything in the shape of feudal rebellion. Not that he was an innovator in his dealings with the feudatories; he was rather an assiduous developer of precedent. In the

suppression of obnoxious privileges, of tournaments, duels, and private warfare, he was but following the lead of his predecessors.

In the matter of taxation also the reign marks an epoch. A real monarchy could not exist on the mere feudal revenue, and it became necessary to introduce the principle of royal taxation. As in England so in France royal taxation grew out of the custom of military service. Such "service" was owed to the Crown by all *fideles*. But the military need of a thirteenth century king was not a vast and ill-disciplined host; and he soon hit on the device of calling up only a part of the feudal levy and making those whom he did not call up pay for the keep of those whom he did. The rates for exemption and the machinery for collecting them were gradually developed and the obligation of service was extended to all the inhabitants of the kingdom. Thus was established the principle and practice of royal taxation.

But the kings of France had undertaken a task which these slender and tentative resources were inadequate to meet. Philip the Fair resorted to other and less reputable expedients. Such expedients were the destruction of the Order of the Temple, the spoliation of the Jews in 1306,¹ and the holding to ransom of the Lombards in 1291. Another resource was found in the peculiar conditions of the coinage. Money was reckoned in *livres*, *sous*, and *deniers*; but the only coins were crowns and *agnels*, and the relations between the coins and the *livres*, *sous*, and *deniers* were periodically established by royal decree. This was a very dangerous and demoralizing arrangement and a constant temptation to the kings. Louis IX deserves all credit for maintaining fair relations in this matter. There was a regular profit to the Crown on the coinage of about $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. This would not have signified. But it was quite another matter when Philip IV, in 1295, began to debase the coinage and so to upset all the financial foundations of society. The value of the *livre* was actually tripled between 1295 and 1306, when the standard of Louis IX was

¹ The Jews had once already been expelled in the first years of the reign of Philip Augustus.

restored. Another simple expedient for raising money was to demand loans and not repay them; and a tax on commercial transactions called a *maltôte* was also imposed, not, however, first by Philip IV. Direct taxation was also resorted to, the idea being borrowed from the municipalities who had long employed this method of raising revenue. Subsidies ranging from one-hundredth to one-fifth of all incomes were levied by Philip IV practically in every year of his reign. A tax of this nature was difficult to collect and the easiest way was to secure the assistance of the overlords. They were allowed to collect rather more than the subsidy and to pocket the balance—a step towards that “farming of the taxes” which was to become such a scourge to the kingdom. In order to secure the efficient levying of these subsidies it was thought advisable to make a show of consulting the people. And in many cases towns and districts were bribed into acquiescence by the grant of a charter which was too often illusory. The most celebrated of these charters was the *Grande Ordonnance* of 1303. The principle of consent to taxation was not so much as dreamt of, but the germ from which it might have grown was there.

Like his neighbour Edward I, Philip IV could claim to have extended the principle of national taxation to the Church as well as to the feudal nobility. After the downfall of Boniface VIII clerical subsidies were levied with comparative regularity. At first a formal consent was obtained, but this was soon dropped, and after 1305 the right of the King to tax the clergy without their consent may be said to have been acknowledged. As for the charters of liberties which were sometimes demanded in return for clerical subsidies, Philip was prodigal with these; but he took good care that they should contain nothing but general promises qualified by innumerable reservations. Far from being the protector he was a heavy-handed oppressor of the Church. With Philip IV, therefore, we enter the period when to a certain extent national takes the place of feudal finance. It is an important juncture because finance was always the skeleton in the cupboard for France until the time when, owing largely to its financial inadequacy, the *ancien régime* crumbled to ruin. Philip increased tenfold the revenues of

his grandfather. But the responsibilities of the Crown had increased more than tenfold ; and never before the Revolution was the revenue for any long period adequate to the needs of the State.

If the germ of popular consent to taxation existed in this reign so too did the germ of popular representation. Philip in his conflict with the Papacy had relied to a remarkable extent on popular backing, and had repeatedly summoned assemblies in which the three orders, Nobles, Clergy, and Commons, were represented. When he did not summon such an assembly he used to send his agents round to ascertain (and to mould also) the feelings of the various districts. These assemblies of Philip IV were not the first meetings of the States General. Assemblies of a precisely similar nature had been held in the previous reigns. But, although not peculiar to this reign, they assumed at this time a place as part of the political system so well assured that we might reasonably expect them to develop into something akin to the English Parliament which was simultaneously developing on the other side of the Channel.

Constitutionally then the reign of Philip IV is of the utmost importance ; in it are seen the earliest shoots of the seed sown by Philip Augustus—royal taxation, royal supremacy over Church as well as over nobility ; in it too the most important constitutional bodies are born—the States General and the *Parlement*. How far these things were accidental and simply the inevitable outcome of the earlier victories of the Crown, and how far they were deliberately fostered by Philip, it is impossible to say. It is difficult to credit this intangible monarch with deep political insight ; on the other hand it is even more difficult to believe that these developments could have taken place had a clumsy hand been at the helm. It will be safest to conclude that this was a critical moment in the constitutional history of France, and that Philip had at least a good conception of the interests of the Crown and fought for those interests with a skill which is surprising in a character so imponderable.

Philip IV was succeeded by his three sons, Louis, Philip,

and Charles in succession. Of them it may be said that if the impression left by their father is indistinct, that left by them is indistinguishable. To the historian they are no more than ciphers round whom centred a certain number of not very important events. Personal interest there is none; nor did these kings take any very important part in European politics. Such interest as there is, is in the domestic affairs of the kingdom.

In the last year of Philip IV's reign there had been an outbreak of resistance to the heavy exactions which the King now levied annually from his subjects. In several districts Leagues were formed comprising representatives of the Nobles, Clergy, and Communes, to resist "unreasonable" exactions. Philip IV bent before the storm, gave up the tax which was specially resented, and was about to renew the *ordonnance* of 1302 when death intervened. Louis X took up the matter and in the spring of 1315 granted charters to a large number of protesting districts. The contrast between the French Leagues and those which were being made at the same time by the English barons is as striking as is the contrast between the charters granted. In the one case the demands were progressive and big with great results and the charters definite and secured by strict guarantees; in the other the demands were petty and reactionary and the charters vague and illusory and secured by no guarantees whatever.

The importance of this reactionary movement may easily be exaggerated. The Leagues soon made themselves unpopular and the Crown had little real difficulty in coping with them. The King died in 1316; he overheated himself playing ball and drank unlimited wine in a cold cellar to refresh himself. Louis left a daughter and his wife was about to be confined. The government of the kingdom under these unusual conditions was taken over by his brother, Philip *le Long*, who on the death of the posthumous son who was born to the deceased king proceeded to Reims and got himself crowned (9 January, 1317). But the ceremony was avoided by the great nobles, and Burgundy recorded a protest in favour of Louis' daughter Jeanne, a Burgundian on her mother's side. The

curious sensitiveness to public opinion which we have already noticed was now once more apparent when both sides appealed to assemblies purposely summoned to support the rival claims. Besides summoning an Assembly of the Nobles, Prelates, Burgesses of Paris, and Doctors of the University, who gave unqualified support to his claims, Philip also sent agents all over the kingdom to speak *le plus aimablement qu'ils pourront* to the notables and secure their adhesion. Moreover, he made a progress in person, speaking fair words by which he gained the hearts of the *menu peuple*. Meanwhile in Burgundy and Champagne a similar attempt was made by Jeanne's supporters to work up public opinion in her favour. Hostilities seemed inevitable, but in the end they were confined to an unimportant campaign in Nevers in the spring of 1317. Finally an arrangement was come to. Burgundy consoled himself by marrying Philip's daughter and securing the reversion of Artois and Franche Comté, while poor Jeanne had to content herself with a money indemnity and the promise of Champagne in the event of Philip's death without heirs. Thus was established the principle which France never forsook that no woman could wear the Crown, and soon to be interpreted that no woman could transmit the crown. Philip V occupied the throne which he had thus secured with no particular distinction. On his death (1322) he was succeeded by his youngest brother Charles, who also reigned for six years and also without distinction. Abortive hostilities in Gascony ended tamely in 1327, and in the same year, smitten, it was said, by the curse of the Templars on the children of their persecutor, Charles too died, like his brothers prematurely, and like them without male heir of his body.

These two brief and unremarkable reigns are noteworthy only because of the repeated summoning of popular assemblies. Time after time the monarchs called to different rendez-vous assemblies not always of the representatives of the entire realm, more often, indeed, only the representatives of a certain locality. The procedure was usually threefold. First the King's demands were submitted; then the grievances of the district were enumerated; and finally the King replied in an

ordonnance, by which in a fashion more or less illusory these grievances were remedied. As long as this custom of consulting assemblies of an ostensibly representative character continued there was always a chance that France, like England, might develop a constitutional government. How was it that this development never took place? The explanation seems to be that it was never seriously demanded or desired. Nothing is more remarkable than the clear evidence that these assemblies were imposed by the King and not in any way demanded by the nation. In particular the *menu peuple* (the *tiers état*) had been taught by experience to look to the King for protection and actually preferred to do so. Hence their acquiescence in the entirely subordinate and helpless rôle allotted to them in the national assemblies. In the second place these assemblies were purely feudal in origin and shape. In the beginning they were simply assemblies of the lay and ecclesiastical vassals of the royal domain, to whom were gradually added, under the name of *tiers état*, the representatives of the enfranchised towns.

Particularism and internal disunion were inherent in the States General from the first. Those districts which fell in to the Crown later and by processes not strictly feudal maintained and cherished independence and were not represented in the central assemblies, with the result that the States General were not national. The country districts did not, until quite far down in the history of the States General, send representatives at all, so that the assemblies were not even representative of the classes they might have been expected to represent; and the deep-seated and long-continued jealousy between the upper orders and the *tiers état*, which divided the States General into three houses, an arrangement quite as bad as single chamber Government, brought it about that this non-national and non-representative body was also divided in itself and incapable of united action to secure constitutional liberties. We shall see as the history of the next 200 years unfolds itself how, in consequence of these limitations, constitutional possibilities never bore fruit.

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CHAPTER XII

SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

WITH the failure of the direct male line of Hugh Capet we arrive at a turning-point in the history of France. Hitherto, since the period when, in face of the growing strength of the Capetian monarchy, private wars had ceased, France had—thanks mainly to the good sense and good fortune of her kings—escaped the affliction of a general war waged within her borders. This happy condition was now to cease, and in 1328 France stands on the brink of a terrible struggle which was destined to convulse her for a period of nearly one hundred years. Men lived and died to whom a France without a war was unknown, to whom war was one of the conditions of existence. It desolated her borders, decimated her population, brought her new-born prosperity to the dust, and left effects from which she did not recover for more than a century after its close. Clearly the moment before this storm bursts is one when a survey of the social and economic condition and resources of the kingdom may be profitably made. Under what conditions did she enter the struggle? What had been the results of the Capetian concentration? What degree of prosperity had France attained and how was it affected by the ordeal?

It may be said at once that all the evidence—and there is a wealth of evidence—justifies the belief that the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries were a time of very great prosperity. No greater mistake can be made than to brush aside that period as a time of poverty, ignorance, and squalor. The population in the first place was large; some authorities have maintained that it was as large as it is at the present

day.¹ Certainly it was much more evenly distributed, for agriculture was the principal industry and, primogeniture being the exception rather than the rule, it was in the hands of an infinite number of small tenants and small proprietors, though large holdings and large "home-farms" were by no means unknown. It is even possible that the subdivision of the soil had been carried too far. The reaction came in the fifteenth century when there was an enormous increase in the number of large holdings. The majority of the thirteenth century occupiers were hereditary tenants with something like security of tenure—a condition not in the end favourable to good husbandry; but there was a strong leaven of leaseholders holding by free contract. Thus the conditions of tenure had quite a modern air. It was the same with agricultural methods. In this particular, indeed, there is no evidence of much advance until the introduction of agricultural machinery in the nineteenth century.

Fortunately it is no longer necessary to invent an imaginary thirteenth century "Antonius," for we are lucky enough to have a record of the management of the estates of a certain Thierrî d'Hireçon, a clerk who had made his way at the court of Philip IV and had been one of Nogaret's confederates in the affair of Boniface VIII. He made a fortune and acquired property in Paris and Artois, settled in the latter district, and became an enlightened proprietor² and a keen agriculturist. Thierrî was a resident landlord, his principal residence being at Bonnières. He interested himself personally in his property and kept detailed accounts. He had much land

¹ Dureau de la Malle, "Document statistique inédit du XIV^e siècle" ("Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes," 1840-1).

In a territory of nearly half the size of the kingdom, 24,150 parishes; 2,411,149 hearths; on the moderate estimate of 4 souls to a hearth, say 10,000,000 inhabitants; 35-40 per square *kilomètre*, about equal to the population at the beginning of the eighteenth century; five departments at the present day are under the average of 1328. See also Siméon Luce, "Histoire de Bertrand du Quesclin" (1876), p. 55.

² "Thierrî d'Hireçon, *Agriculteur Artésien*": in "Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes," Vol. LIII. Thierrî eventually became Bishop of Arras, but died in the year of his appointment to the See (1328).

let on lease and rents were inclined to rise ; nevertheless an important part of the property was kept in hand. *Metayage*, a kind of profit-sharing system, was also practised. The rules of good husbandry were understood and carefully enforced. The preservation of the fertility of the soil was anxiously cared for, and Thierri practised, and made his tenants practise, an approved rotation of crops on a three course shift. In the first year wheat was sown ; wheat in fact was the principal crop ; it was largely exported to Flanders.¹ In the second year there was a spring sowing, generally of oats, and in the third beans or a forage crop unless the land was left fallow. Thierri did not of course know anything of the wonderful work of bacteria which enable leguminous crops to transfer the nitrogen of the air to the soil. Neither by the way did our fathers know it, and there are many farmers to-day who are as ignorant of it as Thierri was in the fourteenth century. But he did know that beans were the best crop to precede wheat.² Thus, though his scientific knowledge fell short of ours, his empirical knowledge did not. A thorough cultivation was practised and insisted on, a fourfold tillage being prescribed for wheat. Seeds were carefully selected and cleaned ; but the crossing of seeds was not understood. Horses, not oxen, were employed for draft work ; weeding, mole-catching, and bird scaring were as necessary then as now. Harvest payments were sometimes by the day's wage, sometimes by a share—varying greatly, e.g. every twelfth, sixteenth, or twentieth sheaf—in the results of the harvest. The ear appears to have been cut with the sickle and the straw afterwards reaped with the scythe. Gleaning was practised as in the days of Boaz. The wheat was of course threshed with the flail and winnowed. The yield ranged from about seven to about elevenfold. Oats (black oats, spring sown) gave a greatly inferior return (not more than five or six fold) ; they were probably not manured. Farmyard manure was liberally used and the “marling” of lands was common. For hay

¹ Nearly all the wheat went to Ghent ; and all had to pass through the town of Bapaume—for customs purposes.

² So for the matter of that did the Romans when Vergil wrote.

Thierri was entirely dependent on his meadows, for the seedling of hay was not understood. He irrigated his meadows much as we do. There is nothing to show what the yield of hay was. As for live-stock, sheep were bred on a large scale and the wool went to Flanders, though it was not in so much demand there as English wool, which enjoyed a popularity for which it is difficult to account. Pigs were also numerous;¹ horse breeding was not of much account and cattle were scarce and chiefly used for dairying, the calves being sold. Fattening was practised in a very casual way. Like any modern farmer Thierri had sometimes to call in the "Vet" or *Mareschal* who prescribed quicksilver for the sheep; no doubt for fluke or liver-rot, for which it is still a remedy.

Thierri himself lived in a comfortable manor-house; fortified dwellings were already getting scarce, though, alas, they were soon to become all too common again. He had fine gardens and orchards, with fountains, pavilions, *gloriettes*, *gayoles*, and elaborate arboreal devices such as "vine-cradles". He had fruit and vegetables in great variety; he made no wine but converted his grapes into verjuice. His farm buildings were extensive; his barn measured 130 feet by 40 and must have resembled the great Edwardian barns which are the glory of some English homesteads. The walls of some of the buildings were probably of clay and timber and their roofs of thatch or shingles; for slates were still uncommon. Thierri employed a vast amount of labour. There was in the first place the regular staff of the farm, housed and fed on the premises. There were twenty-three on the staff at Bonnières. These farm servants were admirably looked after—slept between sheets and eat off table-cloths; wheaten bread, porridge, bacon, beans, cheese, milk, butter and chickens—all produced on the farm—were their ordinary diet; herrings for Lent

¹ They found a living in the forests, which still in spite of clearings covered enormous tracts; with the war, however, came wolves, and the swine vanished. French bacon had been esteemed a delicacy by the Romans as early as the first century B.C. See Varro, "*De Re Rustica*" (ed. Schneider, 1794), II, IV. 410. "*E queis succidias (fitches) Galli optimas et maximas facere consueverunt.*"

and meat for Feasts gave variety ; salt and oil had to be purchased ; likewise beer (*godaille*), which with verjuice was the liquor provided, cider being considered a "mortification" to drink. In addition to the regular staff there were both piece workers and casual day labourers—the latter chiefly women. At Bonnières in 1328 for the threshing 318 days' wages were paid to women, the wage being six *deniers* a day, and there was a half holiday on Saturday for which a three-fifth wage was paid. Servile labour is not mentioned and *corvées* (forced labour on roads) did not enter much into the life of the place. They had mostly been converted into money payments and in other cases were often not exacted. Living was extremely cheap. One or two *deniers* purchased enough bread for daily use ; a chicken cost six *deniers* ; bacon, rabbits, herrings, beans were all within the reach of the casual labourer.

Nor should it be forgotten that this was an age of rare beneficence ; gratuities were common and charities were carefully organized ; gifts of food and clothing helped the poor to tide over the years of famine which were their chief privation. Hospitals were freely provided for lying-in and general purposes. Common rights and privileges also abounded ; the right of common pasture, the privilege of cutting fuel, the privilege of gleaning. Housing was possibly the weakest point : slates were rare ; they are still rare in parts of Ireland and Scotland. The absence of glass was a more serious deficiency ; but for this there were hygienic compensations ; for it is impossible to live in the dark, and where there is no glass light means air, which is far from being the case under modern conditions. Of diet we have already seen something. Mustard and spices it should be added were much sought after, and salt was of supreme importance because it was essential for the preservation of the winter supply of meat. In this matter, however, France, where spring comes early and generously, was better off than the more northern countries. Then, as now, France was a land of liberal wine, and there was no restriction on its sale. Public baths were common—a custom probably of Roman

origin—but you could not get your hot bath on a Sunday or on Feast Days when it was forbidden to light the stoves. Wages proportionately were at least as high as they were in the early nineteenth century and the necessities of life were cheap, though luxuries were extremely dear. Life under these conditions was a generous and picturesque business and the year a gay round of fêtes and ceremonies.

Much of what has been said about the condition of the rural classes applies to that of the urban classes also. We must now try and get some idea of the life of the latter, and in order to do so we will take an imaginary walk through Paris say at some time towards the close of the reign of Louis IX. The appearance and topography of the city need not detain us. It has altered but little since the reign of Philip Augustus. Amongst so much that is new the most noticeable of the old buildings is the Palace of the City, still the residence of the monarch, for the Louvre as yet is only a prison. But our walk is not to take us to palaces, nor shall we attempt to get a glimpse of the very accessible monarch as he walks in the Forest of Vincennes, where on a fine day after Mass it is his custom, leaning against an oak, his court sitting round him, to dispense a patriarchal justice.¹ Our interest is rather in the masses of the people, and to satisfy it we must make our way through the narrow, crowded, unsavoury and sunless streets. Of these streets if we stroll up the Rue St. Denis or the Rue St. Martin even in the twentieth century we can still form a very fair idea. They were narrow and irregular, and the upper stories of the gabled houses overhung the street and shut out the light. There were innumerable passages, courtyards, and *culs de sac*, also many gardens and open spaces—mostly private and many of them belonging to the religious houses. This was a characteristic of Paris right down to the Second Empire when Baron Hausmann began his ghastly transformation of the capital, and of course it was a characteristic which greatly facilitated street fighting and civil disorder. Tortuous streets hemmed in the palaces and public

¹ Joinville, op. cit. p. 25.

buildings ; large private courtyards and gardens made useful hiding places for large bodies of men ; the irregular nature of the streets would render artillery useless (when the days of artillery should begin) and their narrowness hampered the action of cavalry. Thus the peculiarities of her structure adapted the capital for the tumultuous part she so often played.

The moment day breaks the streets begin to hum with the bustle of work ; for work begins at daybreak and ceases at sunset, with suitable intervals for meals. The noise is deafening and confusing ; it is perhaps the chief feature of the industrial quarter ; not only is there the noise of the workers in the shops—the armourer's is a specially noisy trade—but the streets themselves are thronged with hawkers pressing their wares, and if our eyes are spared the offence of modern advertisement our ears suffer from the continual babble of the criers, for crying is the only form of advertisement in an illiterate age, and the criers of Paris are an organized "Craft".¹ *Gaaigne pain ! gaaigne pain !* sounds on the one side ; *Raccommendez meanteaux et plisses !* on another. *Le bain c'est chaut, c'est sans mentir !* suggests that the disappointment of a tepid bath was common. *Chaudaille de coton, chaudaille ! J'ai savon d'outremer, savon !* (not made in Germany but quite as bad !). *Chaume y'a chaume !* (to thatch your house). *La brèche bonne à deux oboles vous le donne !* was more melodious ; *Harens frès !* would be a welcome cry in Lent. As for the wine-criers with their *Bon vin fort à deux à seize à huit et à six !* you may pardon the noise they make, for they will give you a sample of their wares for the asking.²

From the first peep of day knots of workmen gather on the public places waiting to be hired ; each *métier* has its own appointed tryst ; the bakers in one place, the masons in another, the fullers in another, and every mason, baker, and fuller, and every member of every other *métier* is obliged, under pain of losing his status in his *métier*, to attend every

¹ The corporation of wine-criers could compel the *cabarattiers* to employ them at four *deniers* a day. Levasseur, "Histoire des classes ouvrières en France jusqu'à la Révolution" (1859), I. 201.

² Guillaume de la Villeneuve, "Les Crieries de Paris". Printed in Franklin, "La vie privée d'autrefois," Vol. I. (1887).

morning at daybreak at the appointed rendezvous. Thus at our first step we are confronted with the elaborate organization of industries in *métiers*, and it is necessary to try and understand something of this organization.

It was in the decay of feudalism, roughly about 1200 A.D., for purposes of protection and because the workers in one trade had come to live together in one quarter, often even in one street, that corporations of persons engaged in the same trade came into existence. There was no doubt a tendency towards such an arrangement inherited from the "Colleges" in which the Romans had organized their industrial workers, but it is worthy of remark that what had been in Roman times an imperial servitude became in mediaeval times a protection and a privilege. These corporations were known as *corps de métier*, *métiers*, guilds, or *charités*, and they were closely and exclusively organized. In every *métier* there were three grades of members, the master, the *ouvrier* or *valet*, and the apprentice.¹ The apprentices were rather aspirants to membership than members, their numbers in each *métier* were severely restricted, but the sons of all masters could always claim the privileges of apprenticeship in their father's trade. To become an apprentice in any trade you had to pay a fixed sum due to the corporation, you were then bound to serve the master to whom you had apprenticed yourself for a certain number of years, ranging from two to ten. You then, to prove your skill in your trade, had to make a *chef d'œuvre*,² after which you became an *ouvrier* or *valet* and enjoyed the privileges and protection of the corporation.

To become a master was a more difficult matter, and precautions were taken that only those with sufficient ability and capital should set up as masters. In most cases there were considerable payments to be made to the *seigneur* and the *métier*, sometimes to all the other masters of the trade, and of

¹ The best account of the organization of industries in *métiers* is in Levasseur, "Histoire des classes ouvrières en France jusqu'à la Révolution" (1859).

² It is not clear that the *chef d'œuvre* was exacted so early as this.

course it was necessary that you should have served your time as apprentice in your *métier*.

Every *métier* had its governing body of *prud'hommes*, *bailés*, *maitres du métier*, *eswards*, *élus* or *consuls*, who presided at the numerous functions, superintended the labour, checked the quality of the products, denounced frauds and abuses and even exercised a certain jurisdiction over the members. The number of *prud'hommes* ranged from one to twelve.¹ It is clear that these important and powerful functionaries were not in all cases elected, and that a serious attempt was made by the Crown, and later by the municipality, to get their appointment into their hands; but the fact remains that the *métier* was in most cases a self-governing body, and that in many cases, though not in that of Paris, it had a real share in municipal government, being in effect a subdivision of the municipality.

Now it is obvious that the *métier* system had a restrictive and eventually a retrograde influence on industry. It was monopolistic and exclusive and deliberately calculated to thwart competition; it was a check on invention, progress, and originality, and the fact that it procured a certain standard of merit in the products of industry, and made careful regulations to prevent adulteration and the production of inferior wares, cannot be regarded as a set-off to this. Nevertheless it is also obvious that this was a phase through which industry was bound to pass, that it satisfied the needs of the time, and that it was only when society had outgrown the need for such swathing bands that it became retrograde and harmful.

Continuing our walk through Paris we shall see as we go how completely the whole industrial life of the city pivoted on the organization which has just been described. We shall note in the first place how each trade clings to its own quarter, often to its own street, an arrangement which must have made shopping a laborious business. We shall note too how the work is carried on entirely on the

¹ It is curious to note that in certain trades there were also *prudeshommes*; there were also female doctors; thirty-seven doctors, male and female, seem to have sufficed for the wants of Paris.

premises, how at the back or even at the front of each shop the armourer armours, the fuller fulls, and the baker bakes, and we shall observe that in certain trades this custom has endured to our own times. In mediaeval times it was an absolute rule imposed as a check on bad work and adulteration, and to enable the public to see in process of making the article of which they contemplated the purchase. If we prolong our walk till sundown we shall note another precaution observed for the same purpose. At that hour, in all but a few privileged trades, work simultaneously ceases and lights are extinguished; business had to be carried on not only in the public eye but also in the light of day, a regulation which dated from Caroling times.

Crossing the Seine, we shall naturally look for traces of the great University of Paris, whose fame is already world-wide. Its fame, however, does not in the thirteenth century lie in imposing buildings, and there is as little material evidence of the existence of the University either on the island or on the south bank as the Revolution has left us to-day. The College of the Sorbonne, which owed its origin to Louis IX's chaplain, Robert of Sorbon, was indeed founded in 1257, but the building was on a very different scale from that of the existing edifice, which we owe to Richelieu. The great College of Navarre was not founded till 1304. There were several small hostels even in the twelfth century, but none of them were in the least conspicuous. It is in other directions that we must look for traces of academic activity. We may indeed see signs of turbulence, for from 1250 to 1260 the University was in the thick of the struggle with the Mendicant Orders, to understand which we must briefly trace the early history of the University. The idea that its foundation was the work of Charlemagne is a myth: the schools of Alcuin¹ were no doubt migratory and, though there may have been a certain continuity of teaching from the eighth to the twelfth century, the connexion went no farther. The University sprang in quite a commonplace way from the

¹ *Supra*, p. 79.

Cathedral School, which had no special repute until the end of the eleventh century, when the teaching of William of Champeaux and that of his greater pupil, Abelard, began to attract students ("scholars" they were called as they are still called in Scotland) to Paris. The control of the school was in the hands of the Chancellor of the Cathedral, to whom fell the duty of granting licences to masters to teach. We have already seen how great a part in the social and economic life of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was played by guilds and corporations, and, as the number of masters grew, it was inevitable that they should form a guild for mutual protection. This guild of masters was the starting point of the University (about 1170); the first extant charter of privileges is dated 1200; but it was not until some years later that the University could boast a Head of its own. The Chancellor was never its head; he was only the superintendent of the schools, and generally the bitter opponent of the University. In the long struggle waged between the newly formed corporation and this extraneous official, the latter profited by his control of the teaching licence. In the period 1219-22, with the assistance of the Cathedral authorities, he attempted to crush the University, as distinct from the schools, on the ground that it was an unlawful secret society. This provoked the University to appeal to the Pope, and for a long period the popes supported that body against the Cathedral, and by degrees the University became closely bound to the Papacy: this was especially the case during the reigns of Honorius III and Gregory IX (1216-41). At some time between 1219 and 1221 the Masters of Arts, now a very numerous body, not by any means all teachers, and including many foreigners, were divided into four sections called "Nations": the French, the Normans, the Picards, and the English; each nation had its own "proctor" and all ultimately acknowledged an official called "rector" as head. The other faculties (Theology, Law, and Medicine) were not at first included in this arrangement and stood outside the University, represented by "deans". By degrees, however, the rector of the four nations, though technically he only

represented the faculty of Arts, came to be recognized as the representative of the other faculties also ; so that by 1260 the University comprised all the faculties and acknowledged a single head—the Rector.

In the struggle between this growing corporation and the Cathedral, the latter had the support of the Crown and, during the regency, that of Queen Blanche and of the Cardinal Legate of Sant' Angelo also. In 1228 there was a great town-and-gown riot and the Regent ordered the Provost to punish the offending students. In face of this breach of their privileges the masters suspended their teaching and dissolved the University. During the years 1229 and 1230 the lecture rooms were silent and Paris began to realize what an important part the schools played in her life. In 1230 the Pope intervened, recalled the Legate, and issued the bull *Parens Scientiarum* in which he restricted the powers of the Chancellor and sanctioned the University's expedient of suspending lectures in case of need. The masters now began to take advantage of the extended security afforded by the new walls of Philip Augustus to establish themselves outside the bounds of the Cathedral jurisdiction on the south bank of the river, the quarter which still contains the University. Thus they evaded the control of the Chancellor, who still controlled the teaching licence, but whose authority did not extend beyond the island (*inter duos pontes*).

But as it gradually escaped the clutches of the Chancellor the University found itself confronted with other troubles. The early part of the thirteenth century was a period of intellectual unrest. The appearance of the Mendicant Orders or Friars was at first welcomed by the University, but very soon these new-comers began to dominate the schools and to rouse the antagonism of the secular clergy ; by their independence they also provoked the hostility of the University. During the suspension of 1229-30 for instance the Friars had gone on lecturing and so got the unpleasant reputation of academical "black-legs". When, in 1252-3, there was a repetition of the riot of 1228, and the lectures were once more suspended as a protest against the interference of the Crown,

the Friars appealed to Rome and completely ruined the University's chance of success. They were in fact claiming the privileges of the University while refusing to submit to its authority. Alexander IV, an ardent supporter of the regular clergy, excommunicated the University in 1255, and it was only on his death in 1261 that it raised its head again. Certain restrictions were then imposed on the Friars, but broadly speaking they had won. Nevertheless the University had profited by its ordeal. The common adversity through which they had passed had completely welded the faculties into one. The support given by the Papacy to the Friars had also had the effect of freeing the University from its close connexion with Rome, and already it was beginning to adopt the independent tone for which it was afterwards to become celebrated. The moment of our visit would coincide with the crisis of the quarrel between the University and the Mendicant Orders, and it is possible that we may witness the mobbing of friars in the streets. At any rate we shall see some evidence of the struggle and of the difficulties in which the University is plunged.

Leaving the University and retracing our steps to the river we shall be confronted with perhaps the strictest of the monopolies with which Paris is honeycombed. All the craft in the river are flying one ensign, that of the *marchandise de l'eau* or *hanse Parisienne*. This corporation, descended no doubt from the *navtæ* of Roman times,¹ enjoyed a complete monopoly of the river between Mantes and Paris. Below Mantes the monopoly belonged to the corresponding corporation of Rouen, and there were continual and bitter rivalries between these rival hanses. Charles VII abolished the privileges of both, but the Paris hanse did not actually cease to exist till the middle of the seventeenth century.

In this matter as in others Paris was but a type of other towns, and there can be no doubt that by restrictions and monopolies such as these the general prosperity of the country was sacrificed for the benefit of local corporations. We shall

¹ Visitors to the Cluny Museum will remember the six fragments of the altar erected to Jupiter by the *navtæ* of Paris.

perhaps be right in assuming that the conception of a general good as opposed to an agglomeration of local goods had not at this early date taken definite shape. There existed it is true a considerable import and export trade. We have seen how Thierry d'Hireçon exported his corn and wool to Flanders and there was also a considerable export of linen and wine. It is probable that the imports were on a less considerable scale, France so far as necessities were concerned being already to a great extent self-sufficing. The chief imports were woollens from Flanders and spices and other Eastern products from the Levant.

But if she was not a great exporter or importer France was a great centre of exchange, a great mart and meeting place for the middlemen of Western Europe. The reason of this was geographical; true, the great harbours of the Gulf of Lyons were not in the hands of the kings of France, nor did those kings as yet dominate, though they were steadily encroaching on, the valley of the Rhône. But commercially speaking those harbours and that river belonged to France and fed her markets.¹ The Mediterranean seaports had become the pivot of the chief trade route of Western Europe. Practically all the trade of the East was carried by this route and via Beaucaire and St. Jean de Losne to the great fairs of Champagne, the chief of which were at Troyes, Châlons sur Marne, Provins and Lagny, whither also the Flemings came with their woollens to meet the Italian traders who did most of the business of the Levant and who had since 1278 established a regular colony at Nîmes. Champagne had thus become the chief market-place of Western Europe, and its fairs, although they were of little real importance to the true prosperity of the kingdom, had been carefully regulated and fostered by the Capetian kings. The breaking off of relations with Flanders, which was one of the initial steps towards the Hundred Years War, entirely dislocated this mart and ruined the fairs of Champagne. Under the stress of that

¹ The difficulties of navigating the Rhône had been obviated by the construction of canals, of which the most important was the canal between Aigues-Mortes and Beaucaire which is still in use.

war the Flemings ceased to attend these fairs and the Mediterranean trade began to push through the Straits of Gibraltar. In their quarrel with France the Flemings profited greatly by the fact that most of the goods, chiefly linen and wine, which they took from France could be secured from the south-western districts round Bordeaux; these districts were in the hands of England. The Mediterranean goods—such as did not come through the Straits of Gibraltar—found a south-western in lieu of a south-eastern route and reached Bruges via Narbonne, Toulouse, Saint-Jean-d'Angely and La Rochelle.

Thus amongst other things France was to lose during the Hundred Years War her position as the great trade *couloir* and exchange of Western Europe. This, however, was by no means her greatest economic loss; it was incomparably less ruinous than the complete destruction of her agriculture and industry, intentionally wrought by the English, whose deliberate method of warfare was to ride through great districts pillaging, plundering, and burning, and who waged war on industrial and undefended towns like Caen rather than on fortified places. What happened to Thierrî d'Hireçon's estates in Artois during the war there is no evidence to tell us, but judging from what happened elsewhere we can well believe that the crops were ruined, the stock driven off, the fine buildings burnt to the ground, and that, from the advanced degree of prosperity which we saw them enjoying in the thirteenth century, his dependents fell to a depth of want and misery from which they had no spirit to extricate themselves for many decades or even centuries after the war was over.

As for Paris her ruin was even more complete; to return there in the middle of the fourteenth century would be to visit a city of the dead; she presented an abandoned appearance; houses were deserted, walls crumbling and roofs, doors, and windows falling in; a good contemporary authority gives the number of deserted houses as 34,000, and in the streets which we saw so full of life and colour wolves were roving.¹

¹ "Journal d'un bourgeois de Paris, 1405-1449" (ed. Tuetey), 1851, p. 187. "Item en ce temp venoient a Paris les loups toutes les nuys."

Little wonder that under these conditions the wretched citizens turned their eyes to the east, where Flanders and the realms of the Duke of Burgundy were enjoying a prosperity derived in part from the ruin which had overtaken France, and that in their desire to share in that prosperity they abandoned their patriotism and threw themselves, as we shall see, into the arms of the enemies of France.

It has been necessary in this chapter to anticipate somewhat in order to clear the ground for the political events which crowd the period of the Hundred Years War, and in some degree to distinguish between political and economic events. We are now in a better position to renew the narrative that was broken off at the death of Philip V.

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CHAPTER XIII

THE HOUSE OF VALOIS AND THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR

(1328-1360)

CHARLES IV left only daughters, but his wife was enceinte, and in the Assembly of Peers and Barons of the realm Philip of Valois, son of Charles the brother of Philip the Fair, was appointed Regent, a position which gave him a prior claim on the throne in the event of there being no male heir to the deceased King. A daughter was born; Philip was acclaimed King and on 29 May, 1328, was crowned at Reims. With the accession of this new line of kings we feel at once that there is a new hand at the helm. The simplicity and accessibility of the kings disappear and also their sense of responsibility. Chivalry degenerates into mere pride and extravagance and we enter a period of pomp and plumes, a period also when the kings cease to regard themselves as the rulers and guardians of the nation, and begin to treat the kingdom as a mere personal possession. Light-hearted, chivalrous, thoughtless, the Valois kings steered gaily into the whirlpool in which the ship of state was destined to be so nearly engulfed. Philip VI was a true son of his father—an adventurer to the backbone. With a real piety and a certain dilettante love of letters, he was in the main a lover of "chivalry," rejoicing in the colour, movement, and pageantry of it. Such a man would have made an excellent knight-errant; he proved but an indifferent king.

The failure of the direct male line of Philip III gave to Edward III of England, whose mother Isabella was a sister of the late King, and who was also descended from Margaret,

daughter of Philip III, a very plausible claim on the French Crown; and the critical question was whether he would attempt to vindicate that claim, or consent to do homage for his fiefs in France and so postpone the settlement of those great differences which made an ultimate death struggle between France and England inevitable.

Of these differences the most prominent, but at the same time the most superficial, was the feudal difference. Old English Aquitaine, more properly known as the Duchy of Guyenne, had at one time stretched from the Pyrenees to the frontier of Brittany and Anjou, and had comprised about one-third of the territory of France, and thus the Kings of England had not only lain cheek by jowl with the Kings of France from the Somme to the Bidassoa, and possessed as much of France as the Capetians themselves, but had actually cut in two the Capetian realm at the point where Velay (a part of the Guyenne Duchy) marched with the imperial fiefs in the Rhône Valley. Gradually the Capetians had eaten into the English fiefs and by 1200 the Velay gap had been bridged. Issoudun, and Châteauroux in central France and Armagnac, Auch, and Agenais in the Garonne valley had become direct fiefs of the Crown all at the expense of the Duchy of Guyenne. The strength of the Guyenne heritage was in Poitou—and Poitou itself fell in at the confiscation of John's continental possessions in 1208,¹ when Poitou and Saintonge were annexed to the Capetian domain and the bulk of the Guyenne fiefs became direct fiefs of the Crown of France. These included la Marche, Angoulême, Périgord, Thouars, Châtelhéral, Aulnay, Limoges, Turenne, and Ventadour. By the end of the reign of Philip Augustus the English had been driven into the extreme south-west corner of France, and kept only the Gascon part of the Guyenne Duchy together with la Rochelle and the Ile d'Oléron. The question of homage for this remnant of the old Duchy remained, however, as vexed as ever; in 1259, thanks to the concessions made by Louis IX, it had been settled in favour of France, and from that time forward the

¹*Supra*, p. 142.

kings of France had been busily undermining the remaining foothold of the English in France. Philip the Fair had occupied Bordeaux from 1293 to 1303, and in 1324 Charles IV had occupied a large part of English Guyenne. Clearly the French kings were not content to accept the presence of the English kings even as vassals in the south-west. This feudal dilemma in Guyenne was a permanent source of irritation and, by giving England a base in France, encouraged her to challenge the supremacy of the house of Valois. More than this the presence of the English in Guyenne was a challenge to the unity of the kingdom of France—now a conscious aspiration. Sooner or later, and if necessary by force of arms, the English would have to be driven out of France: Guyenne was a jarring note in the national symphony. It is curious to reflect that Edward III raised in Guyenne the very same anti-national standard which he fought against in Scotland, while the Scots shed their blood freely in France for the very cause of national unity in antagonism to which they shed it in Scotland. The "Ancient Alliance" of France and Scotland was of course highly provocative and a contributory cause of hostilities between England and France.

But the cause of all others which made war inevitable and made it war to the knife was the economic antagonism which had its seat in Flanders.¹ Bound increasingly by feudal ties to France, Flanders was bound by the stronger ties of common blood, speech, and manners to Germany, and by a stronger still—that of economic necessity—to England. It was only less important for England to have the Flemish market for her wool than it was for Flanders to have an uninterrupted supply of the raw material from England. Commercially then—and Flanders was essentially a commercial country—she was an English province, and any attack or encroachment on her was equivalent to an attack on England. Such an encroachment had taken place when the Treaty of Athis² was found to be unworkable and the indemnity to France remained unpaid; Philip the Fair had claimed the districts

¹ *Supra*, p. 183.

² *Supra*, p. 184.

which he held as a pledge of payment (Lille, Béthune, Douai, etc.). Such a claim, if maintained, was bound to provoke hostilities. The feudal antagonism might have been settled by compromise, even the national quarrel might have been postponed, but the commercial quarrel involved the very life of England and admitted of no peaceful settlement.

War was thus inevitable, and we ask how was France equipped to face the struggle. We have already seen how prosperous was the condition of the country and naturally the Crown reaped some profit from this prosperity. The chief resource, however, was still the royal domain which—greatly strengthened by the acquisition of Champagne under Philip IV¹—now comprised about half the kingdom.² Much of the domain had indeed been alienated in the form of apanages³ to the Princes of the Blood. This arrangement, although in the end it proved disastrous, was in the beginning a source of strength to the Crown. The Princes governed well on the whole, and, at first at any rate, served the interests of the Crown loyally. Évreux, Alençon, Clermont, Étampes, Dreux, Mortain, Marche, Angoulême, and Bourbon were alienated in this way. Outside the domain and apanages only four of the independent fiefs which had so troubled the Capetians remained to trouble the Valois. Normandy was gone, Anjou gone, la Marche, Toulouse, Champagne, all gone—merged either in the domain or in the apanages. There remained Guyenne and Flanders, to which reference has already been made, and the Duchies of Burgundy and Brittany. Burgundy for the time

¹ And note that Philip VI was wise enough to retain Champagne, though he handed Navarre to Jeanne, Comtesse d'Évreux, daughter of Louis X. To compensate her for Champagne he also gave her Mortain, Angoulême, and other lands. Even after the loss of Champagne the house of Navarre was strong enough to be a great menace to the Crown (*infra*, pp. 237 *sqq.*).

² In addition to Champagne and its dependencies the main additions to the domain since 1259 had been Poitou (1271), Auvergne (1271), Toulouse (1271), and part of Guyenne; French Flanders (1305), Tournai (1320), Lusignan (1303), Soule (1306), Bigorre (1292), Leucate (1309), Anjou, Valois, and Maine (1398). Lyons had been grabbed from the Church by Philip the Fair in 1308.

³ The word is still an anachronism.

being remained loyal, but in Brittany there arose in 1341 a succession question which had considerable influence on events. Thus the process of unification remained incomplete, and these last traces of feudal independence were obstinate—so obstinate that they could hardly have been dissolved without recourse to arms.

It remains to consider the government and administration of the kingdom, its taxable capacity and military resources. The machinery of government had reached a high degree of perfection. The *Hôtel du Roi* gave the King a continuous supply of attendants; his Council—sometimes large sometimes small, according to his own decision—was the main instrument of government. This Council was summoned for purely consultative purposes, and no one had established a right to be summoned. It was the same with the States General. That assembly was summoned at the King's discretion, when he would and how he would. It had established a vague right to present grievances but no real charter had been extracted from the Crown.¹ Justice as administered by the *Parlements* was also the King's justice. Finance was in the hands of the *Chambre des Comptes*.² A fully equipped civil service administered the country in the King's name, France being divided for the purpose into thirty-six *baillages* and *sénéchaussées* with a full staff of officials under the supervision of peripatetic royal agents.

Upon what revenue could this Government rely? We know that Philip IV had had great difficulty in balancing the finances of his kingdom. At best the ordinary revenue did not more than cover the ordinary expenses. In the event of war the King would therefore have to rely on extraordinary resources. And no expedients existed for tapping such resources. For all her fertility and natural wealth the assets of France were less fluid and adaptable than those of her poorer rival. To compensate for this it might be thought that she could at least have counted on putting into the field an army immeasurably superior to that of England. But this was just

¹ *Supra*, p. 201.

² *Supra*, p. 193.

what she could not do, and here—though of course the military and financial questions reacted upon one another—was the Achilles' heel of the Valois. The fact was that in the process of nationalization the army had been neglected, and the French army remained feudal until the time of Charles VII. This was in part the result of the crusades which had taught French military leaders to rely on their cavalry and to despise and neglect infantry and local levies.¹ England meanwhile had been learning in the rough school of the Scots wars; and the most precious lesson she had learnt was the value of the long-bow. Throughout the Hundred Years War her armies were strikingly smaller than those of France; they were therefore more mobile, more homogeneous and better disciplined; and they were not committed to tactics which were becoming obsolete. But though this is clear to us it was not clear to the French in 1337; and France embarked on the war proud in the belief that her knighthood—the knighthood of the crusades and of Bouvines—was the finest in Christendom. It might, it is true, blunder into some such disaster as Courtrai, but, given a fair field and no favour, it would render a good account of itself against any army that could be put into the field against it.

At first it seemed probable that Edward III—a mere boy and sadly hampered by the Scots War—would not proceed to extremities. He came to Amiens in June in 1329 and did homage to Philip for Gascony.² Philip thus scored a notable

¹ In spite of the good services which these levies had proved themselves capable of rendering (e.g. at Bouvines).

² Edward seems to have acknowledged Philip's right to homage; he could hardly have disputed it without advancing his own claim, which was for the moment inconvenient; but he split hairs over the nature of the homage due, whether "liege" or not. On his return to England, however, he acknowledged that the homage he had done had been "liege" homage. See Froissart (ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove), II. 231, 232, 233. Liege homage pledged the vassal to support his liege lord against all comers without reserve. Originally all homage was liege homage; but when homage became attached to the possession of land and a man might be the vassal of several superiors (or even the vassal for one bit of land of a man whose superior he was for another) it became necessary to

success and made preparations to go on crusade. The Flemish difficulty was far more serious than the Gascon dilemma, for there the headstrong burghers were inclined to force the hands of their Count and to throw themselves into the arms of England. Louis, Count of Flanders, had married a daughter of Philip V; he had succeeded to the County in 1332 and had been very roughly handled by his subjects. He seized the opportunity afforded by Philip's coronation to make a melodramatic scene in Reims Cathedral in order to secure his Suzerain's assistance.¹ Philip was just the man to be caught in this way, and swore by the unction and sacrament he had just received that he would not enter Paris until he had put his vassal in possession of his county, and the moment the ceremony was over he hurried off to redeem his promise. He met the rebel Flemings at Mont Cassel. Taken by surprise at first, the French rallied and inflicted a crushing defeat on their opponents. As Froissart tells us there was great *occision* and no quarter was given; out of 15,000 Flemings 12,000 were said to have been slain.² Thus bloodily was Courtrai avenged and the honour of French chivalry vindicated (23 August, 1328).

Philip, with the Count a willing agent, then began to draw his net round Flanders, a proceeding which pointed inevitably to war with England. For, in view of the importance of the wool trade, no English king could acquiesce in a French domination of Flanders and retain the loyalty of his own subjects. The French designs on Flanders were the primary cause of the Hundred Years War.

Egged on by Philip, the Count arrested all English mer-

make a distinction; and in doing ordinary homage the rights of the liege lord were reserved.

¹ When Louis' name was called in the Cathedral in order that he might pay homage he only replied at the third summons and then said, "*Mon Seigneur*, if they had called Louis of Nevers and not Count of Flanders, I would have answered before". "How," said the King, "are you not Count of Flanders?" "Sire," said he, "I bear the name but not the profit," and he went on to describe his woes (Froissart, op. cit. II. 217).

² Mediaeval figures, however, should be accepted with great reserve.

chants in Flanders, and Edward replied by forbidding the export of English wool, just to demonstrate to the Flemings that that commodity was essential to their existence. The famine that ensued convinced the burghers of the absolute necessity of throwing in their lot with England. War was now inevitable on the most elementary grounds ; and in 1337 Edward made the quarrel irreconcilable by bringing forward his claim to the French Crown. He had been incited to this step by Robert of Artois, the descendant of those Artois, father and son, who had played so poor a part at Mansoureh and Courtrai respectively. Robert had been banished from France for forgery and poisoning. His presence in England was an incentive to Edward, over whom he had considerable influence.

Both sides now hurried on preparations for war. Edward established relations with his wife's country, Hainault, with the idea of transferring to that country and the neighbouring Brabant the wool trade which Flanders was forfeiting. He also secured the alliance of many of the German Princes, and on 15 July, 1337, signed a treaty with the Emperor, Louis IV. Philip also set to work to find allies. The Count of Flanders he had already secured. John of Bohemia (son of the Emperor Henry VII), and the King of Castille adhered to France. Philip also established a loose coalition in the north-east, which included the Bishop of Liège, the Count of Deux Ponts, Henry of Bavaria, the Count of Linanges, the *communes* of Frisia and the town of Cambrai. But the most profitable of all and the most dangerous to England was the French alliance with Scotland. This understanding dated from the year 1295 and was destined to endure through the entire period of the war. In 1335 Philip had made considerable preparations for a diversion in favour of the Scots. France had another friend in the Pope. Since 1309 the Papacy had been established in close neighbourhood to France in the city of Avignon ; and in the person of John XXII a Frenchman sat in the chair of St. Peter. John's

THE HOUSE OF ARTOIS

Louis VIII

Louis IX

Robert I Count of Artois,
killed at Mansourah (1250)

Robert II

killed at Courtrai (1302)

Robert
ob.s.p.

Matilda

= Otto IV Count of Burgundy

Jeanne =
Philip VBlanche
= Charles IVPhilip,
killed at Fumes (1298)Robert (*ob.* 1343)
= Jeanne de Valois

successor, Benedict XII, was a mere tool in the hands of France. Philip struck the first blow by declaring the forfeiture of Guyenne (24 May, 1337) and laying siege to its castles. In October Edward responded by assuming the title of King of France. From that date for many hundreds of years the English kings never dropped the title of King of France, and those who penetrate to the crypt of St. Peter's at Rome may read on the tombs of the Stuarts the doubly ironical title, "Kings of Great Britain, Ireland, *and France*". King Edward's defiance reached King Philip on All Saints' Day, 1337.

Events in Flanders made it probable that that country would be the scene of the first hostilities. Edward had found there an invaluable ally in Jacques van Artevelde, the leader of the bourgeois aristocracy, who had been appointed "Captain of Ghent". Under his leadership the Flemings drove out their count, who sought refuge at Philip's Court. In July, 1338, Edward took up residence at Antwerp, with the double object of cementing his alliance with the Emperor and of establishing closer relations with the disaffected Flemings. He met the Emperor at Coblenz, accepted the title of "Vicar of the Empire," and secured for himself—for what it might be worth—the imperial guarantee of the French Crown. Meanwhile in the early days of 1339 the English laid siege to Cambrai, and by the end of October the French and English armies were confronting one another in Picardy, but no serious encounter took place. Flemish support was necessary for the English, and the Flemings would only move if the King of England would commit himself yet further, and van Artevelde insisted that Edward should assume the arms of France and date his Acts from the year of his accession to the French Crown. Only when he had done this was a treaty made. Edward promised his protection to the Flemish insurgents, restored the wool trade, and guaranteed Lille, Douai, Orchies, and Artois to Flanders.¹ The English king then hurried off to make his final preparations and in particu-

¹ *Supra*, p. 184.

lar to get ready a fleet with which to obtain the command of the sea and secure the communications with England. The French navy had made considerable strides since the reign of Philip the Fair, particularly in the Norman ports, and Philip also busily prepared for the naval struggle. On 24 June, 1340, the French fleet was anchored in the roadstead of Sluys when a "perfect forest of masts" was descried, which proved to be the English fleet commanded by Edward in person. The French, who had hitherto had the best of it at sea and had recently harried most of the English ports on the Channel, awaited events in confidence, for although slightly outnumbered in ships they had the advantage in numbers of men. But they allowed themselves to be caught on a lea-shore, and paid the penalty of their blunder. After nine hours' desperate fighting the appearance of an extemporized Flemish fleet decided the day. Of the French a wretched thirty bottoms was all that remained afloat.¹ The English were much less successful by land and had to abandon the siege of Cambrai.


The network of alliances which England had so laboriously brought together had by this time begun to fall asunder. The Emperor, the Archbishops of Mainz and Trier, the Dukes of Brabant and Guelders, and the Marquis of Jülich had reconciled themselves to France. England, finding herself isolated, agreed on 25 September, 1340, to the Truce of Esplechin. More serious for England than these defections was the collapse of her schemes in Flanders. Here van Artevelde had been planning to introduce a new dynasty and with this object had approached the Prince of Wales. But the magnates of Flanders resented this encroachment on their rights. A cry of treachery was raised, and on 24 July, 1345, a mob, instigated by the magnates, set upon van Artevelde and killed him. With him disappeared the English opportunity in the Low Countries, and the seat of hostilities was shifted elsewhere.

¹ The casualties recorded by the Chroniclers (20,000 French and 10,000 English) are quite incredible.

Since the death in 1341 of John, Duke of Brittany, there had been a disputed succession in that Duchy.¹ John had left no children and Charles of Blois, the husband of his niece and nephew of Philip of France, had claimed the succession. He was supported by Philip, who saw in the crisis a grand opportunity for undermining Breton independence, and opposed by John, Count of Montfort, half-brother of the deceased Duke, who urged a kind of Salic custom. It was only natural that Edward of England should give his support to Montfort, whom he created Duke of Richmond. Charles of Blois besieged his opponent in Nantes and made him prisoner. He was thrown into the Louvre, but his heroic wife resisted all attacks in Hennebont until relieved by Sir Walter Manny (1342). In October, freed from the Scottish war, Edward appeared in Brittany. Once more, however, just when things seemed to be coming to a point, the hostilities ended tamely and a three years' truce was arranged (Truce of Malestroit, 19 January, 1343). Philip continued to treat the Bretons with high-handed violence and in 1344 prepared for the resumption of hostilities by sending his eldest son John, Duke of Normandy, to organize Guyenne against the expected English attack.

In 1345 the Earl of Derby landed at Bayonne (25 July) and was besieged by John in the immensely strong city of Aiguillon. The French failed to take the place and the Earl enjoyed *une très belle chevauchée* in the South-West. With the intention of supporting this successful raid, Edward embarked on 5 July, 1346, with about 22,000 men. Impatient of contrary winds, and—as ever—quite indifferent to questions of

¹ BRETON SUCCESSION



strategy, the King determined to land où *Dieu lui donnera la grace*, a decision highly characteristic of the inconsequence of his military methods. "God permitted him" to land at la Hogue, and he started for a dash at Rouen and Paris, but he did not move with the rapidity which such a plan demanded, and wasted twenty-eight days in pillaging unwallied towns such as Caen, and devastating the country on the improved fourteenth-century principle that "war without burning is beef without mustard";¹ while Philip broke the bridges of the Seine, assembled the *ban* and *arrière-ban*, and so strengthened himself that when Edward drew near Paris he abandoned the idea of attacking the capital. Why he did not return by the way he had come it is difficult to guess; perhaps he had swept the country too bare, perhaps he wanted to show himself in the direction of Flanders, perhaps—and this is most likely—he had nothing in view but a little more burning and booty. Whatever the reason, instead of withdrawing westward he repaired the bridge over the Seine at Poissy and began a forced north-easterly march (13-14 August). Philip was after him at once. He had taken the important precaution of cutting the bridges of the Somme, so that when the English reached that river they were in a trap; behind them the apparently superior army of Philip, in front the apparently impassable river. Informed of the existence of a tidal ford at Blanchetaque, Edward determined to make a dash for it. Never was escape more narrow. The English archers brushed away the detachment of Picards which held the further bank and the rising tide made the ford impassable just as the van of the pursuing army came up. Some of the English baggage fell into Philip's hands.

The escape of the English at Blanchetaque had ruined Philip's plans, and like many another general he had not the quickness of intellect to revise them to suit the new conditions. He retired to Abbeville to renew the pursuit on the right bank. Edward, meanwhile, who, though a contemptible strategist,

¹ Or as another chronicler says: "L'incendie est pour la guerre ce que le magnificat est pour les vèpres". Denifle, "La guerre de cent ans et la désolation des églises en France" (ed. Picard, 1899), II, part 1. 1.

was a consummate tactician, had determined to take advantage of the favourable ground in which he found himself and to offer battle in a position of his own choosing. He carefully entrenched his army on the northern slope of a small valley, using pits similar to those which had been so effective at Bannockburn,¹ and resting his right flank on the little river Maye, on the farther bank of which lay the forest of Créçy. When Philip reached this forest he had no idea that the English were entrenched on the other side. When he did realize the situation he recognized at once the folly of attacking with tired and disorganized forces a perfectly fresh enemy in an entrenched and unreconnoitred position, and gave orders for the army to halt with the object of postponing battle till the following day. It was then that the weakness of feudalism as a military system displayed itself. The French chivalry, who regarded the campaign as a glorified tournament, refused to be controlled and pressed on against the enemy. Before leaving Abbeville Philip had organized his army in some five "battles," though it is not clear how they were arranged or by whom commanded. These questions, however, are immaterial, for long before it reached the scene of action the French army had lost all formation and obeyed no commands. The Genoese cross-bowmen² alone preserved their discipline and formation; they were the first to engage, and at once the superiority of the long-bow over the more cumbersome weapon was demonstrated. A storm (*à croire que le monde dû finir*) burst over the armies as they closed and spoilt the shooting of the Genoese by stretching their bowstrings, but it was neither the storm nor the presence of cannon in the English army that threw the Genoese into confusion but the terrible accuracy and rapidity of the fire of the English archers. The Genoese behaved with courage, but their losses were so heavy that they could not stand their ground. In a few minutes they were being rolled in confusion up

¹ Not big enough to engulf horse and rider but sufficient to throw them down.

² Political refugees who had taken service with France. They had been very roughly handed at Sluys already.

the slope of the Vallée des Clercs which they had just descended.

With characteristic stupidity the French knights—who were now riding confusedly on to the field—angered at what they considered the cowardice of the unfortunate Genoese—began to ride them down. The result was of course an indescribable confusion; and all the time the English archers continued to pour in a steady flight of arrows. From that moment, so far as the French were concerned, the battle resolved itself into a succession of isolated charges. Every body of knights that rode into the field simply went in at once as best it could. Of such charges there were as many as fifteen or sixteen. Some of them penetrated the English ranks, but at no time was there any serious prospect of breaking those ranks. Long into the summer night the French chivalry continued their hopeless task. The only result of each fresh rush was to increase the number of killed and wounded, and when at midnight King Philip, who had never ceased to organize the charges, was at length prevailed upon to leave the field he found no more than seventy to accompany him. Morning showed the full extent of the catastrophe: 542 French knights had fallen. The dead included the King of Bohemia, the Duke of Lorraine, and the Counts of Flanders, Alençon, Auxerre, Harcourt, Sancerre, Grandpré, Salm, Blamont, and Forez. Many others were wounded and a few prisoners. Next day the English fell in with some bodies of Communal militia floundering blindly on in the full belief that they were still in pursuit of the English, and made havoc of them.

The Battle of Crécy has been called a revelation to the western world; it would have been more of a revelation if the French army had behaved with discipline instead of with blind recklessness. As it was, it was possible to regard Crécy in the same way as Courtrai, and to hold that it was no real test of strength. The French, therefore, had still much to learn in the school of adversity.

Edward buried the dead with the honours due to their exalted rank; the English helped themselves to what arms and armour they required and destroyed the remainder, and

on 28 August the army moved off in the direction of Calais ; for Edward had determined that that city should be the reward of his victory. Calais, however, was an immensely strong place, being surrounded with dykes which the rising tide flooded twice daily. Moreover, the treacherous sands made it impossible to employ the heavy engines by which alone it might have been taken. So Edward could do no more than sit down before the city and reduce it by starvation. So thorough was the leaguer that he built a complete wooden city which he called Villeneuve-le-hardi in which his army might pass the winter. Philip has been reproached for his tardiness in coming to the rescue. It is surely possible to find excuses for a man who had just come through the ordeal of Créçy. When in July, 1347, he attempted the relief of the town, he found the English strongly entrenched ; and a Flemish army began to threaten his communications. Philip wavered, attempted to negotiate, then tried his favourite expedient of demanding a day for battle ; finally his heart failed him, and on 2 August Jean de Vienne and the stout-hearted garrison saw to their despair the French standards disappear on the horizon. There was nothing for them to do but to make the best terms they could with Edward. Thus on 4 August, 1347, Calais became an English possession. How valuable a possession we may guess from the fact that it was the one to which they clung the longest. Only when Calais was lost in 1558 were the English finally dislodged from French soil. Content with his success, Edward agreed to a truce (28 September), and for nearly four years France had peace.

Freed for a spell from the horrors of war, the kingdom was smitten by an even more terrible calamity. The Great Pestilence or Black Death, the most terrible disease which has ever penetrated to Europe, was brought thither by vessels trading from the East. It first appeared in France at Marseilles in January, 1348.¹ It would be useless to follow its track. But it is important to remember that, although less dramatic than, and therefore tending to be obscured by, the

¹ It was a form of the ordinary bubonic plague. See Gasquet, "The Black Death" (1908).

war, it was responsible for economic changes in Western Europe as great as any that can be traced thereto. It is probably no exaggeration to say that in three years one-half of the population of France had perished, victims to this fearful epidemic. In the midst of all this woe the King fell ill and died (22 August, 1350). For France he must always remain the organizer of defeat. But it would not be just to write him down as an utterly contemptible man. Froissart thought him a coward; there seems to be little justification for his verdict. But he was certainly hot-headed, impolitic and entirely ordinary, and he had the misfortune to live in extraordinary times.

Although the reign of Philip VI leaves an impression of unmitigated disaster it had in reality one bright spot. In the midst of defeat and disaster the royal domain had been steadily growing. It is certainly curious that the reign of one of the most indifferent of her kings should have brought territorial acquisitions so important. Hitherto the boundaries of France had hardly, and that only in isolated places, been pushed over the Rhône and the Saône. Philip the Fair's wife, as heiress of Champagne, had brought a number of *Châtellenies* which she had held of the Empire, also some fiefs of Bar and Lorraine. By 1316, from Lyons southwards the Rhône was the frontier, and in places (e.g. Valentinois) France even crossed the river. The Alpine frontier, however, was all to win. At the very beginning of his reign Philip had begun to feel his way in this quarter, and he had been favoured by the financial collapse of the Dauphin of Viennois, who ruled the important district between the Rhône, the Durance, and the Alps. The Dauphin was a vassal of the Empire, and it was at first arranged that for a money payment he should hand over his lands to a cadet of the house of France, who should as Dauphin do homage for Viennois. Then it was suggested that Philip's heir should be Dauphin, and by degrees the homage to the Empire was abandoned. So this important district was added to the royal domain, and ever since 1350 the title of Dauphin has been borne by the heir to the Crown. A smaller but at the same time important addition was

made to the domain when in 1349 Philip acquired, for the sum of 120,000 crowns, rights over the considerable maritime, commercial, and university city of Montpellier.¹ But what he acquired with one hand he gave away with the other. To his eldest son Maine and Anjou, to his second, Philip, Orleans, Valois and other possessions, to his brother handsome gifts of land.

It can be imagined that Philip's court had not been a good training for the son who now succeeded him. Already as Duke of Normandy John had given proof of military incapacity. He had also shown himself to be greedy, obstinate, and jealous. Of all these characteristics he was now to give further proof upon the throne. He was a man of foolish and passionate affections and the easy prey of evil counsellors. Almost his first act was to execute the Constable of France, Raoul de Brienne, in order to make room for his personal friend and old playmate Charles of Spain, a descendant of the house of Castille. The influence which this man acquired at court provoked the jealousy of Charles of Navarre whom history knows as Charles the Bad. This Charles had inherited the claim of the direct Capetian line, being the son of that Jeanne (daughter of Louis X) whom Philip V had bought off with great gifts;² a monster of wickedness, he could boast a double descent from St. Louis. He was an apanaged prince of the Capetian house, and possessed besides the kingdom of Navarre the important county of Évreux, Mortain, and valuable estates in the valleys of the Seine and Eure. For a time he lived on terms of the closest intimacy with John and married his little daughter Jeanne. But a quarrel over her dowry and increasing jealousy of the Constable alienated him. On 8 January, 1354, Charles of Spain was murdered by the agents of Charles the Bad, and the latter took entire responsibility for the act, and actually had the impertinence to write to the King—"Et vraiment très cher cousin je l'ai avoué plainement, disant que je en ma personne y ai esté et l'ai fait faire et ce est vérité". Little

¹ Montpellier was founded by Charles Martel.

² *Supra*, p. 200.

wonder that the King vowed vengeance on the insolent malefactor.

It was an unfortunate moment for the King of France to fall foul of his powerful vassals, for everything pointed to an immediate renewal of hostilities with England. The truce had expired in 1351, and there had been an outburst of war in Brittany signalized by the famous *combat des trente*, in which thirty Bretons met thirty English: all were wounded, seven English being killed and the remainder taken prisoner (25 March, 1351). A second uneasy truce of two years followed, but negotiations for peace proved abortive. John made desperate and humiliating efforts to conciliate Charles the Bad whose alliance would be invaluable to England, as he had estates in the heart of the Île de France and also a considerable personal following, for he was a man of talent and eloquence; moreover, although Edward III would have preferred to ignore it, he had a strong claim on the French Crown. Rather than allow the English to secure the support of so powerful an ally, John twice (at the Treaty of Nantes, February, 1354, and the Treaty of Valognes, September, 1355) made wholesale concessions to Charles the Bad.

In October, 1355, Edward landed at Calais and made a halting campaign in Artois. His son, the Black Prince, meanwhile executed a lucrative raid in Languedoc, plundering that rich district as far as the Mediterranean. John who had already summoned the Estates of Languedoc in 1351, now in the winter of 1355 summoned those of Languedoil and Languedoc, separately as the custom was, and demanded a subsidy. By this time it would probably have been difficult to raise a subsidy without the consent of the Estates, whose attitude for the last ten years had been growing more and more exacting, and subsidies for the support of 13,000 men were now only granted in return for considerable concessions, the most important of which was the acknowledgment that no subsidy could in future be levied without recourse to the States General. Both assemblies adopted the same attitude although there was no concert between them. In the Estates of Languedoil the spokesman of the Third Estate was a draper named Étienne Marcel.

Meanwhile Navarre was hatching treason in Normandy. John had just created his eldest son, Charles, Duke of Normandy, and Navarre, while professing the profoundest loyalty to the new Duke, was using every persuasion to get the great nobles in Normandy to rise against him. Fully aware of Navarre's treachery, the King on 5 April, 1356, executed a *coup d'état*. The Dauphin was giving a banquet at Rouen at which Navarre and his fellow conspirators were present. With that violent directness which was characteristic of him John burst unexpectedly into the banqueting hall and fell upon the Count of Harcourt, one of the ringleaders of the conspiracy, and having shaken him like a rat turned upon Navarre, seized him by the hair, and flung him to his men. After a scene of frightful violence, in which John received a blow which but for the stoutness of his armour must have been fatal, the Count was led to execution, and Navarre, who as a King could not be treated so summarily, was cast into prison. This act of violence meant open war with all the supporters of Charles the Bad. The greater part of the nobles of Normandy declared against the Crown. Edward III sent the Duke of Lancaster to support their rebellion, and the war reopened with redoubled energy (1356).

Delighted with the success of his raid in Languedoc, the Black Prince now determined to carry out a similar raid in Poitou and the rich country south of the Loire, with a vague subsidiary idea of effecting a junction with John of Gaunt who was engaged on a similar task north of that river. That the Prince did not contemplate a pitched battle with the King of France is proved by the fact that the number of archers he took with him was unusually small. Those that he did take were mounted to enable them to keep up with the army. For anything more than a foray the total number of the English was ridiculously inadequate, being no more than three or four thousand men-at-arms with less than three thousand archers and a thousand irregular troops. Of this small force the majority were Gascons, who like all mountaineers had a special predilection for pillage.

The foray ran the usual course: they burnt and de-

stroyed in every direction ("ardauntz, destruantz, com munement en large"). A large number of defenceless towns were seized and pillaged, and by the time it reached the Loire the army was gorged with the spoil of Poitou. Meanwhile, John of Gaunt's campaign in Normandy having turned out badly, John of France found himself free to deal with the freebooter who was making such havoc of Poitou. While the English were attempting the capture of Tours, he concentrated at Chartres an army of 40,000 men, suddenly crossed the Loire at Blois, and began to hurry south to intercept their retreat. It became a race between John and Edward for the town of Poitiers. Characteristically ill-informed as to each other's movements, the two armies actually blundered into each other just outside the city for which both were making. More by luck than by foresight it was not the main bodies that collided and the resulting skirmish was insignificant. The Prince now made a detour, avoided Poitiers and pushed on to the village of Maupertuis, about seven miles south of that town. He was in a difficult position. With the pick of the plunder of Poitou in his train he had to decide whether he should drop it or fight for it. He determined on what is usually the most dangerous course, to remain, that is, for the night where he was and take his chance of the French attacking. He would hardly have come to this decision had he not been impressed with the favourable nature of the ground. He had stumbled in fact on a wonderful defensive position. On the following day it seems that the Prince was inclined to try and make good his retreat; for he began the difficult task of crossing in face of the enemy the small river Miausson, which lay in his line of retreat. While the Earl of Salisbury was negotiating the passage of the river the French attacked the rearguard, which in order to cover the retreat was still occupying the strong position referred to. The Prince realized at once that retreat was no longer possible, wheeled about his centre, and rejoined the rearguard. The whole ground was masked by hedges and thickets, and the English line was screened by a thick hedge with a ditch in front, the gaps in which as well as the flanks of the army had

been protected with wagons and impedimenta. The only break in this rampart was where a road crossed it, and this would admit no more than four horses abreast. John had plenty of men to turn the position, and it was undoubtedly rash of him to attack so strong a position when a little patience would have put his enemy in his power. His overwhelming superiority in numbers, however, made him the more ready to take summary vengeance for the defeat of Crécy, and he at least managed to avoid the more conspicuous blunders that had marked that battle; for one thing he had brought his army in good order on to the field. Whatever else it might be the Battle of Poitiers would be something more than a series of confused charges. In two other respects John had tried to avoid the blunders of Crécy. In the first place he was not going to have another fiasco with his cross-bowmen. In the effort to avoid this he committed the even worse blunder of not making use of his archers at all. Next, remembering the ill success of the mounted knights at Crécy, and noting perhaps the unevenness of the ground, he took the unprecedented and unwise step of dismounting his knights and sending them to storm the position on foot. Weighed down by their huge load of armour, the poor knights blundered as best they might towards the enemy. By the time they reached them they were for the more part so exhausted that they fell an easy prey. It is this that accounts for the enormous proportion of prisoners. For "fly they could not if they would have fled".

For a long while, however, the issue hung in doubt. It seemed that in spite of all these mistakes sheer force of numbers might carry the day. A small detachment of mounted troops had been told off to prepare the way for the infantry attack. This detachment, however, charged prematurely and before the infantry was ready to back it up. It was practically destroyed by the English archers. The three great "battles" of infantry—really dismounted cavalry—then began to lumber into action. The Dauphin led the first with such vigour that Edward could only hold his position by bringing practically every man into the fighting line. After a prolonged and

bloody struggle, however, the French knights gave way, and the first battle rolled back into the little valley across which it had attacked. The second battle, led by the Duke of Orleans, was much more easily disposed of. For at the sight of the discomfiture of its comrades this craven crowd completely lost heart and fled incontinently from the field. There remained the third battle led by John in person, and probably quite the equal in numbers of the entire English host, which, moreover, had by this time suffered severely and was also running short of ammunition. Edward took the one course open to him : brought up his last reserves, mounted his men, and, leaving his shelter, charged down the slope. The shock when the two hosts met was fearful. The din of clashing steel was heard at Poitiers seven miles away. The two main battles were locked in a death struggle and for a while the issue hung in the balance. At this moment a detached body of 160 men under a celebrated Gascon commander, the Captal de Buch, fell upon the French rear ; and the French finding themselves charged from behind did not take time to judge of the importance of the diversion and began to give way. John, who with his thirteen-year-old son Philip had shown conspicuous courage, flatly refused to leave the field when the bulk of his troops took to flight. Father and son fell into the hands of the enemy and the cup of France's woes was full.

The fortunes of the captive King need not detain us. Our interest is in France not in England. A two years' truce was concluded after Poitiers, and the government of France, during the captivity of the King, fell to the Dauphin Charles, afterwards as Charles V ("the Wise") the first of the saviours of France. It was a grand training in the school of adversity that he now received. Seldom has a ruler had a more difficult position. The military power of France was crushed, and Charles the Bad was at the head of a powerful faction, fiercely antagonistic towards the house of Valois. The States General had been fixed for October and the great bourgeois, with Étienne Marcel at their head, determined to use the troubles of the Government to secure administrative reforms. Marcel, as Provost of the Merchants of Paris, had

taken over the government of the capital. It might have been thought that the reformers would have had an easy task. The kingdom was dislocated and the need for money urgent; if necessary there was an excellent "reform" candidate for the regency in the person of the King of Navarre. Yet there were many things that told in Charles' favour. Personally he was well equipped for the combat, being a man of infinite subtilty and great diplomatic ability; then he had on his side the undoubted popularity of the Capetian house. It is tempting to think that because a Government is absolute and arbitrary it is necessarily unpopular. That this is by no means the case is exemplified by the lack of popular support for Marcel and the reformers. The fact is that the movement was on the whole unpopular and that public opinion was behind the monarchy. Never a national movement, from being a civic agitation it quickly degenerated into a mere intrigue.

The Estates met at Paris on 17 October, 1356, and the Dauphin, being unwilling to redress the grievances which they proceeded to present and which included a demand for the liberation of Charles the Bad, withdrew from Paris, and resorted to a debasement of the coinage in lieu of the subsidy which was not forthcoming.¹ Marcel organized a vigorous resistance, and when Charles returned to the capital (14 January, 1357) he found the city almost in a state of siege. It was time to make concessions. The Estates were reassembled in February and their demands were granted in the *Grande Ordonnance* of March, 1357. The Council was to be reformed. The Estates got the right to assemble if necessary oftener than once a year. Councillors nominated by the Estates but instituted by the Dauphin were to replace the objectionable officials. The Estates were to be consulted before treaties were made. There was to be no more tampering with the coinage. A long list of administrative reforms followed. In return the Estates agreed to furnish 30,000 men and a subsidy. But the subsidy was to be levied and administered by the agents not of the Crown but of the Estates. Although a compromise the re-

¹ But he received a subsidy from the Estates of Languedoc.

formers might put down the *Grande Ordonnance* as a victory. On 5 April, however, the captive King struck in with the announcement of a two years' truce, and forbade the further assembling of the Estates. Once more Marcel armed the citizens, and in spite of the royal commands the Estates assembled on 30 April. But they were badly attended, wavered, and dwindled away. The reformers were in reality but a small minority fighting in the main for their own hands. The Dauphin now determined to play off the Provinces against the Capital and commenced a tour of the country. Financially the experiment was not a great success, but it quickly made the Parisian reformers modify their attitude. When the Estates next met (7 November), they began to cry once more for the release of Charles the Bad. Navarre had anticipated this cry, and had on 8 November made his escape from prison. With him a new factor is introduced into the struggle. Unscrupulous and wicked, he was at the same time clever, eloquent, and popular, and he had a powerful following, especially in Normandy. Moreover he was now definitely in alliance with Marcel, and he had agents within the Council of the Dauphin, the chief of whom was Robert le Coq, Bishop of Laon (a whole-hearted Navarrais who used the most violent language against the Valois); thus it will be seen that his position was a strong one.

On 29 November Charles the Bad reached Saint Denis where he was met by Marcel and delivered a harangue to the citizens (*moult longtemps sermonna*). The Dauphin saw no alternative but to make terms, and so for a time, eyeing one another askance, the two Charleses lived on terms of intimacy and apparent friendship. Matters hung thus in the balance until February, and all Paris was in a highly nervous condition not knowing what the next day might bring forth, when a trifling and accidental occurrence set light to the train. The Dauphin's treasurer was stabbed in a private quarrel by the servant of a bourgeois named Perrin Marc, who was (quite rightly) executed. The bourgeois determined to make this the occasion for showing the Dauphin that they were not to be trifled with. Organized by Marcel, a crowd invaded the

palace on 22 February, and murdered in the actual presence of the Dauphin two of his marshals, one of whom had been responsible for Marc's death. The Dauphin was naturally terrified, and appealed to Marcel for protection which the latter granted. On 23 February Charles renewed and amplified the *Ordonnance*, opening the Council to more bourgeois.

Charles the Bad now appeared on the scene, and he and Marcel compelled the Dauphin to take the title of Regent which would effectually check any further interference on the part of John: hitherto Charles had been merely "Lieutenant of the King". So long as he remained in Paris he was not a free man. And just as Henri III and Louis XVI at later dates sought by flight to free themselves from the tyranny of the Parisians so now he decided to leave the Capital. In March he established himself at Senlis. The result was all that could be desired. The Dauphin found the provincial assemblies, which he now summoned, loyal to himself and resentful of the behaviour of Marcel and Charles the Bad. They were also ready to vote subsidies. Thus early do we note the jealousy with which Paris inspired the Provinces. It was to be a constant factor in the history of France.

In the States General too, when they were assembled in the freer air of Compiègne (4 May), the same resentment at the domination of the capital was seen. A subsidy was voted, and Le Coq very nearly lost his life at the hands of the indignant nobles. The fortunes of the "Reformers" had reached a low ebb when they received assistance from an unlooked for quarter. The years of war and the Black Death had utterly changed the economic situation and dislocated the life of the working classes. Under those circumstances, and in the administrative paralysis which was the result of the reform movement, the lower classes had begun to take the law into their own hands. A popular rebellion, known as the "Jacquerie," spread quickly over a large area of country and became a really serious menace to order. Marcel did not hesitate to organize a Jacquerie of his own in the neighbourhood of Paris. Even Charles the Bad drew the line at such a step: and indeed it was he who defeated in the

vicinity of Meaux, the "Jacques" whom his ally had incited. Charles was probably beginning to doubt both the will and the power of the Provost to set him on the throne. Nevertheless the Provost and the Pretender were still ostensibly allies, and on 29 June they were besieged together in Paris by the forces of the Regent. The Reformers or Rebels, in great peril, now showed the unscrupulous and unpatriotic character of a movement which has too often been dignified with the name of Reform, and began to admit to the Capital some of the bands of English which were still swarming in the neighbourhood. It was an expedient of despair, and it proved fatal to its authors. When Paris began to guess at the truth that the alliance between Marcel and Charles the Bad involved the sacrifice of France to England, it blazed up and set upon the foreigners, who were obliged to appeal to Marcel for armed protection.

The position of affairs was by this time extremely complicated. Marcel, by calling in the English, had sacrificed the support of the Parisian public; but he was still ardently supported by the Gilds. The Dauphin had a strong party in Paris and it was only waiting its time to strike. Charles himself lay outside the city with a powerful army, while the King of Navarre at Saint Denis was negotiating with England for the partition of France. This state of affairs could not last, and in fact it quickly came to a tragic end. Marcel was probably on the point of opening the gates of Paris to the now allied English and Navarrais when he was set upon and killed. With his death the danger to French unity disappeared. Marcel's motives had probably at first at any rate been pure and patriotic, but he had been driven more and more, at first to secure reform and afterwards for his own advancement, into the arms of Charles the Bad, whose motives were neither pure nor patriotic. By the end of July it had become clear that the success of Marcel involved the triumph of Navarre and the triumph of Navarre involved the sacrifice of French unity. Charles the Bad was undoubtedly negotiating with Edward III, and had Marcel succeeded in admitting him to Paris on the night of 31 July, 1358, it

would have involved the disruption of the kingdom. Of Marcel himself it may probably with justice be said that he was at the same time a reformer as he pretended to be and a traitor and an *ambitieux* which he denied. Perhaps like many another politician he began as the one and ended as the other.

The inevitable result of the death of the leader of the revolt was the admission of the Dauphin to Paris. He behaved with forbearance and clemency, and the royal power came out of the ordeal strengthened. But the situation was still very critical. France was overrun with marauding bands, and the Government had neither money nor organization to carry on the war. It was under these conditions that the national feeling of France began to awake. Great campaigns and pitched battles had left the nation unmoved. Now, its feudal armies wiped out and its King a captive, it was stirred to a resistance which the King of England was to find more serious than the most formidable army which had been put into the field. John meanwhile was beginning to weary of captivity. He found the Tower less cheerful than Windsor, and in 1359 he began to negotiate with Edward. The preliminaries of London, however, which heralded the surrender to England of one-half of the kingdom and the payment of a ransom of 4,000,000 crowns, were so humiliating that the Regent, who now began to show his mettle, determined to organize resistance. He took the remarkable step of summoning the States General and getting them to repudiate the humiliating terms which John was making.

Charles the Bad meanwhile, who had been greatly dashed by the death of Marcel, had on the day following that event signed a treaty with England, by which Edward was to have the Crown of France while he himself was to receive Champagne and Brie. He was threatening Paris from Melun: Charles the Dauphin besieged him in the latter town, but the imminence of a fresh English invasion drove him to make terms. Charles the Bad received back all his lands, together with considerable payments in money. Melun was surrendered to the Crown in exchange for compensations elsewhere, and the King of Navarre agreed to renew his

homage. At Easter, 1359, the truce with England, which had been ill-kept, came to an end. Lancaster at once began to ravage Picardy from Calais; and Edward soon landed, intent this time on reaching Reims and getting himself crowned. But he found Reims in such a good state of defence that he decided to winter in Burgundy. In the early spring of 1360 he made a demonstration before Paris. But in April bad news from England decided him to retreat. A truce was arranged on 7 May, and on 24 October the Treaty of Brétigny¹ was signed after prolonged negotiations. It was of course very unfavourable to France, and deprived her of about one-quarter of her dominions. Edward, indeed, abandoned his claim to the French throne, and in return received back old English Aquitaine, as designed by the Treaty of 1259,² with the addition of Poitou, that is to say the old Eleanor inheritance, which now became the Duchy of Guyenne. He was also confirmed in Calais with its outwork Guines, Ponthieu (part of the inheritance of Edward I's Queen, Eleanor of Castille, who inherited it from her mother Jeanne), Montreuil-sur-Mer, and the *seigneurie* of Merk. The question of the Breton succession was held over for separate negotiations. Fortresses were to be mutually restored. Edward was to retain certain lands in the Cotentin surrendered to him by his ally, Godfrey Harcourt. John's ransom was fixed at the absurd sum of 3,000,000 crowns, about 33,000,000 francs of our money.³ The English abandoned the Flemish and the French the Scottish alliance. Finally the Treaty of Brétigny was to be ratified by the Pope.

Thus ended the first round of the great struggle in a treaty, the permanence of which was forbidden by the best interests of France. It proved, as it was no doubt intended to prove, a mere cessation of hostilities. France could not consent to

¹ Finally ratified at Calais, and sometimes known as the Treaty of Calais.

² *Supra*, p. 172.

³ Say £1,500,000; and in addition 80 hostages. See Duckett, "Original Documents relating to the Hostages of John, King of France" (1890).

a revival of the English power within her borders, for that would be a continual source of jeopardy to her national existence. She must either resign her national aspirations or brace herself for prolonged war and a mighty effort to turn the tables on her rival.

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CHAPTER XIV

CHARLES V

(1364-1380)

THE return of her King brought no relief to France. Captivity had not taught John wisdom. In his follies and extravagances he was incorrigible, and was ill worth the immense ransom to raise the instalments of which the resources of the kingdom were strained to the uttermost. Indeed he spent on his own person a large proportion of the money of which the country was mulcted. Bad seasons, poor harvests, and a recrudescence of the plague in 1361, 1362, and 1363 made matters worse; and at the same time the country was devastated by the fierce raids of the "free companies" which had been the most terrible legacy of the war. These were the regiments of the various adventurers who had fought on either side, commanded by men whose profession was war and whose reward was booty. To such men war was a gigantic speculation. They hired and hired out castles as an ordinary man hires or hires out farms, and were deterred by neither truces nor treaties. To disband the English free companies was beyond the power and probably also beyond the wish of Edward, and the relaxation of the discipline of regular warfare gave them just the opportunity for rapine which they desired. Small, compact, skilfully led and excessively mobile, it was almost impossible to hunt them down or drive them over the frontiers. Even du Guesclin, the greatest commander of the day, was powerless against them; indeed on one occasion he was actually taken prisoner by them. From time to time a number of companies would unite and make quite a formidable army. On 6 April, 1362,

such an army, some 15,000 strong, fell upon the royal forces and inflicted a severe defeat on them at Brignais. Nothing was done in the reign of John to check the devastating career of these free-booters, and their depredations continued into the reign of his successor.

The last years of the reign were thus notable for the utter distress and prostration of the kingdom. The gloom was relieved by one great ray of light—the acquisition of the Duchy of Burgundy. Philip of Burgundy died in 1361 leaving no heir. John's mother, Jeanne of Burgundy, was a great-aunt of the deceased Duke, and in her right the King now laid claim to the larger part of the Burgundian dominions. After prolonged negotiations he succeeded in establishing on the ducal throne¹ his son Philip "the Bold," the boy hero of Poitiers (September, 1363). This act, which seems at first so profitable to France, proved in later times a great danger to the Valois. The apanage system dates from the days of Louis VIII and had been on the whole successful until now. In any other house but the house of Valois there is no reason why it should not have continued to be a success. But the early Valois, as we already know, had no real conception of patriotism. They were mere knights-errant who regarded the kingdom as little more than family property; thus it was that the national spirit remained dormant under the attacks of England, and that in the end it was aroused not by the Valois kings but by agencies outside the royal house. And it is this vice of character of the Valois race that accounts for the astounding lapse of the Burgundian branch into the deplorable anti-national courses which had such a disastrous effect in the concluding stages of the Hundred Years War. That this should have occurred within fifty years of their establishment as a separate branch would have been incredible in any other family. In that of the early Valois it was no more than might have been expected from their antecedents.

By this time the matter of the ransom was becoming

¹ The Burgundian heritage did not go entire to Philip. Boulogne, Auvergne, the Counties of Burgundy and Artois, and lands in Champagne were alienated as sops to other claimants.

serious. John had sold the hand of his daughter Isabella to the heir of the rich Visconti family and had also levied a very heavy *aide*, but still the payments were in arrear. With that punctilious regard for obligations of "honour" for which he was remarkable,¹ the King, therefore, determined to return to captivity and in January, 1364, once more left France, this time not to return. For three months he dwelt in the Savoy palace, junketing pleasantly with his captor, then he fell sick and died (8 April, 1364). His obsequies were performed with royal splendour in St. Paul's, and his body was returned to France.

The disappearance from the mortal scene of this disastrous monarch was a heavy financial loss to England and an unmitigated blessing to France. The Dauphin, already Regent, now ascended the throne as Charles V and a reign opens which was to witness the first eddies of the turning tide. Charles V is not a very engaging character; feeble and sickly, a man of the chamber rather than the field, he yet inherited not a few of the vices which we are beginning to associate with the Valois. He was extravagant and lavish as his father had been before him. Moreover he had some unpleasant characteristics from which his predecessors had been free. In him, first of the Valois, we find that subtlety of mind and love of intrigue and chicanery which reached its highest development in his great-grandson. But for all his failings, and in a sense by reason of them, he proved to be the right man to extricate France from the plight into which she had fallen. Lacking the physique for a great captain he was not tempted to repeat the military follies of his predecessors. There would at least be no Crécy or Poitiers in the new reign. Again both by taste and experience Charles was interested in all matters of administration and government; and the man who in youth had successfully coped with Étienne Marcel and Charles the Bad was not likely in maturity to be a blundering ruler. He was in fact well fitted to lay the foundation of the national resistance by which France was gradually to recover from the

¹ One of the hostages sent to England, the Duke of Anjou, had also broken his parole after the Peace of Brétigny.

stunning blows which had fallen on her in the opening stages of the war.

Already, as Dauphin, Charles had declared war on his old enemy Charles the Bad who had of course laid claim to the Burgundian succession. The chief seat of hostilities was the valley of the lower Seine, where Navarre held strong places which were a standing threat to the kings of France. It was in this campaign that du Guesclin, by sheer military ability, made his name.

Du Guesclin came of poor but noble parents from the neighbourhood of Rennes. He had gained his first experience of war in the long struggle over the Breton succession, in which he had fought under the standard of Charles of Blois. The Breton wars, a long series of disconnected campaigns with few great battles and innumerable minor combats, gave unusual opportunities for individual distinction, and du Guesclin had won for himself a unique reputation as a soldier. The rough school in which he had been trained distinguished him from the ordinary knight of chivalry. He preserved the finer qualities of such a knight, but he was purified from the absurd pride and quixotism which ruined the feudal soldier, and he thus introduced a new element into French campaigning. Treating war not only as a glorious but also as a serious business, he studied the choice of positions, the husbanding of resources, and the need for numerical superiority. Without sacrificing the *abandon* and sheer valour on which alone mediaeval commanders had been accustomed to rely, he introduced method and science into his campaigns and was thus the founder of a new school of strategy and tactics. Du Guesclin was now entrusted with the conduct of the campaign against Charles the Bad. In the Battle of Cocherel he completely defeated the redoubtable Captal de Buch by the expedient of a feigned retreat (16 May, 1364). This victory enabled the King to proceed to Reims for his coronation (19 May). Du Guesclin attempted to reduce the Navarrais strongholds in Normandy but in this he failed. The year closed unfavourably to France; but both sides were weary of the struggle, and by the mediation of the Pope peace was signed

at Avignon in March, 1365. Charles the Bad recovered the bulk of his Norman domains¹ and acquired Montpellier. The Burgundian dispute was referred to the arbitration of the Pope. Navarre was clearly not crushed; but for the present Charles V was free from anxiety in that quarter. Almost at the same time he was relieved from another anxiety. The struggle for the Breton succession between Montfort supported by the English, and Charles of Blois supported by the French, was at last ended by the defeat and death of the latter in the Battle of Aurai (29 September, 1364), and the resulting Treaty of Guérande (12 April, 1365). Montfort was recognized as Duke of Brittany, but had to acknowledge the suzerainty of the French King. If he died without heirs the Dukedom was to revert to the house of Blois. This treaty was unexpectedly favourable to France considering that she had supported the defeated party. In this direction too the horizon was clear.

The free companies, French as well as English, remained a serious embarrassment. A proposal was made that du Guesclin should lead them on a crusade against the Turks. But the Emperor not unnaturally objected to the introduction of these dangerous brigands within his borders. Soon, however, a more hopeful outlet for their sinister energies occurred in Spain. Here the crown of Castille was in dispute. The deposed King, Pedro "the Cruel," had the support of Navarre and England while his opponent—his bastard brother Don Enrico—looked to France and Aragon for support. At the close of 1365 du Guesclin led the free companies to the aid of Don Enrico and set him on the throne of Castille (5 April, 1366). Don Pedro proceeded to Bordeaux to work upon the feelings of the Black Prince, and in February, 1267, an English army crossed the Pyrenees, defeated and captured du Guesclin, and restored Pedro. The Black Prince lingered in Spain to try and secure payment of the sum which Pedro had promised him in return for his assistance. Disease played havoc with his troops, and he himself contracted the sickness

¹ With the exception of Mantes, Meulan, and Longueville. The latter had been given to du Guesclin.

which proved fatal to him in 1376. Sick and sullen the mighty Englishman made his way back to Bordeaux. In the following year a further French expedition replaced Enrico on the throne, Pedro being killed in a hand to hand conflict with his brother. It was the last exploit of the free companies, whose importance—to the immense benefit of France—now began to decline.

Meanwhile the King was busy in the reorganization of the kingdom. He saw clearly what he wanted and in the main he got it, and, because he was no slave to rules and could distinguish between substance and shadow, got it with a minimum of friction. In his dealings with the great vassals he saw the necessity of asserting the universality of the royal justice and the ubiquity of the royal tax-collector. Yet in the suppression of private warfare he wisely respected local prejudices, and in the matter of taxation was always willing to sacrifice a fraction of an *aide* in order to secure a vassal's co-operation in the difficult task of levying it. In the involved questions arising out of the relations between Church and State he displayed a like firm moderation. Things had altered since the days of Boniface VIII. Now a royal *bailli* would not hesitate to flout an archbishop. The Popes were always protesting. Charles was always conciliatory and always firm, with the result that he was able to secure his object without seriously wounding the dignity of the Popes. In fact if his was the iron hand his was also the velvet glove.

Charles had realized that Créçy and Poitiers had rung the knell of chivalry, and that he had to bring the military system of France into line with modern ideas. It was a task of immense difficulty and he deserves all credit for accomplishing it. The French disasters had made it clear that there could be no military salvation for France so long as her defence was left to the disconnected, undisciplined, and often blundering efforts of individual vassals. Co-ordination was the first need. The chaotic feudal hosts must give place to an organized royal army. But if the King was to control he must also pay. This was the fundamental principle of all Charles V's reforms. He began to pay his vassals to repair their castles,

but only on condition that his agents should have the right to inspect such castles. He began to pay his soldiers, not the lower ranks only but the greater vassals themselves; even his own brothers drew their regular pay. But he paid only on condition that he commanded. Thus the army grew into a disciplined fighting machine; and while the most important strategic positions were strengthened, garrisoned, and victualled, the superfluous fortresses were dismantled. Charles reaped the fruits of his persistence in this policy when it once more came to a trial of strength with England. With praiseworthy elasticity the King, while thus nationalizing the military organization, did not despise the old feudal resources. The *ban* and *arrière ban* were maintained;¹ foreign mercenaries were employed, and archers—provided in the old way by specified towns—had their place in the reformed Army. But the backbone of the national defence were the paid royal troops. An *Ordonnance* of 1373 created a complete military hierarchy. Lieutenants, generally Princes of the Blood, took nominal precedence; but in practice the Constable (*du Guesclin*) commanded in chief. Two *maréchals* ranked immediately below him. A *maître des arbalétriers* controlled the artillery. A captain-general, ranking just below a *maréchal*, controlled the captains who held the minor commands. A graduated system of payment according to rank was introduced. Considerable strides were made in the development of cannon. The Duke of Burgundy had a wonderful piece which could throw a projectile of 450 lb. weight, we are not told how far. At Caen a considerable arsenal was established. Finally to his capital, which had long since overflowed the fortifications of Philip Augustus, Charles gave new walls. By the end of the reign those of the right bank were almost complete and the Bastille of Saint-Antoine was rising

¹ The *ban* was the summons to military service of the direct vassals of the Crown. The *arrière ban* a similar summons to the *arrière vasseaux*. Together the words meant a *levée en masse* of the feudal host. The *arrière ban* was only resorted to in great emergencies. It was called up so late as 1688 by Louis XIV, and also by Henry IV for the Siege of Amiens. *Infra*, II., 108.

to protect and to overawe the eastern side of the city as the Louvre did the western. Nor was the navy neglected. Under Jean de Vienne, the nephew of the defender at Calais, the reorganization of the navy, which had never recovered the disaster of Sluys, proceeded apace. A great naval arsenal was established at Rouen, and the revival of French sea power was marked by repeated raids on English ports.

Engrossed as he was in these vital matters, Charles yet found time to attend to the development of the royal domain. By arms and diplomacy he made considerable acquisitions. The attempt to confiscate Brittany failed; but the overthrow of Charles the Bad transferred to the Crown the possessions of that vassal, and the domain was continually profiting by small accretions. The royal power was welcomed by abbeys, hospitals, *communes*, and also sometimes by private individuals as a protection against the free companies and other lawless persons. Hand in hand with the royal protection went of course the royal authority—royal justice, royal commissioners, and royal taxation. Charles even repudiated all alienations of domain made since Philip the Fair. In one important instance, however, he had to submit to a loss. Ever since Bouvines France had clung to the idea of absorbing Walloon Flanders, and the Treaty of Athis (1305)¹ had transferred to France, Lille, Douai, and Orchies. It is possible that when he reversed this policy and abandoned Walloon Flanders to the Count of Flanders, Charles may have seen that it was the best chance of ultimately securing the whole of Flanders.

But, while he did much to extend the royal domain, Charles V continued the policy of apanages with its attendant dangers. We have seen how a branch of the house of Capet was established in Burgundy in 1363. In the same way at different times during the reign Berry, Touraine, Macon, Poitiers, Limoges, and Angoulême were all alienated from the royal domain.

The numerous reforms involved the tapping of new sources of revenue. Charles' forced loans were numerous and considerable, and he borrowed from his officers of State, from the

¹ *Supra*, p. 184.

city of Paris, and the city of Rouen. He also continued to levy for five years the taxes which had been imposed and sanctioned by the States General for the purpose of John's ransom. In 1369, finding that he still required more money, the King summoned the States General of Languedoil and laid before them a proposal for replacing John's hearth-tax by a tax on milling and a tariff on liquor. When the Estates refused he imposed the taxes in a modified form; but so strong was the opposition that he had to return to the old system. But if he could not raise what taxes he would Charles gained the even more important point of levying them for as long a period as he would; when the Estates asserted their right to choose the form in which they would be taxed they abandoned the right of deciding for how long they would be taxed. This was an immense step towards the independence of the Crown. Within certain bounds the King was now able to count on a fixed revenue from taxation, and an elaborate machinery was created for the collection of the hearth-tax and the taxes on liquor and merchandise. The hearth-tax (*fouage*) was fixed at a certain figure for each district and was not affected by fluctuations in the population. Assessors and collectors were appointed locally and were personally responsible for the amount. For the tax on wine and merchandise the system of "farming" was employed, the duty on each species of merchandise being handed over to one man, who was responsible for a fixed amount, and could pocket the surplus. It was a disastrous and oppressive system and its adoption led to much loss and friction. It set a premium on injustice and was in the end neither profitable to the Crown, acceptable to the taxpayer, nor always beneficial to the farmer. The only other tax was the *gabelle*. All salt had to be bonded in royal *greniers*. Its price and the amount of the duty (often very high) was fixed by the King. It was then offered to retailers. As the winter's meat had to be salted, salt was a much sought-after commodity, and even as early as this smuggling was common.

It was unfortunate for France that her financial system had its beginnings at a time when her kings were not yet

strong enough to insist that all taxes should be paid direct into the royal treasury, and also at a time when the kingdom was not sufficiently united to ensure equality of taxation in every quarter; at a time too when feudalism, though moribund, had still sufficient force to insist on exemptions and distinctions. In many districts the Princes of the Blood docked the royal taxes for their own benefit. Many whole classes as well as individuals were exempt. Neither clergy nor nobles (when on active service) paid the *fouage*. Many religious foundations were exempt from the dues on wine and merchandise. Favoured towns received considerable concessions. But the most serious anomaly was the partial or total exemption of certain whole districts. It was this that laid the foundation of that inequality of taxation which had such disastrous results in later times. Provence and Dauphiné, on account of their connexion with the Empire, escaped altogether. Flanders and Brittany escaped partially. Burgundy declined to submit to regular taxation. Artois received special treatment, while Languedoc was financially autonomous.¹ Such a system, although no doubt it was the best possible under the circumstances, contained all the seeds of disaster. To us, who have been taught to look for the causes of the French Revolution to financial anomalies, the expedients of Charles V must have a special and sinister significance.

¹ The grand distinction came to be between the *pays d'état* and the *pays d'élection*. In those districts which received ordinary treatment at the hands of the tax-gatherer persons called *élus* were, after 1356, appointed to assist in the collection of the *aides* and the apportionment of the *taille*. In 1372 these *élus* were transformed into royal functionaries, and sat in a tribunal to hear appeals against taxation in the first instance; but the deceptive name of *Élections*, stuck to the districts. The *élus* were finally suppressed in 1625, but the tribunals remained, and in 1789 there were 178 of them. The *pays d'élection* comprised the following *généralités*:—Paris, Amiens, Soissons, Orleans, Bourges, Lyons, Riom, Moulins, Grenoble, Poitiers, Limoges, La Rochelle, Bordeaux, Tours, Pau, Auch, Montauban, Champagne, Rouen, Caen, Alençon, Bresse, Burgundy. The *pays d'état* were those districts which possessed local assemblies; they were, speaking generally, the more recently acquired districts and had in most cases made their own bargains about taxation. They included Artois, Béarn, Burgundy (the Duchy), Brittany, Flanders, Foix, Hainault, Languedoc, Provence, and Rousillon.

Charles V was now beginning to feel the ground under his feet and could attempt to tear up the ignominious Treaty of Brétigny. There was no lack of pretexts for hostilities. The English occupation was everywhere unpopular, and a sense of injured nationality was abroad. The extortions of the Black Prince stirred the Gascons, led by John of Armagnac, to appeal to France. In the autumn of 1368 Charles decided to respond to the appeal. The entire South was aflame against the English rule and in January hostilities began. The official declaration of war was made in May, and on 3 June Edward once more assumed the title of King of France.

With the resumption of hostilities the attitude of Flanders once more became important. Both France and England made offers for the hand of the heiress of that County, Margaret, widow of the deceased Duke of Burgundy, and Charles sacrificed Walloon Flanders in order to secure the prize for his brother Philip, now Duke of Burgundy. It would hardly have been possible to foresee the trouble which was laid up for France by this marriage. At the time the capture of the Flemish alliance and the establishment of a French Prince in Flanders may well have seemed a master-stroke. Charles was also successful in securing the alliance of Castille and Portugal, and he entered into an agreement with the Emperor Charles IV, securing the benevolent neutrality of that ineffective potentate.

In the South-West fortune smiled on the French arms. The Black Prince, now a dying man, directed the campaign from a litter. In two years the French had recovered more than they had lost by the Treaty of Brétigny. John of Gaunt in 1369, and Knollys in 1370, made *chevauchées* in Normandy to create a diversion. From his windows in Paris¹ Charles gazed uncomfortably upon the watchfires of Knollys' army. He had no love of war. But the walls of Paris were an obstacle as insurmountable to Knollys as they had been to Edward. To make a fine *chevauchée* was one thing and to

¹ The windows not of the Louvre but of the Hôtel St. Paul which Charles had made his residence.

storm a walled and defended city another. For three days the English sat ineffectively before Paris and then disappeared. Du Guesclin, whom the King now made Constable, concentrated all available forces to harass Knollys' retreat. By dint of a night march in fearful weather over a difficult country he succeeded in cutting off and destroying a part of the English force at Pontvallain and the *chevauchée* ended in disaster (4 December, 1370). Meanwhile the Black Prince had been engaged on the last and least reputable of his enterprises. Angered beyond measure at the seizure of Limoges by the Duke of Berry, he fell on that city and put the entire population to the sword (September, 1370). This act of cruelty may safely be attributed to the effects of increasing sickness on a man of action. Early in 1371 he returned to England a defeated and dying man.

The field was now clear for du Guesclin, and the next two years saw the gradual reconquest of Poitou. Poitiers was taken in August, 1372, and La Rochelle in September, while in June the English met with a severe naval reverse at the hands of the Castilians. Poitou once recovered, the Constable could turn elsewhere. The affairs of Brittany demanded his attention. Duke John was an Englishman at heart and had gained his Dukedom by English aid; but when he concluded, on 19 July, 1372, an alliance with Edward he flouted the French sympathies of the Breton *noblesse*, and very soon he was obliged to take refuge at the court of his ally. By the end of summer du Guesclin was master of the duchy.

Early in the following year John of Gaunt set out from Calais on another aimless *chevauchée*. But the order was given to refuse battle, and the English advanced through a silent country, glared at by sullen eyes from every castle and fortified town. Scarcely understanding the significance of the new tactics, they pushed aimlessly on through Vermandois, Champagne, and Burgundy. There was no limit of course to the extent of country that might be traversed in this fashion. Lancaster determined, more from bravado than for any tactical reason, to effect his exit by way of Bordeaux. Winter, however, proved a more terrible enemy than the stoutest French

army, and it was a wretched handful of starving stragglers that made its way through.

The French successes continued unbroken. Anjou penetrated in 1374 to within a few leagues of Bordeaux. In Normandy the capture of Saint-Sauveur-le-vicomte,¹ for long the English base, was one of the military feats of the period. Edward was greatly shaken. Seldom has the close of a career so little justified the promise of its commencement. Himself broken in health, he saw the death of his eldest and the military failure of his third son, and the steady gradual loss of all his conquests. Incapable of further effort he now consented to a truce. Before it had run out he followed his son to the grave (1377).

The visit of the Emperor to Paris in January, 1378, was good evidence that the prestige of France was in the ascendant. The last time that imperial eyes had seen the city was when Charles the Fat had failed to relieve it from the Northmen. The Emperor conferred on the Dauphin the vicariate of the long extinct kingdom of Arles—a concession which went far to ensure the ultimate supremacy of the French Crown in that region. In the same year another event of much greater importance occurred, which had long been impending. Since 1309 the Popes had been established at Avignon; they were themselves French, were surrounded with French cardinals, and content to remain the puppets of the French kings so long as they could enjoy the security of this retreat.² Such had been for more than fifty years the state of affairs at the Papal Court. But as France in consequence of the war became yearly more unsettled, it began to dawn upon the Popes that Rome itself, ruined and devastated as it was, was at least not less secure than Avignon. A visit from the free companies on a blackmailing errand brought this home very forcibly. The visitations of the plague which struck the Papal city with special violence urged the Popes in the same direction. The result was that in 1367

¹ Special cannon were made for the siege of Saint-Sauveur. Thirty-two pieces in all were used, throwing stone and leaden missiles.

² *Supra*, p. 179.

Urban V once more established the Curia at Rome. But after an uneasy sojourn of three years in the half-ruined capital he returned to Avignon. His successor Gregory XI, although a Frenchman, was persuaded by Saint Catherine to repeat the experiment, and on 13 September, 1376, the Papal Court left Avignon never to return. When Gregory died the cardinals, terrorized by the Roman mob, elected an Italian, Urban VI. But the French cardinals who formed a majority in the college regretted the step, and in the same year elected Robert of Geneva, a man of French inclinations, who took the title of Clement VII; thus was inaugurated the Great Schism. It had a profound influence on the history of France for many years.

Meanwhile Charles the Bad had once more come to the front. Since 1368 he had been deeply engaged in plots and intrigues; he had also developed a proclivity for poisoning, and was suspected of having made away with his wife and of having attempted to poison his eldest son. But when he attempted to use his favourite weapon on the King of France, Charles decided that an end must be made of him. England being quiescent and France in the ascendant, Navarre gave little trouble. His domains were confiscated and he himself driven into exile.¹

Charles V attempted the same process with Brittany (1378). But the Bretons, though loyal Frenchmen, were also loyal Bretons, the country flamed up into rebellion and Duke John was restored. Instead of annexing Brittany the King had alienated the sympathies of the duchy. Charles V, who had never enjoyed even fair health, now began to feel that his end was near. He was, however, fated to see the death of his great coadjutor. Campaigning in Languedoc against the remains of the free companies, du Guesclin was attacked by a mortal malady to which on 13 July, 1380, he succumbed. Two months later his master followed him. Thus within two months of each other there passed away the two men who by the introduction of reason, the one into the council-chamber and the other into the battle-field, had restored the fortunes

¹ He died in 1387.

of France. In the space of twenty years although, and perhaps because, no battle of the first magnitude had been fought, they had driven England from the position she had acquired at the Peace of Brétigny and left her with a bare foothold at Calais and another in Guyenne. But for the youth and subsequent insanity of Charles' successor and the unpatriotic selfishness of the royal princes, their work might speedily have been completed, and France been spared seventy years of further warfare. But the work of Charles V and du Guesclin was none the less great because its fruits were thrown away by the follies and misfortunes of those who came after them.

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CHAPTER XV

CHARLES VI

(1380-1422)

THE new King was but twelve years old. Youth is a fault which is easily remedied; but in the case of Charles VI years brought no wisdom, and soon after he attained his majority his brain gave way and he became subject to periodic attacks of lunacy. During his disastrous reign the most alarming fact was the absolute selfishness of the Princes of the Blood. Charles V was survived by three brothers, the Dukes respectively of Anjou, Berry, and Burgundy. The Duke of Berry's particular form of selfishness was at any rate innocuous; a gourmet, and a dilettante, he may safely be disregarded. Anjou, the eldest uncle, was more the typical Valois; dashing, extravagant, ambitious, it was fortunate that his adventurous spirit drew him to Italy and that France was freed from his sinister energy. He espoused the cause of Clement VII, the French Pope, undertaking to restore him to his Italian possessions in return for his support in the claims he inherited on the Two Sicilies. He invaded Italy in 1382 and died there two years later, leaving his claims to his son Louis.¹ Philip, Duke of Burgundy, the youngest of the King's uncles, was both by position and temperament the most dangerous of the three. Burgundy, an immensely rich district, was so far as the County was concerned under the suzerainty of the Emperor, and in spite of its being in Valois hands it now became the seat of a Teutonic reaction. This reaction was destined to be greatly intensified when Philip inherited from his wife the even richer, equally Teutonic, and anglophil County of

¹ See for the Angevin claims in the Sicilies, *infra*, p. 344 *sqq.*

Flanders. Philip was utterly unscrupulous and unpatriotic. When he became Duke of Burgundy he set himself wholeheartedly to the aggrandizement of Burgundy. Such aggrandizement was only possible at the expense of France, and the Valois house of Burgundy soon became a greater danger than England herself to its parent stock the Valois house of France. Under these menacing conditions the curtain rises on perhaps the most calamitous reign in the history of France.

At first Anjou tried to obtain the regency, but he was obliged to agree to put the office in commission and a Council of Twelve was appointed. The whole kingdom was in a state of unrest. In Flanders there was civil war; Languedoc was seething with excitement; Paris was clamouring for relief from taxation; Rouen also gave constant trouble. The Estates met repeatedly in 1380, 1381, and 1382. For the moment the Government bent to the storm and all the taxes were abandoned. But of course they had to be reimposed. Meanwhile economic unrest spread from England to France, and insurrections took place in many of the large towns. In Paris (1382) there was an outbreak known as the revolt of the Maillotins,¹ directed against the misgovernment of the royal officials. And it was necessary to repress popular outbreaks in Languedoc, where a popular revolt, known as the revolt of the "Tuchins," broke out in 1381.

Early in 1382 affairs in Flanders came to a crisis. Philip, son of Jacques van Artevelde, led an army against the Count, who fled ignominiously at his approach. Philip of Burgundy could not sit quiet and watch the humiliation of his father-in-law and persuaded the French Government to intervene. Artevelde took up a strong position at Roosebeke which commanded both Ghent and Bruges. When the fog lifted on the morning of 27 November, 1382, the Flemings flung themselves on the French centre. It gave way; but the wings swung round and enclosed the Flemings in a deadly embrace.

¹ So called because they armed themselves with leaden *maillets* (mallets) which they found in the *Arsenal* and *Hôtel de Ville*.

Thousands perished by the sword, more still by suffocation; the remainder in the frenzy of flight fell into a bog. In all it was said 25,000 perished. Artevelde was stifled in the mêlée. Roosebeke was a victory over the forces of rebellion and helped to reduce the rebels at home to reason. It enabled the Government to make an example of seditious Paris, the privileges of the city being revoked, and the office of Provost of the Merchants abolished. It was also a victory for the French over the Roman Pope, for the Flemings were staunch supporters of Urban. The University of Paris, which had been anti-Clementine, now submitted to the French Pope.

England, for whom the successful intervention of France in Flanders had been a subject for resentment and alarm, now prepared an Urbanist Crusade in the low countries under the leadership of the Bishop of Norwich. But he made no serious attempt to resist the second French invasion of the County which took place in 1383. The death of the Count of Flanders (30 January, 1384) gave the County to Philip of Burgundy; but it was only by the help of French arms that he brought the rebellious burghers to terms in the Peace of Tournai (18 December, 1385), in which, by judicious concessions, peace was restored to that long distracted region. This treaty, which gave Philip a contented Flanders, marks a great stride in the progress of Burgundy. It must not be forgotten that Philip owed much to the steady assistance which had been given him by France. He now became the chief patron of his nephew; and exploited the forces of France for the service of Burgundy in two abortive enterprises against England and Guelders.

In 1388 Charles announced his intention of looking after his own affairs; and his uncles were obliged to withdraw from Court. The King's first step was to restore his father's old ministers, scornfully called *Marmousets* by reason of their low birth. Oliver Clisson became Constable, and the King's brother, Louis of Orleans, then Duke of Touraine, took first place at Court. The new Government began well with an attempt to revive the administrative organization of the late reign. An era of good government might now have opened but for the

fatal weakness which betrayed itself in the King's character. Passionately addicted to the vices of his race, he lived a life of unceasing gaiety and luxury, and his constitution was not strong enough to stand his excesses. In 1392 he made an expedition against the Duke of Brittany and, riding over a sun-scorched plain in the height of the dog-days, he was overcome with the heat. One of his pages, dozing on his horse, let his lance fall with a clatter on the steel casque of one of his fellows. The King, believing he was attacked, charged madly at the nearest persons, scattered his escort in every direction, unhorsed several of his pages, and did considerable damage before he could be controlled. The madness soon abated but assumed an intermittent form. For the remainder of his life he was subject to increasingly frequent attacks, and was made *corpus vile* for every kind of magic and quackery.

This intermittent madness of her King was the heaviest blow that could have fallen on France. It would have been far better had the madness been permanent. Then a regent could have been appointed. As it was power fell once more into the hands of the Princes: but men never rightly knew when the King was mad or sane, which acts were his or which those of his advisers. The Princes could thus shelter behind the King to avoid responsibility. Even in misgovernment under these conditions there was no continuity. For half the year, the King being sane, the kingdom was subject to the extortions of his brother, the Duke of Orleans: for the other half, the madness having returned, to those of his uncle the Duke of Burgundy. As for the Duke of Berry he extorted and misgoverned in his own regions quite irrespective of the madness or sanity of the King.

It was probably only the impossibility of raising money that secured a continuation of the peace. Richard II had an interview with Charles VI at Ardres in 1396, and the truce was extended to twenty-eight years, on the understanding that the King of England should marry Charles' daughter Isabella. The peace party in England had carried the day, but there was also a strong party in that country, headed by Lancaster, which favoured a continuation of the war. The fall of Richard and

the triumph of Lancaster was therefore a serious blow to French interests. In Brittany Charles' second daughter was married to the heir of the Duke, and peace was ensured in that quarter.

Meanwhile the papal schism had been largely colouring the politics of Europe. Broadly the Latin states (with the exception of Italy) had declared for the French Pope, while the northern states were Urbanist. Clement VII's trump card was the establishment of French princes in Italy, who should sustain his cause in the Peninsula. Hence his support of the new Angevin claim in Naples, where Louis II, son of Charles VII's uncle, Louis I of Anjou, was established in 1390. Hence also the encouragement by the Pope of the match between Charles VI's brother Louis of Touraine, afterwards of Orleans, and Valentina, daughter of Gian Galeazzo Visconti. This marriage took place in 1387; the bride's dowry was the County of Asti and 450,000 florins; but there was also the expectation of the whole Milanese heritage. This was the origin of the French claim on Milan in the sixteenth century, which was put forward by Louis XII, grandson of Louis of Orleans and Valentina Visconti.¹

The division of Christendom was by this time becoming a scandal, and in 1391 the University of Paris demanded the resignation of both Popes and the election of a single new Pope; failing this the reference of the matter to a council. When, in 1394, Clement VII died the moment seemed to have arrived for the healing of the schism. Both the Royal Council and the University entreated the cardinals at Avignon to pause before electing. "It was," the University rather profanely said, "as if the Holy Ghost stood at the door and knocked." But the conclave turned a deaf ear and elected Peter de Luna (Benedict XIII). He had been chosen because of his expressed willingness to end the schism; "I would abdicate," he had said, "as soon as take off my hat". Vain words; for no sooner was he Pope than he decided that if the schism were to be ended it could only be by the abdication of his rival. France now took the lead in urging the necessity of

¹ *Infra*, p. 353.

ending the scandal. But Benedict declined to withdraw and proved a perfect "mule" of obstinacy. In their disgust the advocates of reunion now proposed that the French Church should withdraw its allegiance. This withdrawal, which was approved by a conference of the French clergy in 1398, was a great step towards that independence of the French Church which under the name of "Gallicanism" was to be so important in the history of France. When Benedict utterly declined to accept the situation he was besieged in Avignon.

Confusion was now worse confounded by the deposition of the drunken Emperor Wenceslas (1400). There were then two Emperors as well as two Popes and the powers of Europe were obliged to take sides once more. While Europe was thus rent internally she had been threatened from without by the Turk, and a great Christian army had suffered a frightful reverse at the hands of the infidels on 25 September, 1396, at Nicopolis. Thus the fourteenth century closed in gloom and calamity. Richard of England had been deposed and murdered; Charles of France was a chronic lunatic; the Emperor Wenceslas had been ousted from the imperial throne; the Empire was divided, the Church split; society was dislocated, and discontent and social revolution seemed everywhere prevalent; to crown all Eastern Christendom was prostrate at the feet of the Turk. For France however the cup was not yet full. The rivalry of the Princes was making civil war more and more imminent. France was too small to contain both Orleans and Burgundy; nor was there any one in the kingdom who could bridle them. Both were dipping deep into the royal treasury for their own purposes; more and more their interests became antagonistic; on every question they took opposite sides. In the matter of the schism, for instance, Burgundy, who, as Count of Flanders, was influenced by the anti-Clementine leanings of his Flemish subjects, favoured the policy of withdrawal, while Orleans advocated obedience to the Pope. It was under his protection that Benedict XIII escaped from besieged Avignon. In Italy also and England the two pursued opposing policies.

On the death of Philip the Bold (1404) Orleans had the

field to himself, while Philip's son Jean *Sans Peur* was taking possession of his Burgundian dominions. But, once secure there, the new Duke began to pursue with vigour the policy of his father. Orleans ruled France oppressively and levied heavy exactions. Burgundy took advantage of this fact to pose as an austere reformer. Throughout the period of the Burgundian rebellion the Dukes of Burgundy profited enormously by the assumption of this rôle, and made the Parisians in particular their fast friends. Paris, throughout the period, must be regarded as Burgundian to the core. When in 1405 the war with England recommenced, Orleans was appointed the King's Lieutenant at sea and in Guyenne, and Jean *Sans Peur* in Picardy. The result was exactly what might have been expected. The two would not co-operate, and Orleans' campaign in the South-West was foiled by the inaction of Burgundy. Jean *Sans Peur* now determined to rid himself of his rival. On 23 November, 1407, Orleans was lured into a trap and murdered. When inquiries were opened Burgundy was obliged to acknowledge that *par l'introduction du diable* he had planned the murder. He then fled to his own dukedom. So popular was he, however, and so unpopular had the Duke of Orleans been, that on his return to Paris in 1408 the Duke was acclaimed a popular benefactor, and the half-witted King actually granted him a free pardon. As soon as he left Paris this pardon was revoked, but when he returned the King was hurriedly withdrawn to Tours.

It was now plain that war alone could decide between the houses of Orleans and Burgundy. Already France was grouping itself round the contending factions. Behind the house of Orleans were ranged the Dukes of Berry, Bourbon, and Brittany, together with Clermont, Alençon, d'Albret the Constable, and the Gascon Count of Armagnac, whose daughter married the new Duke (Charles) of Orleans and who became the protagonist of, and subsequently gave his name to, the faction. The Armagnacs—we may as well give them the name at once—were wholly French and Romance, and had their strength in the West and South. Burgundy, on the other hand, drew his following from the North and East. Behind him were

many men of purely Teutonic origin—the Princes of the Rhine and the Bishop of Liége. His strength was not indeed wholly Teutonic but it had a strong Teutonic leaven.

It was clear that England would be to a large extent arbiter of the situation. Each side was willing to sacrifice national interests in return for the support of Henry IV. At first England leant to Burgundy, and it was by English aid that the Burgundians kept the upper hand in the autumn of 1411. In 1412, tempted by the offer of the Armagnacs to hand him over Aquitaine, Henry transferred his assistance to that side. This truckling to the national foe put the Armagnacs clearly in the wrong; the Duke of Burgundy was justified in treating them as rebels, and when we reproach him with lack of patriotic feeling we must remember that that lack was equally conspicuous among the Armagnacs. Burgundy was now, curiously enough, for the moment the defender of the Crown against the traitorous coalition of the Armagnacs with the national foe. The English auxiliaries being delayed, the Armagnacs agreed in 1412 to the Peace of Auxerre, but this was no more than a pause in hostilities.

During all this time Paris had been in a state of extreme agitation, which increased daily, and ended in the revolt of the *Cabochiens* (so called from their leader Caboché, a butcher¹), in favour of a reform of government. The *Cabochiens* identified the Duke of Burgundy with the cause of reform and aimed at the overthrow of the Dauphin, a loose-living, irresponsible lad of sixteen whom they supposed to be responsible for much of the misgovernment. Burgundy was willing enough to play the part of reformer and allowed the *Cabochiens* to take up arms in his name. He summoned the States General of Languedoil to consider the question of an *aide* and, under pressure of the *Cabochiens*, who invaded the palace of the Dauphin and committed every kind of outrage in the streets, an *Ordonnance*, known as the *Ordonnance Cabochienne*, was promulgated, which created three great councils, of politics, justice, and finance, and insisted that all

¹ The butchers of Paris were the oldest and most powerful corporation in the city.

public business must be transacted therein. This measure, which simply gave an improved organization to the royal administration without imposing any limits on it, was not at all likely to satisfy the *Cabochiens*, who had been fighting for a democratic reform. A further series of riots followed, and the Dauphin's palace was again invaded. But Burgundy had been playing with his humble allies. He was an absolutist as uncompromising as his rivals, and now, in face of the common danger to absolutism, the rival parties began to negotiate; and while the Dukes of Berry and Burgundy were treating at Pontoise, the greater bourgeois of Paris, tired of the insecurity into which the city had been plunged by the violence of the *Cabochiens*, combined to put down the rebels. The Dauphin was reinstated and put at the head of the bourgeoisie, and a kind of "White Terror" was inaugurated in which numbers of the *Cabochiens* lost their lives. Burgundy paid the penalty for his intrigues, and found himself for the moment so unpopular that he had to leave the capital. The absolutist reaction thus became an anti-Burgundian reaction and the Armagnacs found their way back to Paris. The *Ordonnance Cabochienne* was annulled. Burgundy made a futile attempt to return to Paris and, when he failed in this, agreed to peace at Arras (23 February, 1415).

The Armagnacs now, almost in spite of themselves, drifted into the position of defenders of the nationality of France. This position was thrust upon them by the determination of Burgundy, after his failure in 1414-1415, to cement a definite alliance with the national foe. It was emphasized by the identification of the Armagnac party with the movement in favour of a national or Gallican Church. Even after the submission of France to the Papal See Benedict XIII had remained intractable; and during the ascendancy of Burgundy, who clung to the policy of withdrawal, the right to collation of benefices and the right to tax the clergy, two of his most important privileges, were withdrawn from the Pope (1407). Gregory XII, the Roman Pope,¹ was really anxious to end the schism, and offered to meet Benedict to discuss a joint abdic-

¹ Gregory XII became Pope in 1406.

tion. When Benedict's insincerity became patent France withdrew her allegiance, and the Pope replied with a bull of excommunication. By 1408, therefore, France was completely alienated from the Papacy and under the necessity of organizing her own ecclesiastical affairs. Annual Provincial Councils were instituted and the powers of Primate and Metropolitans increased. Meanwhile the malcontent cardinals on both sides, meeting at Pisa, deposed both Gregory and Benedict and elected Alexander V. But instead of the result they had anticipated this action only provided Europe with three Popes instead of two. In 1414, therefore, a council was summoned to Constance to see if the schism could be ended. It deposed John (Alexander's successor) and Benedict, and—Gregory consenting to resign—the unity of Christendom was restored in the person of Martin V.

On this the question naturally arose whether France should return to a position of complete submission to the Pope or whether she should insist on retaining the autonomy she had won during the schism. The idea of National Churches, more or less independent and autonomous, within the Universal Church thus came into violent opposition to the idea of an absolute pontifical power vested in the Pope. And, just as they had drifted into the position of a national political party, the Armagnacs now drifted into the position of a national Church party. The political and ecclesiastical divisions advanced *pari passu*. In the Armagnac South-West Gallicanism held the field, in the Burgundian districts the cause of orthodoxy prevailed.

To France, thus doubly divided, the death of Henry IV of England and the accession of his stirring and ambitious son came as a thunder-clap. Henry V promptly invited Charles to restore him his kingdom of France and demanded the hand of his daughter Catherine. A French mission was sent to speak him fair; but he would hear nothing, and in August, 1415, landed at Chef de Caux. Harfleur was taken (22 September) and Henry set out on the usual march for Calais. The bridges of the Somme had been broken and a considerable French army began to harass the invaders.

Henry was foiled in his attempt to utilize the ford of Blanchetaque which had stood Edward III in such good stead, and the English had to march up the Somme as far as Nesle, where they effected a crossing. Bourbon and Orleans lay between them and Calais, and a battle was inevitable. Agincourt was fought on 25 October. The French had elected to give battle on a restricted plain, where they had no room to deploy and so utilize their immense numerical superiority. They could only, therefore, fight in column against the English line and pour one "battle" after another upon the enemy. This manœuvre they had to execute across a ploughed country: drenched with a night's rain, this soon became a sea of mud in which the heavy-armed knights floundered helplessly under the galling fire of the English archers. The first battle under these circumstances collapsed and threw the second into confusion. Nevertheless the latter offered a stout resistance and it was only after severe hand-to-hand fighting that it too gave way. The third turned tail and left the field. Henry was victorious, but his numbers were so small that he thought himself justified in ordering the prisoners to be killed.

Agincourt was a barren victory for England. But it was a stunning blow to France; for the third time in seventy years the flower of her chivalry lay dead. Seven thousand men-at-arms had fallen as against 500 of the English. Two of the Duke of Burgundy's brothers had perished. Orleans was a prisoner. Henry laid down as his irreducible minimum the surrender of Harfleur, and independent sovereignty over everything which had been surrendered at the Treaty of Brétigny. It was now that he entered into a definite secret alliance with Burgundy.

The tide indeed now set strongly in favour of that party. The madness of Charles VI continued intermittently; the Queen, Isabella of Bavaria, prematurely aged and immensely corpulent, could only get about in a *chaise roulante*. She was utterly unprincipled, and what energy she could muster was eventually devoted to the interests of the Duke of Burgundy. The two elder surviving sons of Charles VI died in quick

succession, and Charles the youngest, a boy of fourteen, became Dauphin in 1417. Louis of Anjou, King of the Two Sicilies,¹ the father-in-law and natural protector of the young Dauphin, was already declining to a premature grave.² The Duke of Brittany was playing an ambiguous part, and the leaders of the Armagnacs were as we have seen prisoners in the hands of Henry of England. Under these circumstances it was only the fierce energy of Bernard VII of Armagnac, the father-in-law of the captured Duke of Orleans, who now (1415) became Constable of France, which saved the Armagnacs from utter effacement.

A fresh invasion seemed imminent, and now that the Armagnacs were in the dust it was difficult to see how it could be met. It was clear at any rate that France could not look for protection to the Duke of Burgundy. Although he never ceased to protest his loyalty to the French Crown, there is no reasonable doubt that he was set on obtaining power in France by the aid of English arms. In the autumn of 1416 he had a meeting at Calais with Henry V. The details of this interview were never revealed, but the mere fact that he was in relations with his country's enemy at this critical juncture should have been sufficient proof to all patriots that he was wholly self-seeking. In that same year there had been an attempt at mediation on the part of the Emperor Sigismund, who had visited both Courts and, impressed no doubt with the apparent hopelessness of the French cause, had thrown his weight into the English scale. We may take it for certain that by the autumn of 1416 there was a widespread plot for the overthrow of the Valois dynasty in favour of the house of Lancaster, that this plot was favoured by the Emperor, and had the secret adherence of the Duke of Burgundy, who was no doubt to receive the reward of his adhesion when it had been carried to a successful issue.

Henry set to work with a systematic thoroughness

¹ King of Naples really; he called himself "King of the Two Sicilies" of course, but never set foot in Sicily, which was Aragonese from 1282-1713.

² He died 30 April, 1417.

that denoted a real conqueror. Lower Normandy was made the base of operations, and from that base the intention was to threaten the two chief towns of Northern France—Rouen and Paris. Caen was taken after a month's siege and became the English head-quarters. Bayeux, Argentan, Alençon, Falaise capitulated one after the other, though none of them without severe fighting. Henry systematized his conquest, and converted his occupation into a regular settlement by banishing all who resisted and giving favourable terms and even-handed justice to all who accepted his rule. It is indeed probable, that in the fearful welter in which France was now plunged (a condition which makes one contemporary allude to the country as "a desert," while another describes the period as *hydeux temps*),¹ the most fortunate of her inhabitants were those who accepted the rule and swore allegiance to the person of Henry V of England.

If further proof were needed of the unscrupulous treachery of Jean Sans Peur it might be found in the fact that it was this moment, when England was knocking at the gates of Rouen, that he chose to march upon Paris. The Duke came of course with fair words in his mouth. He was prodigal of promises of good government, liberties, and remission of taxes, and by fair words won his way to the walls of the city, which he reached in mid-September (1417), without having struck a blow. Paris had always loved the Dukes of Burgundy, and it is creditable to the patriotism of the city that even there men resented the appearance of the Duke at this moment of national danger. "Ceux mesmes qui avoient affection pour luy estoient très mal contens."² It is hardly surprising to read that under the circumstances men suspected him of being in league with the English. The Duke gave up for a time the idea of entering Paris, withdrew to Montlhéry, whence he issued a manifesto to the *bonnes villes*, claiming the government of the kingdom

¹ The "Bourgeois de Paris" (op. cit. pp. 80 and 89) gives a list of current prices in 1417 which shows the great cost of living.

² Jean Juvenal des Ursins (in "Nouvelle Collection des Mémoires," ed. Michaud et Poujoulat, Series I.), Vol. II, p. 535.

in view of the malady of the King and the youth of the Dauphin. There would have been much in this claim had its author not been justly suspected of flagrant treason; as it was no loyal Frenchman could have acknowledged it. One Frenchwoman, however, did accept it—Queen Isabella herself. She allowed herself to be carried off, and aided the Duke to set up an opposition government at Troyes. “Ainsi,” says a Burgundian writer, “se mist la Roine de France au gouvernement du duc Jehan de Bourgoingne et laissa le Roy son seigneur et son filz le duc de Touraine Dauffin.” The royal government was at its wits’ end and opened vain negotiations with the King of England. D’Armagnac led an army against Senlis but was unable to take the place, and it became clear that it would be necessary to treat with the Duke. A conference was held at the monastery of la Tombe near Montereau, but the Council refused to ratify the terms proposed. Treachery admitted the Burgundians within the walls of the Capital (28 May). Then the Burgundianism of the city became apparent. Massacre became the order of the day. “Faites ce qu’il vous plaira mes amis,” said the *prévôt*, and they did, with the result that no less than 5000 persons, including the Constable (d’Armagnac) himself, were murdered in cold blood. The actual instruments of the massacre were a band of *Cabochins* led by the executioner Capeluche.

It was not till 14 July (1418) that the Duke himself and the Queen entered the city, and their advent was only the signal for a fresh outbreak of bloodshed. Order was gradually restored and Capeluche was executed. Confiscation followed massacre. Thus amidst misery and bloodshed the Burgundian regime was inaugurated in the Capital. Jean *Sans Peur* had learnt his lesson. He realized that he could not hope to retain the position of power which he had won unless he made some show of offering resistance to the national enemy. He therefore made loud profession of his intention of marching against the English. Henry V was now before Rouen, and that city, which in size, riches, and importance was almost the equal of Paris, made repeated appeals for help to the Duke. Jean *Sans Peur* after long delays made some feeble pretence of

moving to its assistance ; his friends called him, and called him with justice, "le plus long homme en toutes ses besongnes qu'on peust trouver". He was really something worse ; a traitor who never intended to offer more than a show of opposition to the invader. Rouen capitulated on 19 January, 1419, after a glorious resistance, and with Rouen fell, for the time being, the work of Philip Augustus. Normandy returned after 200 years into English hands ; Henry went on steadily organizing his conquest, established a regular government, and struck a coinage upon which he described himself as *Rex Franciæ*. After the fall of Rouen the surrender of the outlying fortresses was a foregone conclusion ; Château-Gail-lard was the last to fall. Mont-Saint-Michel alone defied the power of England.

Meanwhile the youthful Dauphin, who had escaped from Paris when the Burgundians had entered the town, had assumed the leadership of the Armagnacs. With Charles VII when he becomes king we shall have much to do. He is one of the most enigmatic characters in French history. But in the very difficult position in which he now found himself he conducted himself with dignity and energy, and no act of his was inconsistent with the patriotism which he professed. His first step was to appeal to the Princes and to the loyal towns to support him. In the summer of 1418 he commenced military operations, and wisely refused to allow himself to be enticed to Paris by the wiles of the Duke and his unnatural mother. The Dauphin's attitude was, however, far from inconciliatory, and he left no doubt from the first of his genuine desire to bury the hatchet if he could and to unite France against the national foe. He was willing to give all possible consideration to the Duke, and only insisted on the very reasonable condition that the latter should renounce any treaty he might have contracted with any of the King's enemies. He embarked, therefore, on negotiations for a treaty with the Duke of Burgundy and it was only a shameless attempt on the part of the latter to trick him into signing terms to which he had not agreed that brought the negotiations to an end. The Dauphin now saw that he must resort

to arms. He was roundly accused by the Duke of the very crime of which the latter was guilty, to wit of parleyings with the English. Charles besieged and took Tours and assumed the title of Regent. But he "was not bellicose by nature" and was throughout his life too ready to drop the sword. He proposed a truce of three years which the Duke declined, offering three months : Charles weakly accepted ; he was still hopeful of arranging a real settlement with Burgundy ; but Burgundy was busily negotiating with the English. The opinion of his Council, however, was dead against him, and he was obliged by them to turn an attentive but ever treacherous ear to the Dauphin's proposals. On 8 July, 1419, at Pouilly, the interview so long desired by Charles and so long avoided by John at length took place. Burgundy was there much against his will and purely to throw a sop to public opinion. He had no genuine desire for peace, and it was not very creditable to the sagacity of the Dauphin and his advisers that they believed it possible that a genuine peace might be the result of the meeting. Although negotiations were once broken off, terms were ultimately arranged. Every one cried "Noel, Noel" ; the two princes embraced, heard Mass together, and shared the Holy Wafer. The unhappy divisions appeared to be finally ended and all seemed ready for a combined attack on the English invaders. Those invaders were now at work in earnest, for on 31 July, 1419, Pontoise fell into their hands : it is not impossible that it was by the treachery of Burgundy that it did so. At any rate instead of flinging himself upon the enemy, as he was bound to do by the Treaty of Pouilly, he withdrew the King to Troyes and left Henry to threaten Paris unmolested.

A further meeting had been arranged for 26 August at the bridge of Montereau. But on both sides there was hesitation. We must not forget that the Duke of Burgundy was the avowed instigator of the assassination of the Duke of Orleans, and therefore meetings with him could not be regarded as free from danger. His treachery, moreover, must have been apparent even to the trusting Dauphin, and indeed it is difficult to see what, besides recrimination, he can have expected from

this second interview. Perhaps he only desired to show himself true to his tryst. After considerable delay on the part of Burgundy and hesitations on both sides, the two princes met for the second and last time (10 September, 1419). The evening was drawing in when Jean *Sans Peur* set foot on the bridge where his rival was awaiting him. It had been closed at each end with a palisade, and a *parc* had been constructed upon it, into which no more than ten named companions were admitted with either principal. "Mon très honoré et doubte seigneur je prie à Dieu qu'il vous doint bon soir et bonne vie"; with these words the Duke, kneeling to the Dauphin, began the conversation. "Beau Cousin," the Dauphin replied, "vous soyez le très bien venu." But it was not long before the conversation took a different turn. The Dauphin reproached the Duke with his failure to carry out the recent treaty. He also pointed out that he had been waiting a fortnight at the appointed tryst for the interview. "Mon très honoré seigneur," struck in the Duke, "je suis venu quand je l'ai pu." And he urged the Dauphin to come and discuss the whole matter in the presence of the King. To do so would have been to put his head in the lion's mouth and the Dauphin replied, "Je suis mieux ici qu'avec lui, et j'irai vers monseigneur mon père quand bon me semblera et non à votre volonté". The exchange of words got more and more heated. Each called the other a liar. The Duke laid his hand on his sword, and one of his companions actually laid hands on the Dauphin and threatened him. At this the Dauphin's companions, who had probably throughout expected an assault, closed round their master and withdrew him from the *parc*. In the tumult swords were drawn, and the men-at-arms rushed in from outside, ignorant of what was passing and crying "Kill! Kill!" Meanwhile a "large brown man"—one of the Dauphin's companions—had lunged at the Duke and he had fallen covered with blows. He was already dead when the men-at-arms rushed in, and it is a significant fact that his men had only delayed to interfere because they believed that it was the Dauphin who had fallen.

The question of the responsibility for the murder of Monte-

reau has divided historians.¹ The Duke's hesitation to come to the interview has been urged as proof that he suspected treachery. It is far more likely that he was the plotter; probably he only desired to get possession of the Dauphin's person.² But after all Jean *Sans Peur* was a tried assassin. The most likely explanation is this: both sides entered the *parc* suspecting treachery; one side—that of Jean—probably intending it. Both were therefore in a very nervous condition. The Dauphin's companions had many of them been companions of the murdered Duke of Orleans, and at the first angry word they remembered that they were dealing with a man whose hands were red with their late master's blood. And so they struck, and through the crack they made in the Duke's skull "the English entered France".³ The truth of these words⁴ is only a half-truth. The English were already in France and had had the support of the Burgundians long before the murder of Montereau. That event only made irrevocable a condition of affairs which already existed.

Though the new Duke hesitated, it was not to be expected that he would come to terms with his father's assassin. From this time forward the causes of England and Burgundy are closely interwoven. Philip the Good turned a deaf ear to the Dauphin's overtures; he reopened negotiations with England, and on 20-21 May, 1420, the Treaty of Troyes was signed between the King of England and the King of France, the

¹ Charles gave the following explanation of the murder: "À l'eure que nous convenismes avec lui, lui remonstrames amiablement . . . mès le nous trouvasmes en tel égreur que bien apparut que il avait en son cuer la dicte entention de nous prendre". Nouailles drew his sword and threatened the Dauphin, whose companions then intervened with fatal results (quoted in Chastellain's "Chronicle," ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove, 1863-6, I. 51).

² Kervyn de Lettenhove in his History of Flanders develops the theory that the Duke had been plotting to take the Dauphin prisoner.

³ Or, as Henry V himself put it: "Par sa mort à l'ayde de Dieu et de St. Georges, sommes au dessus de notre desir. Sy aurons malgré tous Français Dame Katherine, que tant avons désirée" (Jean de Wavrin, "Anchiennes chroniques d'Engleterre," ed. Dupont, for Société de l'histoire de France, 1858).

⁴ They are attributed to a monk who exhibited the skull of Jean *Sans Peur* to Francis I.

latter acting under the advice and tutelage of the new Duke of Burgundy. It was afterwards ratified by the States General (6 January, 1421). By this shameful treaty the wretched King was made to disown his own son, the *soi-disant* Dauphin de Viennois, and to adopt the King of England as his successor, the latter being betrothed to his daughter Catherine. Normandy and the conquered districts were handed over to him at once. Thus was accomplished the surrender to England which had so long been contemplated by the Burgundian party. Had the Burgundians really represented France there would have been an end of national independence. But the King, the nominal author of the treaty, was a puppet, and the Burgundian party, though for the moment it had the upper hand, was but a party and had placed itself on the losing because the anti-national side. "Nec fas nec naturale est Francos Anglis . . . subiici." The words were more true in 1420 than they had been when Suger wrote them.

The Dauphin was at Bourges when he heard of the treaty. His miserable condition has been well described by Chastellain, "Véoit et oyoit toutes ces choses contraires à lui grandement et désespérables. Véoit le duc bourgongnon son beau père estre en grand effort et puissant devers le Roy et que par lui et à son appetit toutes les choses de ce royaume se traitoient: véoit à l'autre lez sa sœur estre accordée au Roy anglais contre tout humain droit et divin et que par ceste alliance et amitié incompatible il seroit expulsé et dejeté de son heritage piteusement et fraudé par les deux puissances conjointes. Durement fust esbahy certes et non merveilles."¹

Henry V entered Paris on 1 December, 1420; others have done this and found like him that Paris was not France. He rode into the city at the mad King's side. His mien was proud and he looked askance at the populace ("d'un œil estrange"). Paris had been convulsed at the news of the murder and a deputation had been sent at once to the new duke:² and

¹ Chastellain, op. cit. I. 120.

² Chastellain, op. cit. I. 68: "Ceux de Paris aussi desbaretés en la cruelle et fraudulente mort de leur très cher seigneur le duc Jehan vinrent à refuge cy-aussi".

now Paris, in Chastellain's words, became a second London. But France would not be a second England. The States General and the University¹ might declare adherence to the Treaty of Troyes, and Paris display its delight in dancing and carolling, but neither States General nor University nor Paris spoke the feeling of France. That feeling was organizing itself in the South and West where the Dauphin, having secured the adherence of Languedoc through the local Estates, was building up a centre of resistance which embraced practically all France south of the Loire. He won, or rather the Earl of Buchan and the Scots auxiliaries won for him, the battle of Beaugé (1421) in which Henry's brother Clarence lost his life, and carried the war into the Île de France to the great discomfort of Paris. Henry, who had returned to England, was obliged to resume operations in France (10 June, 1421). He had little difficulty in driving the Armagnacs south once more.

It was clear that, so long as that deliberate, fierce, and mighty warrior lived, and so long as he enjoyed the support of the Burgundians, the Armagnacs, though they might keep up a stout resistance, could not hope to make themselves masters of France. The year 1422 brought relief. Henry died in the prime of his age on 21 August. No Englishman before or since has wrought such havoc in France—havoc too which by no means ended with his death. For in his cold, clear-sighted wisdom he had built up a system which his successors might carry on. In the same year that tragic figure Charles VI was mercifully removed from the stage on which he had played so sorry a part. Thus the struggle fell to be carried on by new hands, and soon the clouds were destined to lift from the brow of the kingdom—soon, but not yet.

¹ The University sent an offer of support to the widowed duchess on 16 October.

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CHAPTER XVI

CHARLES VII

(1422-1461)

ACCORDING to the terms of the Treaty of Troyes not the Dauphin Charles, but Henry VI, the baby English Prince, was heir to the crown of France, and the Duke of Bedford, Henry V's brother, had been nominated Regent in the latter's will. In November, 1422, Bedford came to Paris and extracted an oath of fidelity.¹ A good deal of "sedition" was talked, even in the North, but there seemed no help for it, and the oath was taken. So there were now two kings in France, the one a baby, the other apparently a *fainéant*, and one very capable Regent; to his administration because it was the only administration worthy of the name, our attention may first be given.

Bedford was the typical Lancastrian; cold, cruel, and avaricious he could never win men's affections; an upright ruler, a born organizer, and an astute judge of men and things, he was sure to win their respect. He maintained an admirable discipline and a high degree of efficiency in the army of occupation, and this gave him an immense superiority over the Armagnacs. The English domination extended over most of Northern, and North-Central France; but it was really only in the Île de France and Normandy, and especially in Paris itself, that it was a civil government and had a chance of development. Bedford's idea was to disturb as little as possible, to govern France by French ideas and as far as possible by French officials. Only the *Parlement de Paris*, packed and

¹ Some took the oath willingly, others *de très malvèse volonté* ("Journal d'un bourgeois," op. cit. pp. 182-3).

Anglo-Burgundian though it was, provoked his anger by its interference and intractability. A special Council governed Normandy, with a *Chambre des Comptes* at Caen. The Regent behaved in the most conciliatory fashion to the conquered districts, allowing the past to bury the past, and introducing many statesmanlike reforms; he replaced the coinage on a sound footing, confirmed the privileges and charters of many towns, reformed the abuses of justice in the Court of the *Châtelet*, and abandoned the scheme by which his brother had attempted to colonize certain towns and districts with English. But Bedford was really crying peace when there was no peace. He was applying to a country which was only half conquered the methods applicable to one which was completely conquered; the very districts to which his beneficent policy applied were subject to invasion and devastation by the Armagnacs, and subject also to heavy taxation by the Regent in order that the invasions might be met and the devastation prevented. Bedford's settlement of Northern and Central France must therefore be regarded as premature.

With this enlightened but oppressive government we may contrast the government of the "King of Bourges," for it was there that Charles "the Dauphin" held his Court. Charles VII has been reproached because he did not rise superior to the situation in which at his accession—if accession it can be called—he was placed. The wonder really is that, under the stigma of murder, disowned by his own mother, the tool of a frivolous faction, deprived of his Capital and of half his kingdom, he should have kept up resistance as well as he did to what must have seemed to him a terrible destiny.¹ The tragic event of Montereau had thrown him wholly into the arms of the Armagnac adventurers who had been responsible for the murder of Jean *Sans Peur*. He was bound to these men by the consciousness of a common guilt.

¹ Charles was one of the few French kings who disliked fighting: "Il ne s'armoit mie vollentiers," says a fifteenth century chronicler, "et n'avoit point chier la guerre, s'il s'en eust peu passer". Pierre de Fenin, "Mémoires" (in Michaud et Poujoulat, "Nouvelle Collection des Mémoires," Ser. I), Vol. II, p. 618.

Frotier, the *Grand Écuyer*, Louvet, President of the Council, and Tanneguy du Chastel, *Grand Maître de l'Hôtel du Roi*, at this moment entirely dominated the King; they were all adventurers of low rank, who had been concerned in the affair of Montereau. Nothing can be clearer than that the hesitations of Charles VII in the early years of his reign, his easy acceptance of favourites who were imposed upon him, his gloomy self-repression, were the outcome of the affair of Montereau which haunted him throughout his early life. Neither must it be forgotten that the close identification of the King with the ultra-Armagnac party was in another way disastrous. The extreme Armagnacs were primarily anti-Burgundian, only secondarily anti-English. They were as deaf as the Burgundians to the promptings of patriotism, and the King was now their man. He remained the tool of a party until he was captured by the great wave of national feeling which swept the English out of France.

In 1423 the Armagnacs advanced into Burgundy and besieged Cravant, but the attempt failed and they were completely routed. Negotiations were next opened with the Duke of Brittany, who had been swinging in the balance, with the result that the Duke's brother Arthur (better known as the Count de Richemont) was appointed Constable of France (7 March, 1435). His advent involved the disappearance of the royal favourites, and the advent of a fresh batch whose names need not detain us. But in an evil moment Richemont introduced to Court the most unworthy of them all—Georges de la Tremoille. He soon found that instead of an agent he had given himself a master. By dint of blustering and bullying la Tremoille attained a complete ascendancy over the King and soon persuaded him to take up arms against his own Constable. Thus began a civil war within a civil war, which lasted for five years. Meanwhile the English invasion had been progressing; Maine and Anjou were the principal objectives. The resistance, however, was strenuous and in 1424 the Armagnacs made preparations for a great effort. A fresh Scottish contingent of about 3000 had arrived under Archibald, Earl of Douglas, who was created Duke of Touraine, and a de-

cisive battle was fought (17 August, 1424) between 12,000 English and 20,000 Scots and French at Verneuil in Alençon. The Scots were practically exterminated, Buchan and Douglas and the latter's son were killed, and the Armagnac army utterly cut to pieces.¹

Complications in England robbed the Duke of Bedford of the fruits of this decisive victory and until 1428, during his absence in England, the war languished. The English, however, gradually pushed forward over Maine and by 1425 Bedford was able to consider plans for the conquest of Anjou. Obviously no further step could be taken in this direction until Orleans, which had resisted all English attacks, had fallen. It was not, however, till October, 1428, that the Earl of Salisbury appeared before Orleans and laid siege to the town. The Earl was killed almost at once and Suffolk succeeded him in the command. On 12 February, 1429, an attempt on the part of the French to cut off a convoy (Battle of the Herrings) was foiled. Orleans seemed to be doomed. The demoralization of Charles VII's Government was complete. The "kingdom of Bourges" was rent with internal dissensions. There was no one to offer resistance, and the whole of Central France seemed likely to go the way in which Orleans was going.

Yet, although from the military point of view things seemed well-nigh desperate, and men were even discussing the question whether the King should withdraw into Dauphiné or fly to Castille, there were signs that the fortunes of France were on the turn. In the first place the English were becoming more and more involved in troubles at home; their forces in France were gradually dwindling: secondly, there was a distinct improvement at the Court of Charles VII. Richemont was still Constable, and men like Dunois and d'Alençon were beginning to push their way to the top in spite of the continued presence of la Tremoille, and although the King himself remained plunged in an incurable lethargy. Philip of Burgundy, again, was beginning to show signs of

¹ "Journal d'un bourgeois de Paris," op. cit. pp. 197-9.

wavering. The alliance with England was profitable indeed but it was unpopular, and Philip could not exist without popularity. But the really hopeful sign was the low muttering of patriotic feeling among the humbler classes of the people, and it was from the ranks of the peasants that the leadership came that drove the English out of France and placed the King on his throne.

About noon on 6 March, 1429, there arrived at the Castle of Chinon a young girl clad in male garments and escorted by two friends and their servants.¹ She had travelled a hundred and fifty leagues, she said, from Lorraine and had a message for the King which could only be delivered to his own ears. After considerable inquiry and delay Jeanne d'Arc was admitted to the royal presence. She assured Charles that she had a mission from above to save Orleans and to procure his coronation. She also privately gave him the assurance *de la part de Messire* that he was of a truth the heir of France and son of the late King, a fact of which even he, after his mother's repudiation of him, seems to have been in doubt. From that moment Charles believed that she was inspired. Nevertheless, before he would put himself in her hands he submitted her to the examination of the University and *Parlement*, who after minute inquiry declared that they found no harm in *la Pucelle* but only "good, humility, virginity, devotion, honesty, and simplicity"—a pronouncement which might serve as the verdict of history on Jeanne d'Arc.

On 22 March she was nominated *Chef de Guerre*, and under that title addressed a vigorous Ultimatum to the English concluding with the words, "Je suis cy venu de par Dieu le Roy de Ciel pour vous bouter hors de toute France". She was next provided with an army, and the King himself supplied her with chargers and armour. She proved an expert horse-

¹ Jean de Novelonpont, a young man-at-arms who knew her father and mother slightly, and who had promised to lead her to the King, and Bertrand de Poulengy, an esquire, who had several times visited Jeanne's parents in their house. They took their two servants, and Richard an Archer, and the King's messenger, Colet de Vienne, also rode with her.

woman and a hardy campaigner, spending days and nights together without removing her armour.

To the sound of the *Veni Creator* the army of relief set forth from Blois on 28 April, 1429. On the 29th, with a few companions, the Maid threw herself into Orleans, the bulk of the army falling back, to reach the city five days later. The magnetism of her presence put new life into the garrison, who were not so much hard pressed by the English as paralysed by the long duration of the English military superiority. It was just this paralysis that Jeanne put an end to. "From the moment of her appearance the English, who up to that time could with 200 of their men have put to rout 800 or 1000 of ours, were unable with all their power to resist 400 or 500 French."¹ Her triumph was not so much therefore a military triumph as one of character. It was not generalship that the French had lacked, but just that confidence and courage which Jeanne brought and which was more valuable than the most skilful tactics. On 8 May the siege was raised. Orleans was saved and the first part of Jeanne's mission was accomplished. She would have proceeded to Reims at once to crown the King, but it was decided that the country south of the Loire must first be cleared. The campaign by which this clearance was effected was an unbroken success. Suffolk was taken prisoner; Jargeau and Beaugency fell; Falstaff and Talbot were defeated on 18 June at Patay, Talbot being taken prisoner. The way to Reims was thus opened and on 29 June Charles set out to assume his crown. The French swept round Paris by the upper waters of the Yonne, Seine, and Marne, reaching Reims on 16 July; the ceremony was performed on the following day.

But Jeanne's mission would not be accomplished until France was wholly cleared of the English. The next step was obviously to recover the Capital. Philip the Good had been much shaken by recent events, and sent an embassy to the coronation and made overtures of peace. A truce with Burgundy was arranged on 28 August, but by an incredible act of folly the defence of Paris was expressly excluded. It

¹ Testimony of the Bastard of Orleans in the Trial of Rehabilitation. See Fabre, "*Procès de Rehabilitation de Jeanne d'Arc*" (1888), p. 193.

was not surprising that the attack failed. Jeanne herself was wounded leading an attack on the Porte Saint Honoré. Much of the prestige that had accrued from the coronation was thus thrown away. The French retreated towards the Loire, and things began to drift back into the position in which Jeanne had found them. The Maid was never intended for the wretched police work on which she was now employed. It is easy to say that she should have realized that her mission was at an end. But it was difficult for a woman of her high mettle to desert her companions-in-arms when they had fallen on evil times. Chafing at the want of energy displayed at Court, she set out ill-supported, in the spring of 1430 to assist the royalists to the East of Paris. In May she forced her way into Compiègne, which was besieged by Burgundians. On 23 May, while leading a sally of the besieged, she was surrounded and taken prisoner.¹ Six months later her captors sold her to the English who, raw from their defeats and anxious to undermine the prestige which had accrued to Charles VII from his connexion with her, handed her to the Bishop of Beauvais, an ardent Burgundian named Pierre Cauchon.² She was brought to Rouen, accused of witchcraft, and put on trial.

The trial of Jeanne d'Arc, by reason of the hold which its victim has always had over men's imaginations, by reason also of the existence of a complete *procès-verbal* in an available form, has stirred the most profound indignation against her judges. Yet it is doubtful if it greatly differed from many similar trials of which obscurer persons were the victims. Evidence in prisoner's favour suppressed, counsel withheld from prisoner during the most critical stage of the trial, fatal advice tendered under seal of confession, spies in prison to catch prisoner in talk, the exhibition of instruments of torture ;

¹ Her actual captor was the Bastard of Wandonne; he handed her over to Jean de Luxemburg, who sold her to the English.

² Chastellain, *op. cit.* (i. 204), describes Cauchon as *très noble et très solomnel clere, qui tout son temps avoit léalement porté et maintenu le parti de Bourgogne*. It is an illustration of Chastellain's inveterate Burgundianism that he thought the Maid an impostor.

all these and worse than these Jeanne had to submit to. But this was everyday work for men nurtured in the traditions of the Inquisition. It shocks us because we are not able to enter into the spirit of the times, and because all that is best in the spirit of all times goes out to the stainlessness and undaunted courage of the Maid of Orleans.

Jeanne displayed not only courage but considerable subtlety¹ under the ordeal. Occasionally she confounded her judges by the shrewdness of her answers. It must be acknowledged, however, that she was often inconsistent and that her memory was continually at fault. Often too she simply refused to answer, brushing the questions aside with the words *passez outre*. As she stood firm and nothing prejudicial to the King could be extracted from her, they began to pass sentence on her. Under this ordeal she gave way and recanted. She had been much shaken because her "voices" had kept assuring her that she would be delivered. Her endurance too must have been strained to breaking-point, surrounded as she had been for weeks by cunning and implacable enemies, subjected to the most cruel treatment and denied the consolation of the Sacrament, finally confronted with the immediate prospect of a cruel death. So she recanted, and her sentence was commuted to one of lifelong imprisonment. Having got her abjuration, they proceeded by the foulest means to get her to relapse. She was grossly assaulted in the military prison into which she was illegally cast, and, her female clothes being removed, she was obliged to break the terms of her abjuration by resuming her male attire. Professing a well-feigned despair the judges now pronounced her a relapsed heretic. Death was no doubt in her eyes preferable to such a captivity. On 30 May Cauchon pronounced her sentence in the old market at Rouen, handing her over to the secular authorities with the prayer that they would "moderate their judgment"—the current euphemism for burning at the stake. Jeanne met her fate with fortitude

¹ "Jeanne was very subtle, with the subtlety of a woman as I consider," said one of the witnesses at the Trial of Rehabilitation. See "*Procès de condamnation et de rehabilitation de Jeanne d'Arc*" (ed. Quicherat, for Société de l'histoire de France, 1841-9), I. 21, 338, 358.

and devotion, calling repeatedly on the name of the Lord Jesus. The multitude was horrified and only some English showed signs of pleasure; but even they were frightened: "We have killed a saint," some of them said. Twenty-five years later a formal sentence of rehabilitation confirmed the popular verdict. The processes and sentence of Cauchon and his fellows were pronounced "full of cozenage, iniquity, inconsequences, and manifest errors," and the memory of the Maid was rescued from the aspersions under which it had lain. Before that day the English had been driven out of France in face of the national spirit which she had brought into being.

The episode of Jeanne d'Arc has been and still is the subject of lively controversy. This is not surprising, for there is no other occasion in history where one is suddenly arrested in the sequence of natural events by the intrusion of a factor which claims to be supernatural. We are asked on the one hand to accept the Maid as a saint and a prophetess, armed with heavenly weapons, counselled directly from above, and endowed with supernatural powers; on the other to put her down as a fanatic, the victim of hallucinations, foisted on a credulous nation by a crafty priesthood. One of the latest of her biographers (M. Anatole France) has devoted much ingenuity to proving that she was inspired by Churchmen, that she had no military skill, was treated in fact by the generals as no more than a *porte bonheur* or talisman, that she was subject to hallucinations and that the work she accomplished has been magnified out of all proportion. It is probable that the military skill attributed to her is largely imaginary. Hers was a higher mission—a spiritual one. What she brought to the French was something more than military skill, the fire and confidence *pour bouter les Anglais hors de toute la France*. No amount of military genius would have been as valuable as the sight of her banner in the thickest of the fray. So too there is truth in the assertion that she appeared at the psychological moment, that the cause of England was already doomed. But even M. France would hardly deny that she was the chief instrument in their overthrow.

The question whether she was inspired by Churchmen seems beside the point. It is possible that she may have been, though M. France cannot be said to have proved it. If so it is not to her discredit; nor does it detract from the value or the wonder of her career. There remains the question of the voices or hallucinations. It is impossible here to go into the medical and scientific arguments. But there can be no doubt that, to her, the voices were absolutely real. And it is difficult to accept a non-miraculous solution for a series of events so extraordinary as those which have been narrated.

Witch, sorceress, saint or simple maiden, of one thing there has never been the slightest doubt. Not even when her captors were weaving their terrible web of calumny round her were they able to tarnish the fair fame of their victim. The testimony of all who fought beside her is unanimous as to her spotless purity. She established a new tone among the soldiers; she chased away their mistresses herself with a drawn sword; she would allow no swearing in her presence; she liked to have her soldiers shrived before they went to battle. The testimony of the Bastard of Orleans has the ring of truth: "Neither I nor others, when we were with her, had ever an evil thought; there was in her something divine". Few will be found to contradict this assertion; it is when we try to fix the limits of the divine that our difficulties begin. What part had Charles VII played in this drama? Did he do anything to rescue the Maid? Or was there nothing that he could do? Alas! history can record little to his credit. It is difficult to believe that it would have been impossible for him to ransom Jeanne from her first captor. At least he might have tried, and there is no evidence that he did so. Once she was in the hands of the English the matter was more difficult. It is doubtful if anything that Charles could have done would have served a good purpose. It would, however, have been better for his memory if he had ignored results and made some move—offered to exchange prisoners or made some hostile demonstration. But the records are inexorably silent. Apologists have been found to maintain that he may have negotiated and even threatened.

The proofs are too slender: *Le Roi fut moult dolent mais remedier n'y peut*. The most that can be said is that the King was still completely in the hands of men like la Tremoille who were afraid and jealous of Jeanne, and that in the end he did what he could to secure her rehabilitation. His treatment of the Maid must remain the chief stain on his not too spotless scutcheon. Matters now relapsed into the miserable condition in which Jeanne had found them—the King still entirely in the hands of la Tremoille, who continued his career of intrigue and spoliation. While the Court was in a state of penury the favourite displayed an “insolent opulence”. The air was thick with plots, and the rivalry between Richemont and la Tremoille became daily more bitter. For all national purposes the Government was impotent, worse still, it betrayed no anxiety to be anything else. It seemed that the revival which Jeanne d’Arc had evoked was to die away as quickly as it had arisen. But, although Charles had abandoned the idea of re-establishing the unity of the kingdom at the point of the sword, he was still assiduously working for a reconciliation with Philip of Burgundy. Ever since 1422 there had been attempts at mediation on the part of the Popes and of Amadeus of Savoy, and on every occasion Charles had displayed his willingness to treat. After 1430 the war, it is true, continued for five years on the old lines, though only in a half-hearted fashion, but during that period the hope of arriving at an accommodation between Burgundy and France was daily growing, and that for a multitude of reasons.

In the first place Burgundy was weary of the war, and it was becoming more and more difficult to raise the necessary supplies. The campaigns of 1429-30 had been a failure, and Philip was getting more and more discontented with the support given him by the English. The relations between Philip and the Duke of Bedford were becoming strained, and when Henry VI was crowned King of France (at Notre Dame not at Reims) Philip absented himself from the ceremony. This rift was greatly widened by the death, in 1432, of the Duchess of Bedford and Bedford’s hasty and unsanctioned marriage to a vassal of Burgundy. The deceased

Duchess was a sister of Philip, and she had been influential in maintaining the Anglo-Burgundian alliance. Add to this the fact that Philip was getting more and more anxious about his relations with the German powers, who viewed with growing dissatisfaction his encroachments eastwards. The last of these encroachments had been his acquisition of Brabant, and this had profoundly disturbed the Emperor Sigismund, who entered into negotiations with Charles VII, a step in which he was followed by Frederick, Duke of Austria. Philip was thus confronted with the prospect of a hostile German league; he was the more ready to negotiate because he knew that Charles was willing to give him handsome terms. La Tremoille, one of his fiercest enemies, had fallen, and his timely disappearance undoubtedly aided the cause of peace.

Time after time the delegates of the various parties had met, only to separate without having arrived at terms. Truces there had been in plenty, but nothing more. The main obstacle was the reluctance which Philip felt for excluding the English from the treaty. And no terms that Charles could propose would satisfy the English, who insisted that Henry VI must be recognized King of France. At last, under the mediation of the Pope, a congress assembled at Arras on 5 August, 1435. The three interested powers were represented; Philip indeed appeared in person. Charles offered Normandy and English Guyenne, to be held as fiefs of the French Crown. The Papal legate called the offer *grande, notable et raisonnable* and the lands offered *la meilleure et la plus saine tierce partie du royaume de France*. But the English ambassadors flatly refused to consider the offer and all hope of a general peace was at an end. It remained to be seen if Philip could be persuaded to make terms without the co-operation of his allies. There was an angry scene between the Duke and the English emissaries, who shook the dust of the conference off their feet. Philip, however, who was bound by oath not to make an independent peace, hesitated long. While he was hesitating the death of Bedford (September 14) removed one of the greatest obstacles to peace. At last Philip gave his consent and the treaty was drawn

up and signed. Its terms were sufficiently humiliating for the King. The first clauses referred to the murder of Montreau; in effect Charles said: "I was very young and very foolish, and please forgive me. Name those whom you think were guilty and they shall be punished, and after that consent to bury the hatchet; I will found a religious house on the spot where the said *mauvais cas* happened, where masses shall be said daily for your lamented father's soul." Honour thus satisfied, it became a matter of material concessions. In this respect also the terms offered by Charles were amply generous. Macon, Auxerre, and Bar-sur-Seine were handed to Burgundy, together with the important district known as the "towns of the Somme," which included all the royal possessions eastward of that river and on both banks thereof, with the exception of Saint-Amand and Tournai. The King of France, however, reserved the right to repurchase this district for 400,000 crowns.¹ In addition to these substantial concessions the King of France agreed to exempt Burgundy from all royal taxation and to forego the ceremony of homage in the case of the reigning Duke. As long as Philip lived, in fact, Burgundy should be independent. In return for all this the Duke graciously consented to "remove all rancour from his heart," never to refer to the death of his father, and to live on peaceable terms with France.

One-sided though it was, the Peace of Arras² was perhaps also the most profitable that a king of France ever signed, for it restored unity to a kingdom which had learnt the terrible lesson of a house divided against itself. France could now turn with hope to face the national foe. With hope but not yet with confidence, for, if at length united, it was clear that the country had reached a pitch of exhaustion that precluded

¹ The term "Somme Towns" had a very extended significance. It included the actual towns on and about the river—Amiens, Saint Quentin, Corbie, Abbeville (but excepting Péronne), all the County of Ponthieu; Doullens, Saint Riquier, etc., and really all the Crown domains beyond the Somme (except Tournai and Saint Amand).

² The Treaty of Arras was ratified by Charles on 10 December, 1435.

all hope of immediate recuperation. Towns and country districts alike were devastated, overrun by bands of brigands who by their horrible cruelties earned for themselves the name of *Écorcheurs*. The Government had neither the strength nor the organization nor the disciplined military force for the re-establishment of order. For the moment then it was only to be expected that any successes would be ephemeral. On the whole the nine years that followed the Treaty of Arras were unexpectedly fruitful. The Duke of Burgundy, it is true, proved a passive rather than an active ally. He prepared an expedition against Calais which proved a complete failure. The Flemish *Communes* then threatened to give trouble and, fully occupied with affairs in his own dominions, he withdrew from active participation in the struggle between England and France.

Secure from enemies in her own household, France could meet England on a fair field. The King, moreover, was in good hands at last and was recovering the activity which had distinguished his youth. His Queen and her mother, his brother-in-law (Charles of Anjou, Duke of Maine), and the Bastard of Orleans were now his chief advisers, while Richemont devoted himself to military affairs. All of these were working sincerely in the national cause, and it seemed that the era of petty jealousies and private quarrels was at an end. And yet during these nine years everything is done with an effort; the blows are the blows of a man recovering from an illness, and who has not had the benefit of convalescence. They were successful only because the enemy at whom they were directed was even more feeble. In point of fact the English during these years suffered more from popular outbreaks in the districts which they occupied than from the organized military efforts of their opponents. Such was the outbreak of 1435 in the Pays de Caux, which quickly extended over the greater part of Normandy and which shook to its foundations the power of the English in the duchy.

The official military expedition had naturally been directed at the heart of France, where the capital was still in the hands of the enemy. Richemont gradually invested the

city and took up his quarters at Saint Denis on 10 April, 1436. It is unlikely that he would have succeeded where Jeanne d'Arc had failed but for assistance from within the walls. Only the extraordinary devotion of the Parisians to the cause of Burgundy had kept them so long submissive to the English yoke. Year by year, however, that yoke had been becoming more unpopular. The points of difference between an Englishman and a Frenchman were bound in the long run to outweigh the points of union between a Parisian and a Burgundian. The Treaty of Arras had unchained these forces of discontent; so that, while Richemont attacked the city from without, the populace fell on the English garrison within, and on 13 April Richemont entered the city. But it was not till the autumn of the following year that Charles could persuade himself to make his royal entry into the Capital; he had associations of childhood which always made Paris distasteful to him. Moreover, the city was as yet no safe place for the royal residence. When, however, on 12 November, 1437, the King at last rode into the city it was in the midst of an enthusiasm which even the most hardened Burgundians were constrained to acknowledge as genuine. Three weeks of Paris, however, were enough for Charles, who then withdrew to the familiar castles of the Loire. The English still swarmed round Paris and for four years the Parisians learnt what it was to have deserted one cause without being secure of the assistance of the other. Not until the fall of Pontoise and the consequent clearing of the country south of the Oise (19 September, 1441) could they regard themselves as secure from English reprisals. It seemed now that Charles VII's bolt was shot. With the exhausted, attenuated, and disorganized forces at his disposal he could do no more. An interval of convalescence was imperative for the sick man. Charles realized this and spent the year 1439 in negotiations for a general peace: the conferences of Gravelines indeed came to nothing, but they bear testimony to the strong desire on both sides to arrive at an accommodation.

In the following year civil war was added to Charles' troubles. Bourbon, who was married to the daughter of Jean *Sans Peur*, had long been the centre of intrigues against the

Crown. He profited by the King's absence at Paris to win over the Dauphin, who had now reached the age of sixteen and was ripe for such work. A design was developed for seizing the person of the King and putting out of the way certain of the royal councillors. The "Praguerie" (so called from the recent similar outbreak at Prague) seemed to be attaining dangerous dimensions when it could boast of the support not only of Bourbon, Alençon, and Dunois, but also had the Dauphin as a figure-head, together with the favourable consideration of the Duke of Brittany and the promise of help from the exiled la Tremoille. The ultimate object of the rebellion was to put the King in tutelage and to place the reins of government nominally in the hands of the Dauphin, but really in those of the revolted nobles. But the rebels found to their surprise that the King was capable of vigorous action. He displayed an energy which we are not accustomed to look for in him, utterly refused to treat with his revolted subjects, and insisted on unconditional submission. By July they had found out their mistake, and that submission had been made; the Dauphin was ordered off to his apanage of Dauphiné (28 July, 1440). The King's spirited conduct was of good augury for the future.

The question of peace with England still engaged attention. Much outside influence was brought to bear on both the principals. There was a strong peace party in England, headed by King Henry himself and the Duke of Suffolk. As for Charles he had always been in favour of peace. Negotiations were therefore reopened in April, 1444. The English offered peace on condition that they received the lands they now occupied, Normandy and Guyenne, in full sovereignty. To this the French could not agree, and the conference had consequently to content itself with arranging a truce of twenty-two months, afterwards extended by successive prolongations to five years (Treaty of Tours, 28 May, 1444). This truce was of inestimable value to France, giving her as it did just that period of recuperation without which she could not have made the final effort which thrust the English out of France.

The nine years between the Peace of Arras and the Truce of 1444 had been years of frightful misery. The expulsion of the English in spite of a few military successes seemed as far off as ever, and meanwhile an indescribable chaos and disorder prevailed. Nevertheless something had been done to reassert the royal authority. Paris at least was in French hands again; moreover, the revenue had been at last put on a satisfactory footing. The *aides* suppressed by Charles on his succession were restored in 1435 and established as a permanent source of revenue, with the additional advantage that the King could levy them without recourse to the *états*. In the same way the *taille* was gradually being converted into an absolute right of the Crown, in fact it may be said that from the year 1440 the control of taxation by the *états* ceased and that an irresponsible King became possessed of a source of revenue which might be increased indefinitely. These two taxes, with the *gabelle* on salt and the domain (which, however, had by the utter exhaustion of the country been reduced to a very low figure), were the main sources of revenue. The *taille* of one year produced rather over a million *livres*, the *aides* rather over half a million, the *gabelles* about 160,000, and the domain about 50,000, making a total revenue of 1,750,000 *livres*. The re-establishment of the royal finances on such an independent footing was a very considerable matter. The currency also, which ever since the operations of Philip the Fair had been in a most irregular state, was once more established on a sound footing.

In one other direction the Crown had scored a success. The schism which had so long rent Christendom had terminated in 1417 in the election of Martin V to the Papal chair.¹ But the long-demanded reforms seemed no nearer. The reforming party in the Church was thrown into antagonism to the Pope, and supremacy of Councils over Popes became the fundamental article in the creed of that party. The King of France and his advisers had made use of the Pope in order to secure the peace with Burgundy and the truce with England; but now that his mediation was no longer needed they threw

¹ *Supra*, p. 274.

themselves on to the side of the reformers, less indeed in any enthusiasm for reform than because they desired to turn the troubles of the Papacy to the advantage of the French Crown. The Council of Basle (1431-38) was attended by a strong French deputation and was much influenced by the representatives of the University of Paris, a stronghold of anti-Papal doctrines. Charles VII identified himself with the policy put forward by the University, which was also adopted by a majority of the Council; in February, 1432, he assembled the French prelates at Bourges and they expressed an opinion favourable to the Council. That body passed a number of stringent reforms and ended its stormy existence by decreeing the suspension of Pope Eugenius (1438). Six months later Charles identified himself with the Council by the famous Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges (7 July, 1438). This measure declared the adherence of the French Church to the doctrine that Councils were superior to Popes, and insisted on the summoning of a Council every ten years. A number of disciplinary reforms were enumerated and the Papal right to the collation of benefices was suppressed, the Papal annates withdrawn, and the Papal jurisdiction in France limited. The Pragmatic Sanction was a complete assertion of the Gallican Policy, initiated by Philip the Fair. The fact that the monarchy was able to adopt a policy so uncompromising is a proof that there was in it a life and vigour which, considering the prolonged eclipse through which it had passed, is outstanding testimony to its inherent vitality. That vitality was now to be further developed under the favourable influences which attended the truce with England.

The most remarkable feature in this period is the transformation of the King. We have already seen the beginnings of his awakening. During the period of the truce the process continued, with the curious result that the reign of Charles VII must always be regarded as two reigns—that of Charles asleep and that of Charles awake—that of Charles Roi de Bourges and that of Charles *le bien-servi*. It is frequently forgotten by historians that such inconsequences of character are not uncommon in human nature. We are too often inclined to write

down a King as a fixed quantity; to do so no doubt simplifies the problem, but it is dangerous to the cause of truth. In Charles' case the change is too complete and too obvious to ignore. To account for it is more difficult. In the search for an explanation it has been suggested that the King's awakening was due to the influence of Agnes Sorel, who at some time towards the middle of the reign (probably about 1444) became his mistress. But it is even open to grave doubt if the connexion with Agnes Sorel began at a date early enough to admit of the belief that it was she who wrought the transformation in the King. It seems, therefore, that we must be content to record the transformation and to examine its results.

First and greatest was the celebrated reform of the army which put into Charles' hands the weapon with which he ultimately freed his country from the foreign domination. All the wisest of Charles' advisers had long since realized that without such a reform it was useless to attempt the task. Asleep, Charles had permitted the army to fall into a condition of anarchy; awake, would he be able to restore discipline and organization? Even before the truce there had been unsuccessful efforts at such a reform. The truce once arranged, the matter was reopened with more prospect of success, and on 9 January, 1445, was passed a measure which dismissed all the unnecessary or inefficient or ill-disciplined troops, and arranged for the reorganization of the remainder in what were called *Compagnies d'ordonnance*: each company was to consist of 100 lances, six men going to every lance: the pay of a lance in the *Compagnies d'ordonnance* was 30 *livres tournois* per month. They were to be quartered in specified towns at the expense of the inhabitants. The captains in command were to be appointed by the King and removable at his pleasure. The result was that the King secured a number of élite and well-organized cavalry regiments in place of the disorderly rabble which he at the same time cashiered. The reform was not popular because it cost money, and that meant heavy taxation, and the wisest reform is unpopular if it costs money. This élite cavalry formed the backbone of the royal army, but when war broke out again it was inadequate. In 1449, there-

fore, an auxiliary force was raised known as the *Compagnies de petite ordonnance* at a much smaller rate of pay—10 *livres* to a man-at-arms and 100 *sols* to an archer. While creating this new force Charles VII did not abandon the feudal right of exacting military service from all holders of fiefs; and the *ban* and *arrière ban* were maintained. In the matter of infantry the French King was entitled to the service of all *roturiers*.¹ But the functions of infantry in war were ill understood, and that arm was deemed of little importance. In practice the bulk of the infantry were either foreign mercenaries or contingents sent by towns. In 1448, however, it was ordained that every group of fifty hearths should furnish one archer or one *arbalétrier*—the King was himself an enthusiastic *arbalétrier*; these archers were to be ready for service when called upon and were to be paid four francs a month when on service. They were exempted from the *taille* and for that reason took the name of *Francs Archers*. They numbered at first about 8000 and formed what we should now call a *landwehr*. Such were the military reforms of Charles VII. They were of the first importance, not only because they put into the King's hand the weapon with which he brought the Hundred Years War to an end, and to an end favourable to France; but also because they were in the main (i.e. so far as regards the *Compagnies d'ordonnance*) a reaction against the employment of mercenaries, and because they provided the Crown with the national standing army which is the first requisite of an absolute monarchy. The reform, therefore, had constitutional as well as military importance.

On 17 July, 1449, the French Council decided for open war, and in August the conquest of Normandy was begun. In exactly a year from that date it was completed with a rapidity which even the most sanguine patriot could hardly have anticipated. Richemont and the Duke of Brittany, who was now on the national side, carried out the campaign in Lower Normandy, while Dunois, assisted by the Comte de Saint Pol and by

¹The word *roturier* appears to be derived from the Latin word *ruptuarius*, which signified a tiller of the soil. It came to be applied to all who were not noble, whether bourgeois, freemen, or otherwise.

Alençon, did the same in Upper Normandy. When Rouen fell on 29 October, 1449, the English under Somerset were obliged to fall back upon Caen. The fortunes of England were not aided by the fierce recriminations which followed on the failure of the Norman campaign. Accusations of treachery flew about and Suffolk was murdered on a king's ship. The increasing anarchy in England was indeed as powerful an agent in the loss of Normandy as was the increasing efficiency of the French. One last effort the English made in the spring of the following year. An army commanded by Thomas Kyriel landed in the Cotentin and threatened Bayeux. The Count of Clermont threw himself into its path and inflicted upon it the crushing defeat of Formigny (15 April, 1450), in which the English lost nearly 4000 men and 1200 prisoners, against a very insignificant French loss. This battle not only ended the campaign and left Normandy finally in French hands, but could be reckoned as a set-off to the defeats of Crécy and Agincourt. Charles treated the Normans with tact and clemency, and the country rapidly settled down under the new regime and became one of the most loyal and contented districts in France.

Guyenne was a more difficult matter. Here the English rule had been more continuous, more moderate, and more natural. Guyenne indeed had always reckoned itself English. The great city of Bordeaux had derived much profit from its English and Flemish connexion, and submission to France would involve a complete dislocation of the commercial system which had grown up in the South-West. Guyenne, therefore, looked to England for protection. But England was in no condition to afford it. Bordeaux consequently made the best terms it could with Dunois who had surrounded the city. Bayonne surrendered (20 August, 1451) and Guyenne seemed to have gone the way of Normandy. The Gascons, however, were not of the mould to succumb without striking a blow. The veteran Talbot was sent out in 1452 and had no difficulty in entering Bordeaux (23 October). In July of the following year the English came out from Bordeaux to meet a French force which was advancing against them, met it at Châtillon,

and, advancing incontinently to attack an entrenched position defended by powerful artillery, met with a crushing defeat, Talbot himself being killed (17 July, 1453).¹ Bordeaux fell a second time into the hands of the French (19 October). This time the city and the country was treated as rebel, deprived of autonomy and rigorously administered. Many Gascons took refuge in England. For generations the commercial life of the region was paralysed and general misery prevailed. This did not make the French rule popular; Guyenne long lamented the disappearance of the English, and gave continual trouble to the French Government. As late as 1655 Cromwell had ideas of trading on old English sympathies in that quarter.

By the close of 1453 Charles VII could regard himself as master of France. He had still eight years to reign, and although now an old man he continued to pursue an active and intelligent policy. This policy we may consider *seriatim*: relations with the Church; foreign policy, especially relations with German and Italian powers; home affairs, especially the reorganization of justice and finance on lines which made for the independence of the Crown; relations with the greater vassals of the Crown, and finally social and economic policy. We have seen that Charles was able to deal firmly with the Papacy. The Popes naturally protested vigorously against the Pragmatic Sanction. In 1439 Europe seemed to be threatened with another schism; the Council of Basle had pronounced the deposition of Pope Eugenius and a new Pope was appointed under the title of Felix V. Charles VII decided to adopt a neutral attitude and to leave the matter to a new Council. But he clung stoutly to the Pragmatic against either Pope. Finally, however, he consented to intervene and to secure the abdication of Felix and the restoration of Eugenius (April, 1449). He may be regarded as the champion of Gallicanism, but he cannot escape the reproach of having been also one of those who, by checking the reform of the

¹The fact that the French had 300 pieces of artillery at Châtillon proves that the reformers had not been letting the grass grow under their feet.

Church, sacrificed the unity of Christendom and involved the Catholic Church in the disasters of the Reformation.

The foreign policy of Charles VII, after the Peace of Arras, was of course mainly directed towards the isolation and overthrow of England; but even before the final expulsion of the English other vistas of foreign policy were opening. The most pressing danger to France after the danger from England was that of the creation by Burgundy of a middle kingdom, on the lines of the old Carolingian Lotharingia. Such a kingdom would have become a standing menace to France, and the King of France was bound to use every effort to prevent its formation. Philip the Good never lost sight of this object, the direct steps to which were the acquisition of Bar, Lorraine, Luxemburg, and Alsace, which would have united his possessions in Franche Comté with his possessions in the Low Countries. The Emperors Sigismund and Albert of Austria were not the men to submit to any such encroachment. When the latter died, however, he was succeeded by Frederick of Austria, one of the most incompetent men who ever occupied the imperial throne. He occupied it from 1440 to 1493 and his incompetence was Philip's opportunity. Unfortunately for Philip's chances, however, France was now in a position to thwart his designs. Affairs in Switzerland, where the Emperor had made an alliance with the Canton of Zurich against the independence of the other Cantons, drove him to seek the alliance of France (22 August, 1443). At the same time René of Anjou appealed to Charles to help him to collect a debt which was owed him by the town of Metz. Not only was Charles interested in thwarting Philip, but he was at the moment most desirous of finding an outlet for the sinister activities of the army of *routiers* and *écorcheurs* which was desolating his kingdom. What better plan than to turn them against the Swiss and the Messois and so oblige the Emperor and René? There can be no doubt also that Charles and his son, to whom the operations in Switzerland were entrusted, contemplated territorial acquisitions: so that even before France was clear of the foreign foe her face was set towards a fresh policy of expansion. Charles wanted the Three Bishoprics of Toul, Verdun, and Metz,

while the Dauphin, who was alienated from his father and had set up a practically independent rule in Dauphiné, desired to add to his rather barren apanage the lands eastward of it. In fact he was much more intent on the capture of Basle for himself than on the relief of Zurich, which was hard pressed by the Swiss. When, however, he found out the nature of the opposition of the Swiss, who fought with the utmost valour, and, although cut to pieces in the battle of St. Jaques outside Basle (26 August, 1444), inflicted heavy losses on the Dauphin's army, Louis decided to come to terms with them, and signed the Peace of Ensheim (28 October, 1444) with seven Cantons (excluding Basle and Soleure).¹ Charles himself had meanwhile invaded Lorraine, and that country enjoyed for a period the attentions of his *écôrcheurs*. Metz, however, could not be taken: but at last it was feign to buy peace by consenting to pay King René's debt. Charles now made a *volte face*. He had formed a proper estimate of the nullity of the Emperor, and had resolved to depend for his future struggle with Burgundy on the assistance of the Swiss and of such of the German princes as he could persuade to throw in their lot with him. In 1445, therefore, a series of treaties was concluded with Trier, Cologne, the Elector Palatine, the Elector of Saxony, and other German princes. Philip was now thrown into the arms of the Emperor, but he got little satisfaction from his distinguished ally, and found his German schemes everywhere thwarted by the vigilance of the French Government.

On the whole the Burgundian policy for the establishment of a Lotharingian kingdom was thoroughly checkmated by France. The decline of Burgundy had commenced. The other irons which Charles VII had in the diplomatic fire were the Italian and the far Eastern. René of Anjou, who, on his release from a Burgundian prison, found himself the claimant of the throne of Naples, could not extract much support from Charles, with the result that the disputed throne fell in the end to the other claimant, Alfonso of Aragon. René was a diketante, a poet, and a poor politician, and was probably


¹ See Rott, E., "Henry IV, les Suisses et la haute Italie" (1882), p. 143.

much happier in Provence, which was the only part of the Neapolitan heritage that he retained, than he could have been in those disturbed regions (Naples and Sicily) which formed the bulk of it.¹

Curiously enough another poet and a more considerable one had inherited the claim of the house of Orleans on the Visconti succession in Milan and Asti. Charles of Orleans was no more a politician than René of Anjou, and he had a rival who was a thorough politician in Francesco Sforza. He was indeed well received in Asti, but elsewhere in Italy he met with a very discouraging reception. Sforza got possession of Milan. His accession was a threat to Venice, and an alliance was formed against him. In reply he sought the assistance of various European powers and amongst others that of France. Charles VII, who had never taken Orleans very seriously, consented to give his support to Sforza (1452), and René was sent on an expedition to Italy which, however, came to nothing. As a matter of fact the various Italian powers were seeking to bury the hatchet in

¹ This was the first René, father of Margaret of England, who figures in Scott's "Anne of Geierstein".

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order to concentrate against the development of French influence in Italy. Louis the Dauphin entered into relations with the Sforza in order to thwart his own father's policy. Charles had fixed his eyes on Genoa, and in 1458 that important city was occupied in his name by John of Anjou. In the same year the same John of Anjou put in a claim on Naples, for Alfonso, the Aragonese ruler of that State, had died. But all the influence that Charles could bring to bear in support of the Angevin claim was useless, and even Genoa fell away again. The Italian policy of Charles VII was not in fact conceived on a large scale nor was it carried out with a firm hand; it is interesting in the main because it keeps us alive to the fact that France had interests and ambitions in Italy, which only awaited a favourable opportunity to come to the front and to become the leading item in the foreign policy of the kings of France.

In the far East the rôle of Charles VII was an inglorious one. But it would have been almost too much to expect that a King who had only in his latter years succeeded in restoring unity to his kingdom, and that only after almost unparalleled vicissitudes, should have been ready in his old age to assume the position of protector of Christendom. In his attitude of indifference Charles resembled his neighbours, who none of them moved, though they sometimes talked of moving, and were content to allow the Turks to enter Constantinople (29 May, 1453), and the Christian Empire of the West to perish. "Le Roi de France," says an astute observer, "a chassé l'ennemi de tout son royaume, mais il reste inquiet, et n'osera pas envoyer sa chevalerie hors de son royaume, par crainte d'une descente subite des Anglais." This is probably a very correct description of Charles' attitude. When in 1454 the Duke of Burgundy proposed a crusade against the Turks, Charles refused to be moved.¹ The danger to France would have been too great; her enemies were too numerous and too unscrupulous to admit of her chivalry being drafted to the far

¹ The Dauphin Louis, who had been created Gonfalonier of Christendom by the Pope, asked his father's permission to go (31 August, 1456) ("Lettres de Louis XI," ed. Vaesen et Charavay, for Société de l'histoire de France, 1883, etc., Vol. I, letter 68),

East. Who will say that Charles was wrong? To a Frenchman at least the preservation of the new-won unity of France and the development of her nationality were at least as important as the restoration of the Eastern Empire.

Such were the foreign relations of Charles VII during those later years of his reign when alone he could claim to be really King of France. We may now turn to matters of internal administration. We have spoken during these years of success and recuperation as if it had been the King who was alone or mainly responsible for the rehabilitation of the kingdom. Making every allowance for the change in Charles' character, it is hardly possible to believe that he could have effected such a transformation. Yet there is no one hand among his servants clearly responsible for the work. After the unfortunate period of the favourites the only two great nobles who stand beside the King are Richemont and Dunois, both more occupied in military than in civil affairs. But there were a number of more obscure persons working for Charles, and the conclusion is that it was they and others of the same calibre and extraction who carried out the spade-work of the regeneration. Such were Martin Gouge, Chancellor of Berry and Auvergne; Regnauld de Chartres, Cardinal-Archbishop of Auvergne, Chancellor of the kingdom; Guillaume Lousinot, Bailli of Rouen, for whose ransom Charles paid 20,000 crowns; Étienne Chevalier, *maitre des comptes* and Controller of the Treasury; Jean Dauvet, *procureur général*, and most important of all Jacques Cœur, whose name demands something more than mere mention. Cœur was the son of a merchant of Bourges. He was a man of boundless enterprise, who found France commercially a desert and profited by the absence of competition to establish an immense commercial house with ramifications all over the East. His headquarters were at Montpellier and he had a fleet of seven ships trading to the Levant. He quickly amassed a huge fortune and attracted the attention of the King, who gave him the important post of royal *argentier*. For ten years he basked in the royal favour and was sent on embassies to Genoa and Rome. It was to Cœur that the task of setting the finances

of the kingdom in order was entrusted. From his position as royal banker he made large advances to the Crown. Such a man makes enemies. On the death of Agnes Sorel, Cœur was quite unjustly accused of poisoning her. Of this he was acquitted; but he was condemned on other charges. Charles threw him into prison, whence he escaped, entered the service of the Pope, and died in Chios when leading a Papal expedition against the infidels.

Charles' treatment of Cœur is a fresh proof of the fundamental baseness of his character. Why he should have been well served it is difficult to say, for he was an ungrateful and treacherous master. Nevertheless he was well served, and that by a host of obscure men as well as by great geniuses like Cœur. The Royal Council was full of such obscure workers, and on that Council fell the brunt of the government of the kingdom. The Council followed the King from place to place and all matters of State came into its cognizance—finance, justice, military affairs, relations of Church and State, and administrative details of all kinds. It sat daily, and the King was very largely guided by its decisions. At first the majority of the Council were great nobles and Churchmen such as Dunois, Richemont, and the Comte de Foix; de Brezé, who was perhaps the ablest and most loyal of them all, had a less conspicuous rôle, but it is possible that he, more than any other, was at the bottom of the reforms which marked the close of the reign. Gradually, however, the *personnel* of the Council altered and, while these great nobles were occupied with definite administrative or military tasks, the Council came to be filled more and more with men of humbler birth. It was a pre-Valois tradition in France that the bourgeois class should supply councillors to the Crown; and this return to the old state of affairs was a source of much good to the kingdom, just as the abandonment of it and the domination of the selfish and unscrupulous princes of the fleur de lys had been a source of harm. We shall probably be right in attributing a large share in the rehabilitation of France to the labours of these men of humble origin and little prominence.

When we remember the part that the States General (for

so, although they were not by any means yet really "general," we must for want of a better term describe them) played in the previous century, we shall be surprised at the insignificant and somewhat ignominious part they played in the fifteenth. For a moment they had shown signs of becoming the real organ of national feeling, but France was too large and diverse and not yet sufficiently national to admit of a development of this tendency. It was through the royal power that she shook off the domination of the foreigner and through the royal power that she developed into a nation. Therefore she was of necessity condemned to a long period during which that power would make itself more and more arbitrary and absolute, and during which the *états* would become weaker and weaker until they disappeared altogether, though the memory of them survived to be the model on which the men of 1789 built the *États Généraux* of the Revolution.

The decline of the *états* in the fifteenth century was rapid and decisive. They were hampered, then as before, by want of cohesion. They were more intent on the preservation of their local independence than they were on the consolidation of the kingdom. The idea indeed of a single national assembly was ahead of the political understanding of fifteenth-century France. If one imagines a separate Parliament sitting in Yorkshire with equal powers and quite other aims to those of the one sitting at Westminster, and when one considers what a handicap that would have been in the constitutional struggle in England, one can realize what it meant to France to have separate *états* sitting in Languedoc and elsewhere, proud of their independence and bitterly resenting any attempt to make them sit with the *états* of Languedoc. When we speak of the *états* of the fifteenth century we mean generally the latter, which were the more important, but we must not forget that even a constitutional victory on the part of the *états* of Languedoc would have been but a partial victory, and that the whole matter would have had to be fought out afresh in the *états* of Languedoc. The *états* of the fifteenth century were fortified with one very distinct right which they had gained

for themselves in the previous century—the right of consent to taxation. One can imagine what use an English Parliament would have put it to; and one expects to see the *états* of France making it the basis of a whole charter of liberties. Yet the *états* of Languedoc, when Charles found it necessary to reimpose the *aides* which he had abolished at the beginning of his reign, abandoned their right, not indeed without protest, but without any effectual resistance. From 1436 onwards the King of France was in possession of a permanent *taille* and permanent *aides*, and by 1440 the financial rôle of the *états* was at an end.¹

The *états* of Languedoc made a better fight for their privileges and were able to put some restraints on the arbitrary royal power in matters of taxation at least for a while, but they became gradually less and less a part of the *États Généraux* of France and more and more a purely local assembly, with no more power than an ordinary provincial assembly; they were converted in fact from a parliament into what we should call a county council.

Such provincial assemblies existed all over France and were possessed of considerable powers. They could, for instance, criticize and protest, and often successfully resist the imposition of taxes which had been decreed by the King and accepted by the *États Généraux*. They also enjoyed substantial powers of local government and were on the whole more effective than the *états* of Languedoc. The royal Government of course set itself to compass their overthrow. They made a better fight for their rights than the larger *états*, but by 1451 they had been reduced to a like condition of impotent acquiescence.²

¹ Philippe de Comines (ed. Dupont, for Société de l'histoire de France, 1840-47), II. 224-5. "Le roy Charles VII fut le premier . . . qui gaigna ce point d'imposer tailles à son plaisir sans le consentement des estatz, de son royaume . . . et à cecy se consentirent les seigneurs de France, pour certaines pensions qui leur furent promises pour les deniers qu'on levoit en leurs terres". Comines goes on to say that at his death Charles had a revenue of 1,800,000 francs and an army of 1700 men for the protection of the provinces.

² In treating of the *états* of the fifteenth century it has been necessary to generalize so as to reduce chaos to order. It must, however, be stated

Thus it is clear that the revival of the monarchy after the Hundred Years War was a revival of that institution in its most absolute form. What had perished in that terrible struggle was the germ of constitutionalism, what had survived was the most arbitrary form of monarchy. The monarchy, fallen and abased as it was and vested in unworthy hands, had sufficed unaided to stave off the ruin which had at one moment seemed inevitable. The one thing that the great war had proved was the immense inherent strength of that monarchy, and now that the war was concluded that strength was used for the crushing out of all the slender traces of popular liberties, until that monarchy stood alone and apparently unassailable amid the ruins. This is perhaps the most important outcome of the Hundred Years War.

that we are on shifting ground. The *états* were in an utterly nebulous condition and assembled and disappeared quite without rule. This was inevitable in a country which was only gradually shaking itself free from a foreign yoke. There were many assemblies, which it would only be confusing to name, which were not provincial assemblies, but resembled the two great *États Généraux*. There were also *états de prévôtés* and *sénéchaussées*. The detail is obscure but the general drift is clear.

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CHAPTER XVII

LOUIS XI

(1461-1483)

CHARLES VII was now obviously nearing the end of his life, and men were beginning to take stock of the character of the Dauphin. From the moment when he was old enough to act independently Prince Louis had devoted himself to the attainment of his selfish ends. No one ever thirsted for power more violently than he, nor did anyone ever behave more unscrupulously to satisfy his thirst. While still in his teens he had taken arms against his father.¹ Defeated and exiled to his apanage of Dauphiné, he had there plotted and schemed to cut out for himself an independent kingdom; disappointed in this also, he had adopted an injured attitude because his father continued to live and, by living, to deprive him of his "rights". Many men have no doubt wished for the time when death would remove the obstacle between them and some great position. None ever avowed such feelings with a frankness so cynical as that of Louis. From this time forward he adopted in every political question an attitude antagonistic to his father; allied himself to Aragon and Sforza because Charles was supporting Anjou and Orleans; intrigued with Don Carlos because Charles was allied with John II; declared himself a Yorkist because his father was a Lancastrian; rejoiced in his father's reverses and ground his jealous teeth over his successes; finally took refuge at the Court of his father's most dangerous enemy, the Duke of Burgundy,² and all the time he had agents at Charles' Court who kept him informed

¹ *Supra*, pp. 300, 301.

² Where he lived at Genappe (*place plaisante à déduit des chiens et des oyseaux*) until he returned to France to assume the Crown (Mathieu d'Escouchy, "Chronique," ed. du Fresne de Beaucourt, for Société de l'histoire de France (1863-4), II. 333).

of every sign of increasing infirmity that betrayed itself in the King.

In July Charles' symptoms became alarming. Never was sick-bed more anxiously watched; but for the signs of death not for those of recovery. Astrologers and doctors encouraged the Dauphin to hope for a fatal termination. Nor were they disappointed. Amidst these ghastly surroundings on 22 July, 1461, the King passed miserably away, believing—and the belief is pardonable—that he had been poisoned by his son.¹ Louis XI, who was now thirty-eight years old, lost no time in ascending the throne for which he had waited so impatiently. He was crowned on 15 August, and entered Paris in the early days of September. Of all the Valois kings he is assuredly the most remarkable. Two swash-bucklers, one madman, one cold genius, and that enigma whose death has just been recorded; such was the Valois record. Now we have to deal with a man whose unbounded cunning terrified while it duped his contemporaries, and whose strange character has fascinated and puzzled men's minds ever since.

In person Louis was unkingly. But for his piercing eyes his appearance would have been contemptible, for his nose was long and ill-shapen, his legs thin and his gait halting. These defects unfitted him for the martial and ceremonious functions of royalty, and indeed he had no taste for either; he regarded war as a clumsy expedient in which the fruits of diplomacy were unnecessarily hazarded, and pomp and ceremony as mere waste of time. He clad himself meanly,² although he was not stingy, abandoned the palaces of his predecessors for less magnificent surroundings,³ and rode about the kingdom ill-mounted and sparsely attended. "Benedicite," men said as he passed, "is that the King of France? The whole

¹ Charles VII was much lamented by his people. "Quant il vivoit," says the author of the "*Chronique Scandaleuse*," "c'estoit ung moult sage et vaillant Seigneur, et qui laissa son royaume bien uny et en bon justice et tranquillité". ("*Journal de Jean de Roye, connu sous le nom de 'Chronique Scandaleuse,' 1460-83,*" ed. Mandrot, for Société de l'histoire de France, 1894-6.

² *Ibid.* I. 133.

³ His favourite residence was Plessis les Tours, where he enjoyed security and comfort.

affair is not worth twenty francs horse and all." His ubiquity was marvellous; he went round his kingdom as a gardener goes round his garden, satisfying his unbounded curiosity and storing his capacious memory. He mixed with all classes of his subjects and discoursed with astonishing volubility to all and sundry. But Louis was no garrulous busy-body: he was a singularly alert and wise statesman, who regarded kingship as a business and delighted in his *métier*, appreciating with all an artist's pleasure the fact that, by sheer force of intellect, he, with none of the superficial graces of kingship, was more than a match for his showy neighbours. It would be superfluous to enumerate the idiosyncrasies of this remarkable monarch, for they have been painted for all time by a master hand in "Quentin Durward". One or two characteristics of the reign may, however, be profitably summarized.

In the first place Louis was never a popular king. He neither sought nor desired popularity; his goal was something quite different—power and aggrandizement. His predecessors had risked national security by remitting taxes. Louis, who counted money a surer weapon than arms, not only did not remit taxes, but with real farsightedness set himself to foster by all means in his power the prosperity of his kingdom. But it was not only his exactions that made Louis unpopular; it was also the fact that his joyless nature was alien to the spirit of his people. He was, as Charles the Bold said, more a spider than a man, and even his amazing qualities of intellect did not reconcile the nation to government by spider. In the second place his methods were eminently calculated to set the seal on the autocratic and irresponsible drift of the Valois monarchy. Thirdly, ambitious as he was, not for glory or splendour but for the far more dangerous end of personal aggrandizement, it was inevitable that he should embroil the world. That he would emerge triumphant as he did, and successfully crush his great rival Burgundy, was improbable, and that he did so is the best proof of his consummate ability. Finally a word as to his servants. He was no man of favourites; he knew exactly what he wanted of his servants and had neither scruples as to the *milieu* from which

he drew them, nor care as to what became of them. Their utility at an end he tossed them aside. Nearly all his agents were drawn from the lower, some, like Olivier le Daim,¹ from the very lowest, classes. He knew the danger of trusting to the loyalty of great nobles.

The ambitions of the house of Burgundy were still a serious menace to the house of Valois. It will be remembered that, when the Somme Towns were handed to the latter at the Peace of Arras,² France reserved the right to repurchase the district for 400,000 crowns. Of this option Louis XI at once (1463) availed himself—much to the anger of Burgundy, an immensely rich country where the money was not needed. The next point of difference arose in Liège. The Bishop of Liège was a nephew and vassal of the Duke of Burgundy; he was very unpopular, and there were constant revolts which were only suppressed with the assistance of the suzerain. Louis encouraged the rebel Liégeois, and this quite naturally roused the Duke's indignation. Then in 1464 a French mission to Burgundy was roughly handled by the Count of Charolais, the Duke's intemperate son—afterwards Charles "the Bold". Burgundy, however, was not the only enemy. The first years of his reign were disturbed by the hostility of Francis II of Brittany, and by continual fears of an English invasion especially in the autumn of 1462.³ But the most serious menace was the disaffection of the great nobles. There is a certain satisfaction in recording that Louis XI had to experience the very trial to which he had subjected his father in the rebellion known as the "League of the Public Weal".⁴ This rebellion was headed by the Duke of Bourbon, and Louis' brother and heir presumptive, Charles, Duke of Berry (a miserable lad of eighteen) was put forward as an aspirant to the regency. Amongst the rebels were Brittany, Bourbon, Alençon, d'Albret, Saint Pol,

¹ For Olivier le Daim, "Lettres de Louis XI," op. cit. iv. 160 note.

² *Supra*, p. 298.

³ "Lettres de Louis XI," op. cit. ii. 37, 71, 75 et *sqq.*

⁴ Cp. Comines, op. cit. ii. 254, for Louis' reference to the *Guerre du Bien Public* on his death-bed. He attributed it to his dismissal of his father's servants.

Armagnac, Lorraine and Chabannes. More dangerous than any of these was Burgundy, or rather Charolais, who took the whole affair out of the hands of his now senile father. Twenty-one *puissants Seigneurs* the League was said to number, and 51,000 combatants. Burgundy indeed had no standing army, whereas Louis had inherited a magnificent army¹ from his father, and although deserted by all the great nobles with the single exception of the Count of Foix he could depend on the abstention of the smaller nobles and clergy and the passive support of the common people. He also secured aid from Milan, but against this the rebels could set the support of Bavaria, the Palatinate, Clèves, and Cologne. The very number of the rebels told in Louis' favour and he himself acted with vigour and good sense. Leaving Paris to shift for itself, he advanced into the Bourbonnais at the head of a fine army of upwards of 24,000 men.² He brought this particular knot of rebels to terms on 25 June, 1465. But meanwhile, on 5 July, the Count of Charolais had reached Saint Denis with an army of 20,000 men, but ill-equipped and inexperienced. Here he was to have been joined by Brittany and Berry; as they did not appear the Count, relying on the Burgundian sympathies of Paris, demanded entrance into the Capital. But Louis had left Paris in capable hands. Charles de Melun and Joachim Renault kept the people well disposed to the King and Charolais' demand was refused. Charolais was moving off to Étampes to meet the tardy dukes, when Louis' vanguard marching back from the Bourbonnais came into touch with the Burgundians at Monthéry³ (16 July, 1465). Charolais lost his head as completely as Louis kept his. He allowed his men-at-arms

¹ Thus the war of the Public Weal put to the test the question whether it was better to have no taxes and no army, or to have an army and risk the unpopularity of taxation. Cp. Comines, *op. cit.* i. 17 *sqq.*, for the inferiority of the Burgundian army.

² "Chronique Scandaleuse," *op. cit.* i. 52, 53.

³ de Brezé, who commanded the royal vanguard, was suspected of having treacherously led it into touch with the enemy. Louis wished to avoid a battle.

simply to ride over his archers, who were, as Comines¹ points out, the mainstay of the army. Louis, on the other hand, though he displayed little military talent, behaved with a coolness which proves that he was no coward.² When the bulk of either side had fled the remainder rallied and glared at each other until to everyone's relief the sun went down. Then the French withdrew, and the Burgundians had the barren satisfaction of encamping on the field; Louis on the other hand was able to carry out his original intention of throwing himself into Paris (18 July),³ while Charolais marched to Étampes, where he was at length joined by the Dukes of Brittany and Berry and a little later by the Duke of Lorraine.⁴ On 10 August the King again left Paris and set off for Normandy to raise fresh troops. The rebels once more attempted to persuade Paris to admit them and once more failed, and on 28 August⁵ the King returned with powerful reinforcements. Once back in Paris, however, Louis could not be persuaded to take any further risks, and set himself to break up the League by peaceful means. He saw Pontoise and Rouen fall (21 and 27 September), and was confronted with the demand that his brother of Berry should be made Duke of Normandy.⁶ After much hesitation he gave way,

¹ Comines, *op. cit.* i. 37. Philippe de Commines, Commines, Comynes, or Comines, was born in 1445 of an old Flemish family and died in 1509. He became a servant of the Count of Charolais and fought on the Burgundian side at Monthéry. He afterwards (1472) abandoned the Burgundian cause and served Louis XI. He had therefore personal knowledge of both Courts and his memoirs are invaluable.

² "Si n'eust esté luy seul, tout s'en fust fuy," Comines, *op. cit.* i. 45. See also Maupoint, "Journal parisien" (ed. Fagniez, for Société de l'Histoire de Paris, 1875), *op. cit.* 58.

³ Comines, *op. cit.* 45, gives amusing details of the thoroughness of the flight of some on both sides, one (Frenchman) fled to Lusignan without drawing rein! and one (Burgundian) to Quesnai le Comte.

⁴ *Ibid.* *op. cit.* i. 53: "The Breton forces excellent". *Ibid.* *op. cit.* i. 61: "The forces of the Duke of Lorraine 900 men, splendid troops". After the joining of forces Comines thought there were 100,000 horses in the whole army.

⁵ Comines, *op. cit.* i. 65.

⁶ Louis at first urged that it was out of his power to alienate Normandy, a proceeding that had been expressly forbidden by King John in 1361, when that monarch had united it to the royal domain.

and by the Treaties of Conflans and Saint-Maur-aux-Fossées, Berry became Duke of Normandy, while Charolais recovered the Somme Towns with further acquisitions in Picardy. Saint Pol, who had already twice fought against the Crown, was created Constable—a curious reward for treachery; Bourbon, Anjou, Dunois, and Chabannes were all conciliated.

“Never so good a wedding,” says that mordant historian de Comines, “but some dine badly,”¹ and so on this occasion *les ungs firent ce qu'ils voulurent, les austres n'eurent rien*. Amongst the latter were Nemours, d'Albret, and Armagnac, which was hard, as they had been quite as treacherous as their more fortunate companions. As for the Public Weal the less said about that the better; de Comines puts it in a nutshell when he says: *Le bien public estoit converti en bien particulier*.² Louis signed these treaties as a temporary expedient; he never meant to allow his brother to remain in possession of Normandy, a fief whose importance may be appraised from the fact that it contributed one-third of the revenues of the kingdom.³ On 25 November, he coolly announced his intention of taking the Duchy back.⁴ The new Duke had fallen foul of his ally the Duke of Brittany. Louis quickly arranged a truce with the latter, and had his brother at his mercy.⁵ “Monsieur Charles,” says Comines, “se retira pouvre defaict et habandonné de tous ses chevaliers.” He received the slender and remote compensation of Roussillon. Burgundy was a more serious matter. Louis embarked on an elaborate campaign of corruption in the Somme Towns. But his best opportunity came from the fresh disturbances in Liège, which had been one of the causes that had compelled Burgundy to come to terms with France. Louis in fact had

¹ Comines, op. cit. I. 105.

² *Ibid.* op. cit. I. 93. But by the terms of the Treaty of Saint Maur a commission was appointed to investigate abuses. Cp. “Lettres de Louis XI,” op. cit. III. 74. The names of the commissioners are given in Langlet-Dufresnoy's edition of Comines, II. 519.

³ Cp. “Lettres de Louis XI,” op. cit. III. 15 and 16.

⁴ Maupoint, op. cit. p. 96.

⁵ Comines, op. cit. I. 107 *sqq.*, 417, 423, 437; “Lettres de Louis XI,” III. 13.

deserted his Liégeois friends,¹ but now that France was internally quiet he renewed his alliance with them (15 July, 1467).

By this time war with Burgundy was imminent. Philip had died on 15 June, and in the new Duke, Charles the Bold, Louis was confronted with a personal rival. Charles regarded all Louis' actions since his accession as a series of affronts to Burgundy, and the political differences between the two men were aggravated by the strong contrast between their characters. Where Louis was underhand, evasive, cringing, Charles was blunt, direct, and hot-headed to rashness. He probably realized very soon that Louis was playing with him, and a man of the type of Charles the Bold does not like being played with. The contest between them was therefore bound to be fierce and relentless.

Both sides looked round for allies. Charles found support in Brittany, Savoy, and Denmark, and he hoped to be able to stir the embers of revolt in France. There remained England. Both sides saw the importance of securing the alliance of Edward IV. Louis, who contrary to Valois tradition had supported the Red against the White Rose, was first in the field,² and persuaded Edward to renew (till 1468) the truce with France. In 1467 he had an interview with Warwick the "Kingmaker" at Rouen,³ and a scheme was evolved for a permanent peace between the two countries, and for the marriage of one of Edward's brothers to Louis' second daughter. Edward, however, did not welcome this proposal and received Warwick and the French ambassadors who accompanied him with coldness.⁴ He was in fact negotiating with Charles the Bold,

¹ See "Lettres de Louis XI," op. cit. III. 1, 2, 3.

² So early as August, 1466, Charolais had protested against Louis' relations with England ("Lettres de Louis XI," op. cit. III. 87).

³ "Chronique Scandaleuse," op. cit. I. 170.

⁴ *Y demeurèrent longement et n'y firent riens*, "Chronique Scandaleuse," op. cit. I. 176; Basin, "Histoire des règnes de Charles VII et Louis XI" (ed. Quicherat for Société de l'Histoire de France, 1855-9), II. 182; "Lettres de Louis XI," op. cit. III. 155. Edward sent trumpery pre-

and a proposal was afoot for the marriage of the Duke with Edward's sister Margaret.¹ For the moment Louis had received a serious check. Meanwhile his brother Charles was once more hatching rebellion in conjunction with Brittany, and received promises of support from Burgundy and Alençon. On 15 October Louis was informed that a Breton army was invading Normandy. The news that Charles the Bold was advancing against Liége, however, relieved him of all fear from that quarter. Louis had no scruples about deserting his Liégeois allies, and, while these unfortunates were engaging the attention of Burgundy, he was able to reduce the Bretons to terms on 25 January, 1468.²

Still the inevitable struggle with Burgundy was the great danger. In view of it Louis summoned the States General (26 February, 1468) to Tours, and they voted the impossibility of handing Normandy to Monsieur Charles.³ The truce between France and Burgundy came to an end on 15 July, 1468, and in the same month an Anglo-Burgundian alliance confirmed Louis' worst fears. On 3 July Charles the Bold espoused Margaret of York, the sister of Edward of England. Louis took advantage of the lull created by the wedding festivities to stamp out the embers of revolt in Brittany, and to sign with Francis II the Peace of Ancenis (10 September).⁴ This was greatly to the detriment of Burgundy.

Louis was so elated with this diplomatic success that he now thought to try his hand on the Duke of Burgundy himself. He had no liking for war, and now that Charles was upon him breathing fire and slaughter he determined to speak him fair; concessions must be made; by and by they could easily be re-

sents, hunting horns, and leather bottles by their hands in return for the handsome gifts which they had brought from Louis ("Chronique Scandaleuse," op. cit. I. 177).

¹ This proposal had been mooted two years before at Étampes (Comines, op. cit. I. 57), and had been openly discussed prior to the Rouen interviews ("Lettres de Louis XI," op. cit. III. 143).

² *Ibid.* op. cit. III. 277.

³ "Chronique Scandaleuse," op. cit. I. 200: "Disans qu'il n'était pas au Roy de la bailler ne desmembrer de sa couronne".

⁴ *Ibid.* op. cit. I. 210.

puddied. With complete sang-froid he put his head quite confidently into the lion's mouth, riding with an escort of no more than 100 men into the Burgundian head-quarters at Péronne (9 October, 1468).

On this occasion the great master of intrigue overreached himself. The spider had spun such a web that he was himself caught in the toils. Sir Walter Scott has seized with unerring judgment on the dramatic moment when messengers arrived from Liége to inform the Duke that, on Louis' instigation, the populace of that city had risen and driven out their bishop¹ to make it the culminating point of his novel, "Quentin Durward". Louis was caught in a trap and for a time his life was in imminent danger. De Comines gives an eyewitness' account of Charles' terrible anger.² At last he was persuaded to see the King, and in a voice broken with anger laid down his terms. Louis must accompany him to Liége, to assist the Duke to punish his own allies for the crime which he himself had instigated. The King saw that there was nothing for it but to agree and agreed without a murmur. Without more ado was signed the Treaty of Péronne (14 October, 1468). All the outstanding questions between France and Burgundy were settled in favour of the latter, and Flanders was given judicial independence: Monsieur Charles was to be established in Champagne and Brie, an arrangement which would bring him close under the wing of Burgundy.³ Louis accompanied the Duke to Liége and witnessed without apparent emotion the fierce punishment meted out to the rebels.⁴ While condemning his heartless treachery one can hardly help admiring his cool self-possession.

Once out of the clutches of his terrible host, Louis showed that he did not intend to be slavishly bound by anything that had passed at Péronne. He had, for instance, no intention of establishing his brother in Champagne and Brie, and that

¹ Louis, Bishop of Liége, was the son of Charles of Bourbon by Agnes of Burgundy (sister of Philip the Good). He was therefore a first cousin of Charles the Bold.

² Comines, *op. cit.* i. 158 *sqq.*

³ Cp. *Ibid.* *op. cit.* i. 174; "Lettres de Louis XI," *op. cit.* iii. 289.

⁴ Comines, *op. cit.* i. 181 *sqq.*; "Lettres de Louis XI," *op. cit.* iii. 300.

weak prince was soon persuaded to accept the more valuable but less accessible apanage of Guyenne and La Rochelle.

Louis' main object was the isolation of Burgundy. The main obstacle was England: Warwick, now in disgrace, fled to France with the Duke of Clarence, and urged the King to declare war on Edward;¹ and Louis, who had been a Yorkist for purely utilitarian reasons, had no difficulty in converting himself into a red-hot Lancastrian. He effected a reconciliation between Warwick and Margaret of Anjou and in September, 1470, Warwick invaded England, drove out Edward, and re-established Henry VI. Charles was greatly alarmed while Louis "bathed himself in roses".² French arms overran Picardy, and Amiens, Roye and Mondidier returned to French allegiance. But these hopes were disappointed when in the spring of 1471 Edward landed in England with an army which comprised many Burgundians; Warwick was defeated and slain in the Battle of Barnet (14 April), and on 21 May the Battle of Tewkesbury finally ruined the Lancastrian cause. Small wonder that the King of France was much upset at the news,³ for all the good work of the previous year had been wasted.

Charles the Bold was meanwhile attempting to recover the Somme Towns and intriguing with Monsieur Charles, to whom he offered the hand of his only daughter, Mary.⁴ But the city of Amiens refused to be taken, and on 25 May, 1472, death removed that invaluable puppet the Duke of Guyenne. Once more the see-saw swung; Louis was up and Charles was down.⁵ In the summer, however, the latter invaded Normandy, taking Eu and St. Valéry, but failing to make any impression on Beauvais and Rouen. The Duke of Brittany,

¹ "Chronique Scandaleuse," op. cit. i. 238; "Lettres de Louis XI," op. cit. iv. 110.

² Chastellain, op. cit. v. 487: "Se baignoit le Roy Loys en roses ce lui sembloit d'oyr, ceste bonne aventure".

³ *Ibid.* op. cit. i. 259: "Fut de ladicte disconfiture moult desplaisant".

⁴ Cp. Comines, op. cit. i. 263; cp. "Lettres de Louis XI," op. cit. iv. 359.

⁵ Comines, op. cit. i. 275: "Le dit Duc" (Burgundy) "fût désespéré de ceste mort".

much dashed by Guyenne's death, made a truce with Louis (15 October), and on 3 November Burgundy followed suit. The King took advantage of the pause thus created to deal with his rebellious vassals. Alençon was condemned but pardoned,¹ Armagnac was executed.² Louis was keeping the ring clear for the trial of strength with Burgundy. In this trial he was immensely aided by the fact that Burgundy had aspirations which, if indulged, were bound to embroil her with other powers besides France. Charles was no mere rebellious feudatory. He aimed at independence, kingship, empire; and it was the multitude and magnitude of his ambitions that ruined him.³ The greatest of these ambitions was the restoration of the old middle kingdom, in something like the shape in which it had been allotted in the ninth century to the Caroling Lothair; and if this was to be accomplished it involved the acquisition of Alsace and Lorraine. To Charles Alsace was far more important than Picardy. *Trouva goust en ces choses d'Allemagne*, and he was constantly working for the possession of that coveted region. In reality he was falling between two stools. He might have shaken off the suzerainty of France, he might even have resuscitated Lotharingia, had he given his undivided attention to either. As it was, when he was occupied in Germany Louis was undermining his influence in Picardy, and when he turned to fly at Louis' throat down went his castle of cards in Alsace-Lorraine. We have seen how he asserted his supremacy in Liège; in 1473 he brought Guelders into his net⁴ and his eyes were now fixed on Alsace. Alsace belonged to Sigismund of Austria, who was on bad terms with the Swiss. He failed to secure Louis XI's assistance against them; for Louis had had a taste of the Swiss in his Dauphin days. Sigismund therefore turned to Charles the Bold, and secured his help by the sacrifice of certain rights in

¹ "Chronique Scandaleuse," op. cit. I. 290.

² *Ibid.* op. cit. I. 291.

³ Comines, op. cit. I. 229: "Il taschoit à tant de choses grandes qu'il n'avait point le temps à vivre pour les mettre à fin".

⁴ *Ibid.* op. cit. I. 306.

Alsace (Treaty of Saint-Omer, 1469). Thus Charles acquired a foothold in Alsace, and in 1473 (Treaty of Nancy) he also acquired a foothold in Lorraine. Louis, who had renewed his father's alliance with the Swiss at Abbeville (November, 1463), now by the Convention of Tours (August-September, 1470) made a defensive alliance with them against Burgundy. This in turn was converted into an offensive and defensive alliance in the Treaty of Paris (October, 1474, to January, 1475).¹

The great Burgundian bubble was now to be quickly pricked. Louis had no false pride, and was quite willing that another should have the credit of the enterprise. He would provide the money and pull the strings and enjoy the fun of a blow in the dark. Charles the Bold had been drawing a hornet's nest about his ears by his policy of aggrandizement at the expense of the Rhenish States, and, thanks largely to the efforts of the King of France, all the offended interests had been welded into one in the Union of Constance (March-April, 1474). By far the most formidable member of this union was the Swiss Confederacy, which could place 40,000 splendid soldiers in the field and which, its independence being threatened, was ready to fight to the death.

Instead of grappling with his enemies at once, Charles wasted the whole of 1474 in a useless attempt to take the almost impregnable town of Neuss; at the same time he was trying to find allies, with the result that in July, 1475, Edward IV landed at Calais at the head of an army which Comines describes as the finest that any King of England had led into France "since the days of Arthur".² Edward, however, was but half-hearted in the Burgundian cause. Comines unkindly suggests that he only embarked his army in order to secure the war subsidies; however that may be, he was certainly negotiating with France before he left Dover. An interview between Louis and Edward was arranged, and on 29 August, 1475, the two kings embraced through a trellis specially constructed for the purpose, on a bridge (similarly constructed)

¹ Rott, *op. cit.* p. 144.

² Comines, *op. cit.* i. 336. Burgundy supplied the ships for the English invasion.

over the Somme at Péquigny.¹ Edward accepted an immense bribe and his followers lesser bribes; a seven years' truce was arranged, to be cemented by the marriage of the Dauphin to the daughter of Edward. In September that monarch returned to England with his army. Louis' policy was to let others do his work for him, and having warded off the blow from England he signed a truce with Burgundy (Treaty of Souleuvre, 13 September, 1475),² being quite content to leave the Duke to be dealt with by the powerful anti-Burgundian coalition which he had stirred up in the East. He now had leisure for a further distribution of justice amongst his disloyal subjects. The Constable, Saint Pol, who had been alternately disloyal to Burgundy and France, ended a unique career of treason on the scaffold, and the Duke of Nemours suffered a like fate. The Duke of Brittany and René of Anjou made submission and the Duke of Bourbon was deprived of some of his territory. Charles the Bold, meanwhile, had easily conquered Lorraine, and early in 1476 set off to wreak vengeance on the Swiss. Louis has been reproached for not having sent material assistance to the latter; for it was by his encouragement that they had declared war on Burgundy. But it must not be forgotten that the ink was hardly dry on the Treaty of Souleuvre. Louis proceeded to Lyons with 10,000 men and sat down there "chin upon hand to watch the game at bay".³ Charles the Bold's campaign was as completely disastrous as even Louis could have hoped. In less than a year Burgundy suffered three frightful defeats (Granson, 2 March, 1476, Morat, 22 June, 1476, and Nancy, 5 January, 1477). In the last of these Charles was killed and his ambitions were in the dust.

The Battle of Granson demonstrated to Europe the vulnerability of Burgundy, and the rats immediately began to leave the sinking ship. The Duke of Milan and the Count of

¹ Louis no doubt remembered that the combination of bridges and interviews had before now been dangerous.

² It was for nine years, and the King agreed to desert the Swiss and his other allies.

³ For Louis' relations with the Swiss see "*Lettres de Louis XI*," *op. cit.* v. 371.

Provence, who had both been negotiating with Charles the Bold, made overtures to France. In Germany there was an immediate upheaval against the Burgundian domination. Well might Louis thank God and the Saints for this "singular benefit,"¹ and assure the Swiss that he could not have been more delighted if a similar happiness had befallen him in person.² The succeeding catastrophes only enhanced his delight, and with the news of the Duke's death in the Battle of Nancy his cup was full, and he ordered processions and rejoicings for the *bonnes et agréables nouvelles*.

The King's first thought was to marry the Dauphin to Charles' daughter and heiress, Mary.³ But, on reflection, he abandoned this idea (foolishly as Comines thought) and set to work, by the underhand means which were congenial to him, gradually to absorb the Burgundian heritage. In this, up to a point, he was extraordinarily successful.

The Swiss were easily bought out, and bribery in all its forms, of individuals by money, and districts by concessions, also did its work. For five years Louis prosecuted this policy with unwavering persistency. The two Burgundies offered some resistance. Picardy and Boulogne were an easier prey, Artois was more obstinate and the resistance of Arras was so stubborn that it was only when its walls had been levelled to the ground, its name altered to "Franchise," and its inhabitants driven out and replaced by drafts from almost every province in France, that Louis felt himself master there.⁴

But it was on rich Flanders that the avaricious monarch had specially set his heart; and the marriage of Mary of Burgundy to Maximilian of Austria (19 August, 1477) made the absorption of Flanders a matter of difficulty. In 1478 and 1479 there was heavy fighting in that quarter and the bloody Battle of Guinegate (7 August, 1479) was indecisive. Mary died in 1482, leaving two children, Philip and Margaret. Maximilian, who was unpopular in Flanders, determined to

¹ "Lettres," op. cit. vi. 50: "Von søelichen besundern guttæt sagen wir danck Gott und der hochgelopten junckfrowen Marien".

² *Ibid.*, vi. 60.

³ *Ibid.*, vi. III.

⁴ "Chronique Scandaleuse," op. cit. II. 44.

treat with France, and on 23 December, 1482, the Princess Margaret was betrothed to the Dauphin with Franche Comté and Artois as dowry. The Duchy of Burgundy was not so much as mentioned in the treaty ; for it was already in French hands. Such was the final settlement after all the years of war and intrigue. Louis secured the lion's share, though Austria's establishment in Flanders was a serious blow. The failure to complete the Burgundian marriage sacrificed Mary's splendid dowry and marred the triumph of France.

While these great events were afoot in the North-East Louis had not been idle in other directions. In Spain his opportunity seemed to have come when the misgovernment of John II of Aragon provoked the rich districts of Catalonia and Roussillon to rebel. Louis, who had Aragonese blood in his veins, through his mother (grand-daughter of John I of Aragon), at first made overtures to the rebels and then allied himself with John II, who guaranteed the succession of Navarre (which kingdom he had usurped in 1441) to the house of Foix. Louis' sister Madeleine was married to the heir-apparent of Gaston IV and so the net was thrown round Navarre. Gaston, the husband of Madeleine, died before his father, and in 1479, John II of Aragon and his daughter Eleanor (wife of Gaston IV) having also died, Madeleine became Regent of Navarre for her son Francis Phœbus. In the end Louis XI's diplomacy successfully enmeshed Navarre when, on the death of Francis Phœbus, his sister Catherine inherited the throne. She was married to a staunch supporter of the Valois, Jean d'Albret, and from that time French influence predominated in Navarre.

Henry IV of Castille had meanwhile intervened in the quarrel and had invaded Aragon. Louis forced himself on the combatants as arbiter and (April, 1463) awarded the Navarrais district of Estella to Castille, in other respects maintaining the *status quo*. He next tried to secure a hold on Catalonia by supporting John of Lorraine (a cadet of the house of Anjou) whom the Catalonians had chosen as their leader. But John's death put an end to this idea. Louis had to content himself with the conquest of Roussillon, which district he

successfully reduced (1475). This was the limit of his successes in this quarter. He was unable to prevent the marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon to Isabella, sister and heiress of Henry IV of Castille (1469), or the consequent union of the two Crowns in 1479. In spite of this Louis XI had spun his web to some effect in Spain; he had acquired the important district of Roussillon and his influence dominated Navarre.

In Italy Louis XI's interventions were purely diplomatic, but none the less successful. The fact that, while his wife was a Princess of Savoy, his sister was married to the heir to that throne, points to the fact that the Valois had designs on Savoy. Louis' sister Yolande, however, was a woman of great force of character and had no intention of being the tool of her brother. Throughout her regency of her adopted county she succeeded in thwarting the encroachments which Louis was obviously anxious to make upon its independence. Even after she had called in the assistance of Charles the Bold to help her against the Swiss, and after Charles had met his match at Granson, she was able to appease her terrible brother and to maintain the independence of Savoy.

Elsewhere in Italy, although there was no active intervention or attempt at annexation, Louis' influence steadily increased, and after the fall of Charles the Bold France was in a great degree arbiter of the Peninsula. The Sforzas held the keys of Italy and it was sound diplomacy on Louis' part to conciliate them. Francesco Sforza was Louis' steady ally. His successor Galeazzo was less trustworthy. After his death it was largely by Louis' influence that Ludovico il Moro usurped the throne of Milan (1479). Untrustworthy, too, was Ferdinand of Naples; nor was Venice, to which state Louis paid assiduous court, to be relied upon. The staunchest friends that France had in Italy were the Medicis¹ in Florence. There was a strong trade connexion between Lyons and Florence which contributed to the friendship. To maintain it Louis even bearded Sixtus IV and saved the Medicis from the Papal wrath (1478). Did he contemplate

¹ "Lettres de Louis XI," op. cit. v. 127.

the active intervention in Italy which absorbed his successors? It is hardly probable that he would have been led into such a wild-goose chase; but his diplomatic "preparation" opened breaches in Italy through which it was easy for Charles VIII and Louis XII to enter.

If Louis' foreign policy was intricate and fruitful his internal administration also calls for some attention. He inaugurated the rule of *le bon plaisir*. The States General were summoned but once (1468) and then their functions were severely restricted and, although a committee "to consider grievances" was appointed, it did nothing.¹ Nevertheless Louis was a progressive monarch; only his reforms were the outcome of his own good pleasure. His commercial policy was wise and far-seeing. He fostered the industries of his towns; it was he, for instance, who was first struck with the incongruity of the importation of silk into France, and in consequence he made an attempt to establish the silk industry at Lyons and Tours. He was in fact an enlightened protectionist and did much to increase the prosperity of the towns, of Orleans, Amiens, Lyons, Marseilles and Bordeaux in particular. The peasantry on the other hand he does not seem to have understood. Without his attention to the prosperity of commerce Louis could hardly have raised the immense sums necessary to grease the wheels of diplomacy and to maintain his mercenary army. For Louis had abandoned his father's military methods and was the founder of the mercenary system which France was to employ so successfully in her Italian campaigns. In 1480 he hired 6000 Swiss and sent a French army to be trained in Switzerland. The artillery which he established was the finest in the world, and he may be regarded as the father of that arm in which France was to have such a long pre-eminence. All this cost money; and with money Louis was amply provided. The total revenues of the Crown nearly trebled themselves in his reign. Not that this was possible without much exaction and oppression. The *taille* which was actually nearly quadrupled was certainly

¹The Provincial Estates preserved a certain importance, especially those of Languedoc. "Lettres de Louis XI," op. cit. v. 136.

a grinding burden.¹ But the resources of the country were expanding with the increase of taxation, otherwise Louis' exactions would have been impossible.

In the matter of personal religion Louis was a superstitious cynic; he attempted continually to "corrupt the incorruptible" by lavish gifts.² But in his relations with the Church as a material power he was a simple cynic and made full use of the Pragmatic Sanction in order to bring pressure to bear on the Pope. During his long conflicts with Sixtus IV he insisted on the full conditions of the Pragmatic and the complete submission of the clergy, but in the last years of his life this insistence was somewhat relaxed.

Already before the Treaty of Arras the King had begun to feel the approach of illness. In 1479 he had what was probably a stroke, and although he recovered he was never the same man afterwards. When the prospect of death confronted him, he at first refused to face it³ and sent everywhere for every kind of remedy. Medicines which even to contemporaries seemed "terrible and marvellous"⁴ were administered; a hermit from Calabria was specially fetched to cure him; the sacred *ampulla* was brought from Reims.⁵ But when he realized that there was no hope, he behaved with dignity, even with kingliness. So in his self-imposed prison (on 30 August, 1483), the centre of suspicion and distrust, the terrible King breathed his last.

¹ Comines, op. cit. II. 143, 144: 4,700,000 francs against 1,800,000 francs at the death of Charles VII.

² "Lettres de Louis XI," op. cit. v. 50. A favourite gift of Louis' was a silver town which cost about 1,200 crowns.

³ Comines, op. cit. II. 260: "Oncques homme ne craignit tant la mort my ne feit tant de choses pour y cuyder mettre remède".

⁴ "Chronique Scandaleuse," op. cit. II. 138.

⁵ Comines, op. cit. II. 249.

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CHAPTER XVIII
CHARLES VIII AND LOUIS XII

(1483-1515)

LOUIS XI's son, Charles, was a delicate lad of thirteen. He reigned in all but twelve years, during the first nine of which he was completely in the hands of his strong-minded elder sister, Anne of Beaujeu, and in those of her husband, Peter of Beaujeu, a brother of the Duke of Bourbon ; this period (1483-1492) is known as the period of the Beaujeus. Anne was a more masculine edition of her father, a woman of austere manners and strong political instincts. The young King was terrified of her ; and she was well supported by her husband. With a clear perception of the requirements of the situation, the Beaujeus restored the members of the *Parlement de Paris* whom Louis had degraded, gave their protection to the servants of the deceased monarch, and conciliated the Princes of the Blood by the establishment of a Council of Fifteen on which they all sat, but which was probably intended to be merely ornamental. Of these princes, Louis, Duke of Orleans, who had married Louis XI's daughter, Jeanne, was the most important, and both he and the Beaujeus demanded the assembly of the States General, the former to secure some share in the government of the kingdom and the latter to strengthen themselves in their position.

The States General of 1484 are important because they were the first in which the whole of France, with the solitary exception of Brittany, was represented. They are also notable as the first occasion on which the words *tiers état* were employed, although the three orders sat together under one president, a fact which was not forgotten in 1789 when that




ITALY

TO ILLUSTRATE THE CAMPAIGNS OF
Charles VIII. Louis XII.
Francis I.

Statute Miles

20 0 20 40 60 80 100



question was important. The details of this assembly are instructive, for we learn from them something of what the States General thought of their own functions and also what use the Government had for them. What the Government wanted was the authority of the Estates for a council of its own nomination. The Estates were inclined to think that this was not their business at all; and, even after a remarkable address from Philippe Pôt, a deputy for the *noblesse* of Burgundy, in which he dwelt on the elective character of the monarchy and the powers of the people, they refused to be drawn into the matter.

The Estates, in fact, considered that their function was simply to draw up a list of grievances, of which the most important was the financial grievance. But the Beaujeus had no idea of allowing them to do more than amuse themselves with this question, and supplied them with figures which were obviously inaccurate. The Estates, therefore, confined themselves to registering a protest against the most unpopular of the taxes—the *taille*. A demand for the reduction of this tax was claimed as of right and not besought as of grace; the demand by the Estates that another assembly should be held in two years' time was a distinct attempt to assert the principle of consent to taxation. At the same time an effort was made to secure to the Estates the distribution of the *taille*. Neither attempt was successful. The Government held the Estates in the palm of its hand and was easily able to disperse them. Little or nothing had been secured in the way of constitutional concessions, for vague promises are easily eluded. In the matter of taxation the Provincial Assemblies had been cleverly played off against the States General, the national interests being scandalously sacrificed to local prejudice and privilege. In the matter of the council the Beaujeus had their own way, though they had failed to secure the authority of the States General for it. The promise to reassemble the Estates in a year's time was not kept. But in spite of this the Estates of 1484 had not been a complete failure: they had effected a considerable administrative reform, and had also secured freedom of commerce and the

abandonment of the excessive protection of the preceding reign.

The assembly of 1484 was the most hopeful constitutionally of all the assemblies of the States General. But the solidarity of the demand for constitutional recognition was spoilt by the particularism displayed by the *pays d'état*, who clamoured for provincial liberties to the detriment of national liberties. On the whole, however, the Beaujeus got their way with very little sacrifice of the royal prerogative. This is remarkable considering their need of popular support; one can imagine circumstances under which they might have been obliged to make such sacrifices of prerogative as would have secured to France real constitutional limitations.¹

The Beaujeus during the nine years of their rule were surrounded with dangers. From without they were watched jealously by Richard III of England and Maximilian of Austria, who in 1486 was crowned King of the Romans. At home there was always the possibility of the young King asserting his independence, and there was disaffection among the Princes of the Blood: Prince Louis of Orleans in particular was continually plotting. There was also considerable resentment against the French rule in Burgundy; but the most serious danger of all lay in the continued independence of Brittany and in the necessity for determining the succession to that Duchy when the old Duke (Francis II) should die. Brittany was the last of the great independent fiefs, and to complete the triumph of the Crown over the greater feudatories all that was necessary was to make an end of her independence. In appraising the work of the Beaujeus it must not be forgotten that by enmeshing Brittany they made a final end of feudalism.

Francis II had two daughters, the elder of whom, Anne, was heiress to the Duchy. To marry her to the young King was obviously the most convenient solution of a difficult question. But to accomplish this was not an easy matter. Others also desired the hand of the heiress—Louis of Orleans

¹ The failure of the States General to assert themselves at this favourable moment marks the close of what M. Hanotaux calls their "heroic period". Hanotaux, "*Histoire du Cardinal de Richelieu*" (1894, etc.), I. 368.

for example (who detested the deformed wife who had been forced upon him by Louis XI and was already negotiating for a divorce), and the Emperor Maximilian himself. During the whole period of the government of the Beaujeus the Breton marriage was the burning question, and that they finally accomplished their purpose in this matter is high testimony to their ability.

The old Duke of Brittany was a tool in the hands of a low-born minister, Landois, who, setting himself to thwart the Beaujeus, entered into relations with Orleans, Richard III, and Maximilian, as well as with the discontented Burgundians. The Beaujeus turned to the Flemings, who were disaffected towards Maximilian, to the large opposition interest in Brittany itself, to the Queen of Navarre and her husband d'Albret, and to the Dukes of Bourbon and Lorraine; and when in 1485 an attempt was made to raise the old cry of *Bien Publique* they had little difficulty in quelling it.¹ The year 1485 saw a temporary accommodation with Brittany and was also marked by the submission of Orleans and the overthrow of Richard III on the field of Bosworth. Maximilian remained and he raised a fresh coalition against the Beaujeus. Anne, displaying a diplomacy which would have done credit to her father, took the wind out of the sails of the coalition, but was unable to prevent the arrangement of a marriage between Maximilian and Anne of Brittany (December, 1490) now Duchess in her own right.² Maximilian, however, was too far from Brittany to come and claim his bride. Charles VIII invaded the Duchy and laid siege to Rennes. Anne of Brittany, seeing herself defenceless, was constrained to exchange one crown for another. The union with Maximilian was repudiated on the ground that it had been effected without the consent of Anne's suzerain, the King of France, and, exactly one year after her marriage to Maximilian, the Duchess espoused that suzerain himself (December, 1491). With that marriage disappeared the last of the great independent fiefs and from that moment the Crown may be reckoned supreme

¹ *La Guerre Folle* this little outburst of 1485 was called.

² Francis II died in 1488.

within the boundaries of France. It was a fitting close to the enlightened government of Anne of Beaujeu and her husband. By a curious nemesis the marriage which the wisdom of the Beaujeus had brought about sealed their fate. It was the signal for Charles VIII to assume the reins of government in person.

With his accession a new epoch opens in the history of France. Her feudal difficulties settled, and secure within her ample borders, France now began to intervene actively in European politics, and, under Charles VIII, Louis XII, and Francis I, to embark on a policy of conquest in regions where she had hitherto been no more than vicariously interested. It is time, therefore, to understand what the Europe was in which France was to play so disturbing a part; and the first thing to realize is that, as in France so in Europe, the close of the fifteenth century marks a new epoch. We have reached the end of the period in which Popes and Emperors guide, or profess to guide, the politics of Europe. The time-honoured conception of a universal Empire died hard indeed and was destined to have spasmodic returns of vitality, but as the controlling influence in Western Europe it was already moribund, and the epoch of the Italian Wars has been rightly held to be the moment of its death. In fact, Western Europe with the exception of Italy and of the great region which owned the sway of the Emperor, was by this time grouped in nations. The ejection of the English and the absorption of Burgundy had made France a nation; the union of Castile and Aragon under Ferdinand and Isabella had brought Spain also to the threshold of a national existence. England was more truly a nation after the loss of her continental possessions than she had been before. And it was because Italy had fallen behind in the race towards nationality that she now became the battle-ground of Europe.

Of the powers of Western Europe, England, under Henry VII, who was of pacific disposition, was tending to drop out of the struggle. When she did intervene it was in antagonism to France; but her intervention was never very serious. In Spain the union of the houses of Castile and Aragon

had given an international turn to the long-standing rivalry between France and Aragon. Louis XI, as we know, had fought with Aragon on the Spanish frontier, and had fought on the whole with fair success. There was, however, another sphere where the same struggle could be carried on, and that was in Italy, where a branch of the house of Aragon occupied intermittently the throne of the "Two Sicilies," and less intermittently that of Sicily proper, since the end of the thirteenth century. Charles VIII elected to fight in the Italian rather than the Spanish arena; and he gave up much of what Louis XI had won in Spain in order to keep that arena clear; whether he was wise or unwise we shall have an opportunity of judging. To return to Spain. Portugal remained independent and Navarre was, as we know, closely bound to the Valois throne by the judicious d'Albret marriage to which reference was made in the last chapter.¹ The union of the house of Habsburg with the house of Castile-Aragon by the marriage of the daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella to the son of Maximilian and Mary of Burgundy did not take place until 1496. When it did, the Aragonese quarrel, the Burgundian quarrel, and the rivalry with the imperial house were welded into one. During the period now under discussion the Aragonese quarrel was still isolated and capable of independent solution.


The Emperor had indeed taken up the Burgundian quarrel, and was constantly on the look-out for opportunities of snatching shreds of the wreck of Burgundy from the Valois. But his interests were so diverse and his position so complicated that he was not, until the Spanish match of his son, a really dangerous enemy. In addition to his interests in Burgundy, he had interests in the East, where the advance of the Turks seemed to cry for his intervention, and he had also undoubted interests in Italy where many of the smaller states (such as Modena) held of him; the investiture of Milan was also his. The Empire, therefore, was well equipped with dormant claims in the Peninsula, and might be expected at the first suitable opportunity to challenge the domination in that quarter of any other

¹ *Supra*, p. 333.

power. There was perhaps little prospect of an immediate collision between France and Austria in Italy, but their ultimate collision there was inevitable.

For the present it was Spain not Austria that France would have to deal with in Italy. The Aragonese dynasty in the Two Sicilies was now represented by Ferdinand I, the bastard son of Alfonso V of Aragon.¹ The Aragonese claim to Sicily, however, had always been challenged, and from time to time its champions had been ejected, by the house of Anjou, which dated its claim on Sicily from 1262, when Urban IV had presented the Sicilian crown to Louis IX's brother, Charles of Anjou.² The direct line of Charles of Anjou had twice run out in the persons of two queens both named Joan, neither of whom had children. Joan I, who died in 1382, had adopted Louis, son of King John of France, for whom the Duchy of Anjou had been revived and who was thus the founder of the second Angevin house; but in spite of this the crown of Sicily went to her cousins of the house of Durazzo, which line ended in 1435 with Joan II.


¹ THE BASTARD ARAGON DYNASTY OF NAPLES.



² *Supra*, p. 173.

SIMPLIFIED TABLE OF THE TWO HOUSES OF ANJOU

SHOWING THE CLAIMS ON THE CROWN OF THE TWO SICILIES.



* The connexion of the Angevins with Hungary involved the hostility of Venice; for Venice and Hungary were continually at each other's throats in Dalmatia.

Joan II also adopted as her heir the representative of the second Angevin house, René I of Provence. René left a daughter, whose descendants built up the houses of Guise and Lorraine, but in the Sicilian succession they were passed over and René's nephew, Charles of Maine, inherited the claim. When he too died without children he left his claim on the Two Sicilies by will to Louis XI. Neither Charles of Maine nor Queen Joan had the smallest right to dispose in this way of a Papal fief, and thus the claim of the Valois on Sicily was a fundamentally bad one.

There was, however, another French claim in Italy—that of the house of Orleans on the Duchy of Milan. It will be remembered how in 1387 Charles VI's brother, Louis, had married Valentina Visconti.¹ The present Duke of Orleans was the grandson of this marriage; he was heir-presumptive to the throne of France, and, when he became King as Louis XII, he urged his claim to some purpose; it was on the whole a much better one than that of Charles VIII on Naples. During the reign of Charles, however, the Orleans claim on Milan was an embarrassment rather than an asset, for the friendship of the reigning house, that of Sforza, was a necessary link in the scheme for the invasion of Italy. The Sforzas were represented by the famous Ludovico il Moro, who (1494) had usurped the ducal throne from his nephew, Gian Galeazzo Sforza. The Sforzas had long been the allies of the French, but their support, partly on account of their fickle temperament and partly on account of the Orleans claim, could not be depended upon.

Venice was another power which might eventually be expected to come into conflict with France in the Peninsula. Receding step by step from her eastward outposts in face of the advance of the Turks, she was driven to seek compensation in the valley of the Po, and at the expense of Milan. When France began to seek aggrandizement in the same quarter a collision was inevitable. The Republic of Genoa, on the other hand, which had actually been for a moment in the possession of France in the reign of Louis XI, was rent with

¹ *Supra*, p. 269.

internal dissension. Genoa was immensely important to France if there was to be a French kingdom of Naples, as she controlled the coastal route towards Florence, and it was upon Florence that France counted for support. There the accession of Piero de' Medici (in 1492) had reawakened civil strife and the reforming party, under the influence of Savonarola, had called on France to intervene. The support of that party and the appeal which it made were two of the influences which decided France to involve herself in Italy. Pope Alexander VI (who was elected in 1492) was at first inclined to side with Aragon in the Neapolitan quarrel. The Papacy had suffered a terrible eclipse during the Great Schism and the temporal power was but a shadow of what it had once been. To Alexander VI the wars which rent Italy were simply an opportunity for him to rebuild the fortunes of the Papacy which he identified with the fortunes of his own family. The influence of the Papacy, one way or the other, in the early stages of the Italian struggle, was inconsiderable, and it was not until Julius II had ascended the throne that it took a leading part in the resistance to French aggression.

It was into such a maelstrom of conflicting interests that the young King of France now decided to plunge. The temptation was wellnigh irresistible, particularly to a youth of his turn of mind; he was infatuated with chivalry and devoured romances with the voracity of Don Quixote. The appeals from Italy were strong and immensely flattering to French vanity, while the claims, if not strong, were traditional and the opportunity seemed a unique one. Nevertheless the call was a siren call; the true interests of France lay outside the Italian peninsula and the Italian intervention distracted her attention from affairs more vital to her future than the destinies of Naples and Milan. The warlike energies of France—brilliant as they were—might have been exercised as brilliantly and with more profit on her own frontiers, in consolidating the Burgundian inheritance, in securing the Pyrenean frontier and in the absorption of Savoy. Nor must it be forgotten that this was the moment when vistas

of the New World were beginning to open, and that the opportunity of the lead, which she now lost owing to her immersion in Italian affairs, was destined never to return.

Charles VIII, the lad who gave this unfortunate but interesting turn to French policy, had inherited the frail and misshapen body of his father, while Louis XI's qualities of mind and character seem to have been monopolized by Anne of Beaujeu. Charles' judgment was ill-balanced and his spirit feverish, though neither mean nor cowardly. The "Loyal Serviteur" (who wrote the life of Bayard and who is one of the most important, and certainly the most lively, of the authorities of the period) was inclined to see every one through rose-coloured glasses; to him there was scarcely a French captain who was not a *gentil et triomphant seigneur*, and one must probably discount his eulogy of Charles VIII: "*Était un des bons princes*," he says, "*des courtois, liberaux et charitables qu'on ait jamais vus ni lus. Il aimait et craignait Dieu, ni ne jurait que 'par le foi de mon corps' ou autre petit serment; si longuement eut vecu eut achevé de grandes choses.*"¹ Whatever we may think of his chances of achieving great things we are bound to admit that his was at least no stay-at-home spirit. In his absorption in the Italian adventure we see the impulsiveness of youth, an impulsiveness not wholly personal to him, for the spirit of modern France was young as was the monarch who first set foot lightly on the flower-strewn path of the Renaissance. Charles crossed the Alps in the spirit of a wayward child, and in doing so shocked the experienced statesmen who had been brought up in the traditions of the court of Louis XI. Comines, for instance, makes light of the young King: "*Le Roy*," he says, "*estoit très jeune, foible personne, plein de son vouloir, peu accompagné de saiges gens ne de bons chiëfs: nul argent contant*."² Very true, no doubt, and very shocking to Comines, who counted himself one of the *saiges gens*, and who had been accus-

¹ Loyal Serviteur (Jacques de Mailles), "Histoire du seigneur de Bayart" (ed. Société de l'histoire de France, 1878), p. 16.

² Comines, *op. cit.* 292.

tomed to the parsimonious regime of Louis XI, but it is possible to see in this waywardness and extravagance and *abandon*, of which complaint is made, indications of those characteristics which found their full development in Francis I, and which were less the characteristics of a family than those of a period—the period of the Renaissance. We are not yet in the Renaissance so far as France is concerned, but we are conscious of a certain air of suspense, which tells us that we are on the threshold of great events. This is what gives to the reigns of two somewhat indifferent monarchs an undeniable quality of breadth and importance.

Charles took up the Italian idea with a whole-heartedness which would have been admirable had it not also involved wholesale sacrifice of French interests in other quarters. He was already at issue with the Emperor, to whom the Breton match had been a double insult; for not only had his bride been snatched almost literally out of his arms, but his daughter, who had been betrothed to Charles by the Treaty of Arras, had been rudely flung back to him. Maximilian therefore persuaded England to attack the treaty-breaker. But Henry VII disliked war, and after an ineffective siege of Boulogne was easily persuaded to agree to the Treaty of Étaples (3 November, 1492), by which, on condition of the expulsion of Perkin Warbeck and the payment of an enormous indemnity (745,000 crowns), England retired from the contest. The policy of clearing the Italian arena at all costs had begun.

Charles next turned to Spain, and secured neutrality in that quarter by ceding Roussillon and Cerdagne, a stultification of the clever Pyrenean policy of his father (Treaty of Barcelona, 19 January, 1493). To propitiate Maximilian was more difficult, but not so difficult as might have been expected. The abandonment of the Austrian match had upset the Treaty of Arras and Maximilian naturally claimed the restoration of Artois and Franche Comté, which had been handed over to France as the dowry of the now rejected bride. By the Treaty of Senlis (23 May, 1493) Charles agreed to abandon this territory, though reserving his royal rights on

Artois and Charolais.¹ Maximilian's neutrality was, however, only temporary.

Having thus dropped a large part of the substance, Charles was now able to turn his attention to the shadow. Most of the older and wiser statesmen of France looked askance on the enterprise for the sake of which such sacrifices had been made. Comines, who stoutly opposed it, declares that it seemed most dangerous to all wise and experienced people, and withal that the King was provided neither with the sense nor with the money nor with any other quality necessary for such an enterprise. The Italian policy was supported only by the King's favourites, de Vesc and Briçonnet, who may be regarded as a new school of statesmen quite unfamiliar with the *haute politique* of Europe and easily drawn into crack-brained enterprises.

Negotiations in Italy were fruitless and exasperating. Ludovico il Moro was no easy subject for inexperienced diplomatists, and it was with Ludovico that the most important negotiations were carried on. The outcome was that when, in 1494, Charles began his military preparations for the invasion of Italy he could count on no sincere ally in the Peninsula. Naples, whose King, Ferdinand I, died in January of that year, was of course hostile, under Ferdinand's son, Alfonso II. So was the Pope, so were the Medici in Florence; but the revolutionaries in Florence might gain the upper hand at any moment, and they were friendly to the French. Venice would not commit herself, and Milan adopted the correct Machiavellian attitude of saying one thing and doing another.

On 23 August, 1494, the King set out from Vienne at the head of an army of some 30,000 men supported by a naval force which comprised about 10,000. From the military point of view we are still in the Middle Ages. Lances remain the great weapon of offence, and defensive armour is reaching perfection. Arquebuses and artillery, though they played a certain part in the campaign of 1494, are still

¹ Auxerre, Macon, and Bar-sur-Seine were to be the subject of future negotiations.

of secondary importance,¹ though men may already have seen the approach of the time when they must abandon the arts of chivalry to "scuffle, mid the uncleanly smoke of arquebus and culverin". In the expedition of Charles VIII the French strength was mainly in cavalry, organized in *Compagnies d'ordonnance* according to the system introduced by Charles VII,² each company comprising from twenty-five to a hundred lances and each lance six or seven men.

By dint of extraordinary good fortune Charles was able to execute his march on Naples. He reached Asti on 9 September, and proceeded by way of Pavia, Pisa, and Florence to Rome, where he terrified the Pope into signing a treaty (31 December). Thence he marched on Naples. On his approach Alfonso abdicated in favour of his son, Ferdinand II. This upheaval in the face of the enemy placed the game in Charles' hands and he had little difficulty in effecting his entry into the city (22 February, 1495). The expedition had been a series of brilliant pageants rather than a campaign. State entries had taken the place of battles, and the King had been vastly delighted with the pomp and circumstance of the long march. Preceded and followed by an immense train, mounted on his famous black charger "Savoy," and clad in armour covered with gold and jewels, a brocade jacket and a long blue velvet cloak, with his crown resting on a white hat with black plumes, he had perhaps been so smothered in finery as to forget his feeble frame; so pleased, at any rate, with the blare and glitter that he forgot the plan of a crusade, with talk of which he had beguiled the Pope, and turned a deaf ear to the ominous news which reached him from the north of Italy.

But Charles had run his head into a noose. He had marched gaily on Naples without having assured himself of his communications. These communications might be threatened at any moment when it suited the convenience of Milan, Venice, or the Papacy, all of whom were undefeated and by no means as friendly as they pretended to be. Charles

¹ There were about seventy-seven pieces of artillery in the army, of which fifty were horse arquebuses of large calibre.

² *Supra*, pp. 304 *sqq.*

had hardly spent a month in Naples when these powers all combined (League of Venice, 25 March, 1495); they were joined by the Emperor and by Ferdinand and Isabella. Charles would not leave Naples without making a second entry into the city (12 May). Then he bowed to circumstances and started on his homeward journey, which proved to be of a sterner nature. All went well as far as Pisa; but on the arrival of the army there it became apparent that the French would not be suffered to recross the Apennines unmolested. A considerable army of the allies was waiting in the mountain passes to oppose their passage. Charles, whose whole army now numbered no more than 9000 or 10,000, sent forward a powerful advance guard; forty-two heavy guns followed. Behind the artillery was the main body—600 lances with 2000 foot.¹ In the neighbourhood of Fornovo battle was joined. The King behaved with courage, fighting in the ranks like a common soldier, and in the end the French were enabled, after a hard-fought battle, to effect their object. In October Charles returned to France. His campaign had been no more than a “nine days’ wonder” and had no lasting result. The defence of Naples had been left to the Duc de Montpensier (*bon chevalier mais se levant à midi*). By the efforts of Gonsalvo da Cordova the French garrisons were quickly reduced, and Naples, never more than nominally won, was lost to France. The real victors were the Venetian condottieri, upon whom had fallen the brunt of the fighting. Maximilian, it is true, had crossed the Alps in 1496, but his expedition was utterly fruitless.

Charles by no means gave up his Italian ambitions. He made preparations for a second expedition; and in November, 1497, a Franco-Spanish *entente* was effected with the intention of bringing about a partition of Italy. In the midst of these schemes and negotiations on 8 April, 1498, the King died. If we cannot altogether agree with the Loyal Serviteur, who calls this event an irreparable misfortune for the kingdom, we can regret the untimely decease of a young king who

¹ Cherrier, “Histoire de Charles VIII” (1870), II. 233; Thoumas, “Les transformations de l’armée Française” (1887), II. 335.

had at any rate displayed during his short life some kingly qualities.

Charles VIII died without an heir of his body, and the crown passed to that Louis of Orleans who had been so conspicuous a figure at the Court of Louis XI, and whose unfortunate matrimonial affairs have been so well painted by Sir Walter Scott. Louis was no longer a brawling lad but an experienced man of affairs of thirty-six. He is a heavy and uninspiring figure to linger on the threshold of the Renaissance. Parsimonious in his habits, he was able, in spite of his campaigns in Italy, to spare his people taxation and so to earn a genuine popularity. He was a wise and good ruler, and lived on terms of familiarity and friendship with his subjects. But he was an Orleans at heart, could not forget the fact, and fought for the Orleans claim on Milan with blind determination.¹ His Italian policy thus differs from that of Charles in that it was directed in the first instance against Milan.

His first proceeding as King, however, was one of a more ignoble nature. Once in a position to do so, he lost no time in getting rid of the saintly but ill-favoured wife with whom Louis XI had provided him. A prolonged *procès* against the unfortunate Jeanne was instituted, in which the King appeared to little advantage. In the end she was put away, and Louis hastened to marry Charles VIII's widow, Anne of Brittany. Referring to the unpleasant incident of the *procès* the Loyal Serviteur makes the following terse observation to which we may well say Amen: "Si ce fut bien ou mal fait Dieu est tout seul Qui le congnoist".² Anne proved an excellent wife and Louis was devoted to her, but she was a whole-hearted Bretonne and a bad Frenchwoman.

Louis now commenced preparations for a fresh Italian campaign. Negotiations were opened all over Europe in order to secure the neutrality of the powers. In July, 1499, Philip "the Handsome" did homage for Flanders, Artois, and Charolais. A treaty was signed with the redoubtable Swiss³ and Charles VIII's old enemies the Venetians (9 February, 1499),

¹ *Supra*, p. 269.

² Loyal Serviteur, op. cit. p. 59.

³ Treaty of Blois, 16 March, 1499, with the ten cantons.

who were naturally anxious for the humiliation of Milan, entered into an alliance with France. Having purchased the favour of the Pope, Louis felt himself in a position to commence operations. In the autumn of 1499 a French army under Trivulzio and Stuart of Aubigny descended on the Milanese and effected an easy conquest of the Duchy. Louis followed, and on 6 October made a triumphal entry into the capital, where he received an extravagant welcome. The streets were all decked with tapestry, and Leonardo da Vinci, the paint on whose "Last Supper" was hardly dry, constructed an automatic lion whose heart opened and emitted lilies; in spite of which the Gascon bowmen made a target of his masterpiece. Ludovico meanwhile had sought refuge in Germany;¹ but no sooner had Louis returned to France after organizing his conquest than he recrossed the Alps at the head of a great army of mercenaries, and quickly repossessed himself of Milan (3 February, 1500). On receipt of this unpleasant news Louis despatched his favourite and chief minister George, Cardinal-Archbishop of Amboise, and La Tremoille and they succeeded in blockading Ludovico in Novara. Both armies were largely Swiss and reluctant to fight with each other. In the end Ludovico was betrayed by his soldiers. He disguised himself when they surrendered and was only discovered when the entire army was made to pass in single file under the yoke. He was carried to France and rigorously imprisoned, dying in captivity eight years later. The Milanese was annexed, and a pause ensued while Louis considered how he might best recover Naples. The year 1500 saw a general truce. There was some talk of a crusade, but a French expedition to Mitylene proved a complete failure.

Meanwhile Ferdinand II of Naples had died and had been succeeded by his uncle Frederick. It was now that Louis succeeded in getting Ferdinand the Catholic of Aragon to agree to the overthrow of the bastard Aragonese dynasty in Naples and the partition of the Two Sicilies between France and Aragon proper (Treaty of Granada, 11 November, 1500). This comfortable understanding having been reached, in

¹ The Emperor had married his niece and was ready to welcome him.

the following year *prit volonté au roi Louis douzième d'envoyer reconquister son royaume de Naples*. So in June, 1501, using Milan as a base, a French army for the second time penetrated through the Papal States into the kingdom of Naples. The Pope, who was by this time convinced that it was the intention of the French to depose him and "hang the Apostolic Keys to the belt of the Cardinal of Amboise," was terrified and thought it best to speak the French captains fair. He received them, therefore, in the Vatican, entertained them to an alfresco banquet, and from the security of an embrasure of the Castle of Sant' Angelo, bestowed the apostolic blessing on the army as it passed through the Eternal City. Frederick of Naples, deserted by his kinsfolk, could make no head against the invasion. Capua was taken on 24 July, 1501. The unfortunate King threw himself on the mercy of Louis XII, who behaved with magnanimity, giving him the Duchy of Anjou and a pension. With Frederick fell the Italian branch of the house of Aragon.¹

Louis XII visited Italy in the following year (1502) but did not attempt to penetrate as far as Naples, contenting himself with triumphant entries and sojourns in the cities of the North: Asti, Milan, Pavia, and Genoa. The prestige of France grew apace in Lombardy: "*Et si n'avoit place ne chasteau en Lombardye ne en Tuscanie ou le lys ne fust en spectacle de triomphe et le nom de France mys en cry commun*".² The truth was that while Louis regarded it as a conscientious duty to assert the rights of the Crown of Naples, he was ready to seize the first opportunity to withdraw from the entanglement and consolidate his acquisitions in Lombardy, which he regarded as a personal inheritance. Matters in Naples were in point of fact taking a turn unfavourable to France. It was never likely that two such strange bedfellows as France and Spain would share in quietness a bed so long disputed; and very soon hostilities broke out between the partitioners of Naples. These hostilities are famous on ac-

¹ Frederick died in France in 1504.

² Jean d'Auton, "*Chroniques de Louis XII*" (ed. de Maulde la Clavière for Société de l'histoire de France, 1893), III. 82.

count of the extraordinary feats of individual prowess displayed on either side, the single combat, for instance, between Bayard and Sotomayor and the *combat des onze*. From the military point of view they were disastrous to French arms. Town after town fell into Spanish hands, and finally on 27 December, 1503, the French suffered the crushing defeat, or series of defeats, of the Garigliano. "Vela commant le bonheur des Francais est retourné en rabaissement d'estat et amoindrissement d'honneur," says d'Auton, after recounting the incidents of the battle ; and things only went from bad to worse in the following year.

The issue had been further confused and the strength of France in Southern Italy diminished by the death of Pope Alexander VI on 15 August, 1503, and the necessity for two Papal elections in quick succession, in both of which Amboise was a candidate. In the second election which followed the death of Pius III (the stop-gap Pope who succeeded Alexander), Amboise actually got within two votes of the coveted position. "Ce fut aller bien près des portes de Paradis," says the chronicler. The magnanimous Frenchman, however, whose physiognomy is familiar to us from the statue on his glorious tomb in Rouen Cathedral, scandalized Machiavelli by voting for his rival in the interests of peace, and Guiliano della Rovere ascended the throne under the title of Julius II ; one imagines that the kindly and progressive Frenchman would have been at least as splendid a patron of the fine arts as his successful rival. His election might have meant much in the artistic history of his country. As it was, the immediate result of his candidature was a further check on the progress of French arms in Naples, for the troops which filled Rome during the election were those which had been intended to withstand the advance of Gonsalvo in the South. After the Battle of the Garigliano things in Naples went rapidly from bad to worse. The loss of Gaëta was the direct consequence of that battle (January, 1504), and the loss of Gaëta involved the abandonment of Southern Italy. In March the Pope sent an embassy to urge the necessity of a truce between France and Spain and to demand assistance against the Venetians,

who were encroaching on the Papal States. In March, therefore, a treaty was signed between the two powers; and this was the end of the French attempts on Naples.

It is during the period of peace which ensued that we see the King at his worst. We feel that at heart he is blindly following the interests of the house of Orleans at the expense of those of France. At the same time we feel that Anne of Brittany is following the interests of Brittany. Amidst all this self-seeking it was only to be expected that the interests of France would suffer. In order to secure the investiture of Milan (the family claim of the house of Orleans)¹ Louis now opened negotiations with the Emperor, and a proposal was made that his grandson Charles, afterwards the Emperor Charles V, should espouse the King's daughter, Claude; for Louis had no son. On the basis of this proposal were signed in September, 1504, the Treaties of Blois, in which Maximilian's son, Philip, and Louis XII swore an indissoluble friendship. Louis received the coveted investiture of Milan; the Princess Claude was betrothed to Charles, and they were to receive, in the event of Louis' death without male heirs, the following important districts: Burgundy, Brittany, Blois, Milan, Genoa, and Asti, by which an uncomfortable hole would have been made in the dominions of the French King, and the Italian claims of France would have been handed over to Charles, who under conditions so favourable should have had no difficulty in consolidating the power of Austria in Italy. The Treaties of Blois included a secret clause committing the signatories to what the Pope had been working for—hostilities with Venice. It should be said for Louis that at the time of these treaties he was extremely ill, and the policy was probably less his than that of his masterful wife. Only two months afterwards Isabella of Castille died, and Ferdinand claimed the regency of Castille for himself on behalf of his daughter Juana, to the detriment of Juana's husband, Philip the Handsome. In the following year Louis XII made a will in which, having realized the unpopularity of the treaties with the House of Austria, he reversed the policy

¹ *Supra*, p. 269.

which had therein been laid down by engaging his daughter to Francis of Angoulême, the heir-presumptive to the French throne. The King's counsellors, wishing to shelter themselves behind a great national manifestation, had called an Assembly of the Estates at Tours. Here before a vast assembly, Thomas Briçot, acting as spokesman, declared that the country earnestly desired the marriage of Claude with Francis of Angoulême. Two days later the engagement was announced. All who had promoted the betrothal of Claude and Charles were furious, and Maximilian wrote an indignant letter to the King of England. Philip was perhaps the most angry of all: "toutefois ne sceut autre chose que faire sur ce si n'est user de menasses;" and menaces were of no avail. It seemed likely that the resentment felt by the Emperor might have unpleasant consequences: "Or, estoit le Royaume de France menacé de tous parts" (25 September, 1506). But the premature death of Philip altered the situation. "France ne perdit guère à sa mort, car il y avait sémé un grain qui peu y eut profité."

In 1507 Genoa, which the French had recovered in 1499, revolted, and in April Louis led an expedition against the city. His success was complete and greatly staggered Italy; the Pope in particular, who had been suspected of fomenting the trouble in Genoa, was much concerned at its speedy collapse. In the same year an abortive attempt was made to effect a *rapprochement* between France and Spain (i.e. Ferdinand) to the detriment of the Empire. This roused Maximilian to fury, but when in the following year he invaded Italy, it was only to run his head against the stubborn Venetians. It was rapidly coming to be understood by all the powers that the proud Republic of the Adriatic was the first obstacle in each of their paths. The Pope, as we have seen, had long been seeking to raise a coalition against her. The Emperor realized that, so long as Venice was mistress of the eastern passes into Italy, the Peninsula was closed to him. Spain also was anxious for the humiliation of a power which seemed likely to make a bid for the hegemony of Italy. France had not forgotten the part that Venice had played during the reign

of Charles VIII; but as a matter of fact Louis ought to have seen that in Venice he had the most useful protection against the onslaughts of the Empire in Northern Italy; but, in his anxiety to enlarge the borders of his Milanese inheritance and in his resentment of the opposition which Venice had offered to the advance of France in the earlier stages of the Italian wars, he was now prepared to throw away this advantage and to join the coalition which was gathering against Venice.

So in December, 1508, was formed the League of Cambrai "pour ruiner la Seigneurie de Venise qui en grande pompe et à peu de congnoissance de Dieu, vivoit glorieusement et en opulence faisant peu d'estime des autres princes de la Chrestienté, dont peuet-estre que Nostre Seigneur fut courroucé comme il apparut".¹ Peace was established between the Emperor and the King of France for the currency of their lives, and with it peace between each and the allies of the other. There was to be a special *rapprochement* for the protection of Christendom against the Turks; this one feels to have been a piece of rhetorical persiflage. Then came the arrangement for which the League was really called into being. The Emperor, France, the Papacy, and Aragon, entered into an alliance against Venice. That state was to be shorn for the benefit of the Leaguers; the Empire was to gain Verona, France Brescia, the Pope Ravenna, and Spain Otranto. It is apparent that this treaty was one-sidedly favourable to the Emperor, the Pope, and Aragon, at the expense of France.

In conformity with the terms of the League of Cambrai, Louis, in the spring of 1509, descended upon Lombardy and inflicted on the Venetians the crushing and decisive defeat of Agnadello (14 May). Maximilian, who should have crossed the Alps to support his ally, delayed so long that before his arrival Louis had returned to France. When he did come it was with an army *assez pour conquister un monde*,² and especially with an artillery which was the astonishment of all beholders, although it was only possible, we are told, for the guns to be fired three times a day. Now, however, it became clear that the League of Cambrai was the hollowest of shams. No

¹ Loyal Serviteur, op. cit. p. 137.

² *Ibid.* op. cit. 153.

one of the signatories had the slightest idea of remaining in it after he had secured the material benefit which had impelled him to sign it. The first to betray his insincerity was Julius II, who, having secured his slice of Venetian territory reconciled himself to Venice by withdrawing the interdict under which he had laid her, and at the same time embarked on diplomatic negotiations with the Swiss (whose relations with France had become gradually more strained), with Ferdinand, with Henry VIII, and with the Emperor. The object of these negotiations was to form a coalition which should drive the French once for all back across the Alps. After some abortive hostilities on his own account, Julius at last (4 October, 1511) formed a definite league, known as the Holy League, against France, with the double object of recovering Bologna for the Papacy and of driving the French out of Italy; it embraced himself, Venice, and Spain, and was afterwards joined by Henry VIII (13 November).

Louis turned to confront this alarming situation. He selected for the military command his young nephew, Gaston of Foix, Duke of Nemours, who, although but twenty-three years of age, had already the reputation of a great soldier, and who in the campaign displayed a generalship as much in advance of his times as it was of his years, while his brief and glorious career, comparable only to that of Claverhouse, is one of the most romantic which military history provides. Gaston is not only a poetical figure in history, he was a general of real military perceptions. He had a general's wisdom in pausing to strike until he could do so with effect, and like all successful generals he was not afraid to wait. He therefore simply watched the Swiss, when, in response to the appeal of Julius II, they invaded Italy. When in 1512 the Spaniards laid siege to Bologna, he hastened to its relief, and swinging round upon Brescia, which was threatened by the Venetians, he inflicted on them the defeat of Valeggio. Brescia, a city which was regarded by contemporaries as a terrestrial paradise, was mercilessly sacked and its inhabitants put to the sword.

Gaston was now instructed to proceed to the invasion of


the Papal States. He therefore advanced upon Ravenna, which was held by the Venetians. A Spanish army came to the relief of the city, and on Easter Day, 1512, was fought the battle of Ravenna, one of the most glorious in the military annals of France. "Il y a eu plusieurs batailles depuis que Dieu créa ciel et terre, mais jamais n'en fut vu pour le nombre qu'il y avait de si cruelle si furieuse ni mieux combattue de toutes les deux parties que la bataille de Ravenne."¹ The allies having lost 12,000 men—a number which seems quite incredible in view of the size of the French army—began to withdraw. In attempting to cut off their retreat Gaston was surrounded and slain. With him disappeared all the profit of the victory, for there was no one to follow it up, no one even to extricate the French army from an undeniably hazardous position. Ravenna, it is true, capitulated, and the Pope signed a treaty with the victors (20 April). But the Emperor's attitude was menacing, the French army was disorganized, and, when an army of Swiss invaded the Milanese in May, la Palisse, who had succeeded Gaston, was obliged to fall back upon Pavia, and in June the entire French army was hustled over the Alps, carrying with it, it may be remarked, the remnants of the Œcumenical Council of Pisa, which had been summoned by Louis XII and the Emperor (1511) and which had decreed the suspension of Julius II. Ill received at Pisa and at Milan, whither it migrated, the Council had gradually dwindled away and now vanished ingloriously in the French debacle.

The untimely death of Gaston de Foix not only led to the loss of Italy and the collapse of the Council of Pisa, it made its effect felt in another quarter also. After the death, in 1504, of Isabella of Castille, Gaston's sister, Germaine, had married Ferdinand of Aragon and on her brother's death she inherited his claim on the kingdom of Navarre.² Ferdinand therefore promptly invaded Navarre and took Pampeluna, and in spite of Louis XII's efforts to rouse the opposition of the d'Albrets, was quickly master of the kingdom. Francis of Angoulême, Louis' cousin, son-in-law, and heir-presumptive, assisted by la Palisse, in a winter campaign (1512), failed entirely to recover it, and by

¹ *Loyal Serviteur*, op. cit. p. 329.

² See p. 362.

NAVARRE AND FOIX



the close of the year Aragon seemed to be securely established in Navarre.

The outlook for France at this moment was extremely black. Maximilian had joined the Holy Alliance in November, and largely by the vigorous support of the Swiss, Maximilian Sforza (son of Ludovico il Moro) was re-established in Milan. A slight compensation came in the death of Julius II (February, 1513) and the election of the more tractable Leo X, while an alliance of France with Venice (14 March, 1513) helped to restore the balance in Italy. France took advantage of the more encouraging prospect to make a truce with Ferdinand, and to invade Italy once more. The French army reached Alessandria and threatened Milan. It was fiercely attacked by the Swiss at Novara (June, 1513), utterly defeated, and swept back into France.

Louis XII had revived (1513) the "Auld Alliance" by a fresh treaty with the Scots, and in retaliation Henry VIII now entered the European arena. He landed at Calais, joined hands with the Emperor, and laid siege to Thérouanne. On 16 August a French army was quickly put to flight at Guinegate (Battle of the Spurs). On 9 September France's ally, the King of Scots, was defeated and killed at the Battle of Flodden; while on 7 September the Swiss, who had penetrated as far as Dijon, forced La Tremoille to agree to terms so humiliating that they were at once repudiated by the King;¹ an action which redoubled the animosity of the Swiss towards France. It had been an ill year for Louis XII. "Le bon Roi," says the Loyal Serviteur, "en ceste année (1513) eut de terribles affaires et ses alliés aussi."² So much so that he determined to conciliate one at least of his enemies, and on 7 August, 1514, signed the Treaty of London with Henry VIII and married Henry's sister, Mary.

It was not only peace with England that Louis desired to promote by this match. He was not without the hope that the

¹ The terms to which la Tremoille agreed included the surrender of Milan and Asti (the most constant of the French possessions in Italy); the surrender of all the artillery in the Italian fortresses; reparation to the Pope and the Emperor, and a handsome indemnity to the Swiss.

² Loyal Serviteur, op. cit. p. 365.

union might bring him a son. Louise of Savoy, the mother of Francis of Angoulême, describes the King as *fort antique et débile*; ¹ but he was not so old and feeble that he could not mount *ung grant cheval bayart, qui sautoit*, or accomplish the feat of embracing his bride on horseback. It was gout rather than old age that was the matter with him. At any rate Francis had some uncomfortable moments during the last months of Louis' life and even had to consult the widowed Queen before he was able to assume the crown. Queen Mary led the feeble King a wretched life, made him dine at twelve instead of eight, and often kept him up till midnight; two months of such hours drove him into his grave. He died on 1 January, 1515.

The reign of Louis XII was looked back to with gratitude from the troublous times that were to follow; and Louis, alone of the kings of France, enjoyed the title of "father of his people". There can be no doubt that in some degree he earned it. For, while he was almost a monomaniac in foreign politics, his internal government was wise and enlightened. Of course he profited by the fact that the last of the great feudal states had been merged in the Crown, and that there was now no great noble who could pretend to question the supremacy of the King. The feudal struggle, in fact, was over, while the religious struggle had not yet begun; the Italian complication, foolish and impolitic though it was, was less directly felt in France than any other possible European war would have been. French soil was to a great extent free from invasion; the capital was never seriously menaced, and, but for the heavy taxation which the wars brought in their train, to the common people they might almost have been non-existent. Louis XII—benevolent monarch though he was—did nothing to encourage the growth of popular institutions. He never really summoned the States General; for the Assembly of 1506, which was summoned in order to secure popular backing for the rupture of the Austrian match, was not a true

¹ Louise de Savoie, "Journal," in Petitot Collection des Mémoires, I, xvi. 396.

² Fleurange ("le jeune aventureux"), "Mémoires," in Petitot, op. cit. p. 266.

States General, but only a casually summoned Assembly of Notables, dignified with the name of States General in order to create the desired impression. But the Kings of this period habitually consulted Assemblies of Notables, summoned by their good pleasure and with no history, traditions, or rights. In this way they were able to avoid constitutional concessions such as States General were notoriously accustomed to demand, and at the same time to have the benefit of the advice and support of assemblies of distinguished men. Thus they secured all the advantages of a "parliament" without any of the dangers.


It is in matters of justice that Louis XII has the greatest claim to be regarded as a reformer. Both he and his predecessor did much to make justice rapid and cheap. Charles VIII revived the *Parlement* of Burgundy, Louis XII founded that of Provence. The "Exchequer" of Normandy was established on a permanent footing in 1499. Louis XII's *Ordonnance* of 1499 was full of wise judicial reforms, and it removed or moderated many of the worst abuses. This was no mean work, and it accounts for the fact that Louis XII won the regard of his subjects. We may allow the Loyal Serviteur to say the last word on a reign which was not without glories and a monarch who was not without virtues: "Ce fut en son vivant un bon prince sage et vertueux qui maintint son peuple en paix sans le fouler aucunement, forz que par contrainte. Il eu en son temps du bien et du mal beaucoup: par quoi il avait ample connaissance du monde. Plusieurs victoires obtint sur ses ennemis: mais sur la fin de ses jours fortune lui tourna un peu son effrayé visage. Le bon prince fut plaint et pleuré de tout ses sujets, et non sans cause: car il les avait tenus en paix et en grande justice de façon que après sa mort et toutes louanges dites de lui fut appelé Père du peuple. Ce titre lui fut donné à bonne raison. Il n'avait pas encore cinquante-six ans quand il paya le tribut de nature. On le porta enterrer à Saint Denis avec ses bons predecesseurs en grands pleurs et cris et au grand regret de ses sujets."¹

¹ Loyal Serviteur, op. cit. p. 368.

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


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